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Darrel E. Christensen [49]David Christensen [32]Dr Wayne Christensen [5]D. Christensen [3]
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Profile: David Christensen (Brown University)
Profile: Diane Christensen (Milwaukee Area Technical College)
Profile: Dan Christensen (Brigham Young University)
Profile: Devin J. Christensen (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
  1.  633 DLs
    David Christensen (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
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  2.  594 DLs
    David Christensen (2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.
    How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions (...)
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  3.  410 DLs
    David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
    Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
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  4.  202 DLs
    David Christensen (2011). Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (6).
    Responding rationally to the information that others disagree with one’s beliefs requires assessing the epistemic credentials of the opposing beliefs. Conciliatory accounts of disagreement flow in part from holding that these assessments must be independent from one’s own initial reasoning on the disputed matter. I argue that this claim, properly understood, does not have the untoward consequences some have worried about. Moreover, some of the difficulties it does engender must be faced by many less conciliatory accounts of disagreement.
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  5.  193 DLs
    David Christensen (2009). Introduction: The Epistemology of Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):231-232.
    One of the most salient features of forming beliefs in a social context is that people end up disagreeing with one another. This is not just an obvious fact about belief-formation; it raises interesting normative questions, especially when people become aware of the opinions of others. How should my beliefs be affected by the knowledge that others hold contrary beliefs? In some cases, the answer seems easy. If I have reason to think that my friend is much better informed than (...)
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  6.  127 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1967). The Coherence Theory of Truth. Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 (2):193-194.
  7.  109 DLs
    David Christensen (1992). Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology. Philosophy of Science 59 (4):540-557.
    Much contemporary epistemology is informed by a kind of confirmational holism, and a consequent rejection of the assumption that all confirmation rests on experiential certainties. Another prominent theme is that belief comes in degrees, and that rationality requires apportioning one's degrees of belief reasonably. Bayesian confirmation models based on Jeffrey Conditionalization attempt to bring together these two appealing strands. I argue, however, that these models cannot account for a certain aspect of confirmation that would be accounted for in any adequate (...)
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  8.  99 DLs
    David Christensen (2000). Diachronic Coherence Versus Epistemic Impartiality. Philosophical Review 109 (3):349-371.
    It is obvious that we would not want to demand that an agent' s beliefs at different times exhibit the same sort of consistency that we demand from an agent' s simultaneous beliefs; there' s nothing irrational about believing P at one time and not-P at another. Nevertheless, many have thought that some sort of coherence or stability of beliefs over time is an important component of epistemic rationality.
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  9.  97 DLs
    David Christensen (2010). Rational Reflection. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.
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  10.  93 DLs
    David Christensen & Hilary Kornblith (1997). Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a Priori. Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20.
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle (...)
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  11.  89 DLs
    David Christensen (2007). Epistemic Self-Respect. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.
  12.  82 DLs
    David Christensen (1996). Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers. Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):450-479.
    The most immediately appealing model for formal constraints on degrees of belief is provided by probability theory, which tells us, for instance, that the probability of P can never be greater than that of (P v Q). But while this model has much intuitive appeal, many have been concerned to provide arguments showing that ideally rational degrees of belief would conform to the calculus of probabilities. The arguments most frequently used to make this claim plausible are the so-called "Dutch Book" (...)
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  13.  78 DLs
    David Christensen (1999). Measuring Confirmation. Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461.
  14.  75 DLs
    David Christensen (1994). Conservatism in Epistemology. Noûs 28 (1):69-89.
  15.  68 DLs
    David Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.
    What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.
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  16.  68 DLs
    David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) (2013). The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy.
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  17.  54 DLs
    David Christensen (2007). Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.
    Formally-inclined epistemologists often theorize about ideally rational agents--agents who exemplify rational ideals, such as probabilistic coherence, that human beings could never fully realize. This approach can be defended against the well-know worry that abstracting from human cognitive imperfections deprives the approach of interest. But a different worry arises when we ask what an ideal agent should believe about her own cognitive perfection (even an agent who is in fact cognitively perfect might, it would seem, be uncertain of this fact). Consideration (...)
