Search results for 'DSM' (try it on Scholar)

139 found
Sort by:
  1. Markus Heinimaa (2002). Incomprehensibility: The Role of the Concept in DSM-IV Definition of Schizophrenic Delusions. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5 (3):291-295.score: 18.0
    In this paper the role of incomprehensibility in the conceptualization of the DSM-IV definition of delusion is discussed. According to the analysis, the conceptual dependence of (...)DSM-IV definition of delusion on incomprehensibility is manifested in several ways and infested with ambiguity. Definition of bizarre delusions is contradictory and gives room for two incompatible readings. Also the definition of delusion manifests internal inconsistencies and its tendency to account for delusions in terms of misinterpretation is bound to miss the content of the traditional comprehension of delusionality. It is suggested that the ambiguities in defining delusions has to do with the question whether psychiatric practice is better accounted for in terms of the grammar of incorrectness or of incomprehensibility. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Paul Healy (2011). DSM Diagnosis and Beyond: on the Need for a Hermeneutically-Informed Biopsychosocial Framework. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 14 (2):163-175.score: 18.0
    While often dubbedthe bible of contemporary psychiatryand widely hailed as providinga benchmarkfor the profession, on closer inspection the DSM is seen to be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jonathan Y. Tsou (forthcoming). DSM-5 and Psychiatry's Second Revolution: Descriptive Vs. Theoretical Approaches to Psychiatric Classification. In Steeves Demazeux & Patrick Singy (eds.), The DSM-5 in Perspective: Philosophical Reflections on the Psychiatric Babel. Springer.score: 15.0
    A large part of the controversy surrounding the publication of DSM-5 stems from the possibility of replacing the purely descriptive approach to classification favored by the (...)DSM since 1980. This paper examines the question of how mental disorders should be classified, focusing on the issue of whether the DSM should adopt a purely descriptive or theoretical approach. I argue that the DSM should replace its purely descriptive approach with a theoretical approach that integrates causal information into the DSMs descriptive diagnostic categories. The paper proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I examine the goals (viz., guiding treatment, facilitating research, and improving communication) associated with the DSMs purely descriptive approach. In the second section, I suggest that the DSMs purely descriptive approach is best suited for improving communication among mental health professionals; however, theoretical approaches would be superior for purposes of treatment and research. In the third section, I outline steps required to move the DSM towards a hybrid system of classification that can accommodate the benefits of descriptive and theoretical approaches, and I discuss how the DSMs descriptive categories could be revised to incorporate theoretical information regarding the causes of disorders. I argue that the DSM should reconceive of its goals more narrowly such that it functions primarily as an epistemic hub that mediates among various contexts of use in which definitions of mental disorders appear. My analysis emphasizes the importance of pluralism as a methodological means for avoiding theoretical dogmatism and ensuring that the DSM is a reflexive and self-correcting manual. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Pierangelo di Vittorio, Michel Minard & François Gonon (2013). Les virages du DSM : enjeux scientifiques, économiques et politiques. Hermès 66:, [ p.].score: 15.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2011). The Importance of History for Philosophy of Psychiatry: The Case of the DSM and Psychiatric Classification. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (3):446-470.score: 12.0
    Abstract Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and seeks (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Rachel Cooper (2004). What is Wrong with the DSM? History of Psychiatry 15 (1):5-25.score: 12.0
    The DSM is the main classification of mental disorders used by psychiatrists in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. Although widely used, the DSM has (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Dr H. Stefan Bracha & Dr Jack D. Maser (2008). Anxiety and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Context of Human Brain Evolution:A Role for Theory in Dsm-V? Cogprints.score: 12.0
