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  1. D. Goldstick (2013). Discussion: Internal Impediments. Philosophy 88 (2):313-315.
    Not everything that it's FOR you to do is something it's THAT you will do. The compatibilist freedom formula must embrace external and internal impediments. Desires are impediments only when they impede, owing to motivational conflict. But other impediments, external or internal, require merely the potential to impede.
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  2. D. Goldstick (2010). Does Epistemic “Ought” Imply “Can”? Dialogue 49 (01):155-158.
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  3. D. Goldstick (2008). On What There is (in Space). Philosophy 83 (3):353-357.
    Dispositions depend on "categorical" facts definitionally and pedagogically. Must they always depend on them also ontologically for "grounding"? Does there really have to be an ultimate "bottom level" of matter, and must it be "categorical"? The concepts microphysics supplies, however, are dispositional in meaning. What predicates aren't? Besides "shaping" and "locating" predicates, predicates expressing degrees of similarity and dissimilarity are nondispositional enough in meaning: but the predication of all these features of things depends upon other features for these to bound (...)
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  4. D. Goldstick (2008). The Fabrication Metaphor. Ratio 21 (1):28–41.
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  5. Daniel Goldstick (2006). Beliefs, Desires and Moral Realism. Philosophy 81 (315):153 - 160.
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  6. D. Goldstick (2005). On What There Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):313–320.
    Dispositions depend on "categorical" facts definitionally and pedagogically. Must they always depend on them also ontologically for "grounding"? Does there really have to be an ultimate "bottom level" of matter, and must it be "categorical"? The concepts microphysics supplies, however, are dispositional in meaning. What predicates aren't? Besides "shaping" and "locating" predicates, predicates expressing degrees of similarity and dissimilarity are nondispositional enough in meaning: but the predication of all these features of things depends upon other features for these to bound (...)
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  7. D. Goldstick (2004). Cans and Ifs: Ability to Will and Ability to Act. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (1):105-108.
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  8. D. Goldstick (2003). Circular Reasoning. International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):129-130.
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  9. D. Goldstick (2002). The 'Two Hats' Problem in Consequentialist Ethics. Utilitas 14 (01):108-.
    A largely deontological conscience will probably optimize consequences. But Bernard Williams objects to the , if one therefore embraces indirect consequentialism, of . Admittedly the strategy is painful, and a counsel of imperfection at best. But it need not be psychologically impossible, inconsistent, or even self-deceptive, given ethical cognitivism.
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  10. D. Goldstick (2002). Interests. Dialogue 41 (02):241-.
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  11. D. Goldstick (2000). Correspondence. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000 (2):195 - 197.
    Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.
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  12. D. Goldstick (2000). Motivations. Philosophy 75 (3):423-436.
    An exploratory discussion. Call a desire “finitisic” if some conceivable eventuality would fulfil it completely (so that no conceivable eventuality would fulfil it more). That flexibility of behaviour distinguishing the animate from the mindless is accounted for fundamentally by supposing ultimate motivation all infinitistic and outweighable. Decision-making by the counterpoise of such motivation contrasts with algorithmic thinking; and this suggests a non-computational view of mentation, a compatibilist understanding of creative imagination, and (with some additional conceptions) a possible definitional avenue for (...)
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  13. D. Goldstick (2000). Three Epistemic Senses of Probability. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):59-76.
  14. Dan Goldstick (1999). "Soundness" Unsound. Informal Logic 19 (1).
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  15. D. Goldstick (1997). Property Identity and 'Intrinsic' Designation. Philosophy 72 (281):449 - 452.
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  16. D. Goldstick (1995). Justified Belief. Dialogue 34 (01):99-.
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  17. D. Goldstick (1995). Marxism on Dialectical and Logical Contradiction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):102 – 113.
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  18. D. Goldstick (1994). Might-Counterfactuals and Gratuitous Differences, Maek Heller. European Journal of Philosophy 2 (3).
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  19. D. Goldstick (1993). Laws of Nature and Physical Existents. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):255 – 265.
    Abstract Nominalists, denying the reality of anything over and above concreta, are committed to a reductive account of any law of nature, explaining its necessity?the fact that it not only holds for all actual instances, but would hold for any additional ones?in, for example, epistemic terms (its likelihood/certainty of holding beyond the already observed instances). Nominalists argue that the world would be no different without irreducible modalities. ?Modal realists? often object that this parallels a common phenomenalist argument against believing in (...)
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  20. D. Goldstick (1993). Propositions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 45:105-116.
    Propositions - truths and falsehoods - are "eternal" objects of possible ("de dicto") belief and disbelief, potential points of agreement and disagreement. Accordingly the criterion of two sentence-tokens "expressing tiie same proposition" will be tiie logical impossibility of beheving (disbelieving) what one expresses without believing (disbelieving) what the other expresses. This involves an ultra-thight synonymity relation ("semantic equivalence") and a sharing of denotations as between corresponding Unguistic expressions in each. Only locutions containing names, indexicals, etc. which commit speakers to the (...)
