Search results for 'DSM' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Markus Heinimaa (2002). Incomprehensibility: The Role of the Concept in DSM-IV Definition of Schizophrenic Delusions. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5 (3):291-295.score: 24.0
    In this paper the role of incomprehensibility in the conceptualization of the DSM-IV definition of delusion is discussed. According to the analysis, the conceptual dependence of (...)DSM-IV definition of delusion on incomprehensibility is manifested in several ways and infested with ambiguity. Definition of bizarre delusions is contradictory and gives room for two incompatible readings. Also the definition of delusion manifests internal inconsistencies and its tendency to account for delusions in terms of misinterpretation is bound to miss the content of the traditional comprehension of delusionality. It is suggested that the ambiguities in defining delusions has to do with the question whether psychiatric practice is better accounted for in terms of the grammar of incorrectness or of incomprehensibility. (shrink)
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  2. Paul Healy (2011). DSM Diagnosis and Beyond: on the Need for a Hermeneutically-Informed Biopsychosocial Framework. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 14 (2):163-175.score: 24.0
    While often dubbedthe bible of contemporary psychiatryand widely hailed as providinga benchmarkfor the profession, on closer inspection the DSM is seen to be (...)
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  3. Jonathan Y. Tsou (forthcoming). DSM-5 and Psychiatry's Second Revolution: Descriptive Vs. Theoretical Approaches to Psychiatric Classification. In Steeves Demazeux & Patrick Singy (eds.), The DSM-5 in Perspective: Philosophical Reflections on the Psychiatric Babel. Springer.score: 21.0
    A large part of the controversy surrounding the publication of DSM-5 stems from the possibility of replacing the purely descriptive approach to classification favored by the (...)DSM since 1980. This paper examines the question of how mental disorders should be classified, focusing on the issue of whether the DSM should adopt a purely descriptive or theoretical approach. I argue that the DSM should replace its purely descriptive approach with a theoretical approach that integrates causal information into the DSMs descriptive diagnostic categories. The paper proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I examine the goals (viz., guiding treatment, facilitating research, and improving communication) associated with the DSMs purely descriptive approach. In the second section, I suggest that the DSMs purely descriptive approach is best suited for improving communication among mental health professionals; however, theoretical approaches would be superior for purposes of treatment and research. In the third section, I outline steps required to move the DSM towards a hybrid system of classification that can accommodate the benefits of descriptive and theoretical approaches, and I discuss how the DSMs descriptive categories could be revised to incorporate theoretical information regarding the causes of disorders. I argue that the DSM should reconceive of its goals more narrowly such that it functions primarily as an epistemic hub that mediates among various contexts of use in which definitions of mental disorders appear. My analysis emphasizes the importance of pluralism as a methodological means for avoiding theoretical dogmatism and ensuring that the DSM is a reflexive and self-correcting manual. (shrink)
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  4. Pierangelo di Vittorio, Michel Minard & François Gonon (2013). Les virages du DSM : enjeux scientifiques, économiques et politiques. Hermes 66:, [ p.].score: 21.0
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  5. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2011). The Importance of History for Philosophy of Psychiatry: The Case of the DSM and Psychiatric Classification. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (3):446-470.score: 18.0
    Abstract Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and seeks (...)
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  6. Rachel Cooper (2004). What is Wrong with the DSM? History of Psychiatry 15 (1):5-25.score: 18.0
    The DSM is the main classification of mental disorders used by psychiatrists in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. Although widely used, the DSM has (...)
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  7. Dr H. Stefan Bracha & Dr Jack D. Maser (2008). Anxiety and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Context of Human Brain Evolution:A Role for Theory in Dsm-V? Cogprints.score: 18.0
    Thehypervigilance, escape, struggle, tonic immobilityevolutionarily hardwired acute peritraumatic response sequence is important for clinicians to understand. Our commentary supplements the useful article on human tonic (...)
