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Derk Pereboom [99]Dirk Pereboom [4]D. Pereboom [2]
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Profile: Derk Pereboom (Cornell University)
  1. Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
    Most people assume that, even though some degenerative or criminal behavior may be caused by influences beyond our control, ordinary human actions are not similarly generated, but rather are freely chosen, and we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for them. A less popular and more radical claim is that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform. It is this hard determinist stance that Derk Pereboom articulates in Living Without Free Will. Pereboom argues that our best scientific (...)
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  2.  57
    Derk Pereboom (2014). Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. OUP Oxford.
    Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life.
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  3.  40
    Derk Pereboom (2011). Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed. The first exploits the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental properties as they are in themselves; specifically, that introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, which these properties might actually lack. The second response draws on the proposal that currently unknown fundamental intrinsic (...)
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  4.  29
    Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (forthcoming). Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life. In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press
    As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some (...)
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  5. Derk Pereboom (2007). Hard Incompatibilism. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub.
     
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  6. Derk Pereboom (2002). Robust Nonreductive Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 99 (10):499-531.
  7. Derk Pereboom (2005). Defending Hard Incompatibilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.
    In _Living Without Free Will_, I develop and argue for a view according to which our being morally responsible would be ruled out if determinism were true, and also if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively events.1 Absent agent causation, indeterministic causal histories are as threatening to moral responsibility as deterministic histories are, and a generalization argument from manipulation cases shows that deterministic histories indeed undermine moral responsibility. Agent causation has not been ruled out as (...)
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  8. Derk Pereboom (2004). Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent? Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):275-286.
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  9.  67
    Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (forthcoming). Hard-Incompatbilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life. In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press
  10. Derk Pereboom (2008). A Hard-Line Reply to the Multiple-Case Manipulation Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):160-170.
  11. Derk Pereboom (1995). Determinism Al Dente. Noûs 29 (1):21-45.
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  12.  43
    Derk Pereboom (2000). Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories. Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):119-138.
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  13. Derk Pereboom & Hilary Kornblith (1991). The Metaphysics of Irreducibility. Philosophical Studies 63 (August):125-45.
    During the 'sixties and 'seventies, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and Richard Boyd, among others, developed a type of materialism that eschews reductionist claims.1 In this view, explana- tions, natural kinds, and properties in psychology do not reduce to counterparts in more basic sciences, such as neurophysiology or physics. Nevertheless, all token psychological entities-- states, processes, and faculties--are wholly constituted of physical entities, ultimately out of entities over which microphysics quantifies. This view quickly became the standard position in philosophy of mind, (...)
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  14. Gunnar Björnsson & Derk Pereboom (forthcoming). Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility. In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Blackwell
    Examines the relevance of empirical studies of responsibility judgments for traditional philosophical concerns about free will and moral responsibility. We argue that experimental philosophy is relevant to the traditional debates, but that setting up experiments and interpreting data in just the right way is no less difficult than negotiating traditional philosophical arguments. Both routes are valuable, but so far neither promises a way to secure significant agreement among the competing parties. To illustrate, we focus on three sorts of issues. For (...)
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  15.  82
    Derk Pereboom (2009). Further Thoughts About a Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.
    I have presented a Frankfurt-style argument (Pereboom 2000, 2001, 2003) against the requirement of robust alternative possibilities for moral responsibility that features an example, Tax Evasion , in which an agent is intuitively morally responsible for a decision, has no robust alternative possibilities, and is clearly not causally determined to make the decision. Here I revise the criterion for robustness in response to suggestions by Dana Nelkin, Jonathan Vance, and Kevin Timpe, and I respond to objections to the argument by (...)
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  16. Derk Pereboom (2008). Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again. In Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (eds.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars 1--33.
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  17.  56
    Derk Pereboom (2012). Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection1. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.
  18. John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas (2007). Four Views on Free Will. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moral responsibility, and determinism, this text represents the most up-to-date account of the four major positions in the free will debate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’s explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader (...)
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  19. Derk Pereboom (2012). The Disappearing Agent Objection to Event-Causal Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies (1):1-11.