    Thehypervigilance, escape, struggle, tonic immobilityevolutionarily hardwired acute peritraumatic response sequence is important for clinicians to understand. Our commentary supplements the useful article on human tonic (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Dr H. Stefan Bracha (2006). Human Brain Evolution and the "Neuroevolutionary Time-Depth Principle:" Implications for the Reclassification of Fear-Circuitry-Related Traits in Dsm-V and for Studying Resilience to Warzone-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. .score: 12.0
    The DSM-III, DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 have judiciously minimized discussion of etiologies to distance clinical psychiatry from Freudian psychoanalysis. With this goal mostly achieved (...), discussion of etiological factors should be reintroduced into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V). A research agenda for the DSM-V advocated the "development of a pathophysiologically based classification system". The author critically reviews the neuroevolutionary literature on stress-induced and fear circuitry disorders and related amygdala-driven, species-atypical fear behaviors of clinical severity in adult humans. Over 30 empirically testable/falsifiable predictions are presented. It is noted that in DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10, the classification of stress and fear circuitry disorders is neither mode-of-acquisition-based nor brain-evolution-based. For example, snake phobia (innate) and dog phobia (overconsolidational) are clustered together. Similarly, research on blood-injection-injury-type-specific phobia clusters two fears different in their innateness: 1) an arguably ontogenetic memory-trace-overconsolidation-based fear (hospital phobia) and 2) a hardwired (innate) fear of the sight of one's blood or a sharp object penetrating one's skin. Genetic architecture-charting of fear-circuitry-related traits has been challenging. Various, non-phenotype-based architectures can serve as targets for research. In this article, the author will propose one such alternative genetic architecture. This article was inspired by the following: A) Nesse's "Smoke-Detector Principle", B) the increasing suspicion that the "smooth" rather than "lumpy" distribution of complex psychiatric phenotypes (including fear-circuitry disorders) may in some cases be accounted for by oligogenic (and not necessarily polygenic) transmission, and C) insights from the initial sequence of the chimpanzee genome and comparison with the human genome by the Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium published in late 2005. Neuroevolutionary insights relevant to fear circuitry symptoms that primarily emerge overconsolidationally (especially Combat related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) are presented. Also introduced is a human-evolution-based principle for clustering innate fear traits. The "Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle" of innate fears proposed in this article may be useful in the development of a neuroevolution-based taxonomic re-clustering of stress-triggered and fear-circuitry disorders in DSM-V. Four broad clusters of evolved fear circuits are proposed based on their time-depths: 1) Mesozoic (mammalian-wide) circuits hardwired by wild-type alleles driven to fixation by Mesozoic selective sweeps; 2) Cenozoic (simian-wide) circuits relevant to many specific phobias; 3) mid Paleolithic and upper Paleolithic (Homo sapiens-specific) circuits (arguably resulting mostly from mate-choice-driven stabilizing selection); 4) Neolithic circuits (arguably mostly related to stabilizing selection driven by gene-culture co-evolution). More importantly, the author presents evolutionary perspectives on warzone-related PTSD, Combat-Stress Reaction, Combat-related Stress, Operational-Stress, and other deployment-stress-induced symptoms. The Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle presented in this article may help explain the dissimilar stress-resilience levels following different types of acute threat to survival of oneself or one's progency (aka DSM-III and DSM-V PTSD Criterion-A events). PTSD rates following exposure to lethal inter-group violence (combat, warzone exposure or intentionally caused disasters such as terrorism) are usually 5-10 times higher than rates following large-scale natural disasters such as forest fires, floods, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes. The author predicts that both intentionally-caused large-scale bioevent-disasters, as well as natural bioevents such as SARS and avian flu pandemics will be an exception and are likely to be followed by PTSD rates approaching those that follow warzone exposure. During bioevents, Amygdala-driven and locus-coeruleus-driven epidemic pseudosomatic symptoms may be an order of magnitude more common than infection-caused cytokine-driven symptoms. Implications for the red cross and FEMA are discussed. It is also argued that hospital phobia as well as dog phobia, bird phobia and