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Daniel M. Hausman [105]Daniel Hausman [22]D. M. Hausman [10]David B. Hausman [9]
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Profile: Daniel Hausman (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
  1.  254 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman & Brynn Welch (2010). Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge. Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (1):123-136.
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  2.  166 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2011). A Lockean Argument for Universal Access to Health Care. Social Philosophy and Policy 28 (2):166-191.
    This essay defends the controversial and indeed counterintuitive claim that there is a good argument to be made from a Lockean perspective for government action to guarantee access to health care. The essay maintains that this argument is in some regards more robust than the well-known argument in defense of universal health care spelled out by Norman Daniels, which this essay also examines in some detail. Locke's view that government should protect people's lives, property, and freedom–where freedom is understood as (...)
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  3.  125 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman, Reuben Stern & Naftali Weinberger (2014). Systems Without a Graphical Causal Representation. Synthese 191 (8):1925-1930.
    There are simple mechanical systems that elude causal representation. We describe one that cannot be represented in a single directed acyclic graph. Our case suggests limitations on the use of causal graphs for causal inference and makes salient the point that causal relations among variables depend upon details of causal setups, including values of variables.
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  4.  99 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson (2009). Preference Satisfaction and Welfare Economics. Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-25.
    The tenuous claims of cost-benefit analysis to guide policy so as to promote welfare turn on measuring welfare by preference satisfaction and taking willingness-to-pay to indicate preferences. Yet it is obvious that people's preferences are not always self-interested and that false beliefs may lead people to prefer what is worse for them even when people are self-interested. So welfare is not preference satisfaction, and hence it appears that cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics in general rely on a mistaken theory of (...)
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  5.  88 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1995). The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. Mind 104 (415):473-490.
  6.  87 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman, Philosophy of Economics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.
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  7.  83 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman & Matt Sensat Waldren (2012). Egalitarianism Reconsidered. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):567-586.
    This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O'Neill's “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,“ is that egalitarianism is better (...)
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  8.  81 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1989). Are Markets Morally Free Zones? Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (4):317-333.
    Markets are central institutions in societies such as ours, and it seems appropriate to ask whether markets treat individuals justly or unjustly and whether choices individuals make concerning their market behavior are just or unjust. After all, markets influence most important features of our lives from the environment in which we live to the ways in which we find pleasure and fulfillment. Within market life we collectively determine the shape of human existence.<1>.
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  9.  80 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2015). Equality Versus Priority: A Misleading Distinction. Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):229-238.
    People condemn inequalities for many reasons. For example, many who have no concern with distribution per se criticize inequalities in health care, because these inequalities lessen the benefits provided by the resources that are devoted to health care. Others who place no intrinsic value on distribution believe that a just society must show a special concern for those who are worst off. Some people, on the other hand, do place an intrinsic value on equality of distribution, regardless of its contribution (...)
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  10.  80 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2010). Hedonism and Welfare Economics. Economics and Philosophy 26 (03):321-344.
    This essay criticizes the proposal recently defended by a number of prominent economists that welfare economics be redirected away from the satisfaction of people's preferences and toward making people happy instead. Although information about happiness may sometimes be of use, the notion of happiness is sufficiently ambiguous and the objections to identifying welfare with happiness are sufficiently serious that welfare economists are better off using preference satisfaction as a measure of welfare. The essay also examines and criticizes the position associated (...)
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  11.  78 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2009). Equality of Autonomy. Ethics 119 (4):742-756.
  12.  76 DLs
    Ole Fritjof Norheim, Trygve Ottersen, Alex Voorhoeve, Bonah Chitah, Richard Cookson, Norman Daniels, Nir Eyal, Walter Flores, Axel Gosseries, Daniel Hausman, Samia Hurst, Lydia Kapiriri, Toby Ord, Shlomi Segall & Frehiwot Defaye (2014). Making Fair Choices on the Path to Universal Health Coverage. World Health Organisation.
