In this paper, the problem of correct ascriptions of consciousness to patients in neurological intensive care medicine is explored as a special case of the general philosophical other minds problem. It is argued that although clinical ascriptions of consciousness and coma are mostly based on behavioral evidence, a behaviorist epistemology of other minds is not likely to succeed. To illustrate this, the so-called total locked-in syndrome, in which preserved consciousness is combined with a total loss of motor abilities due to (...) a lower ventral brain stem lesion, is presented as a touchstone for behaviorism. It is argued that this example of consciousness without behavioral expression does not disprove behaviorism specifically, but rather illustrates the need for a non-verificationist theory of other minds. It is further argued that a folk version of such a theory already underlies our factual ascriptions of consciousness in clinical contexts. Finally, a non-behaviorist theory of other minds for patients with total locked-in syndrome is outlined. (shrink)

The role of scientific theories in classifying plants and animals is traced from Hennig's phylogenetics and the evolutionary taxonomy of Simpson and Mayr, through numerical phenetics, to present-day cladistics. Hennig limited biological classification to sister groups so that this one relation can be expressed unambiguously in classifications. Simpson and Mayr were willing to sacrifice precision in representation in order to include additional features of evolution in the construction of classifications. In order to make classifications more objective, precise and quantitative, numerical (...) pheneticists limited themselves to representing degrees of phenetic similarity. Finally, present-day cladists can be separated into phylogenetic cladists, who retain much of Hennig's theory of classification, and pattern cladists, who have stripped Hennig's system down to its bare essentials. (shrink)

Brandt's purpose is to clarify and help resolve the fundamental issues of moral philosophy by using "non-traditional types of evidence and non-traditional argument." Observing the deficiencies of common approaches to morality that build on alleged linguistic or moral "intuitions", he proposes instead to build on the findings of "contemporary psychology." Despite the promised novelty of Brandt's approach, however, his ultimate substantive findings differ relatively little from those of other contemporary Anglo-American writers on moral philosophy such as Rawls, and his method (...) of arguing for them suffers from some of the same defects that characterize more overtly intuitionistic approaches. (shrink)

Jacob Klein used to say that he learned something from Heidegger "that what another man had thought and written might actually and genuinely be understood". This characteristically understated view means, not only that intersubjectivity is possible, but more, that we have access to our past. Objectivity, and thus liberating education, is possible in a world which seems to preclude it. This made for a life of learning and teaching and Saint John’s College, Annapolis. It is thus correct that a festschrift (...) honoring his contribution be published. (shrink)

The author of this study aims to provide a synthetic survey of Diderot’s philosophy, as distinguished from the numerous analytic studies that have been made of particular aspects of the Frenchman’s thought. The central thread uniting Diderot’s various works, Crocker contends, is a view of the universe as comprising simultaneously both order and disorder in an ineluctable tension. In the initial chapter, Crocker outlines this rather loose theme by examining Diderot’s "dynamic" conception of the physical universe and man’s ambiguous relation (...) to it. The theme is elucidated in succeeding chapters devoted, respectively, to Diderot’s aesthetic theories, his view of morality, and his political thought. Crocker stresses the evolution of Diderot’s thought on these subjects as a consequence of the very intractability of the central problem that concerned him. Although Diderot often contradicted himself, the author concludes, his self-contradictions were a reflection of the contradictory nature of reality as perceived by both Diderot and the author. (shrink)

This first volume of a projected trilogy seeks to initiate a new style of philosophizing—a nonreductive philosophical psychohistory—that sees the work of great thinkers as mirrors of their minds. It is especially instructive to learn, Kaufmann argues, how even the greatest thinkers have "fallen pitifully short" of philosophy’s central function set out by the Delphic prescription "Know Thyself.".

