In France, bioethics norms have emerged in close interaction with medical practices. The first bioethics laws were adopted in 1994, with provisions for updates in 2004 and most recently, in 2011. As in other countries, bioethics laws indirectly refer to certain fundamental values. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, I shall briefly describe the construction of the French bioethics laws and the values they are meant to protect. Secondly, I will show that the practice of clinical ethics, as (...) reported in a few studies on ART, living organ donation and PGD, challenge the role attributed to doctors as “gatekeepers” of those fundamental values. Thirdly, I will suggest that the quality of medical practices would improve if the law focused on strengthening the tacit pact between doctors and patients, rather than putting doctors in charge of enforcing societal values. Doctors, for their part, would limit their role to what they can do best: provide sufficient patient support and safe care. Against those who argue that we should dispense with bioethics laws altogether, I hold that the laws are useful in order to limit the development of abusive practices. However, a new legislative approach should be adopted which would a positive presumption in favor of patients’ requests. (shrink)
Is there any ethical justification for limiting the reproductive autonomy and not make assisted reproductive technologies available to certain prospective parents? We present and discuss the results of an interdisciplinary clinical ethics study concerning access to assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in situations which are considered as ethically problematic in France (overage or sick parents, surrogate motherhood). The study focused on the arguments that people in these situations put forward when requesting access to ART. It shows that requester’s arguments are based (...) on sound ethical values, and that their legitimacy is at least as strong as that of those used by doctors to question access to ART. Results reveal that the three implicit normative arguments that founded the law in 1994, which are still in force after the bioethics law revision in July 2011—the welfare of the child, the illegitimacy of a “right to a child,” and the defense of the so called “social order”—are challenged on several grounds by requesters as reasons for limiting their reproductive autonomy. Although these results are limited to exceptional situations, they are of special interest insofar as they give voice to the requesters’ own ethical concerns in the ongoing political debate over access to ART. (shrink)