107 found
Order:
  1. D. Goldstick (1974). Reply to Professor Rollin. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):598-600.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. D. Goldstick (1993). Laws of Nature and Physical Existents. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):255 – 265.
    Abstract Nominalists, denying the reality of anything over and above concreta, are committed to a reductive account of any law of nature, explaining its necessity?the fact that it not only holds for all actual instances, but would hold for any additional ones?in, for example, epistemic terms (its likelihood/certainty of holding beyond the already observed instances). Nominalists argue that the world would be no different without irreducible modalities. ?Modal realists? often object that this parallels a common phenomenalist argument against believing in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. D. Goldstick (1967). On Moore's Paradox. Mind 76 (302):275-277.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  96
    D. Goldstick (1979). Why We Might Still Have a Choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (December):305-308.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  7
    D. Goldstick (2016). Logical Facts. Philosophical Forum 47 (1):123-124.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  20
    D. Goldstick (1971). Methodological Conservatism. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):186 - 191.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  7.  44
    D. Goldstick (1992). Cognitive Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):117-124.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8.  15
    D. Goldstick (1976). More on Methodological Conservatism. Philosophical Studies 30 (3):193 - 195.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9.  40
    D. Goldstick (1979). Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (2):265-271.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10.  38
    D. Goldstick (1973). Refutation of "Ethical Egoism". Analysis 34 (2):38 - 39.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  44
    D. Goldstick (2002). The 'Two Hats' Problem in Consequentialist Ethics. Utilitas 14 (1):108.
    A largely deontological conscience will probably optimize consequences. But Bernard Williams objects to the, if one therefore embraces indirect consequentialism, of. Admittedly the strategy is painful, and a counsel of imperfection at best. But it need not be psychologically impossible, inconsistent, or even self-deceptive, given ethical cognitivism.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  31
    D. Goldstick (2000). Correspondence. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000 (2):195 - 197.
    Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  8
    D. Goldstick & B. O'Neill (1988). Truer. Philosophy of Science 55 (4):583-597.
    When can one say that a new theory is truer than the old one it contradicts, even though neither is absolutely true? We are primarily concerned with the case in which the conflicting theories offer answers to the same questions, and so we do not introduce considerations of "logical width". We propose that part of the new theory is truer than part of the old one when the former part gets right whatever the latter-part got right while the former does (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  28
    D. Goldstick (1972). A Contribution Towards the Development of the Causal Theory of Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):238-248.
    1 Cf. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind (London, 1968), Chapter 9; 'A Causal Theory of Knowledge' by Alvin I. Goldman, The Journal of Philosophy , Vol. LXIV, No. 12, June 22, 1967. A striking parallelism would appear to exist between 'the causal theory of knowledge' and the orthodox Stoic doctrine regarding the kataleptike phantasia . See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.248 (reprinted in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta , edited by H. F. A. von Arnim, Leipzig, 1921, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  18
    D. Goldstick (1974). Against 'Categories'. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):337 - 356.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16.  32
    D. Goldstick (2010). Does Epistemic “Ought” Imply “Can”? Dialogue 49 (1):155-158.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  30
    D. Goldstick (1972). Hume's “Circularity” Charge Against Inductive Reasoning. Dialogue 11 (2):258-266.
  18.  4
    D. Goldstick (1997). Property Identity and ‘Intrinsic’ Designation. Philosophy 72 (281):449.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  22
    D. Goldstick (1972). A Contribution Towards the Development of the Causal Theory of Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):238 – 248.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  2
    Dan Goldstick (1979). Critical Notice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):357-372.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  2
    Daniel Goldstick (2009). 32. Utilitarianism Proved. In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press 311-317.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  16
    D. Goldstick (1978). The Truth-Conditions of Counterfactual Conditional Sentences. Mind 87 (345):1-21.
  23.  24
    Charles W. Mills & Danny Goldstick (1989). A New Old Meaning of “Ideology”. Dialogue 28 (03):417-.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  6
    D. Goldstick (1990). One Commends Something By Attributing the Property of Goodness To It. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):73-75.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  24
    D. Goldstick (1980). The Leninist Theory of Perception. Dialogue 19 (March):1-19.
  26.  11
    D. Goldstick (1975). Correspondence. Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (2):195-197.
    Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  15
    D. Goldstick (1973). An Alleged Paradox in the Theory of Democracy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (2):181-189.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  22
    D. Goldstick (1989). The Meaning of “Grue”. Erkenntnis 31 (1):139 - 141.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  28
    D. Goldstick (2000). Three Epistemic Senses of Probability. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):59-76.
  30.  27
    D. Goldstick (2004). Cans and Ifs: Ability to Will and Ability to Act. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (1):105-108.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  5
    Dan Goldstick (1986). What Are "Purely Qualitative" Terms? American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1):71 - 81.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32.  7
    D. Goldstick (1980). Immorality with a Clear Conscience. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):245 - 250.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  18
    D. Goldstick (1990). Could God Make a Contradiction True? Religious Studies 26 (3):377 - 387.
    Was Thomas Aquinas the first major Western philosopher to distinguish systematically between things it would be contradictory to deny and other things? He certainly was willing to give his authority to the proposition that whatever is logically impossible ‘does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence’. In the later Middle Ages, scholastic philosophers came virtually to equate achievable by divine power and free of contradiction free of contradiction and not achievable by divine power ).