This collection of nine previously unpublished papers is a valuable and important addition to current discussions of free action. Each of the essays deserves, and will no doubt get, careful attention, but those by Donald Davidson, D. C. Dennett and David Pears will probably attract most interest. Davidson suggests that freedom to act be construed as a causal power of the agent, and offers in clarification an analysis of "can" in terms of what the agent will do given desires and (...) beliefs which "rationalize" that action. His discussion throws fresh light on hypothetical, and other, analyses of "can," but Davidson eventually rejects his own suggested analysis, thus leaving obscure the original claim that freedom to act is a causal power. Dennett approaches in a fresh way, based on a distinction between the different stances we might adopt to appropriately functioning entities, the question of the relation between mechanical and rational explanations of behavior. He argues that the two are compatible, and that while certain mechanical explanations may conflict with the ascription of responsibility, this is not always or necessarily the case. Pears argues against the view that explanation in terms of reasons and desires cannot be construed deterministically, concentrating on the issue of whether such explanation presupposes empirical generalizations linking reasons with actions. This complex and often obscure discussion touches on a variety of important topics, among them the difference between production and mere succession, and the extent to which our knowledge of our own reasons is immune from error. (shrink)

Vinit Haksar has written a fairly lengthy book in order to establish a rather simple point : that it is impossible to arrive at an adequate account of justice without judging the objective merit of alternative ways of life. The main target of his argument is John Rawls, whose influential A Theory of Justice purports to sever considerations of justice from those of the human good in precisely this way. Haksar’s argument is also intended, however, as a criticism of the (...) views of such other contemporary liberal theorists as Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick. (shrink)

These are eleven previously-published essays, revised to varying degrees, on topics central in recent philosophy of action. As with most articles they tend to concentrate on points of detail, or particular disagreements with other writers, and despite an introductory essay which attempts to relate the issues discussed to each other, and to locate them in the general field of contemporary action theory, this will not serve as an introduction to the subject for the novice. Some of the essays are on (...) relatively minor, if still interesting, points: whether we can intend to do what we believe to be impossible; whether we can forecast our own decisions, as opposed to deciding in advance. One essay opens with the difficult but important question of how far the fact that a man cannot choose to do something means that he cannot do it, turns out to be a discussion of such incidentals as whether decisions can be accidental, involuntary, or dependent on authority, permission or special skills, as actions may be. Other essays usefully criticize the notion of agent-causality, and H. L. A. Hart’s account of strict liability, and they discuss the extent to which actions may be explained non-causally, and the extent to which our knowledge of our own actions is non-observational. (shrink)

This book would more aptly, if wordily, have been subtitled "An Introduction to Contemporary Liberal, Anglo-American Political Philosophy." The author’s purpose is "to bring within a single focus the main lines of thinking in the recent welter of speculation on social justice" as set forth by such scholars as John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Kenneth Arrow. Pettit’s conception of political philosophy, his selection of views to be considered, and his judgments of those views are bounded by political assumptions derived from (...) liberal egalitarianism, and methodological premises characteristic of the "analytic" school of philosophy: Marxist thought is barely alluded to, and there is no reference to the work of such radically different thinkers as Martin Heidegger or Leo Strauss. (shrink)