    This report by the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage addresses how countries can make fair progress towards the goal of universal coverage. It explains the relevant tradeoffs between different desirable ends and offers guidance on how to make these tradeoffs.
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  13.  75 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2008). Fairness and Social Norms. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):850-860.
    This essay comments on the theory of social norms developed by Cristina Bicchieri in The Grammar of Society ( 2006 ). It applauds her theory of norms but argues that it cannot account for the experimental results concerning ultimatum games. A theory of fairness is also needed. It develops a number of specific criticisms of her way of incorporating the influence of norms into preferences. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5197 Helen C. (...)
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  14.  67 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2003). Philip Kitcher, Science, Truth, and Democracy:Science, Truth, and Democracy. Ethics 113 (2):423-428.
  15.  62 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2005). Sympathy, Commitment, and Preference. Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):33-50.
    While very much in Sen's camp in rejecting revealed preference theory and emphasizing the complexity, incompleteness, and context dependence of preference and the intellectual costs of supposing that all the factors influencing choice can be captured by a single notion of preference, this essay contests his view that economists should recognize multiple notions of preference. It argues that Sen's concerns are better served by embracing a single conception of preference and insisting on the need for analysis of the multiple factors (...)
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  16.  56 DLs
    D. M. Hausman (2011). Is an Overdose of Paracetamol Bad for One's Health? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):657-668.
    1 Overview of the problem2 Situationally Specific Normal Functioning and Capacities3 Kingma’s Criticism4 How Normal Responses can be Pathological5 Too Many Pathologies?6 Conclusions.
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  17.  55 DLs
    D. M. Hausman (2011). Mistakes About Preferences in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):3-25.
    Preferences are the central notion in mainstream economic theory, yet economists say little about what preferences are. This article argues that preferences in mainstream positive economics are comparative evaluations with respect to everything relevant to value or choice, and it argues against three mistaken views of preferences: (1) that they are matters of taste, concerning which rational assessment is inappropriate, (2) that preferences coincide with judgments of expected self-interested benefit, and (3) that preferences can be defined in terms of choices.
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  18.  54 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman & James Woodward (2004). Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):147-161.
    expose some gaps and difficulties in the argument for the causal Markov condition in our essay ‘Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition’ ([1999]), and we are grateful for the opportunity to reformulate our position. In particular, Cartwright disagrees vigorously with many of the theses we advance about the connection between causation and manipulation. Although we are not persuaded by some of her criticisms, we shall confine ourselves to showing how our central argument can be reconstructed and to casting doubt (...)
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  19.  54 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2000). Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):99-115.
    The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
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  20.  50 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman, Economics, Philosophy Of.
    People have thought about economics for as long as they have thought about how to manage their households, and indeed Aristotle assimilated the study of the economic affairs of a city to the study of the management of a household. During the two millennia between Aristotle and Adam Smith, one finds reflections concerning economic problems mainly in the context of discussions of moral or policy questions. For example, scholastic philosophers commented on money and interest in inquiries concerning the justice of (...)
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  21.  48 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2003). Critical Studies / Book Reviews. Philosophia Mathematica 11 (3):354-358.
  22.  46 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2009). Benevolence, Justice, Well-Being and the Health Gradient. Public Health Ethics 2 (3):235-243.
    The health gradient among those who are by historical standards both remarkably healthy and well-off is of considerable moral importance with respect to benevolence, justice and the theory of welfare. Indeed it may help us to realize that for most people the good life lies in close and intricate social ties with others which can flourish only when inequalities are limited. The health gradient suggests that there is a story to be told in which egalitarian justice, solidarity, health and well-being (...)
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  23.  44 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2007). What's Wrong with Health Inequalities? Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (1):46–66.
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  24.  43 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1988). Ceteris Paribus Clauses and Causality in Economics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:308 - 316.
    In this paper I distinguish the kind of ceteris paribus qualifications that often attach to derivative generalizations from those which typically attach to fundamental laws and argue that the latter are typically more tractable. I provide a sketch of a semantics for qualified generalizations and an account of how they may be justified. In addition I argue that legitimate uses of ceteris paribus qualifications must satisfy specific causal conditions.
