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Doris Olin [13]D. Olin [1]
  1. B. D. Katz & D. Olin (2010). Conditionals, Probabilities, and Utilities: More on Two Envelopes. Mind 119 (473):171-183.
    Sutton ( 2010 ) claims that on our analysis (2007), the problem in the two-envelope paradox is an error in counterfactual reasoning. In fact, we distinguish two formulations of the paradox, only one of which, on our account, involves an error in conditional reasoning. According to Sutton, it is conditional probabilities rather than subjunctive conditionals that are essential to the problem. We argue, however, that his strategy for assigning utilities on the basis of conditional probabilities leads to absurdity. In addition, (...)
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  2. Bernard D. Katz & Doris Olin (2007). A Tale of Two Envelopes. Mind 116 (464):903-926.
    This paper deals with the two-envelope paradox. Two main formulations of the paradoxical reasoning are distinguished, which differ according to the partition of possibilities employed. We argue that in the first formulation the conditionals required for the utility assignment are problematic; the error is identified as a fallacy of conditional reasoning. We go on to consider the second formulation, where the epistemic status of certain singular propositions becomes relevant; our diagnosis is that the states considered do not exhaust the possibilities. (...)
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  3. Doris Olin (2005). A Case Against Closure. Veritas 50 (4).
    Este artigo examina a objeção ao fechamento [dedutivo] que surge no contexto de certos paradoxos epistêmicos, paradoxos cuja conclusão é que a crença justificada pode ser inconsistente. É universalmente aceito que, se essa conclusão é correta, o fechamento deve ser rejeitado, para que se evite a crença justificada em enunciados contraditórios (P, ~P). Mas, mesmo que os argumentos desses paradoxos – o paradoxo da falibilidade (do prefácio) e o paradoxo da loteria – sejam mal-sucedidos, eles, ainda assim, sugerem a existência (...)
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  4. Doris Olin (2003). Paradox. Acumen.
    An in-depth examination of paradoxes and the philosophical issues they raise.
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  5. William James & Doris Olin (eds.) (1992). William James: Pragmatism, in Focus. Routledge.
    The original 1907 text is accompanied with a series of critical essays from scholars including Moore and Russell.
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  6. Doris Olin (1989). The Fallibility Argument for Inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 56 (1):95 - 102.
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  7. Doris Olin (1988). Predictions, Intentions and the Prisoner's Dilemma. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):111-116.
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  8. Doris Olin (1987). On an Epistemic Paradox. Analysis 47 (4):216 - 217.
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  9. Doris Olin (1986). On a Paradoxical Train of Thought. Analysis 46 (1):18 - 20.
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  10. Doris Olin (1986). The Prediction Paradox: Resolving Recalcitrant Variations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):181 – 189.
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  11. Doris Olin (1983). The Prediction Paradox Resolved. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):225 - 233.
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  12. Doris Olin (1978). Newcomb's Problem, Dominance and Expected Utility. In. In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. 385--398.
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  13. Doris Olin (1976). Knowledge and Defeasible Justification. Philosophical Studies 30 (2):129 - 136.
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  14. Doris Olin (1976). Newcomb's Problem: Further Investigations. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):129 - 133.
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