173 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Daniel M. Hausman [113]Daniel Hausman [24]David B. Hausman [11]D. M. Hausman [10]
David Hausman [6]DM Hausman [3]Daniel Murray Hausman [3]D. Hausman [2]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also:
Profile: Daniel Hausman (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
  1.  21
    D. M. Hausman (1992). The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a comprehensive overview of the structure, strategy and methods of assessment of orthodox theoretical economics.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   61 citations  
  2. Daniel M. Hausman & Brynn Welch (2010). Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge. Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (1):123-136.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  3.  22
    Daniel M. Hausman (1998). Causal Asymmetries. Cambridge University Press.
    This book, by one of the pre-eminent philosophers of science writing today, offers the most comprehensive account available of causal asymmetries. Causation is asymmetrical in many different ways. Causes precede effects; explanations cite causes not effects. Agents use causes to manipulate their effects; they don't use effects to manipulate their causes. Effects of a common cause are correlated; causes of a common effect are not. This book explains why a relationship that is asymmetrical in one of these regards is asymmetrical (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  4.  50
    DM Hausman & J. Woodward (1999). Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):521-583.
    This essay explains what the Causal Markov Condition says and defends the condition from the many criticisms that have been launched against it. Although we are skeptical about some of the applications of the Causal Markov Condition, we argue that it is implicit in the view that causes can be used to manipulate their effects and that it cannot be surrendered without surrendering this view of causation.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   39 citations  
  5.  6
    Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson (1998). [Book Review] Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW] Ethics 109 (1):198-200.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  6.  36
    Daniel M. Hausman (2012). Health, Naturalism, and Functional Efficiency. Philosophy of Science 79 (4):519-541.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  7.  65
    Daniel M. Hausman & James Woodward (2004). Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):147-161.
    expose some gaps and difficulties in the argument for the causal Markov condition in our essay ‘Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition’ ([1999]), and we are grateful for the opportunity to reformulate our position. In particular, Cartwright disagrees vigorously with many of the theses we advance about the connection between causation and manipulation. Although we are not persuaded by some of her criticisms, we shall confine ourselves to showing how our central argument can be reconstructed and to casting doubt (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  8. Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson (2009). Preference Satisfaction and Welfare Economics. Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-25.
    The tenuous claims of cost-benefit analysis to guide policy so as to promote welfare turn on measuring welfare by preference satisfaction and taking willingness-to-pay to indicate preferences. Yet it is obvious that people's preferences are not always self-interested and that false beliefs may lead people to prefer what is worse for them even when people are self-interested. So welfare is not preference satisfaction, and hence it appears that cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics in general rely on a mistaken theory of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  9.  62
    D. M. Hausman (2011). Is an Overdose of Paracetamol Bad for One's Health? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):657-668.
    1 Overview of the problem2 Situationally Specific Normal Functioning and Capacities3 Kingma’s Criticism4 How Normal Responses can be Pathological5 Too Many Pathologies?6 Conclusions.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  10.  18
    Daniel M. Hausman (2006). Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Public Policy. Cambridge University Press.
    This book shows through accessible argument and numerous examples how understanding moral philosophy can improve economic analysis, how moral philosophy can benefit from economists' analytical tools, and how economic analysis and moral philosophy together can inform public policy. Part I explores rationality and its connections to morality. It argues that in defending their model of rationality, mainstream economists implicitly espouse contestable moral principles. Part II concerns welfare, utilitarianism and standard welfare economics, while Part III considers important moral notions that are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  11.  7
    Daniel M. Hausman (2014). Health and Functional Efficiency. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):634-647.
    This essay argues that what is central to Christopher Boorse’s biostatistical theory of disease as statistically subnormal part function (BST) are comparisons of the “functional efficiency” of parts and processes and that statistical considerations serve only to pick out a healthy level of functional efficiency. On this interpretation, the distinction between health and pathology is less important than comparisons of functional efficiency, which are entirely independent of statistical considerations. The clarifications or revisions of the BST that this essay offers are (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12. Daniel M. Hausman, Reuben Stern & Naftali Weinberger (2014). Systems Without a Graphical Causal Representation. Synthese 191 (8):1925-1930.