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  8
    D. Goldstick (1993). Propositions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 45:105-116.
    Propositions - truths and falsehoods - are "eternal" objects of possible ("de dicto") belief and disbelief, potential points of agreement and disagreement. Accordingly the criterion of two sentence-tokens "expressing tiie same proposition" will be tiie logical impossibility of beheving (disbelieving) what one expresses without believing (disbelieving) what the other expresses. This involves an ultra-thight synonymity relation ("semantic equivalence") and a sharing of denotations as between corresponding Unguistic expressions in each. Only locutions containing names, indexicals, etc. which commit speakers to the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  25
    D. Goldstick (1991). Distributive Justice and Utility. Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (1):65-71.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  21
    D. Goldstick (1971). The Tolerance of Rudolf Carnap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):250 – 261.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  21
    D. Goldstick (1972). Analytic a Posteriori Truth? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (4):531-534.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  12
    Dan Goldstick (1979). Critical Notice of Sebastiano Timpanaro, On Materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):357-372.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. D. Goldstick (1989). When Inconsistency is Logically Impossible. Logique Et Analyse 125 (25):139-42.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40.  13
    D. Goldstick (2003). Circular Reasoning. International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):129-130.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  13
    D. Goldstick (1974). Monotheism's "Euthyphro" Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):585 - 589.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  4
    D. Goldstick (1981). Realism About Possible Worlds. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (June):272-273.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  17
    D. Goldstick (2008). On What There is (in Space). Philosophy 83 (3):353-357.
    Dispositions depend on "categorical" facts definitionally and pedagogically. Must they always depend on them also ontologically for "grounding"? Does there really have to be an ultimate "bottom level" of matter, and must it be "categorical"? The concepts microphysics supplies, however, are dispositional in meaning. What predicates aren't? Besides "shaping" and "locating" predicates, predicates expressing degrees of similarity and dissimilarity are nondispositional enough in meaning: but the predication of all these features of things depends upon other features for these to bound (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  13
    Daniel Goldstick (2006). Beliefs, Desires and Moral Realism. Philosophy 81 (315):153 - 160.
    An argument against the claim that moral realism cannot be sustained because moral beliefs, being affective-conative states, cannot themselves be true or false. In fact moral claims can fail both in terms of a failure of the standard it expresses to be realised by a given agent and also in terms of whatever it commends to be good or bad, right or wrong, in actual fact.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  16
    D. Goldstick (1995). Marxism on Dialectical and Logical Contradiction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):102 – 113.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  15
    D. Goldstick (2005). On What There Is. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):313–320.
    Dispositions depend on "categorical" facts definitionally and pedagogically. Must they always depend on them also ontologically for "grounding"? Does there really have to be an ultimate "bottom level" of matter, and must it be "categorical"? The concepts microphysics supplies, however, are dispositional in meaning. What predicates aren't? Besides "shaping" and "locating" predicates, predicates expressing degrees of similarity and dissimilarity are nondispositional enough in meaning: but the predication of all these features of things depends upon other features for these to bound (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  1
    Daniel Goldstick (2009). Appendix 2: ‘Desire’. In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press 327-332.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  1
    Daniel Goldstick (2009). 5. Preliminary Assault on the Philosophy of Empiricism. In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press 59-78.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  14
    D. Goldstick (1987). Secondary Qualities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):145-146.
    LOCKE WAS RIGHT TO SAY PRIMARY QUALITIES "RESEMBLE" OUR\nIDEAS OF THEM IN A WAY SECONDARY QUALITIES DO NOT, BECAUSE\nHAVING THE APPROPRIATE PRIMARY-QUALITY "IDEA" IS LOGICALLY\nSUFFICIENT IN EACH CASE FOR KNOWING HOW SOMETHING MUST BE\n(INTRINSICALLY) IN ORDER FOR THE "QUALITY" TO INHERE IN IT.\nCOMPARE THE WAY A PERSON IS SAID TO "RESEMBLE" A VERBAL\nDESCRIPTION IN THE EVENT OF "ANSWERING TO" IT.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. D. Goldstick (1977). A Little-Noticed Feature of "A Priori" Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):131.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 107