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D. Gene Witmer [22]D. G. Witmer [3]
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Profile: D. Gene Witmer (University of Florida)
  1. D. Gene Witmer (2014). The Conceptual Link From Physical to Mental By Robert Kirk. Analysis 74 (3):552-556.
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  2. D. Gene Witmer (2012). 4 Naturalism and Physicalism. In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. 90.
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  3. D. G. Witmer (2011). Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Edited by Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup. Mind 120 (479):882-888.
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  4. D. Gene Witmer (2011). The Philosophy of Philosophy. By Timothy Williamson. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):155-160.
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  5. D. Gene Witmer (2009). Review of Christopher Peacocke, Truly Understood. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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  6. D. Gene Witmer (2008). Review of Steven Horst, Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (4).
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  7. D. Gene Witmer (2007). Necessity, Identity, and A Priori Access. Philosophical Topics 35 (1/2):241-263.
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  8. D. G. Witmer (2006). Review: Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1136-1141.
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  9. D. Gene Witmer (2006). How to Be a (Sort of) A Priori Physicalist. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.
    What has come to be known as “a priori physicalism” is the thesis, roughly, that the non-physical truths in the actual world can be deduced a priori from a complete physical description of the actual world. To many contemporary philosophers, a priori physicalism seems extremely implausible. In this paper I distinguish two kinds of a priori physicalism. One sort – strict a priori physicalism – I reject as both unmotivated and implausible. The other sort – liberal a priori physicalism – (...)
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  10. D. Gene Witmer, William Butchard & Kelly Trogdon (2005). Intrinsicality Without Naturalness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):326–350.
    Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property" that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. We find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property (...)
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  11. D. Gene Witmer (2004). Christopher S. Hill, Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence. Philosophical Inquiry 26 (4):142-145.
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  12. D. Gene Witmer (2004). Review of Andrew Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (6).
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  13. D. Gene Witmer (2003). Dupre's Anti-Essentialist Objection to Reductionism. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):181-200.
    In his 'The Disorder of Things' John Dupré presents an objection to reductionism which I call the 'anti-essentialist objection': it is that reductionism requires essentialism, and essentialism is false. I unpack the objection and assess its cogency. Once the objection is clearly in view, it is likely to appeal to those who think conceptual analysis a bankrupt project. I offer on behalf of the reductionist two strategies for responding, one which seeks to rehabilitate conceptual analysis and one (more concessive) which (...)
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  14. D. Gene Witmer (2003). Functionalism and Causal Exclusion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):198-215.
    Recent work by Jaegwon Kim and others suggest that functionalism leaves mental properties causally inefficacious in some sense. I examine three lines of argument for this conclusion. The first appeals to Occam's Razor; the second appeals to a ban on overdetermination; and the third charges that the kind of response I favor to these arguments forces me to give up "the homogeneity of mental and physical causation". I show how each argument fails. While I concede that a positive theory of (...)
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  15. Carl Gillett & D. Gene Witmer (2001). A "Physical" Need: Physicalism and the Via Negativa. Analysis 61 (272):302–309.
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  16. Crystal Thorpe & D. Gene Witmer (2001). Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little (Ed.), Moral Particularism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000, Pp. Xiv + 317. Utilitas 13 (03):369-.
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  17. D. Gene Witmer (2001). Conceptual Analysis, Circularity, and the Commitments of Physicalism. Acta Analytica 16 (26):119-133.
  18. D. Gene Witmer (2001). Experience, Appearance, and Hidden Features. Psyche 7 (9).
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  19. D. Gene Witmer (2001). Sufficiency Claims and Physicalism: A Formulation. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  20. D. G. Witmer (2000). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Review 109 (3):459-462.
    Conceptual analysis is currently out of favour, especially in North America. This is partly through misunderstanding of its nature. Properly understood, conceptual analysis is not a mysterious activity discredited by Quine that seeks after the a priori in some hard‐to‐understand sense. It is, rather, something familiar to everyone, philosophers and non‐philosophers alike—or so I argue. Another reason for its unpopularity is a failure to appreciate the need for conceptual analysis. The cost of repudiating it has not been sufficiently appreciated; without (...)
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  21. D. Gene Witmer (2000). Locating the Overdetermination Problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):273-286.
    Physicalists motivate their position by posing a problem for the opposition: given the causal completeness of physics and the impact of the mental (or, more broadly, the seemingly nonphysical) on the physical, antiphysicalism implies that causal overdetermination is rampant. This argument is, however, equivocal in its use of 'physical'. As Scott Sturgeon has recently argued, if 'physical' means that which is the object of physical theory, completeness is plausible, but the further claim that the mental has a causal impact on (...)
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  22. D. Gene Witmer (1999). Supervenience Physicalism and the Problem of Extras. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):315-31.
  23. D. Gene Witmer (1998). What is Wrong with the Manifestability Argument for Supervenience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):84-89.
    The manifestability argument presented by Papineau and Loewer turns on the premise that nonphysical properties are capable of making a difference to physical conditions. From this and the completeness of physics a strenuous supervenience conclusion is supposed to follow. I argue that the plausible version of this premise implies a weaker supervenience thesis only, one that is too weak to be of any use for a physicalist. There is a more contentious premise one might use to deduce the needed conclusion, (...)
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  24. D. Gene Witmer & John Sarnecki (1998). Is Natural Kindness a Natural Kind? Philosophical Studies 90 (3):245-264.
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