bat phobia require re-taxonomization in DSM-V in a new "overconsolidational disorders" category anchored around PTSD. The overconsolidational spectrum category may be conceptualized as straddling the fear circuitry spectrum disorders and the affective spectrum disorders <span class='Hi'>categoriesspan>, and may be a category for which Pitman's secondary prevention propranolol regimen may be specifically indicated as a "morning after pill" intervention. Predictions are presented regarding obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (e.g., female-pattern hoarding vs. male-pattern hoarding) and "culture-bound" acute anxiety symptoms (taijin-kyofusho, koro, shuk yang, shook yong, suo yang, rok-joo, jinjinia-bemar, karoshi, gwarosa, Voodoo death). Also discussed are insights relevant to pseudoneurological symptoms and to the forthcoming Dissociative-Conversive disorders category in DSM-V, including what the author terms fright-triggered acute pseudo-localized symptoms (i.e., pseudoparalysis, pseudocerebellar imbalance, psychogenic blindness, pseudoseizures, and epidemic sociogenic illness). Speculations based on studies of the human abnormal-spindle-like, microcephaly-associated (ASPM) gene, the microcephaly primary autosomal recessive (MCPH) gene, and the forkhead box p2 (FOXP2) gene are made and incorporated into what is termed "The pre-FOXP2 Hypothesis of Blood-Injection-Injury Phobia." Finally, the author argues for a non-reductionistic fusion of "distal (evolutionary) neurobiology" with clinical "proximal neurobiology," utilizing neurological heuristics. It is noted that the value of re-clustering fear traits based on behavioral ethology, human-phylogenomics-derived endophenotypes and on ontogenomics (gene-environment interactions) can be confirmed or disconfirmed using epidemiological or twin studies and psychiatric genomics. (shrink)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Louis Charland, Moral Nature of the Dsm-IV Cluster B Personality Disorders.score: 12.0
    Moral considerations do not appear to play a large role in discussions of the DSM-IV personality disorders and debates about their empirical validity. Yet philosophical analysis (...)reveals that the Cluster B personality disorders, in particular, may in fact be moral rather than clinical conditions. This finding has serious consequences for how they should be treated and by whom. (shrink)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Leslie Forman & Wendy Wakefield Davis (1994). Dsm-IV Meets Philosophy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):207-218.score: 12.0
    The authors discuss some of the conceptual issues that must be considered in using and understanding psychiatric classification. DSM-IV is a practical and common sense nosology (...)of psychiatric disorders that is intended to improve communication in clinical practice and in research studies. DSM-IV has no philosophic pretensions but does raise many philosphical questions. This paper describes the development of DSM-IV and the way in which it addresses a number of philosophic issues: nominalism vs. realism, epistemology in science, the mind/body dichotomy, the definition of mental disorders, and dimensional vs. categorical classification. Keywords: DSM-IV, Nosology, psychiatric classification CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. S. Nassir Ghaemi (2009). Nosologomania: DSM & Karl Jaspers' Critique of Kraepelin. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 4 (1):10.score: 12.0
    Emil Kraepelin's nosology has been reinvented, for better or worse. In the United States, the rise of the neo-Kraepelinian nosology of DSM-III resuscitated Kraepelin's (...)work but also differed from many of his ideas, especially his overtly biological ontology. This neo-Kraepelinian system has led to concerns regarding overdiagnosis of psychiatric syndromes (. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Bernard Gert (1992). A Sex Caused Inconsistency in Dsm-III-R: The Definition of Mental Disorder and the Definition of Paraphilias. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):155-171.score: 12.0
    The DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder is inconsistent with the DSM-III-R definition of paraphilias. The former requires the suffering or increased risk of suffering (...)some harm while the latter allows that deviance, by itself, is sufficient to classify a behavioral syndrome as a paraphilia. This inconsistency is particularly clear when examining the DSM-III-R account of a specific paraphilia, Transvestic Fetishism. The author defends the DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder and argues that the DSM-III-R definition of paraphilias should be changed. He recommends that the diagnostic criteria for specific paraphilias, particularly that for Transvestic Fetishism, be changed to make them consistent with the DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder. Keywords: diagnoses, disease, paraphilia, philosophy, psychiatry CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Karen Ritchie (1989). The Little Woman Meets Son of Dsm-III. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (6):695-708.score: 12.0