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  8. Dr H. Stefan Bracha (2006). Human Brain Evolution and the "Neuroevolutionary Time-Depth Principle:" Implications for the Reclassification of Fear-Circuitry-Related Traits in Dsm-V and for Studying Resilience to Warzone-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Philosophical Explorations.score: 18.0
    The DSM-III, DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 have judiciously minimized discussion of etiologies to distance clinical psychiatry from Freudian psychoanalysis. With this goal mostly achieved (...), discussion of etiological factors should be reintroduced into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V). A research agenda for the DSM-V advocated the "development of a pathophysiologically based classification system". The author critically reviews the neuroevolutionary literature on stress-induced and fear circuitry disorders and related amygdala-driven, species-atypical fear behaviors of clinical severity in adult humans. Over 30 empirically testable/falsifiable predictions are presented. It is noted that in DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10, the classification of stress and fear circuitry disorders is neither mode-of-acquisition-based nor brain-evolution-based. For example, snake phobia (innate) and dog phobia (overconsolidational) are clustered together. Similarly, research on blood-injection-injury-type-specific phobia clusters two fears different in their innateness: 1) an arguably ontogenetic memory-trace-overconsolidation-based fear (hospital phobia) and 2) a hardwired (innate) fear of the sight of one's blood or a sharp object penetrating one's skin. Genetic architecture-charting of fear-circuitry-related traits has been challenging. Various, non-phenotype-based architectures can serve as targets for research. In this article, the author will propose one such alternative genetic architecture. This article was inspired by the following: A) Nesse's "Smoke-Detector Principle", B) the increasing suspicion that the "smooth" rather than "lumpy" distribution of complex psychiatric phenotypes (including fear-circuitry disorders) may in some cases be accounted for by oligogenic (and not necessarily polygenic) transmission, and C) insights from the initial sequence of the chimpanzee genome and comparison with the human genome by the Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium published in late 2005. Neuroevolutionary insights relevant to fear circuitry symptoms that primarily emerge overconsolidationally (especially Combat related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder) are presented. Also introduced is a human-evolution-based principle for clustering innate fear traits. The "Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle" of innate fears proposed in this article may be useful in the development of a neuroevolution-based taxonomic re-clustering of stress-triggered and fear-circuitry disorders in DSM-V. Four broad clusters of evolved fear circuits are proposed based on their time-depths: 1) Mesozoic (mammalian-wide) circuits hardwired by wild-type alleles driven to fixation by Mesozoic selective sweeps; 2) Cenozoic (simian-wide) circuits relevant to many specific phobias; 3) mid Paleolithic and upper Paleolithic (Homo sapiens-specific) circuits (arguably resulting mostly from mate-choice-driven stabilizing selection); 4) Neolithic circuits (arguably mostly related to stabilizing selection driven by gene-culture co-evolution). More importantly, the author presents evolutionary perspectives on warzone-related PTSD, Combat-Stress Reaction, Combat-related Stress, Operational-Stress, and other deployment-stress-induced symptoms. The Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle presented in this article may help explain the dissimilar stress-resilience levels following different types of acute threat to survival of oneself or one's progency (aka DSM-III and DSM-V PTSD Criterion-A events). PTSD rates following exposure to lethal inter-group violence (combat, warzone exposure or intentionally caused disasters such as terrorism) are usually 5-10 times higher than rates following large-scale natural disasters such as forest fires, floods, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes. The author predicts that both intentionally-caused large-scale bioevent-disasters, as well as natural bioevents such as SARS and avian flu pandemics will be an exception and are likely to be followed by PTSD rates approaching those that follow warzone exposure. During bioevents, Amygdala-driven and locus-coeruleus-driven epidemic pseudosomatic symptoms may be an order of magnitude more common than infection-caused cytokine-driven symptoms. Implications for the red cross and FEMA are discussed. It is also argued that hospital phobia as well as dog phobia, bird phobia and bat phobia require re-taxonomization in DSM-V in a new "overconsolidational disorders" category anchored around PTSD. The overconsolidational spectrum category may be conceptualized as straddling the fear circuitry spectrum disorders and the affective spectrum disorders <span class='Hi'>categoriesspan>, and may be a category for which Pitman's secondary prevention propranolol regimen may be specifically indicated as a "morning after pill" intervention. Predictions are presented regarding obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (e.g., female-pattern hoarding vs. male-pattern hoarding) and "culture-bound" acute anxiety symptoms (taijin-kyofusho, koro, shuk yang, shook yong, suo yang, rok-joo, jinjinia-bemar, karoshi, gwarosa, Voodoo death). Also discussed are insights relevant