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Profile: Curtis Brown (University of North Florida)
Profile: Curtis Brown (Trinity University)
  1. Curtis Brown, "I Wish I Had Never Existed&Quot.
    Both David Lewis and Roderick Chisholm have proposed that beliefs are best understood, not as relations between people and the propositions they believe, but as relations between people and the properties they "directly attribute" to themselves or "self-ascribe." If this account is correct for belief, it seems that it ought to be possible to extend it to other "propositional attitudes" such as considering and wishing. But the most straightforward way of extending the account to such other attitudes faces difficulties, some (...)
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  2. Curtis Brown, Moral Truths and Moral Principles.
    In recent years, a number of moral philosophers have held both that there are particular moral truths, and also that there are no general moral principles which explain these particular moral truths--either because there simply are no moral principles, or because moral principles are themselves explained by or derived from particular moral truths rather than vice versa. Often this combination of doctrines is held by philosophers interested in reviving an Aristotelean approach..
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  3. Curtis Brown (2013). Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and Ethics By Jennifer Mather Saul. Analysis 74 (1):ant101.
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  4. Curtis Brown, Narrow Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual's environment. Narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual's environment as well as on features of the individual. It is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how it is determined (...)
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  5. Curtis Brown (2004). Implementation and Indeterminacy. Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology 37.
    David Chalmers has defended an account of what it is for a physical system to implement a computation. The account appeals to the idea of a “combinatorial-state automaton” or CSA. It is unclear whether Chalmers intends the CSA to be a computational model in the usual sense, or merely a convenient formalism into which instances of other models can be translated. I argue that the CSA is not a computational model in the usual sense because CSAs do not perspicuously represent (...)
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  6. Curtis Brown (2002). Art, Oppression, and the Autonomy of Aesthetics. In Alex Neill & Aaron Ridley (eds.), Arguing about Art, Second Edition. Routledge.
    Mary Devereaux has suggested, in an overview of feminist aesthetics[1], that feminist aesthetics constitutes a revolutionary approach to the field: "aesthetics cannot simply 'add on' feminist theories as it might add new works by [<span class='Hi'>Nelson</span>] Goodman, Arthur Danto or George Dickie. To take feminism seriously involves rethinking our basic concepts and recasting the history of the discipline." In particular, feminist theory involves a rejection of "deeply entrenched assumptions about the universal value of art and aesthetic experience." Overthrowing these assumptions (...)
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  7. Curtis Brown (1993). Belief States and Narrow Content. Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.
    The first thesis is that beliefs play a role in explaining behavior. This is reasonably uncontroversial, though it has been controverted. Why did I raise my arm? Because I wanted to emphasize a point, and believed that I could do so by raising my arm. The belief that I could emphasize a point by raising my arm is central to the most natural explanation of my action.
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  8. Curtis Brown (1992). Charles Crittenden, Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 12 (3):177-179.
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  9. Curtis Brown (1992). Direct and Indirect Belief. Philosophy And Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316.
    The word 'belief' is ambiguous, referring sometimes to what is believed, sometimes to the act or state of believing it. I believe that as I write this it is sunny outside. This belief is true. What is true is what I believe, namely that it is sunny, not my believing it. On the other hand, my belief that it is sunny is rational and unshakeable, and it played a causal role in my deciding not to wear a coat today. What (...)
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  10. Curtis Brown (1991). Believing the Impossible. Synthese 89 (3):353-364.
    Ruth Barcan Marcus has argued that, just as we cannot know what is false, we cannot believe what is impossible.1 I will offer an interpretation of her defense of this view. I will then argue, first, that if the defense succeeded it would also justify rejecting many, perhaps most, of our ordinary belief ascriptions; and second, that, luckily, the defense does not succeed. Finally, I suggest that despite its failure there is something correct and important in Marcus's argument.
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  11. Curtis Brown & Steven Luper-Foy (1991). Belief and Rationality. Synthese 89 (3):323 - 329.
  12. Curtis Brown (1990). How to Believe the Impossible. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):271-285.
    Can we believe things that could not possibly be true? The world seems full of examples. Mathematicians have "proven" theorems which in fact turn out to be false. People have believed that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, that they themselves are essentially incorporeal, that heat is not molecular motion--all propositions which have been claimed to be not just false, but necessarily false. Some have even seemed to pride themselves on believing the impossible; Hegel thought contradictions could be true, and Kierkegaard seems (...)
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  13. Curtis Brown (1988). ¸ Itefrench:Rar.
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  14. Curtis Brown (1988). Internal Realism: Transcendental Idealism? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):145-155.
    Idealism is an ontological view, a view about what sorts of things there are in the universe. Idealism holds that what there is depends on our own mental structure and activity. Berkeley of course held that everything was mental; Kant held the more complex view that there was an important distinction between the mental and the physical, but that the structure of the empirical world depended on the activities of minds. Despite radical differences, idealists like Berkeley and Kant share what (...)
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  15. Curtis Brown (1986). Overriding Reasons and Reasons to Be Moral. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):173-187.
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  16. Curtis Brown (1986). What is a Belief State? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):357-378.
    What we believe depends on more than the purely intrinsic facts about us: facts about our environment or context also help determine the contents of our beliefs. 1 This observation has led several writers to hope that beliefs can be divided, as it were, into two components: a "core" that depends only on the individual?s intrinsic properties; and a periphery that depends on the individual?s context, including his or her history, environment, and linguistic community. Thus Jaegwon Kim suggests that "within (...)
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  17. Curtis Brown (1984). The Necessary a Posteriori: A Response to Tichý. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 45 (3):379 - 397.
    Some of Tichý's conclusions rest on an assumption about substitutivity which Kripke would not accept. If we grant the assumption, then Tichý successfully shows that we can discover true identity statements involving names a priori, but not that we can discover a priori what properties things have essentially. Many of Tichý's arguments require an implausible rejection of the possibility of indirect belief as described in Section III. 25Are there necessary a posteriori propositions? I have argued that we certainly can discover (...)
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