    The author discusses conceptual problems in psychiatry, illustrated by a debate over inclusion of a new disorder, masochistic personality disorder, in DSM-III-R, the manual of psychiatric (...) diagnoses. While the DSM committee has attempted to avoid assumptions about theory and values in an attempt to be scientific, this has proved impossible, as theory is an integral part of scientific observation and values are a prerequisite for any judgment. The foundation for psychiatry cannot be theoryit can only be patient need. Keywords: psychiatry, diagnosis, disease, illness, mental illness, women CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. J. S. Blumenthal-Barby (forthcoming). Psychiatrys New Manual (DSM-5): Ethical and Conceptual Dimensions. Journal of Medical Ethics.score: 12.0
    The introduction of the Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-5) in May 2013 is being hailed as the biggest event in psychiatry in the (...)last 10 years. In this paper I examine three important issues that arise from the new manual: (1) Expanding nosology: Psychiatry has again broadened its nosology to include human experiences not previously under its purview (eg, binge eating disorder, internet gaming disorder, caffeine use disorder, hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder). Consequencebased ethical concerns about this expansion are addressed, along with conceptual concerns about a confusion ofconstruct validityandconceptual validityand a failure to distinguish betweendisorderandnon disordered conditions for which we help people.” (2) The role of claims about societal impact in changes in nosology: Several changes in the DSM-5 involved claims about societal impact in their rationales. This is due in part to a new online open comment period during DSM development. Examples include advancement of science, greater access to treatment, greater public awareness of condition, loss of identify or harm to those with removed disorders, stigmatization, offensiveness, etc. I identify and evaluate four importantly distinct ways in which claims about societal impact might operate in DSM development. (3) Categorisation nosology to spectrum nosology: The move todegrees of severityof mental disorders, a major change for DSM-5, raises concerns about conceptual clarity and uniformity concerning what it means to have a severe form of a disorder, and ethical concerns about communication. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. A. Frances, A. H. Mack, M. B. First, T. A. Widiger, R. Ross, L. Forman & W. W. Davis (1994). DSM-IV Meets Philosophy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):207-218.score: 12.0
    The authors discuss some of the conceptual issues that must be considered in using and understanding psychiatric classification. DSM-IV is a practical and common sense nosology (...)of psychiatric disorders that is intended to improve communication in clinical practice and in research studies. DSM-IV has no philosophic pretensions but does raise many philosphical questions. This paper describes the development of DSM-IV and the way in which it addresses a number of philosophic issues: nominalism vs. realism, epistemology in science, the mind/body dichotomy, the definition of mental disorders, and dimensional vs. categorical classification. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. T. L. Schwartz (2013). Psychopharmacological Practice: The DSM Versus The Brain. Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):25.score: 12.0
    In 1952, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) system of creating, validating, studying and employing a diagnostic system in clinical psychiatric practice was introduced. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Serife Tekin (2011). Self-Concept Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass: Narratives and Mental Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):357-380.score: 9.0