to pseudoneurological symptoms and to the forthcoming Dissociative-Conversive disorders category in DSM-V, including what the author terms fright-triggered acute pseudo-localized symptoms (i.e., pseudoparalysis, pseudocerebellar imbalance, psychogenic blindness, pseudoseizures, and epidemic sociogenic illness). Speculations based on studies of the human abnormal-spindle-like, microcephaly-associated (ASPM) gene, the microcephaly primary autosomal recessive (MCPH) gene, and the forkhead box p2 (FOXP2) gene are made and incorporated into what is termed "The pre-FOXP2 Hypothesis of Blood-Injection-Injury Phobia." Finally, the author argues for a non-reductionistic fusion of "distal (evolutionary) neurobiology" with clinical "proximal neurobiology," utilizing neurological heuristics. It is noted that the value of re-clustering fear traits based on behavioral ethology, human-phylogenomics-derived endophenotypes and on ontogenomics (gene-environment interactions) can be confirmed or disconfirmed using epidemiological or twin studies and psychiatric genomics. (shrink)
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  9. Leslie Forman & Wendy Wakefield Davis (1994). Dsm-IV Meets Philosophy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):207-218.score: 18.0
    The authors discuss some of the conceptual issues that must be considered in using and understanding psychiatric classification. DSM-IV is a practical and common sense nosology (...)of psychiatric disorders that is intended to improve communication in clinical practice and in research studies. DSM-IV has no philosophic pretensions but does raise many philosphical questions. This paper describes the development of DSM-IV and the way in which it addresses a number of philosophic issues: nominalism vs. realism, epistemology in science, the mind/body dichotomy, the definition of mental disorders, and dimensional vs. categorical classification. Keywords: DSM-IV, Nosology, psychiatric classification CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
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  10. Louis Charland, Moral Nature of the Dsm-IV Cluster B Personality Disorders.score: 18.0
    Moral considerations do not appear to play a large role in discussions of the DSM-IV personality disorders and debates about their empirical validity. Yet philosophical analysis (...)reveals that the Cluster B personality disorders, in particular, may in fact be moral rather than clinical conditions. This finding has serious consequences for how they should be treated and by whom. (shrink)
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  11. Bernard Gert (1992). A Sex Caused Inconsistency in Dsm-III-R: The Definition of Mental Disorder and the Definition of Paraphilias. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):155-171.score: 18.0
    The DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder is inconsistent with the DSM-III-R definition of paraphilias. The former requires the suffering or increased risk of suffering (...)some harm while the latter allows that deviance, by itself, is sufficient to classify a behavioral syndrome as a paraphilia. This inconsistency is particularly clear when examining the DSM-III-R account of a specific paraphilia, Transvestic Fetishism. The author defends the DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder and argues that the DSM-III-R definition of paraphilias should be changed. He recommends that the diagnostic criteria for specific paraphilias, particularly that for Transvestic Fetishism, be changed to make them consistent with the DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder. Keywords: diagnoses, disease, paraphilia, philosophy, psychiatry CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
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  12. S. Nassir Ghaemi (2009). Nosologomania: DSM & Karl Jaspers' Critique of Kraepelin. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 4 (1):10.score: 18.0
    Emil Kraepelin's nosology has been reinvented, for better or worse. In the United States, the rise of the neo-Kraepelinian nosology of DSM-III resuscitated Kraepelin's (...)work but also differed from many of his ideas, especially his overtly biological ontology. This neo-Kraepelinian system has led to concerns regarding overdiagnosis of psychiatric syndromes (. (shrink)
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  13. A. Frances, A. H. Mack, M. B. First, T. A. Widiger, R. Ross, L. Forman & W. W. Davis (1994). DSM-IV Meets Philosophy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):207-218.score: 18.0
    The authors discuss some of the conceptual issues that must be considered in using and understanding psychiatric classification. DSM-IV is a practical and common sense nosology (...)of psychiatric disorders that is intended to improve communication in clinical practice and in research studies. DSM-IV has no philosophic pretensions but does raise many philosphical questions. This paper describes the development of DSM-IV and the way in which it addresses a number of philosophic issues: nominalism vs. realism, epistemology in science, the mind/body dichotomy, the definition of mental disorders, and dimensional vs. categorical classification. (shrink)
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  14. T. L. Schwartz (2013). Psychopharmacological Practice: The DSM Versus The Brain. Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):25.score: 18.0
    In 1952, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) system of creating, validating, studying and employing a diagnostic system in clinical psychiatric practice was introduced. (...)