    There are simple mechanical systems that elude causal representation. We describe one that cannot be represented in a single directed acyclic graph. Our case suggests limitations on the use of causal graphs for causal inference and makes salient the point that causal relations among variables depend upon details of causal setups, including values of variables.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  86
    Daniel M. Hausman (2010). Hedonism and Welfare Economics. Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):321-344.
    This essay criticizes the proposal recently defended by a number of prominent economists that welfare economics be redirected away from the satisfaction of people's preferences and toward making people happy instead. Although information about happiness may sometimes be of use, the notion of happiness is sufficiently ambiguous and the objections to identifying welfare with happiness are sufficiently serious that welfare economists are better off using preference satisfaction as a measure of welfare. The essay also examines and criticizes the position associated (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  14.  51
    Daniel M. Hausman (2007). What's Wrong with Health Inequalities? Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (1):46–66.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  15.  67
    Daniel M. Hausman (2005). Sympathy, Commitment, and Preference. Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):33-50.
    While very much in Sen's camp in rejecting revealed preference theory and emphasizing the complexity, incompleteness, and context dependence of preference and the intellectual costs of supposing that all the factors influencing choice can be captured by a single notion of preference, this essay contests his view that economists should recognize multiple notions of preference. It argues that Sen's concerns are better served by embracing a single conception of preference and insisting on the need for analysis of the multiple factors (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  16. Daniel M. Hausman (2011). A Lockean Argument for Universal Access to Health Care. Social Philosophy and Policy 28 (2):166-191.
    This essay defends the controversial and indeed counterintuitive claim that there is a good argument to be made from a Lockean perspective for government action to guarantee access to health care. The essay maintains that this argument is in some regards more robust than the well-known argument in defense of universal health care spelled out by Norman Daniels, which this essay also examines in some detail. Locke's view that government should protect people's lives, property, and freedom–where freedom is understood as (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Ole Fritjof Norheim, Trygve Ottersen, Bonah Chitah, Richard Cookson, Norman Daniels, Nir Eyal, Walter Flores, Axel Gosseries, Daniel Hausman, Samia Hurst, Lydia Kapiriri, Toby Ord, Shlomi Segall, Frehiwot Defaye & Alex Voorhoeve (2014). Making Fair Choices on the Path to Universal Health Coverage. World Health Organisation.
    This report by the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage addresses how countries can make fair progress towards the goal of universal coverage. It explains the relevant tradeoffs between different desirable ends and offers guidance on how to make these tradeoffs.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18.  64
    Daniel M. Hausman (2000). Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):99-115.
    The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  19. Daniel M. Hausman (1995). The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. Mind 104 (415):473-490.
  20.  12
    Daniel Hausman (2008). Protecting Groups From Genetic Research. Bioethics 22 (3):157–165.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  21.  20
    Daniel M. Hausman (2010). Probabilistic Causality and Causal Generalizations. In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer 47--63.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  22.  47
    Daniel M. Hausman (ed.) (2008). The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  23.  38
    Daniel Hausman & James Woodward (2004). Manipulation and the Causal Markov Condition. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):846-856.
    This paper explores the relationship between a manipulability conception of causation and the causal Markov condition (CM). We argue that violations of CM also violate widely shared expectations—implicit in the manipulability conception—having to do with the absence of spontaneous correlations. They also violate expectations concerning the connection between independence or dependence relationships in the presence and absence of interventions.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  24. Cheshire Calhoun, Mark LeBar, Matthew S. Bedke, Neil Levy & Daniel M. Hausman (2009). 10. Iakovos Vasiliou, Aiming at Virtue in Plato Iakovos Vasiliou, Aiming at Virtue in Plato (Pp. 796-800). In John Hawthorne (ed.), Ethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  25.  32
    Daniel M. Hausman (1992). Essays on Philosophy and Economic Methodology. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection brings together the essays of one of the foremost American philosophers of economics. Cumulatively they offer fresh perspectives on foundational questions such as: what sort of science is economics? and how successful can economists be in acquiring knowledge of their subject matter?
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  26. Daniel M. Hausman (2004). Polling and Public Policy. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):241-247.
