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Profile: Derk Pereboom (Cornell University)
  1. Derk Pereboom (web). A Compatibilist Theory of the Beliefs Required for Rational Deliberation. Journal of Ethics.
     
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  2. Gunnar Björnsson & Derk Pereboom (forthcoming). Comments on Eddy Nahmias, “Is Free Will an Illusion?”. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4. MIT Press.
    Discusses Eddy Nahmias' “Is Free Will an Illusion?”.
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  3. Derk Pereboom (forthcoming). Powers, Laws and Freedom of the Will. Metascience:1-5.
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  4. Michael McKenna & Derk Pereboom (2015). Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge.
    If my ability to react freely is constrained by forces beyond my control, am I still morally responsible for the things I do? The question of whether, how and to what extent we are responsible for our own actions has always been central to debates in philosophy and theology, and has been the subject of much recent research in cognitive science. And for good reason- the views we take on free will affect the choices we make as individuals, the moral (...)
     
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  5. Derk Pereboom (2014). Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oup Oxford.
    Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life.
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  6. Susan Blackmore, Thomas W. Clark, Mark Hallett, John-Dylan Haynes, Ted Honderich, Neil Levy, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Shaun Nichols, Michael Pauen, Derk Pereboom, Susan Pockett, Maureen Sie, Saul Smilansky, Galen Strawson, Daniela Goya Tocchetto, Manuel Vargas, Benjamin Vilhauer & Bruce Waller (2013). Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
     
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  7. D. Pereboom & M. M. S. K. Sie (2013). Introduction. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):97-100.
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  8. Derk Pereboom (2013). Free Will. In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press.
     
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  9. Derk Pereboom (2013). Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Punishment. In Thomas A. Nadelhoffer (ed.), The Future of Punishment. Oup Usa. 49.
  10. Derk Pereboom (2013). Optimistic Skepticism About Free Will. In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. Oup Usa. 421.
  11. Derk Pereboom (2013). Précis of Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):715-727.
    Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism has three parts. The first (Chapters 1–4) develops a response to the knowledge and conceivability arguments against physicalism, one that features the open possibility that introspective representations represent mental properties as having features they actually lack. The second part (Chapters 5 and 6) proposes a physicalist version of a Russellian Monist answer to these arguments, the core of which is that currently unknown intrinsic physical properties provide categorical bases for known physical properties and also (...)
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  12. Derk Pereboom (2013). Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):753-764.
     