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  25.  43 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1992). Thresholds, Transitivity, Overdetermination, and Events. Analysis 52 (3):159 - 163.
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  26.  42 DLs
    Daniel Murray Hausman (2005). Causal Relata: Tokens, Types, or Variables? [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 63 (1):33 - 54.
    The literature on causation distinguishes between causal claims relating properties or types and causal claims relating individuals or tokens. Many authors maintain that corresponding to these two kinds of causal claims are two different kinds of causal relations. Whether to regard causal relations among variables as yet another variety of causation is also controversial. This essay maintains that causal relations obtain among tokens and that type causal claims are generalizations concerning causal relations among these tokens.
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  27.  41 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1981). John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Economics. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):363-385.
    John Stuart Mill regards economics as an inexact and separate science which employs a deductive method. This paper analyzes and restates Mill's views and considers whether they help one to understand philosophical peculiarities of contemporary microeconomic theory. The author concludes that it is philosophically enlightening to interpret microeconomics as an inexact and separate science, but that Mill's notion of a deductive method has only a little to contribute.
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  28.  41 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1999). The Handbook of Economic Methodology, John Davis, D. Wade Hands, and Uskali Mäki (Eds.). Edward Elgar, 1998, Xviii + 572 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 15 (02):289-.
  29.  40 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1999). Lessons From Quantum Mechanics. Synthese 121 (1-2):79-92.
  30.  39 DLs
    DM Hausman & J. Woodward (1999). Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):521-583.
    This essay explains what the Causal Markov Condition says and defends the condition from the many criticisms that have been launched against it. Although we are skeptical about some of the applications of the Causal Markov Condition, we argue that it is implicit in the view that causes can be used to manipulate their effects and that it cannot be surrendered without surrendering this view of causation.
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  31.  38 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (ed.) (2008). The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.
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  32.  38 DLs
    D. M. Hausman (2005). Review: Weighing Lives. [REVIEW] Mind 114 (455):718-722.
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  33.  37 DLs
    DM Hausman (1997). Discussion. The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons - a Reply. Mind 106 (421):99-100.
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  34.  35 DLs
    Daniel Hausman & James Woodward (2004). Manipulation and the Causal Markov Condition. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):846-856.
    This paper explores the relationship between a manipulability conception of causation and the causal Markov condition (CM). We argue that violations of CM also violate widely shared expectations—implicit in the manipulability conception—having to do with the absence of spontaneous correlations. They also violate expectations concerning the connection between independence or dependence relationships in the presence and absence of interventions.
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  35.  33 DLs
    Malcolm R. Forster, I. A. Kieseppä, Dan Hausman, Alexei Krioukov, Stephen Leeds, Alan Macdonald & Larry Shapiro (forthcoming). The Conceptual Role of 'Temperature'in Statistical Mechanics: Or How Probabilistic Averages Maximize Predictive Accuracy. Philosophy of Science.
  36.  33 DLs
    David B. Hausman (1978). The Paradox of Teleological Ascription. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 3 (2):144-157.
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  37.  32 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1998). Problems with Realism in Economics. Economics and Philosophy 14 (02):185-.
    This essay attempts to distinguish the pressing issues for economists and economic methodologists concerning realism in economics from those issues that are of comparatively slight importance. In particular I shall argue that issues concerning the goals of science are of considerable interest in economics, unlike issues concerning the evidence for claims about unobservables, which have comparatively little relevance. In making this argument, this essay raises doubts about the two programs in contemporary economic methodology that raise the banner of realism. In (...)
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  38.  32 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2004). Polling and Public Policy. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):241-247.
    : This commentary distinguishes five reasons why one might want to conduct a survey concerning people's beliefs about death and the permissibility of harvesting organs: (1) simply to learn what people know and want; (2) to determine if current law and practice conform to the wishes of the population; (3) to determine the level of popular support for or opposition to policy changes; (4) to ascertain the causes and effects of popular beliefs and attitudes; and (5) to provide guidance in (...)