    The question I raise is whether Mark Balaguer’s event-causal libertarianism can withstand the disappearing agent objection. The concern is that with the causal role of the events antecedent to a decision already given, nothing settles whether the decision occurs, and so the agent does not settle whether the decision occurs. Thus it would seem that in this view the agent will not have the control in making decisions required for moral responsibility. I examine whether Balaguer’s position has the resources to (...)
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  20. Derk Pereboom (2006). Kant on Transcendental Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):537-567.
    Transcendental freedom consists in the power of agents to produce actions without being causally determined by antecedent conditions, nor by their natures, in exercising this power. Kant contends that we cannot establish whether we are actually or even possibly free in this sense. He claims only that our conception of being transcendentally free involves no inconsistency, but that as a result the belief that we have this freedom meets a pertinent standard of minimal credibility. For the rest, its justification depends (...)
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  21. Derk Pereboom (2002). Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Journal of Ethics. Oxford University Press 477-488.
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  22.  41
    Derk Pereboom (2006). Reasons-Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities, and Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism: Reflections on John Martin Fischer's My Way. Philosophical Books 47 (3):198-212.
  23.  69
    Derk Pereboom (2011). Free Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life. In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press
  24. Derk Pereboom (2003). Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities. In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate 184--199.
    The claim that moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent could have done otherwise is surely attractive. Moreover, it seems reasonable to contend that a requirement of this sort is not merely a necessary condition of little consequence, but that it plays a decisive role in explaining an agent's moral responsibility for an action. For if an agent is to be blameworthy for an action, it seems crucial that she could have done something to avoid this blameworthiness. If (...)
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  25.  96
    Derk Pereboom (2007). On Alfred Mele's Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):163 – 172.
    I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism.
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  26.  46
    Derk Pereboom (2009). Free Will, Love and Anger. Ideas Y Valores 141 (141):5-25.
    I have argued we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, while at the same time a conception of life without this type of free will would not be devastating to morality or to our sense of meaning in life, and in certain respects it may even be beneficial (cf. Pereboom 2001). In ..
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  27. Derk Pereboom (2009). Hard Incompatibilism and its Rivals. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.
    In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his (...)
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  28.  76
    Derk Pereboom (2008). A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):287 - 306.
    A traditional concern for determinists is that the epistemic conditions an agent must satisfy to deliberate about which of a number of distinct actions to perform threaten to conflict with a belief in determinism and its evident consequences. I develop an account of the sort that specifies two epistemic requirements, an epistemic openness condition and a belief in the efficacy of deliberation, whose upshot is that someone who believes in determinism and its evident consequences can deliberate without inconsistent beliefs. I (...)
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  29.  50
    Derk Pereboom (2013). Optimistic Skepticism About Free Will. In Paul Russell & Oisin Deery (eds.), The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings From the Contemporary Debates. OUP Usa 421.
  30. Susan Blackmore, Thomas W. Clark, Mark Hallett, John-Dylan Haynes, Ted Honderich, Neil Levy, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Shaun Nichols, Michael Pauen, Derk Pereboom, Susan Pockett, Maureen Sie, Saul Smilansky, Galen Strawson, Daniela Goya Tocchetto, Manuel Vargas, Benjamin Vilhauer & Bruce Waller (2013). Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books.
    Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility is an edited collection of new essays by an internationally recognized line-up of contributors. It is aimed at readers who wish to explore the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications.
     
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  31.  26
    Derk Pereboom (2002). On Baker's Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):615–622.
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  32.  30
    Derk Pereboom (2009). Kant's Transcendental Arguments. In Edward Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford
  33. Derk Pereboom (1994). Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):315-29.
  34.  93
    Derk Pereboom (2002). Meaning in Life Without Free Will. Philosophic Exchange 33:19-34.
    In a recent article Gary Watson instructively distinguishes two faces or aspects of responsibility. The first is the self-disclosing sense, which is concerned centrally with aretaic or excellence-relevant evaluations of agents. An agent is responsible for an action in this respect when it is an action that is inescapably the agent’s own, if, as a declaration of her adopted ends, it expresses what the agent is about, her identity as an agent. An action for which the agent is responsible in (...)
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  35.  1
    Derk Pereboom (2013). Free Will. In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press
    This chapter analyses the problem of free will and moral responsibility, to which the history of philosophy records three standard reactions. Compatibilists maintain that it is possible for us to have the free will required for moral responsibility if determinism is true. Others contend that determinism is not compossible with our having the free will required for moral responsibility – they are incompatibilists – but they resist the reasons for determinism and claim that we do possess free will of this (...)
