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D. H. Mellor [154]D. Hugh Mellor [1]
  1. D. H. Mellor (2004). The Matter of Chance. Cambridge University Press.
    This book deals not so much with statistical methods as with the central concept of chance, or statistical probability, which statistical theories apply to nature.
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  2. D. H. Mellor (1998). Real Time Ii. Routledge.
    Real Time II extends and evolves D.H. Mellor's classic exploration of the philosophy of time, Real Time . This wholly new book answers such basic metaphysical questions about time as: how do past, present and future differ, how are time and space related, what is change, is time travel possible? His Real Time dominated the philosophy of time for fifteen years. This book will do the same for the next twenty years.
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  3.  68
    D. H. Mellor (1995). The Facts of Causation. Routledge.
    The Facts of Causation grapples with one of philosophy's most enduring issues. Causation is central to all of our lives. What we see and hear causes us to believe certain facts about the world. We need that information to know how to act and how to cause the effects we desire. D. H. Mellor, a leading scholar in the philosophy of science and metaphysics, offers a comprehensive theory of causation. Many questions about causation remain unsettled. In science, the indeterminism of (...)
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  4. D. H. Mellor (1981). Real Time. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a study of the nature of time. In it, redeploying an argument first presented by McTaggart, the author argues that although time itself is real, tense is not. He accounts for the appearance of the reality of tense - our sense of the passage of time, and the fact that our experience occurs in the present - by showing how time is indispensable as a condition of action. Time itself is further analysed, and Dr Mellor gives answers to (...)
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  5. Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor (1990). There is No Question of Physicalism. Mind 99 (394):185-206.
    Many philosophers are impressed by the progress achieved by physical sciences. This has had an especially deep effect on their ontological views: it has made many of them physicalists. Physicalists believe that everything is physical: more precisely, that all entities, properties, relations, and facts are those which are studied by physics or other physical sciences. They may not all agree with the spirit of Rutherford's quoted remark that 'there is physics; and there is stamp-collecting',' but they all grant physical science (...)
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  6.  19
    D. H. Mellor (2005). Probability: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.
    This book: * assumes no mathematical background and keeps the technicalities to a minimum * explains the most important applications of probability theory to ...
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  7.  68
    D. H. Mellor (2009). Truthmakers for What? In Heather Dyke (ed.), From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics.
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  8.  33
    D. H. Mellor (2003). Real Metaphysics: Replies. In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in honour of D. H. Mellor. Routledge
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  9. D. H. Mellor (1974). In Defense of Dispositions. Philosophical Review 83 (2):157-181.
  10.  27
    D. H. Mellor (1978). Conscious Belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (March):87-101.
  11.  7
    D. H. Mellor (ed.) (1980). Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press.
    SUSAN HAACK . . . if we believe pq to the extent of iand pq to the extent of i, we are bound in consistency to believe p also to the degree of i . . . but ...
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  12.  38
    D. H. Mellor (1991). Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge Univ Pr.
    Together they form a complete modern metaphysics. The book starts with the mind: the subjectivity of the self, consciousness, how like computers we are, and how psychology relates to physics.
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  13. D. H. Mellor (1977). Natural Kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (4):299-312.
  14.  6
    D. H. Mellor (2012). Mind, Meaning, and Reality: Essays in Philosophy. OUP Oxford.
    Mind, Meaning, and Reality presents fifteen philosophical papers in which D. H. Mellor explores some of the most intriguing questions in philosophy. These include: what determines what we think, and what we use language to mean; how that depends on what there is in the world and why there is only one universe; and the nature of time.
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  15.  43
    D. H. Mellor (1993). How to Believe a Conditional. Journal of Philosophy 60 (5):233-248.
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  16.  68
    D. H. Mellor (2006). Wholes and Parts: The Limits of Composition. South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):138-145.
    The paper argues that very different part-whole relations hold between different kinds of entities. While these relations share most of their formal properties, they need not share all of them. Nor need other mereological principles be true of all kinds of part–whole pairs. In particular, it is argued that the principle of unrestricted composition, that any two or more entities have a mereological sum, while true of sets and propositions, is false of things and events.
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  17.  31
    D. H. Mellor (1970). Index 1950-69 Volumes 1-20. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):1-80.
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  18. D. H. Mellor (1968). Two Fallacies in Charles Taylor's Explanation of Behaviour. Mind 77 (305):124-126.
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  19.  31
    D. H. Mellor (2008). Micro-Composition. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (62):65-80.
    Entities of many kinds, not just material things, have been credited with parts. Armstrong , for example, has taken propositions and properties to be parts of their conjunctions, sets to be parts of sets that include them, and geographical regions and events to be parts of regions and events that contain them. The justification for bringing all these diverse relations under a single ‘part–whole’ concept is that they share all or most of the formal features articulated in mereology . But (...)
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  20. D. H. Mellor (1990). Laws, Chances and Properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):159 – 170.
    Abstract The paper develops a unified account of both deterministic and indeterministic laws of nature which inherits the merits but not the defects of the best existing accounts. As in Armstrong's account, laws are embodied in facts about universals; but not in higher?order relations between them, and the necessity of laws is not primitive but results from their containing chances of 0 or 1. As in the Ramsey?Lewis account, law statements would be the general axioms and theorems of the simplest (...)
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  21. D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.) (1997). Properties. Oxford University Press.
    When we say a certain rose is red, we seem to be attributing a property, redness, to it. But are there really such properties? If so, what are they like, how do we know about them, and how are they related to the objects which have them and the linguistic devices which we use to talk about them? This collection presents these ancient problems in a modern light. In particular, it makes accessible for the first time the most important contributions (...)
     