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  18.  52 DLs
    Dr Wayne Christensen (2010). The Decoupled Representation Theory of the Evolution of Cognition--A Critical Assessment. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):361-405.
    Sterelny’s Thought in a Hostile World ([ 2003 ]) presents a complex, systematically structured theory of the evolution of cognition centered on a concept of decoupled representation. Taking Godfrey-Smith’s ([ 1996 ]) analysis of the evolution of behavioral flexibility as a framework, the theory describes increasingly complex grades of representation beginning with simple detection and culminating with decoupled representation, said to be belief-like, and it characterizes selection forces that drive evolutionary transformations in these forms of representation. Sterelny’s ultimate explanatory target (...)
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  19.  50 DLs
    David Christensen (2014). Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity. Noûs 49 (3):n/a-n/a.
    Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality. It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of rationality. This (...)
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  20.  49 DLs
    David Christensen (1991). Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs. Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.
  21.  42 DLs
    David Christensen (1997). What is Relative Confirmation? Noûs 31 (3):370-384.
    It is commonly acknowledged that, in order to test a theoretical hypothesis, one must, in Duhem' s phrase, rely on a "theoretical scaffolding" to connect the hypothesis with something measurable. Hypothesis-confirmation, on this view, becomes a three-place relation: evidence E will confirm hypothesis H only relative to some such scaffolding B. Thus the two leading logical approaches to qualitative confirmation--the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account and Clark Glymour' s bootstrap account--analyze confirmation in relative terms. But this raises questions about the philosophical interpretation (...)
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  22.  40 DLs
    David Christensen (2013). Epistemic Modesty Defended. In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press 77.
    It has often been noticed that conciliatory views of disagreement are "self-undermining" in a certain way: advocates of such views cannot consistently maintain them when other philosophers disagree. This leads to apparent problems of instability and even inconsistency. Does self-undermining, then, show conciliationism untenable? If so, the untenablity would extend not only to almost all views of disagreement, but to a wide range of other views supporting what one might call epistemic modesty: roughly, the idea that getting evidence that one (...)
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  23.  38 DLs
    David Christensen (1983). Glymour on Evidential Relevance. Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.
    Glymour's "bootstrap" account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence, however, the "bootstrap" condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain why neither can give a satisfactory analysis of evidential relevance.
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  24.  38 DLs
    David Christensen (2001). Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism. Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.
    Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representation Theorem arguments which avoids the untenable premises. It then develops a parallel approach to Dutch Book Arguments, and compares the results. In each case (...)
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  25.  38 DLs
    David Christensen (1990). The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping. Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.
    The main appeal of the currently popular "bootstrap" account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to (...)
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  26.  35 DLs
    Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.) (2013). The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy.
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  27.  33 DLs
    David Christensen (1993). Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):301-321.
  28.  32 DLs
    D. Christensen (1992). Causal Powers and Conceptual Connections. Analysis 52 (3):163-8.
    In "A Modal Argument for Narrow Content" ("Journal of Philosophy", LXXXVIII, 1991, pp 5-26), Jerry Fodor proposes a necessary condition for the distinctness of causal powers. He uses this condition to support psychological individualism. I show that Fodor's argument relies on inconsistent interpretations of his condition on distinct causal powers. Moreover, on no consistent interpretation does Fodor's condition yield the results claimed for it.
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  29.  31 DLs
    David Christensen (2007). Three Questions About Leplin's Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):43 - 50.
    Jarrett Leplin’s paper is multifaceted; it’s rich with ideas, and I won’t even try to touch on all of them. Instead, I’d like to raise three questions about the paper: one about its definition of reliable method, one about its solution to the generality problem, and one about its answer to clairvoyance-type objections.
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  30.  22 DLs
    David Christensen (1993). Switched-Words Skepticism: A Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):33 - 58.
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  31.  22 DLs
    Dr Wayne Christensen (2007). The Evolutionary Origins of Volition. In Cogprints.