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  15. J. S. Blumenthal-Barby (forthcoming). Psychiatrys New Manual (DSM-5): Ethical and Conceptual Dimensions. Journal of Medical Ethics.score: 18.0
    The introduction of the Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-5) in May 2013 is being hailed as the biggest event in psychiatry in the (...)last 10 years. In this paper I examine three important issues that arise from the new manual: (1) Expanding nosology: Psychiatry has again broadened its nosology to include human experiences not previously under its purview (eg, binge eating disorder, internet gaming disorder, caffeine use disorder, hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder). Consequencebased ethical concerns about this expansion are addressed, along with conceptual concerns about a confusion ofconstruct validityandconceptual validityand a failure to distinguish betweendisorderandnon disordered conditions for which we help people.” (2) The role of claims about societal impact in changes in nosology: Several changes in the DSM-5 involved claims about societal impact in their rationales. This is due in part to a new online open comment period during DSM development. Examples include advancement of science, greater access to treatment, greater public awareness of condition, loss of identify or harm to those with removed disorders, stigmatization, offensiveness, etc. I identify and evaluate four importantly distinct ways in which claims about societal impact might operate in DSM development. (3) Categorisation nosology to spectrum nosology: The move todegrees of severityof mental disorders, a major change for DSM-5, raises concerns about conceptual clarity and uniformity concerning what it means to have a severe form of a disorder, and ethical concerns about communication. (shrink)
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  16. Karen Ritchie (1989). The Little Woman Meets Son of Dsm-III. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (6):695-708.score: 18.0
    The author discusses conceptual problems in psychiatry, illustrated by a debate over inclusion of a new disorder, masochistic personality disorder, in DSM-III-R, the manual of psychiatric (...) diagnoses. While the DSM committee has attempted to avoid assumptions about theory and values in an attempt to be scientific, this has proved impossible, as theory is an integral part of scientific observation and values are a prerequisite for any judgment. The foundation for psychiatry cannot be theoryit can only be patient need. Keywords: psychiatry, diagnosis, disease, illness, mental illness, women CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
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  17. Marino Pérez-Álvarez, Louis A. Sass & José M. García-Montes (2009). More Aristotle, Less DSM: The Ontology of Mental Disorders in Constructivist Perspective. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (3):211-225.score: 15.0
  18. Sabina Alam, Jigisha Patel & James Giordano (2012). Working Towards a New Psychiatry - Neuroscience, Technology and the DSM-5. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):1-.score: 15.0
    This Editorial introduces the thematic series on 'Toward a New Psychiatry: Philosophical and Ethical Issues in Classification, Diagnosis and Care' http://www.biomedcentral.com/series/newpsychiatry.
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  19. Carol Steinberg Gould (2011). Why the Histrionic Personality Disorder Should Not Be in the DSM: A New Taxonomic and Moral Analysis. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 4 (1):26-40.score: 15.0
    The scene was pleasant on both sides. A cruder lover would have lost the view of her pretty ways and attitudes, and spoiled all by stupid attempts (...)