    : This commentary distinguishes five reasons why one might want to conduct a survey concerning people's beliefs about death and the permissibility of harvesting organs: (1) simply to learn what people know and want; (2) to determine if current law and practice conform to the wishes of the population; (3) to determine the level of popular support for or opposition to policy changes; (4) to ascertain the causes and effects of popular beliefs and attitudes; and (5) to provide guidance in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  95
    Daniel M. Hausman & Matt Sensat Waldren (2011). Egalitarianism Reconsidered. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):567-586.
    This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O'Neill's “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,“ is that egalitarianism is better (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  40
    D. Hausman (1982). Constructive Empiricism Contested. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):21-28.
    Constructive empiricism, Bas van fraassen's new variety of anti-Realism, Maintains that science aims at empirically adequate, Rather than true theories and that, In fully accepting a theory, One should believe only that it is empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate just in case it has a model in which all observable phenomena may be embedded. I challenge van fraassen's main arguments and argue that the observable/unobservable distinction will not bear the weight that van fraassen places on it.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  29.  42
    Daniel M. Hausman (1998). Problems with Realism in Economics. Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):185.
    This essay attempts to distinguish the pressing issues for economists and economic methodologists concerning realism in economics from those issues that are of comparatively slight importance. In particular I shall argue that issues concerning the goals of science are of considerable interest in economics, unlike issues concerning the evidence for claims about unobservables, which have comparatively little relevance. In making this argument, this essay raises doubts about the two programs in contemporary economic methodology that raise the banner of realism. In (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  30.  5
    Daniel M. Hausman (2016). On the Econ Within. Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (1):26-32.
    This essay examines the critique of behavioral economics that Infante, Lecouteaux and Sugden offer in:"Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent.” It identifies and questions three main criticisms that ILS make: a methodological criticism, alleging that there is no psychological basis for the attribution of purified preferences, an epistemological criticism, alleging that there is little evidence for claims about purified preferences, and a normative criticism, arguing that policies should aim to facilitate people’s choices rather than to satisfy purified preferences. The (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  19
    Daniel M. Hausman (2006). Valuing Health. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (3):246–274.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  32.  17
    Daniel M. Hausman (2007). Group Risks, Risks to Groups, and Group Engagement in Genetics Research. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 17 (4):351-369.
    : This essay distinguishes between two kinds of group harms: harms to individuals in virtue of their membership in groups and harms to "structured" groups that have a continuing existence, an organization, and interests of their own. Genetic research creates risks of causing both kinds of group harms, and engagement with the groups at risk can help to mitigate those harms. The two kinds of group harms call for different kinds of group engagement.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  33.  59
    D. M. Hausman (2011). Mistakes About Preferences in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):3-25.
    Preferences are the central notion in mainstream economic theory, yet economists say little about what preferences are. This article argues that preferences in mainstream positive economics are comparative evaluations with respect to everything relevant to value or choice, and it argues against three mistaken views of preferences: (1) that they are matters of taste, concerning which rational assessment is inappropriate, (2) that preferences coincide with judgments of expected self-interested benefit, and (3) that preferences can be defined in terms of choices.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34. Daniel M. Hausman, Philosophy of Economics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35.  46
    Daniel M. Hausman (1981). John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Economics. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):363-385.
    John Stuart Mill regards economics as an inexact and separate science which employs a deductive method. This paper analyzes and restates Mill's views and considers whether they help one to understand philosophical peculiarities of contemporary microeconomic theory. The author concludes that it is philosophically enlightening to interpret microeconomics as an inexact and separate science, but that Mill's notion of a deductive method has only a little to contribute.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  36.  49
    Malcolm R. Forster, I. A. Kieseppä, Dan Hausman, Alexei Krioukov, Stephen Leeds, Alan Macdonald & Larry Shapiro (forthcoming). The Conceptual Role of 'Temperature'in Statistical Mechanics: Or How Probabilistic Averages Maximize Predictive Accuracy. Philosophy of Science.
  37.  80
    Daniel M. Hausman (2009). Equality of Autonomy. Ethics 119 (4):742-756.
  38.  98
    Daniel M. Hausman (1989). Are Markets Morally Free Zones? Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (4):317-333.