    It appears to be a straightforward implication of distributed cognition principles that there is no integrated executive control system (e.g. Brooks 1991, Clark 1997). If distributed cognition is taken as a credible paradigm for cognitive science this in turn presents a challenge to volition because the concept of volition assumes integrated information processing and action control. For instance the process of forming a goal should integrate information about the available action options. If the goal is acted upon these processes should (...)
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  32.  21 DLs
    David Christensen (2014). Disagreement and Public Controversy. In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press
    One of Mill’s main arguments for free speech springs from taking disagreement as an epistemically valuable resource for fallible thinkers. Contemporary conciliationist treatments of disagreement spring from the same motivation, but end up seeing the epistemic implications of disagreement quite differently. Conciliationism also encounters complexities when transposed from the 2-person toy examples featured in the literature to the public disagreements among groups that give the issue much of its urgency. Group disagreements turn out to be in some ways more powerful (...)
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  33.  15 DLs
    Dr Wayne Christensen (2006). The Evolutionary Origins of Volition. In [Book Chapter] (in Press).
    It appears to be a straightforward implication of distributed cognition principles that there is no integrated executive control system (e.g. Brooks 1991, Clark 1997). If distributed cognition is taken as a credible paradigm for cognitive science this in turn presents a challenge to volition because the concept of volition assumes integrated information processing and action control. For instance the process of forming a goal should integrate information about the available action options. If the goal is acted upon these processes should (...)
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  34.  14 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1975). Hegel's Phänomenologie Des Geistes: Die Bestimmung Ihrer Idee in "Vorrede" Und "Einleitung". Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (1):115-117.
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  35.  13 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1968). Hegel's Phenomenological Analysis and Freud's Psychoanalysis. International Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3):356-378.
  36.  13 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1966). Plato: The Founder of Dialectic. Journal of the History of Philosophy 4 (2):169-170.
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  37.  12 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1968). Review: Beck, Studies in the Philosophy of Kant. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (3):297-298.
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  38.  11 DLs
    Karl-Heinz Ilting & Darrel E. Christensen (1972). Two New Dual-Language Editions of Hegel's Lectures on The Philosophy of Religion. The Owl of Minerva 4 (1):5-6.
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  39.  10 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1970). The Religion of Vision: A Proposed Substitution for Hegel's 'Unauthentic' Religion of Utility. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (3):147 - 160.
  40.  10 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1970). Monade Und Begriff: Der Weg Von Leibniz Zu Hegel. Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (2):217-220.
  41.  10 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1967). Beyond the Edge of Certainty: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 (4).
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  42.  9 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1984). Whitehead's "Prehension" and Hegel's "Mediation": Parallel Dynamical Concepts at the Service of Different Methodologies. Review of Metaphysics 38 (2):341 - 374.
  43.  9 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1973). Hegels Lehre Vom Absoluten Geist Als Theologisch-Politischer Traktat. The Owl of Minerva 5 (1):1-7.
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  44.  9 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1966). Rice University Studies: Papers in Philosophy. Journal of the History of Philosophy 4 (1):83-83.
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  45.  9 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1976). Hegel's Justification of Christianity: Serious or Sophistry? Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):413-430.
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  46.  8 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1986). Kant and Hegel. Review of Metaphysics 40 (2):339 - 363.
  47.  8 DLs
    Sanford G. Thatcher, James S. Stramel, Heather Blair, David Christensen, Ronald De Sousa, Timothy F. Murphy, Paul Raymont, Harold J. Dumain, Joseph A. Grispino, Todd Volker, Anto Knežević & Karen M. Kuss (1995). Letters to the Editor. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (5):107 - 122.
    A letter protesting the publication of a homophobic rant in the Proceedings of the APA.
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  48.  8 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1975). Hegel's Dialektik: Fünf hermeneutische Studien (review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (3):416-417.
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  49.  8 DLs
    Darrel E. Christensen (1989). Hegel and Whitehead. International Studies in Philosophy 21 (3):132-135.
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  50.  7 DLs
    David Christensen (1994). John Earman's 'Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory' (Book Review). Philosophical Review 103:345-347.
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