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  21. John D. Sommer, Ed Casey, Mary C. Rawlinson, Eva Kittay, Michael A. Simon, Patrick Grim, Clyde Lee Miller, Rita Nolan, Marshall Spector, Don Ihde, Peter Williams, Anthony Weston, Donn Welton, Dick Howard, David A. Dilworth, Tom Foster Digby 3d, Anthony Appiah, David Auerbach, Annette Baier, Seyla Benhabib, Akeel Bilgrami, Richard Boyd, Robert Brandon, Joshua Cohen, Arnold Davidson, Owen Flanagan, Nancy Fraser, Marcia Lind, Alexander Nehamas, Linda Nicholson, Adrian Piper, Lynne Tirrell, Lawrence Blum, Lawrence Foster, Roma Farion, Mitchel Silver, Jenifer Radden, Jack Bayne, Robert K. Shope, Jane Roland Martin, Arthur B. Millman, Beebe Nelson, Robert Rosenfeld, Janet Farrell-Smith, David E. Flesche, Daniel E. Anderson, J. R. Brown, F. Cunningham, D. Goldstick, I. Hacking, C. Normore, A. Ripstein, W. Sumner, Alison M. Jaggar, Harry Deutsch, Irving Stein, John Hund, George Englebretsen, Fred Strohm, D. L. Ouren, P. Bilimoria, F. B. D. & Nora Nevin (1993). Letters to the Editor. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (5):97 - 112.
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  22. D. Goldstick (1992). Cognitive Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):117-124.
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  23. D. Goldstick (1991). Distributive Justice and Utility. Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (1):65-71.
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  24. D. Goldstick (1990). Could God Make a Contradiction True? Religious Studies 26 (3):377 - 387.
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  25. D. Goldstick (1990). One Commends Something By Attributing the Property of Goodness To It. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):73-75.
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  26. D. Goldstick (1989). But Could I Have Wanted to Do That. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (June):99-104.
     
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  27. D. Goldstick (1989). The Meaning of “Grue”. Erkenntnis 31 (1):139 - 141.
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  28. D. Goldstick (1989). When Inconsistency is Logically Impossible. Logique Et Analyse 125:139-42.
     
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  29. Daniel Goldstick (1989). Belief. American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (3):231 - 238.
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  30. Charles W. Mills & Danny Goldstick (1989). A New Old Meaning of “Ideology”. Dialogue 28 (03):417-.
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  31. D. Goldstick (1988). The Welfare of the Dead. Philosophy 63 (243):111 - 113.
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  32. D. Goldstick (1988). Intérêts objectifs. Etyka 24:229-247.
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  33. D. Goldstick & B. O'Neill (1988). Truer. Philosophy of Science 55 (4):583-597.
    When can one say that a new theory is truer than the old one it contradicts, even though neither is absolutely true? We are primarily concerned with the case in which the conflicting theories offer answers to the same questions, and so we do not introduce considerations of "logical width". We propose that part of the new theory is truer than part of the old one when the former part gets right whatever the latter-part got right while the former does (...)
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  34. Daniel Goldstick (1988). Interesy obiektywne. Etyka 24.
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  35. D. Goldstick (1987). Secondary Qualities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):145-146.
    LOCKE WAS RIGHT TO SAY PRIMARY QUALITIES "RESEMBLE" OUR\nIDEAS OF THEM IN A WAY SECONDARY QUALITIES DO NOT, BECAUSE\nHAVING THE APPROPRIATE PRIMARY-QUALITY "IDEA" IS LOGICALLY\nSUFFICIENT IN EACH CASE FOR KNOWING HOW SOMETHING MUST BE\n(INTRINSICALLY) IN ORDER FOR THE "QUALITY" TO INHERE IN IT.\nCOMPARE THE WAY A PERSON IS SAID TO "RESEMBLE" A VERBAL\nDESCRIPTION IN THE EVENT OF "ANSWERING TO" IT.
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  36. D. Goldstick (1987). The Kantian Way of Answering Hume. In Moyal (ed.), Early Modern Philosophy.
  37. Dan Goldstick (1986). What Are "Purely Qualitative" Terms? American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1):71 - 81.
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  38. Daniel Goldstick (1985). Lecture d'Althusser. Philosophiques 12 (2):363-391.
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  39. D. Goldstick (1981). Realism About Possible Worlds. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (June):272-273.
    There are many things which do not exist. In particular, There are more possible worlds than the actual one, Thought every other one is something that is actually possible, And the possibility of it is actual (existent). "actual" and "exist" are not really indexicals since "world" (best understood as a comprehensive ensemble of existence) isn't. Thus, Ordinary language, David k lewis' sole support for his "realism" regarding possible worlds, Does not really support it.
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  40. D. Goldstick (1980). Cognitive Synonymy. Dialectica 34 (3):183-203.
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  41. D. Goldstick (1980). Immorality with a Clear Conscience. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):245 - 250.
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  42. D. Goldstick (1980). The Leninist Theory of Perception. Dialogue 19 (March):1-19.
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  43. D. Goldstick (1979). Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (2):265-271.
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  44. D. Goldstick (1979). Why We Might Still Have a Choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (December):305-308.
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  45. Dan Goldstick (1979). Critical Notice of Sebastiano Timpanaro, On Materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):357-372.
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  46. D. Goldstick (1978). The Truth-Conditions of Counterfactual Conditional Sentences. Mind 87 (345):1-21.
  47. D. Goldstick (1976). More on Methodological Conservatism. Philosophical Studies 30 (3):193 - 195.
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  48. D. Goldstick (1975). Correspondence. Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (2):195-197.
    Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.
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  49. D. Goldstick (1974). Against 'Categories'. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):337 - 356.
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  50. D. Goldstick (1974). Monotheism's "Euthyphro" Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):585 - 589.
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