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Profile: Duncan Pritchard (University of Edinburgh)
Profile: David James Pritchard
  1.  98
    Duncan Pritchard (2005). Epistemic Luck. Clarendon Press.
    Epistemic Luck is the first book to offer a rigorous philosophical examination of the concept of luck and its relationship to knowledge.
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  2.  78
    Duncan Pritchard (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford University Press.
    The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge? -- Achievement without (...)
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  3.  39
    Duncan Pritchard (2012). Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford University Press.
    Epistemological disjunctivism in outline -- Favouring versus discriminating epistemic support -- Radical scepticsim.
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  4. Duncan Pritchard (2012). Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
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  5.  87
    Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.) (2009). Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Eighteen leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.
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  6. J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2015). Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck. Noûs 49 (3):440-453.
    Reductive intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.
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  7. Duncan Pritchard (2007). Anti-Luck Epistemology. Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti- luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck. Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti- luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.
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  8. Duncan Pritchard (2010). Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis. Synthese 175 (1):133 - 151.
    This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current (...)
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  9. J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (2014). Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):63-109.
    Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first (...)
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  10.  45
    Duncan Pritchard (2014). The Modal Account of Luck. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
    This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work . In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a (...)
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  11. J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2014). Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):181-199.
    According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according (...)
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  12. Duncan Pritchard (2007). Recent Work on Epistemic Value. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):85 - 110.
    Recent discussion in epistemology has seen a huge growth in interest in the topic of epistemic value. In this paper I describe the background to this new movement in epistemology and critically survey the contemporary literature on this topic.
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  13.  43
    J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2016). Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this proposal can: accommodate our (...)
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  14. Duncan Pritchard (2011). Wittgenstein on Scepticism. In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press
    An overview of Wittgenstein’s remarks on scepticism in On Certainty is offered, especially with regard to the notion of a “hinge proposition”. Several possible interpretations of the anti-sceptical import of this text are then critically assessed, with each view situated within the contemporary literature on scepticism.
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  15. Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (2012). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford University Press Uk.
    This volume comprises three distinct investigations into the relationship between the nature and the value of knowledge. Each is written by one of the authors in consultation with the other two. 'Knowledge and Understanding' critically examines virtue-theoretic responses to the problem of the value of knowledge, and argues that the finally valuable cognitive state is not knowledge but understanding. 'Knowledge and Recognition' develops an account of knowledge in which the idea of a recognitional ability plays a prominent role, and argues (...)
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  16.  1
    Duncan Pritchard (2005). Epistemic Luck. Oxford University Press Uk.
    One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know (...)
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  17. Duncan Pritchard (2002). Recent Work on Radical Skepticism. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):215-257.
    This discussion surveys recent developments in the treatment of the epistemological problem of skepticism. These are arguments which attack our knowledge of certain truths rather than, say, our belief in the existence of certain entities. In particular, this article focuses on the radical versions of these skeptical arguments, arguments which purport to show that knowledge is, for the most part, impossible, rather than just that we lack knowledge in a particular discourse. Although most of the key recent developments in this (...)
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  18. Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard (2014). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):335-357.
    A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue-theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate (...)
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  19.  26
    Duncan Pritchard (2016). Seeing It for Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy. Episteme 13 (1):29-42.
    The idea of is explored. It is claimed that there is something epistemically important about acquiring one's knowledge first-hand via active perception rather than second-hand via testimony. Moreover, it is claimed that this kind of active perceptual seeing it for oneself is importantly related to the kind of understanding that is acquired when one possesses a correct and appropriately detailed explanation of how cause and effect are related. In both cases we have a kind of seeing it for oneself which (...)
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  20. D. Pritchard (2012). In Defence of Modest Anti-Luck Epistemology. In Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press 173--192.
     
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  21. Duncan Pritchard (2009). Knowledge. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
     
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  22.  82
    Duncan Pritchard (2009). Safety-Based Epistemology. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.
    This paper explores the prospects for safety-based theories of knowledge in the light of some recent objections.
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  23.  50
    Spyrion Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (2013). Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (8):105-120.
    The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radically transforming the latter to fit the results and (...)
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  24.  64
    Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard (2012). Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):84-103.
    According to robust virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where this means that the agent's cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. One type of objection to robust virtue epistemology that has been put forward in the contemporary literature is that this view has problems dealing with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge, and thus that it is in tension with standard views in the epistemology of testimony. We build on this critique to argue that insofar as agents epistemically (...)
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  25.  72
    Duncan Pritchard (2002). Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.
    G. E. Moore famously offered a strikingly straightforward response to the radical sceptic which simply consisted of the claim that one could know, on the basis of one's knowledge that one has hands, that there exists an external world. In general, the Moorean response to scepticism maintains that we can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses on the basis of our knowledge of everyday propositions. In the recent literature two proposals have been put forward to try to accommodate, to varying (...)
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  26. Ram Neta & Duncan Pritchard (2007). McDowell and the New Evil Genius. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):381–396.
    (NEG) is widely accepted both by internalist and by externalists. In fact, there have been very few opponents of (NEG). Timothy Williamson (e.g., 2000) rejects (NEG), for reasons that have by now received a great deal of scrutiny.2 John McDowell also rejects (NEG), but his reasons have not received the scrutiny they deserve. This is in large part because those reasons have not been well understood. We believe that McDowell’s challenge to (NEG) is important, worthy of fair assessment, and maybe (...)
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  27. Duncan Pritchard (2012). Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Synthese 189 (2):255-272.
    In his final notebooks, published as On Certainty , Wittgenstein offers a distinctive conception of the nature of reasons. Central to this conception is the idea that at the heart of our rational practices are essentially arational commitments. This proposal marks a powerful challenge to the standard picture of the structure of reasons. In particular, it has been thought that this account might offer us a resolution of the traditional scepticism/anti-scepticism debate. It is argued, however, that some standard ways of (...)
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  28. Duncan Pritchard (2003). McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):273-294.
    At the very least, externalists about content will accept something like the following claim.
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  29. Duncan Pritchard (2011). What is the Swamping Problem? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press
     