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  13. Derk Pereboom (2013). Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. 40.
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  14. Derk Pereboom (2013). Replies to Daniel Stoljar, Robert Adams, and Lynne Baker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):753-764.
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  15. Derk Pereboom (2013). Skepticism About Free Will. In Gregg Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books. 19.
  16. Derk Pereboom & Maureen Sie (2013). Introduction. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):97-100.
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  17. Derk Pereboom (2012). Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection1. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.
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  18. Derk Pereboom (2012). On Fischer's Our Stories. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 158 (3):523-528.
    On Fischer’s Our Stories Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9670-5 Authors Derk Pereboom, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Ithaca, NY 14850, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  19. Derk Pereboom (2012). The Disappearing Agent Objection to Event-Causal Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies (1):1-11.
    The question I raise is whether Mark Balaguer’s event-causal libertarianism can withstand the disappearing agent objection. The concern is that with the causal role of the events antecedent to a decision already given, nothing settles whether the decision occurs, and so the agent does not settle whether the decision occurs. Thus it would seem that in this view the agent will not have the control in making decisions required for moral responsibility. I examine whether Balaguer’s position has the resources to (...)
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  20. Derk Pereboom (2011). And Divine Providence. In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oup Oxford. 262.
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  21. Derk Pereboom (2011). Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed. The first exploits the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental properties as they are in themselves; specifically, that introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, which these properties might actually lack. The second response draws on the proposal that currently unknown fundamental intrinsic (...)
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  22. Derk Pereboom (2011). Free Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life. In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
  23. Derk Pereboom (2011). Theological Determinism and Divine Providence. In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford University Press.
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  24. Andrew Chignell & Derk Pereboom (2010). Kant's Theory of Causation and its Eighteenth-Century German Background. Philosophical Review 119 (4):565-591.
    This critical notice highlights the important contributions that Eric Watkins's writings have made to our understanding of theories about causation developed in eighteenth-century German philosophy and by Kant in particular. Watkins provides a convincing argument that central to Kant's theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn't reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and non-Leibnizean because it doesn't reduce to logical or conceptual relations. However, we (...)
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  25. Derk Pereboom (2010). Structuralism, Anti-Structuralism, and Objectivity. Philosophic Exchanges 40:45-59.
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  26. Kit Fine, David Kaplan, D. A. Martin, Derk Pereboom, David Sanson & Luca Struble (2009). Production and Necessity. Philosophical Review 118 (2).
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  27. D. Pereboom (2009). Can God Be Free? Philosophical Review 118 (1):121-127.
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  28. Derk Pereboom (2009). Book Review. Can God Be Free? William Rowe. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 118 (1):121-27.
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  29. Derk Pereboom (2009). Consciousness and Introspective Inaccuracy. In Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. Oxford University Press.
  30. Derk Pereboom (2009). Can God Be Free? Philosophical Review 118 (1):121-127.
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  31. Derk Pereboom (2009). Further Thoughts About a Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.
    I have presented a Frankfurt-style argument (Pereboom 2000, 2001, 2003) against the requirement of robust alternative possibilities for moral responsibility that features an example, Tax Evasion , in which an agent is intuitively morally responsible for a decision, has no robust alternative possibilities, and is clearly not causally determined to make the decision. Here I revise the criterion for robustness in response to suggestions by Dana Nelkin, Jonathan Vance, and Kevin Timpe, and I respond to objections to the argument by (...)
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  32. Derk Pereboom (2009). Free Will, Love and Anger. Ideas y Valores 141 (141):5-25.
    I have argued we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, while at the same time a conception of life without this type of free will would not be devastating to morality or to our sense of meaning in life, and in certain respects it may even be beneficial (cf. Pereboom 2001). In ..
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  33. Derk Pereboom (2009). Hard Incompatibilism and its Rivals. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.
    In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his (...)
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  34. Derk Pereboom (2009). Kant's Transcendental Arguments. In Edward Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford.
  35. Derk Pereboom (2008). A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):287 - 306.
    A traditional concern for determinists is that the epistemic conditions an agent must satisfy to deliberate about which of a number of distinct actions to perform threaten to conflict with a belief in determinism and its evident consequences. I develop an account of the sort that specifies two epistemic requirements, an epistemic openness condition and a belief in the efficacy of deliberation, whose upshot is that someone who believes in determinism and its evident consequences can deliberate without inconsistent beliefs. I (...)
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  36. Derk Pereboom (2008). A Hard-Line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):160-170.
  37. Derk Pereboom (2008). Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again. In Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (eds.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars. 1--33.
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  38. Derk Pereboom (2007). John Martin Fischer, My Way:My Way. Ethics 117 (4):754-757.
  39. Derk Pereboom (2007). Book Review. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Randolph Clarke. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74:269-72.
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  40. Derk Pereboom (2007). Book Review. My Way. John Martin Fischer. [REVIEW] Ethics 117 (4):754-57.
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  41. Derk Pereboom (2007). Hard Incompatibilism. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..
     
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  42. Derk Pereboom (2007). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):269–272.
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  43. Derk Pereboom (2007). On Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.
    I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism.
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  44. Derk Pereboom (2007). Response to Kane, Fischer, and Vargas. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub..
  45. Derk Pereboom (2006). Reasons-Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities, and Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism: Reflections on John Martin Fischer's My Way. Philosophical Books 47 (3):198-212.
  46. Derk Pereboom (2006). Kant on Transcendental Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):537-567.
    Transcendental freedom consists in the power of agents to produce actions without being causally determined by antecedent conditions, nor by their natures, in exercising this power. Kant contends that we cannot establish whether we are actually or even possibly free in this sense. He claims only that our conception of being transcendentally free involves no inconsistency, but that as a result the belief that we have this freedom meets a pertinent standard of minimal credibility. For the rest, its justification depends (...)
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  47. Derk Pereboom (2006). The Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions. In Graham Bird (ed.), A Companion to Kant. Blackwell.
  48. Derk Pereboom (2005). Defending Hard Incompatibilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.
    In _Living Without Free Will_, I develop and argue for a view according to which our being morally responsible would be ruled out if determinism were true, and also if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively events.1 Absent agent causation, indeterministic causal histories are as threatening to moral responsibility as deterministic histories are, and a generalization argument from manipulation cases shows that deterministic histories indeed undermine moral responsibility. Agent causation has not been ruled out as (...)
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  49. Derk Pereboom (2005). Free Will, Evil, and Divine Providence. In Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press.
  50. Derk Pereboom (2004). Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent? Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):275-286.
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