A defense of Kant’s moral philosophy. The author seeks to counteract those interpretations of Kant that restrict their focus to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. He argues that one must look at the whole of Kant’s writings, the earlier and later ethical writings as well as the theoretical works. This makes it possible for him to challenge the popular misconceptions of Kant’s teaching: the overemphasis on the correct motive of an action, the mistaken impression that consequences are of (...) no consequence when evaluating the moral worth of an act, and the overattention paid to logical contradiction as the test of a maxim’s morality. The Groundwork is not simply a conclusion of Kant’s early reflections on morality, but it also represents a new departure whose full significance is not seen until the later works. With the Groundwork Kant realizes that morality cannot be established on the grounds set out by the Critique of Pure Reason but requires an independent foundation. His new concept of practical necessity represents a revolution in morality. It is a mistake, then, to read the practical philosophy solely in the light of the theoretical critique. Though founded on a blind "fact of reason," Kant’s teaching is yet not abstract, overly formalistic, or rigoristic. "One must go through all the different formulas [of the categorical imperative] to understand the concept of moral judgment". Rossvaer’s rethinking brings him to stress that "the categorical imperative has no validity beyond being the form of... sensuous striving". This contention that the intellectual and sensuous faculties are not to be radically divorced leads to the ultimate intent of Rossvaer’s work. He argues that the categorical imperative is a principle of execution and only assumes its fullest form in a social philosophy. Consideration of Kant’s notion of the highest good, especially as it is developed in the later works on religion and history, allows Rossvaer to argue for the social and historical relevance of Kant’s teaching. "Since the highest good cannot be justified within an individualistic perspective, but only within a philosophy which takes up society as a problem, morality is meaningless from a human point of view unless we consider ourselves obligated to realize a universal, ethical community". With this, the kingdom of ends is transformed into an historical idealism, practical philosophy becomes a theory of action, and Kant turns out to be not so different from his detractors, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Habermas, and others. Yet the historicization of the moral agent is yet not complete in Kant. The moral agent retains his critical standpoint, that is the distinction between rationality and the social system. Yet one is brought to ask how this critical distance can be maintained. To what extent does Kant’s overstepping the bounds of theoretical reason also entail the loss of that critical validity won by the first Critique? And, if one is forced in the end to justify one’s practical philosophy only by a social philosophy which does not find its foundation in a theoretical critique, then is the original fear of the first Critique confirmed, that morality may be meaningless after all? (shrink)

Four theories of political obligation are here subjected to meticulous scrutiny and found wanting, from which "We must conclude," Simmons says, "that citizens generally have no special political bonds which require that they obey and support the governments of their countries of residence". The four are consent theory, fairness theory, the natural duty of justice, and gratitude theory. As Simmons acknowledges, all four "fall squarely within the mainstream of liberal political theory", and the question is, how does Simmons draw his (...) sweeping conclusion from so limited a study? The answer is that he has arrived at the four "most plausible" theories by a process of elimination. Utilitarianism is eliminated because act utilitarianism cannot account for obligation of the sort required, while rule utilitarianism has been shown to be incoherent. The "linguistic front" is eliminated because its contention that obedience to and support of "legitimate government" are tautological begs the real questions. Finally, "a large number of widely supported answers to questions about political obligation" are eliminated by a requirement of theories of such obligation that Simmons formulates as the "particularity requirement". What remain are the four theories within the liberal mainstream, to each of which Simmons directs skillful analysis. (shrink)

A well-known biologist tries to show in this book that the effort to understand living things mechanistically is utterly frustrated by new discoveries in genetics and ethology. In opposition to Jacques Monod, Thorpe argues that purpose and mind rather than chance and necessity rule the world. His last chapter is called "The Primacy of ‘Mind’ in Nature"—a title somewhat out of keeping with that of the book as a whole. The latter seems to set the problem, the former the solution.

This work is part of the Arguments of the Philosophers series that aims to give a contemporary analytic assessment of "the great and influential philosophers". With Schopenhauer, however, the series runs up against an unruly subject overtly critical of analytic methods as unrevealing. In view of this he may well appear to be a "not very systematic thinker." It is Hamlyn's task, then, to try to isolate the main argument of his work--which he does by means of "reconstruction" and analysis (...) of "plausible hypotheses" --in order to bring us to see that Schopenhauer was both "a great mind indeed" and also a fit subject for exposition in this series. (shrink)