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  22.  59
    D. H. Mellor (1986). Tense's Tenseless Truth Conditions. Analysis 46 (4):167 - 172.
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  23.  90
    D. H. Mellor (1974). Special Relativity and Present Truth. Analysis 34 (3):74 - 77.
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  24.  47
    D. H. Mellor (2000). Possibility, Chance and Necessity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):16 – 27.
  25. D. H. Mellor (1988). Crane's Waterfall Illusion. Analysis 48 (June):147-50.
  26.  96
    D. H. Mellor (2000). The Point of Refinement. Analysis 60 (267):243–246.
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  27. D. H. Mellor (2000). Equally Effective Causes. Analysis 60 (265):71–73.
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  28.  65
    D. H. Mellor (1992). There Are No Conjunctive Universals. Analysis 52 (2):97 - 103.
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  29.  51
    D. H. Mellor (2013). Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Analysis 73 (3):548-554.
  30.  34
    Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.) (2005). Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.
    The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically in 1930 at the age of 26, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show its (...)
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  31.  55
    Robin Le Poidevin & D. H. Mellor (1987). Time, Change, and the `Indexical Fallacy'. Mind 96 (384):534-538.
    E. J. Lowe sets out in a recent paper1 to refute McTaggart's proof of the unreality of time, by exposing an ‘indexical fallacy’ in his disproof of the existence of tensed (i. e., A-series) facts.2 Lowe then develops an original account of what makes time the dimension of change, based on his own account of tensed facts. But in our opinion he fails on both counts: (1) he fails to refute McTaggart's perfectly sound disproof of tensed facts, which shows that (...)
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  32.  67
    D. H. Mellor (1980). The Self From Time to Time. Analysis 40 (1):59 - 62.
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  33.  11
    D. H. Mellor (1993). The Presidential Address: Nothing Like Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:1 - 16.
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  34.  53
    D. H. Mellor (1989). Induction Is Warranted. Analysis 49 (1):5 - 7.
  35.  29
    D. H. Mellor (1982). Counting Corners Correctly. Analysis 42 (2):96-7.
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  36. Hallvard Lillehammer, Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra & D. H. Mellor (2003). Real Metaphysics Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor.
     
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  37.  24
    D. H. Mellor, Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra (eds.) (2003). Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor. Routledge.
    This text brings together a collection of new essays by a number of philosophers to honor Hugh Mellor's contribution to philosophy. The collection stands as an original exploration of some of the most central issues in philosophy.
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  38.  18
    D. H. Mellor (1988). I and Now. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:79 - 94.
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  39.  94
    D. H. Mellor (1993). Supervenience? No Chance! Reply to Menuge. Analysis 53 (4):236-239.
  40.  89
    D. H. Mellor (1991). Causation and the Direction of Time. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):191 - 203.
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  41. D. H. Mellor (1980). Consciousness and Degrees of Belief. In Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press
  42.  62
    D. H. Mellor (1967). Connectivity, Chance, and Ignorance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (3):209-225.
  43. D. H. Mellor (1993). The Unreality of Tense. In Robin Le Poidevin & Murray MacBeath (eds.), The Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press 47--59.
     
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  44. D. H. Mellor (1991). The Warrant of Induction. In Matters of Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press
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  45.  38
    D. H. Mellor (2012). Nature's Joints: A Realistic Defence of Natural Properties. Ratio 25 (4):387-404.
    This paper attacks two contrary views. One denies that nature has joints, taking the properties we call natural to be merely artefacts of our theories. The other accepts real natural properties but takes their naturalness to come by degrees. I argue that both are wrong: natural properties are real, and their naturalness no more comes by degrees than does the naturalness of the things that have them.1.
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  46. D. H. Mellor (ed.) (1990). F. P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press.
    Frank Ramsey was the greatest of the remarkable generation of Cambridge philosophers and logicians which included G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Maynard Keynes. Before his tragically early death in 1930 at the age of twenty-six, he had done seminal work in mathematics and economics as well as in logic and philosophy. This volume, with a new and extensive introduction by D. H. Mellor, contains all Ramsey's previously published writings on philosophy and the foundations of mathematics. The latter (...)
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  47. D. H. Mellor (2008). Mctaggart's Proof. In L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), The Philosophy of Time. Routledge 1--81.
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  48. D. H. Mellor (1988). On Raising the Chances of Effects. In J. Fetzer (ed.), Probability and Causality. D. Reidel
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  49.  5
    D. H. Mellor (2011). Contingent Facts: A Reply to Cresswell and Rini. Analysis 71 (1):62-68.
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  50.  5
    D. H. Mellor (1968). Models and Analogies in Science. Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 59:282-90.
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