    This paper explores how the diagnosis of mental disorder may affect the diagnosed subjects self-concept by supplying an account that emphasizes the influence of autobiographical and (...) social narratives on self-understanding. It focuses primarily on the diagnoses made according to the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and suggests that the DSM diagnosis may function as a source of narrative that affects the subjects self-concept. Engaging in this analysis by appealing to autobiographies and memoirs written by people diagnosed with mental disorder, the paper concludes that a DSM diagnosis is a double-edged sword for self- concept. On the one hand, it sets the subjects experience in an established classificatory system which can facilitate self-understanding by providing insight into subjects condition and guiding her personal growth, as well as treatment and recovery. In this sense, the DSM diagnosis may have positive repercussions on self-development. On the other hand, however, given the DSMs symptom-based approach and its adoption of the Biomedical Disease model, a diagnosis may force the subject to make sense of her condition divorced from other elements in her life that may be affecting her mental- health. It may lead her frame her experience only as an irreversible imbalance. This form of self-understanding may set limits on the subjects hopes of recovery and may create impediments to her flourishing. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jerome C. Wakefield (2010). False Positives in Psychiatric Diagnosis: Implications for Human Freedom. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):5-17.score: 9.0
    Current symptom-based DSM and ICD diagnostic criteria for mental disorders are prone to yielding false positives because they ignore the context of symptoms. This is often (...)seen as a benign flaw because problems of living and emotional suffering, even if not true disorders, may benefit from support and treatment. However, diagnosis of a disorder in our society has many ramifications not only for treatment choice but for broader social reactions to the diagnosed individual. In particular, mental disorders impose a sick role on individuals and place a burden upon them to change; thus, disorders decrease the level of respect and acceptance generally accorded to those with even annoying normal variations in traits and features. Thus, minimizing false positives is important to a pluralistic society. The harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder is used to diagnose the sources of likely false positives, and propose potential remedies to the current weaknesses in the validity of diagnostic criteria. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Alison C. Boyce (2009). Neuroimaging in Psychiatry: Evaluating the Ethical Consequences for Patient Care. Bioethics 23 (6):349-359.score: 9.0
    According to many researchers, it is inevitable and obvious that psychiatric illnesses are biological in nature, and that this is the rationale behind the numerous neuroimaging studies (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Marino Pérez-Álvarez, Louis A. Sass & José M. García-Montes (2009). More Aristotle, Less DSM: The Ontology of Mental Disorders in Constructivist Perspective. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (3):211-225.score: 9.0
  21. Serife Tekin (forthcoming). Self-Insight in the Time of Mood Disorders: After the Diagnosis, Beyond the Treatment. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology.score: 9.0
    This paper explores the factors that contribute to the degree of a mood disorder patients self- insight, defined here as her understanding of the particular contingencies (...)of her life that are responsive to her personal identity, interpersonal relationships, illness symptoms, and the relationship between these three necessary components of her lived experience. I consider three factors: (i) the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), (ii) the DSM culture, and (iii) the cognitive architecture of the self. I argue that the symptom-based descriptions of mood disorders which eliminate the subjective features of the patients illness experience, in conjunction with the features of the DSM-culture and the cognitive biases that guide the patient, contribute to the impoverishment of her self-insight. The resulting impoverished self-insight would prevent her from developing resourceful responses to her interpersonal problems. In analyzing how these factors combine to influence the patients self-insight, I distinguish the therapeutic impact of receiving a psychiatric diagnosis, which facilitates patients clinical treatment, from its reflective impact, how the diagnosis informs the patients reflection on who she is, how her mental disorder is expressed, and how her interpersonal relationships proceed. I substantiate my argument by considering a patients memoir of psychopathology. (shrink)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Sabina Alam, Jigisha Patel & James Giordano (2012). Working Towards a New Psychiatry - Neuroscience, Technology and the DSM-5. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):1-.score: 9.0
    This Editorial introduces the thematic series on 'Toward a New Psychiatry: Philosophical and Ethical Issues in Classification, Diagnosis and Care' http://www.biomedcentral.com/series/newpsychiatry.