Bursill-Hall, writing as a linguist, has produced a book of interest and use to all students of philosophy who are intrigued either by medieval or by modern theories of language, or by both. Bursill-Hall’s book is the first full-length presentation of this material in English. After a brief, not to say, desultory, survey of the history of linguistic theory from the Greeks until the appearance of the so-called Modistae, the author discusses the descriptive technique and the terminology of the speculative (...) grammarians. The third chapter, "Metalanguage," offers a valuable analysis of the basic "elements" and "categories" of modistic grammar. One especially striking feature of this chapter is the author’s account of the sequence of operations through which a vox, or meaningless sound, becomes, first, a dictio, or sound capable of signifying, and, then, a pars orationis, a part of speech or word-class, capable of entering into syntactic relations with other partes orationis so as to produce a meaningful and well-formed sentence. The next four chapters form the core of the work. Taking as his primary sources the Belgian Siger of Courtrai, the German Thomas of Erfurt, and the Dane Martin of Dacia, Bursill-Hall expounds in detail the modistic treatments of the essential, specific and accidental features of the declinable and indeclinable word-classes and the modistic theories of syntax. An evaluative conclusion comparing modistic and modern linguistic theory is followed by a series of appendices in which detailed diagrams make visible the definitions and interrelations of the various modes and partes orationis in the texts of Siger, Thomas and Martin. The work includes a useful bibliography, a table of passages cited from medieval authors, an index of examples cited in the main text, an index of names and an index of subjects. The exposition and the apparatus combine to yield a volume of quickly apparent value for both reference and research. This said, and with due regard for the fact that the author is writing as a professional linguist, it must be said that a certain sense of philosophical disappointment cannot be suppressed. Looked at linguistically, speculative grammar is an attempt to inventory and describe those features of word-classes in virtue of which an element of language is potentially expressive of meaning and capable of entering into syntactic relations with other significant elements. Looked at philosophically, speculative grammar is a theory of the intelligibility of linguistic expressions—cp. Thomas of Erfurt, #225: the end served by a complete expression is "to express a composite mental concept and to generate a perfect understanding in the mind of the hearer." Intelligibility is seen in this theory as the product of the concurrence or interpenetration of the ontological constitution of extramental realities, the apprehensive powers of the intellect and the manners of signifying conferred by the intellect on the linguistic medium in accordance with its appreciation of extramental reality. The author is certainly aware of the philosophical matrix of the grammatical theories he rehearses. At the same time, he seems to give these underlying philosophical considerations rather short shrift. To say, as he does, that the Modistae "seem to have been unaware of... the fact that their theories were in fact a projection into reality of the basic patterns of the language in which they were expressed," is surely not to do justice to the complex ontological, epistemological and semantic issues informing their work. Similarly, a statement that comparison between modistic and modern theories faces the difficulty that "the medieval vision of man in his environment and the metaphysical theories of the world are entirely different from those of today" is, at best, uninformative and, at worst, a piece of vaporous historicism. At other times, it is not entirely clear what interpretation the author is recommending. This is especially true of his remarks about the inactive character of the modus intelligendi. While the Modistae were, after all, doing grammar and not epistemology or, should one say, rational psychology, still, their grammatical theory rests on their insistence that the forms of language are linked appropriately to the forms of being and it is the modus intelligendi activus that is responsible both for the possibility and the success of this linkage. This volume is well-produced and almost completely free of misprints. However, the obnoxiously high price asked by the publisher is not justified either by the quality of production or by the inclusion of numerous Latin citations; it only serves, I fear, as a barrier to the wide circulation the book deserves.—D. L. (shrink)

There is a widespread disagreement, Drucker observes, about "what an ideology is." He proposes to cast light on the subject, not by proffering his own definition, but by showing that the diversity of opinion about the meaning of ideology is itself the product of differing ideological points of view. Part I of the book describes "the various definitions of ideology which occur in writing directed primarily to intellectual audiences," notably the views of Destutt de Tracy, Marx, Comte, and several contemporary (...) sociologists. In Part II the author examines four individual examples of "manifestly ideological" writing: Milton’s Areopagitica, Paine’s Common Sense, Comte’s Appeal to Conservatives, and Koestler’s Darkness at Noon. The third and concluding section of the book argues "that the various notions of ideology current today fit easily into the scheme of one or other" of three ideologies: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Marxism. (shrink)

Charvet presents a "critical reconstruction" of Rousseau’s argument in the Second Discourse, Emile, and the Social Contract, in order to elucidate the French philosopher’s thought about the problem of "the individual’s relation to others in society." While the book is devoid of reference to other works of Rousseau scholarship, this seeming lack helps to give Charvet’s critical work a refreshing clarity and directness.