    Markets are central institutions in societies such as ours, and it seems appropriate to ask whether markets treat individuals justly or unjustly and whether choices individuals make concerning their market behavior are just or unjust. After all, markets influence most important features of our lives from the environment in which we live to the ways in which we find pleasure and fulfillment. Within market life we collectively determine the shape of human existence.<1>.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  39.  16
    Daniel M. Hausman (2015). Much Ado About Models. Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (2):241-246.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  38
    David B. Hausman (1978). The Paradox of Teleological Ascription. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 3 (2):144-157.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  26
    Daniel M. Hausman, Yukiko Asada & Thomas Hedemann (2002). Health Inequalities and Why They Matter. Health Care Analysis 10 (2):177-191.
    Health inequalities are of concern both becausestudying them may help one learn how to improvehealth and because health inequalities may beunjust. This paper argues that attending tothese reasons why health inequalities may beimportant undercuts the claims of researchersat the World Health Organization in favor offocusing on individual health variation ratherthan on social group health differences. Inequalities in individual health are of littleinterest unless one goes on to study how theyare related to other factors.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  42.  31
    Daniel M. Hausman (1997). Causation, Agency, and Independence. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):25.
    This paper explores versions of agency or manipulability theories of causation and argues that they are unacceptable both for the well-known reasons of their anthropomorphism, limited scope, and circularity and because they are subsumed by an alternative "independence" theory of causation, which is free of these difficulties.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  43.  56
    Daniel M. Hausman (1992). Thresholds, Transitivity, Overdetermination, and Events. Analysis 52 (3):159 - 163.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44.  95
    Daniel M. Hausman (2015). Equality Versus Priority: A Misleading Distinction. Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):229-238.
    People condemn inequalities for many reasons. For example, many who have no concern with distribution per se criticize inequalities in health care, because these inequalities lessen the benefits provided by the resources that are devoted to health care. Others who place no intrinsic value on distribution believe that a just society must show a special concern for those who are worst off. Some people, on the other hand, do place an intrinsic value on equality of distribution, regardless of its contribution (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  27
    Daniel Hausman (2013). Motives and Markets in Health Care. Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (2):64-84.
    The truth about health care policy lies between two exaggerated views: a market view in which individuals purchase their own health care from profit maximizing health-care firms and a control view in which costs are controlled by regulations limiting which treatments health insurance will pay for. This essay suggests a way to avoid on the one hand the suffering, unfairness, and abandonment of solidarity entailed by the market view and, on the other hand, to diminish the inflexibility and inefficiency of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  47
    Daniel M. Hausman (1988). Ceteris Paribus Clauses and Causality in Economics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:308 - 316.
    In this paper I distinguish the kind of ceteris paribus qualifications that often attach to derivative generalizations from those which typically attach to fundamental laws and argue that the latter are typically more tractable. I provide a sketch of a semantics for qualified generalizations and an account of how they may be justified. In addition I argue that legitimate uses of ceteris paribus qualifications must satisfy specific causal conditions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47.  18
    Daniel M. Hausman (1986). Causation and Experimentation. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):143 - 154.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  48.  16
    Daniel M. Hausman (1997). Theory Appraisal in Neoclassical Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (2):289-296.
    After answering relatively minor criticisms of The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics by Geert Reuten and Uskali Mäki, this essay grants their main charge that I could not sensibly defend the way economists assess theories while at the same time criticizing their insistence that economic theories be unified and of maximal scope. I should have said that economists are mistaken in their methods of assessment because they focus on the wrong data and because they unjustifiably insist that only unified (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49.  14
    Daniel M. Hausman, Reuben Stern & Naftali Weinberger (2015). Erratum To: Systems Without a Graphical Causal Representation. Synthese 192 (9):3053-3053.
    Erratum to: Synthese 191:1925–1930 DOI:10.1007/s11229-013-0380-3 The authors were unaware that points in their article appeared in “Caveats for Causal Reasoning with Equilibrium Models,” by Denver Dash and Marek Druzdzel, published in S. Benferhat and P. Besnard : European Conferences on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty 2001, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2143, pp. 192–203. The authors were unaware of this essay and would like to apologize to the authors for failing to cite their excellent work.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. DM Hausman (1997). Discussion. The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons - a Reply. Mind 106 (421):99-100.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 173