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Peter Horn (2008). Psychiatric Ethics Consultation in the Light of Dsm-V. HEC Forum 20 (4):315-324.score: 9.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Shadia Kawa & James Giordano (2012). A Brief Historicity of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: Issues and Implications for the Future of Psychiatric Canon and Practice. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):2-.score: 9.0
    The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association, currently in its fourth edition and considered the reference for the characterization and diagnosis of mental (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Carol Steinberg Gould (2011). Why the Histrionic Personality Disorder Should Not Be in the DSM: A New Taxonomic and Moral Analysis. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 4 (1):26-40.score: 9.0
    The scene was pleasant on both sides. A cruder lover would have lost the view of her pretty ways and attitudes, and spoiled all by stupid attempts (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Elizabeth H. Flanagan Roger K. Blashfield (2007). Should Clinicians' Views of Mental Illness Influence the DSM? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 285-287.score: 9.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Pier Jaarsma & Stellan Welin (2012). Autism as a Natural Human Variation: Reflections on the Claims of the Neurodiversity Movement. [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 20 (1):20-30.score: 9.0
    Neurodiversity has remained a controversial concept over the last decade. In its broadest sense the concept of neurodiversity regards atypical neurological development as a normal human difference. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Serife Tekin (2010). Mad Narratives: Exploring Self-Constitutions Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass. Dissertation, York Universityscore: 9.0
    InMad Narratives: Self-Constitutions Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass,” by using narrative approaches to the self, I explore how the diagnosis of mental disorder shapes personal (...)identities and influences flourishing. My particular focus is the diagnosis grounded on the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). I develop two connected accounts pertaining to the self and mental disorder. I use the memoirs and personal stories written by the subjects with a DSM diagnosis as illustrations to bolster my claims. First, expanding on the narrative approaches to the self, I explain how narratives about a subject shape her self-constitution. I elucidate how this process is generated by drawing on research in developmental psychology, cognitive science, and social psychology. Next, using this account as a springboard, I argue that the DSM diagnosis of mental disorder serves as a source of narrative, entering into the patientsautobiographical and social narratives. This plays an important role in the diagnosed subjectsself-understanding, self-constitution and flourishing. In this vein, how mental disorders are classified is not only a theoretical question about accurately taxonomizing the various experiences related to mental distress but also an ethical question about which ways of talking about mental disorders will allow subjects to respond effectively to their psychological distress, to flourish and to live autonomous and fulfilling lives. Finally, I suggest that the DSM-based narratives wield a double-edged sword when it comes to the subjects flourishing: On the one hand, there are problems with some DSM-based narratives that stem from the DSM diagnostic schema and the culture of DSM diagnoses. These problems render these DSM-based narratives unbeneficial for flourishing as they constrain the range of adoptive social, cognitive and emotional responses the subjects can give to their mental disorders. On the other hand, there are grounds to believe that some DSM-based narratives help subjects to flourish. For instance, they provide certainty to subjects' otherwise puzzling symptoms and help them reach out to others with similar experiences. Understanding how the DSM-based narratives can both benefit and harm will help us address problems with psychiatric diagnoses and the dissemination of knowledge about mental disorders in popular culture. The project aims to convince both philosophers and psychiatrists that no plausible theory of the self can be developed without attending to the topic of mental disorder and that no theory of mental disorder can be complete without devising the tools provided by the philosophical approaches to the self as well as developmental and social psychology. It also calls for methodological alterations in mental health ethics research, arguing that a careful scrutiny of mental disorder memoirs can advance the ethical underpinnings to the practice of psychiatry. (shrink)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Lisa Cosgrove (2011). The DSM, Big Pharma, and Clinical Practice Guidelines: Protecting Patient Autonomy and Informed Consent. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 4 (1):11-25.score: 9.0
    Researchers, investigative journalists, community physicians, ethicists, and policy makers have voiced strong concerns about the integrity of medicine. Specifically, questions have been raised about the ways in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Lara Kutschenko (2011). In Quest of 'Good' Medical Classification Systems. Medicine Studies 3 (1):53-70.score: 9.0
    Medical classification systems aim to provide a manageable taxonomy for sorting diagnoses into their proper classes. The question, this paper wants to critically examine, is how to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Massimiliano Aragona (2009). About and Beyond Comorbidity: Does the Crisis of the DSM Bring on a Radical Rethinking of Descriptive Psychopathology? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):29-33.score: 9.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. G. Scott Waterman (2007). Clinicians' “FolkTaxonomies and the DSM: Pick Your Poison. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 271-275.score: 9.0