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  39.  31 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman, Why Not Just Ask? Preferences, “Empirical Ethics” and the Role of Ethical Reflection.
    Many questions concerning health involve values. How well is a health system performing? How should resources be allocated between the health system and other uses or among competing healthrelated uses? How should the costs of health services be distributed among members of a population? Who among those in need of transplants should receive scarce organs? What is the best way to treat particular patients? Although many kinds of expertise bear on these questions, values play a large role in answering them. (...)
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  40.  30 DLs
    Daniel Hausman (2009). When Jack and Jill Make a Deal. Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (01):95-.
    This essay is concerned with the problems of justice created by spillovers. After characterizing such spillovers more precisely and relating the concept to the economist's notion of an externality, I shall then consider the moral conclusions concerning spillovers that issue from a natural rights perspective and from the perspective of welfare economics supplemented with theories of distributive justice. I shall argue that these perspectives go badly awry in taking spillovers to be the exception rather than the rule in human interactions.
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  41.  30 DLs
    D. Hausman (1982). Constructive Empiricism Contested. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):21-28.
    Constructive empiricism, Bas van fraassen's new variety of anti-Realism, Maintains that science aims at empirically adequate, Rather than true theories and that, In fully accepting a theory, One should believe only that it is empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate just in case it has a model in which all observable phenomena may be embedded. I challenge van fraassen's main arguments and argue that the observable/unobservable distinction will not bear the weight that van fraassen places on it.
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  42.  30 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1995). Rational Choice and Social Theory: A Comment. Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):96-102.
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  43.  29 DLs
    Daniel Hausman, Beware of Economists Bearing Advice.
    Beware of economists bearing advice. Though some of it is valuable, the framework of theoretical welfare economics from which economic advice usually issues has serious normative limitations and distortions. When economists go beyond identifying consequences of policies to making recommendations, they typically rely on a theory whose only normative concern is welfare and its distribution and that mistakenly identifies welfare with the satisfaction of preferences. Their advice about how to increase welfare must accordingly be regarded with caution, and policy makers (...)
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  44.  28 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1982). Causal and Explanatory Asymmetry. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:43 - 54.
    This paper asks why causal asymmetries should give rise to explanatory asymmetries. One way to give some rationale for the asymmetries of causal explanation is to adopt a pragmatic view of explanation and to stress the fact that causes can be used to manipulate their effects. This paper argues, however, that when one recognizes that causal asymmetry is fundamentally an asymmetry of "connectedness", one can see how causal asymmetry leads to an objective difference between explanations in terms of causes and (...)
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  45.  28 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1992). Essays on Philosophy and Economic Methodology. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection brings together the essays of one of the foremost American philosophers of economics. Cumulatively they offer fresh perspectives on foundational questions such as: what sort of science is economics? and how successful can economists be in acquiring knowledge of their subject matter?
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  46.  28 DLs
    Daniel Hausman (2001). Explanation and diagnosis in economics. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3:311-326.
  47.  27 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (2012). Health, Naturalism, and Functional Efficiency. Philosophy of Science 79 (4):519-541.
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  48.  27 DLs
    DM Hausman (1999). Review Article. The Mathematical Theory of Causation. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):151-162.
  49.  26 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman (1997). Causation, Agency, and Independence. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):25.
    This paper explores versions of agency or manipulability theories of causation and argues that they are unacceptable both for the well-known reasons of their anthropomorphism, limited scope, and circularity and because they are subsumed by an alternative "independence" theory of causation, which is free of these difficulties.
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  50.  26 DLs
    Daniel M. Hausman, Trust in Game Theory.
    No doubt men are capable even now of much more unselfish service than they generally render; and the supreme aim of the economist is to discover how this latent social asset can be developed more quickly and turned to account more wisely. (Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics , p. 8).
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