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  36.  2
    D. Pereboom & M. M. S. K. Sie (2013). Introduction. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):97-100.
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  37. Gunnar Björnsson & Derk Pereboom (2014). Free Will Skepticism and Bypassing. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4. MIT Press 27–35.
    Discusses Eddy Nahmias' “Is Free Will an Illusion?”.
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  38.  49
    Derk Pereboom (2011). Theological Determinism and Divine Providence. In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford University Press
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  39. Andrew Chignell & Derk Pereboom (2010). Kant's Theory of Causation and its Eighteenth-Century German Background. Philosophical Review 119 (4):565-591.
    This critical notice highlights the important contributions that Eric Watkins's writings have made to our understanding of theories about causation developed in eighteenth-century German philosophy and by Kant in particular. Watkins provides a convincing argument that central to Kant's theory of causation is the notion of a real ground or causal power that is non-Humean (since it doesn't reduce to regularities or counterfactual dependencies among events or states) and non-Leibnizean because it doesn't reduce to logical or conceptual relations. However, we (...)
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  40.  84
    Derk Pereboom (2013). Précis of Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):715-727.
    Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism has three parts. The first (Chapters 1–4) develops a response to the knowledge and conceivability arguments against physicalism, one that features the open possibility that introspective representations represent mental properties as having features they actually lack. The second part (Chapters 5 and 6) proposes a physicalist version of a Russellian Monist answer to these arguments, the core of which is that currently unknown intrinsic physical properties provide categorical bases for known physical properties and also (...)
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  41. Derk Pereboom (ed.) (1999). The Rationalists: Critical Essays on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This book brings together thirteen articles on the most discussed thinkers in the rationalist movement: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Malebranche. These articles address the topics in metaphysics and epistemology that figure most prominently in contemporary work on these philosophers. The articles have all been produced since 1980, and their authors are among the most respected in the field.
     
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  42. Derk Pereboom (2005). Free Will, Evil, and Divine Providence. In Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press
  43. Derk Pereboom, A Compatibilist Theory of the Beliefs Required for Rational Deliberation. Journal of Ethics.
  44.  60
    Derk Pereboom (1994). Stoic Psychotherapy in Descartes and Spinoza. Faith and Philosophy 11 (4):592-625.
    The psychotherapeutic theories of Descartes and Spinoza are heavily influenced by Stoicism. Stoic psychotherapy has two central features. First, we have a remarkable degree of voluntary control over our passions, and we can and should exercise this control to keep ourselves from having any irrational passions at all. Second, the universe is determined by the providential divine will, and in any situation we can and should align ourselves with this divine will in order to achieve equanimity. Whereas Descartes largely endorses (...)
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  45. Derk Pereboom (2009). Consciousness and Introspective Inaccuracy. In Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. Oxford University Press
  46.  3
    Derk Pereboom (2002). Robust Nonreductive Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 99 (10):499.
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  47.  68
    Derk Pereboom (1988). Kant on Intentionality. Synthese 77 (3):321 - 352.
  48.  49
    Derk Pereboom (1991). Kant's Amphiboly. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 73 (1):50-70.
  49.  79
    Derk Pereboom (1990). Kant on Justification in Transcendental Philosophy. Synthese 85 (1):25 - 54.
    Kant''s claim that the justification of transcendental philosophy is a priori is puzzling because it should be consistent with (1) his general restriction on the justification of knowledge, that intuitions must play a role in the justification of all nondegenerate knowledge, with (2) the implausibility of a priori intuitions being the only ones on which transcendental philosophy is founded, and with (3) his professed view that transcendental philosophy is not analytic. I argue that this puzzle can be solved, that according (...)
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  50. Derk Pereboom (2006). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
    Most people assume that, even though some degenerative or criminal behavior may be caused by influences beyond our control, ordinary human actions are not similarly generated, but rather are freely chosen, and we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy for them. A less popular and more radical claim is that factors beyond our control produce all of the actions we perform. It is this hard determinist stance that Derk Pereboom articulates in Living Without Free Will. Pereboom argues that our best scientific (...)
     
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