  33. Simona Giordano (2012). Sliding Doors: Should Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder and Other Body Modifications Be Privately Funded? [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (1):31-40.score: 9.0
    Gender Identity Disorder (GID) is regarded as a mental illness and included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It will also appear (...)in the DSM-V, due to be published in 2013. The classification of GID as a mental illness is contentious. But what would happen to sufferers if it were removed from the diagnostic manuals? Would people lose their entitlement to funded medical care, or to reimbursement under insurance schemes? On what basis should medical treatment for GID be provided? What are the moral arguments for and against funded or reimbursed medical care for GID? This paper starts out with a fiction: GID is removed from the diagnostic manuals. Then the paper splits in two, as in happened in the Howitts 1998 film Sliding Doors . The two scenarios run parallel. In one, it is argued that GID is on a par with other body modifications, such as cosmetic and racial surgery, and that, for ethical reasons, treatment for GID should be privately negotiated by applicants and professionals and privately paid for. In the other scenario, it is argued that the comparison between GID and other body modifications is misleading. Whether or not medical treatment should be funded or reimbursed is independent of whether GID is on a par with other forms of body dissatisfaction. (shrink)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Nicola L. Bragazzi (2013). Rethinking Psychiatry with OMICS Science in the Age of Personalized P5 Medicine: Ready for Psychiatome? Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 8 (1):4.score: 9.0
    The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is universally acknowledged as the prominent reference textbook for the diagnosis and assessment of psychiatric diseases. However, since (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Steen Halling & Mical Goldfarb (1996). The New Generation of Diagnostic Manuals (Dsm-Iii, Dsm-Iii-R aNd Dsm-Iv) : an Overvi Ew an D a pHenomenologically Based Critique. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 27 (1):49-71.score: 9.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Serife Tekin (2009). Review of &quot;Dimensional Models of Personality Disorders: Refining the Research Agenda for DSM-V&quot;. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online Reviews 13 (17).score: 9.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Guy A. Boysen (2011). Revision of the DSM and Conceptual Expansion of Mental Illness: An Exploratory Analysis of Diagnostic Criteria. Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (4):295-315.score: 9.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Elizabeth H. Flanagan & Roger K. Blashfield (2008). Should Clinicians' Views of Mental Illness Influence the DSM? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):285-287.score: 9.0
  39. Randolph M. Nesse & Eric D. Jackson (2011). Evolutionary Foundations for Psychiatric Diagnosis: Making DSM-V Valid. In Pieter R. Adriaens & Andreas de Block (eds.), Maladapting Minds: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Evolutionary Theory. Oxford University Press. 167--191.score: 9.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Henrik Walter (2013). The Third Wave of Biological Psychiatry. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 9.0
    In this article I will argue that we are witnessing at this moment the third wave of biological psychiatry. This framework conceptualizes mental disorders as brain disorders (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Guy A. Boysen (2007). An Evaluation of the DSM Concept of Mental Disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):157-173.score: 9.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (2010). What's Wrong with 'Mental' Disorders? Psychological Medicine.score: 9.0
    Commentary on the editorial by D Stein et al.'s &quot;What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V&quot;.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Simon Cushing (2013). Autism: The Very Idea. In Jami L. Anderson & Simon Cushing (eds.), The Philosophy of Autism. Rowman & Littlefield.score: 9.0
    If each of the subtypes of autism is defined simply as constituted by a set of symptoms, then the criteria for its observation are straightforward, although, of (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Michael B. First (2012). The Development of DSM-III From a Historical/Conceptual Perspective. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford. 127.score: 9.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Dupuy Franca, Clarke Adam, Barry Robert, McCarthy Rory & Selikowitz Mark (2013). EEG Activity of Men and Women with DSM-5 Adult AD/HD. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 9.0
  46. K. W. Fulford (forthcoming). Report to the Chair of the DSM-VI Task Force From the Editors of. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology.score: 9.0
  47. K. W. M. Fulford & N. Sartorius (2009). The Secret History of ICD and the Hidden Future of DSM. In Matthew Broome Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives.score: 9.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Bernard Gert (1990). Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition of Mental Disorder. Analyse and Kritik 12:34-46.score: 9.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. David H. Jacobs (2011). Is the DSM's Formulation of Mental Disorder a Technical-Scientific Term? Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (1):63-79.score: 9.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 139