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  30.  48
    Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli (forthcoming). Colour, Scepticism and Epistemology. In Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Routledge
  31. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press
    This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.
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  32. Duncan Pritchard (2007). Epistemic Luck. Oxford University Press Uk.
    One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know (...)
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  33.  90
    Duncan Pritchard (2009). Review: Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (3):407 - 416.
  34. Duncan Pritchard (2009). Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84 (64):19-.
    It is argued that a popular way of accounting for the distinctive value of knowledge by appeal to the distinctive value of cognitive achievements fails because it is a mistake to identify knowledge with cognitive achievements. Nevertheless, it is claimed that understanding, properly conceived, is a type of cognitive achievement, and thus that the distinctive value of cognitive achievements can explain why understanding is of special value.
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  35. Duncan Pritchard (2003). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck. Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
    The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call “veritic” epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I (...)
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  36.  40
    Duncan Pritchard (2009). The Value of Knowledge. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1):54-55.
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  37.  48
    Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli (forthcoming). On Metaepistemological Scepticism. In Michael Bergmann & Brett Brett Coppenger (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press
    Fumerton’s distinctive brand of metaepistemological scepticism is compared and contrasted with the related position outlined by Stroud. It is argued that there are at least three interesting points of contact between Fumerton and Stroud’s metaepistemology. The first point of contact is that both Fumerton and Stroud think that (1) externalist theories of justification permit a kind of non-inferential, perceptual justification for our beliefs about non-psychological reality, but it’s not sufficient for philosophical assurance. However, Fumerton claims, while Stroud denies, that (2) (...)
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  38. Duncan Pritchard (2011). Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.
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  39.  29
    Duncan Pritchard (2015). Risk. Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.
    In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti-risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti-luck condition. Second, to legal (...)
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  40. Duncan Pritchard (2006). What is This Thing Called Knowledge? Routledge.
    What is Knowledge? Where does it come from? Can we know anything at all? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology. Duncan Pritchard discusses both traditional issues and contemporary ideas in thirteen easily digestible sections which include: *the value of knowledge *the structure of knowledge *virtues and faculties *perception *testimony and memory *induction *scepticism What is this thing called knowledge? contains many (...)
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  41.  35
    Duncan Pritchard (2008). Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):437–447.
    I discuss John Greco's paper 'What's Wrong with Contextualism?', in which he outlines a theory of knowledge which is virtue-theoretic while also being allied to a form of attributor contextualism about 'knows'.
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  42.  41
    Duncan Pritchard (2004). The Value of Knowledge. The Philosophers' Magazine 16 (26):54-55.
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  43. Duncan Pritchard (2010). Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination. Noûs 44 (2):245-268.
    This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recognise an important distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support that (...)
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  44.  74
    Duncan Pritchard (2005). Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
    A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of not as (...)
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  45. Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content (...)
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  46. Duncan Pritchard (2007). How to Be a Neo-Moorean. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press 68--99.
    Much of the recent debate regarding scepticism has focussed on a certain template sceptical argument and a rather restricted set of proposals concerning how one might deal with that argument. Throughout this debate the ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism is often cited as a paradigm example of how one should not respond to the sceptical argument, so conceived. As I argue in this paper, however, there are ways of resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic. In particular, I consider the prospects (...)
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  47.  75
    D. Pritchard (2002). Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):19-55.
    The recent popularity of contextualist treatments of the key epistemic concepts has tended to obscure the differences that exist between the various kinds of contextualist theses on offer. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards rectifying this problem by exploring two of the main formulations of the contextualist position currently on offer in the literature—the 'semantic' contextualist thesis put forward by Keith DeRose and David Lewis, and the 'inferential' contextualist thesis advanced by Michael Williams. It is argued that (...)
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  48.  51
    Andy Clark, Duncan Pritchard & Krist Vaesen (2012). Extended Cognition and Epistemology. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):87 - 90.
    Philosophical Explorations, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 87-90, June 2012.
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  49. Duncan Pritchard (2004). The Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):326–348.
    Let us focus on what I take it is the paradigm case of testimony—the intentional transfer of a belief from one agent to another, whether in the usual way via a verbal assertion made by the one agent to the other, or by some other means, such as through a note.1 So, for example, John says to Mary that the house is on fire (or, if you like, ‘texts’ her this message on her phone), and Mary, upon hearing this, forms (...)
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  50. Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli (2013). Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology. Humanities 2 (3):351-368.
    We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald Davidson, in contrast to Williams’s Wittgenstein-inspired view. It is argued that the key to evaluating this debate is to understand the particular conception of the radical skeptical problem that is offered in influential work by Barry Stroud, a conception of the skeptical (...)
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