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  20. Peter Horn (2008). Psychiatric Ethics Consultation in the Light of Dsm-V. HEC Forum 20 (4):315-324.score: 15.0
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  21. Elizabeth H. Flanagan Roger K. Blashfield (2007). Should Clinicians' Views of Mental Illness Influence the DSM? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 285-287.score: 15.0
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  22. Lisa Cosgrove (2011). The DSM, Big Pharma, and Clinical Practice Guidelines: Protecting Patient Autonomy and Informed Consent. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 4 (1):11-25.score: 15.0
    Researchers, investigative journalists, community physicians, ethicists, and policy makers have voiced strong concerns about the integrity of medicine. Specifically, questions have been raised about the ways in (...)
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  23. Massimiliano Aragona (2009). About and Beyond Comorbidity: Does the Crisis of the DSM Bring on a Radical Rethinking of Descriptive Psychopathology? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):29-33.score: 15.0
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  24. Steen Halling & Mical Goldfarb (1996). The New Generation of Diagnostic Manuals (Dsm-Iii, Dsm-Iii-R aNd Dsm-Iv) : an Overvi Ew an D a pHenomenologically Based Critique. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 27 (1):49-71.score: 15.0
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  25. G. Scott Waterman (2007). Clinicians' “FolkTaxonomies and the DSM: Pick Your Poison. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 271-275.score: 15.0
  26. Elizabeth H. Flanagan & Roger K. Blashfield (2008). Should Clinicians' Views of Mental Illness Influence the DSM? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):285-287.score: 15.0
  27. [deleted]Bassam Khoury, Ellen J. Langer & Francesco Pagnini (2014). The DSM: Mindful Science or Mindless Power? A Critical Review. Frontiers in Psychology 5.score: 15.0
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  28. S. Pearce (forthcoming). DSM-5 and the Rise of the Diagnostic Checklist. Journal of Medical Ethics.score: 15.0
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  29. Stuart A. Kirk & Herb Kutchins (forthcoming). The Myth of the Reliability of DSM. Journal of Mind and Behavior.score: 15.0
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  30. M. D. Pickersgill (forthcoming). Debating DSM-5: Diagnosis and the Sociology of Critique. Journal of Medical Ethics.score: 15.0
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  31. Guy A. Boysen (2011). Revision of the DSM and Conceptual Expansion of Mental Illness: An Exploratory Analysis of Diagnostic Criteria. Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (4):295-315.score: 15.0
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  32. M. T. McGuire (1985). Phenomenological Classification Systems: the Case of DSM-III. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 30 (1):135-147.score: 15.0
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  33. Randolph M. Nesse & Eric D. Jackson (2011). Evolutionary Foundations for Psychiatric Diagnosis: Making DSM-V Valid. In Pieter R. Adriaens & Andreas de Block (eds.), Maladapting Minds: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Evolutionary Theory. Oxford University Press. 167--191.score: 15.0
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  34. Michael Strand (2011). Where Do Classifications Come From? The DSM-III, the Transformation of American Psychiatry, and the Problem of Origins in the Sociology of Knowledge. Theory and Society 40 (3):273-313.score: 15.0
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  35. Serife Tekin (2009). Review of &quot;Dimensional Models of Personality Disorders: Refining the Research Agenda for DSM-V&quot;. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online Reviews 13 (17).score: 15.0
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  36. William James Earle (2014). Dsm5. Philosophical Forum 45 (2):179-196.score: 15.0
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  37. Michael B. First (2012). The Development of DSM-III From a Historical/Conceptual Perspective. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford. 127.score: 15.0
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  38. Kwm (2009). A Secret History of ICD and the Hidden Future of DSM. In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oup Oxford.score: 15.0
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  39. B. Verhoeff & G. Glas, The Search for Dysfunctions. A Commentary on 'What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V' by Stein Et Al. (2010).score: 15.0
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  40. Guy A. Boysen (2007). An Evaluation of the DSM Concept of Mental Disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):157-173.score: 15.0
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  41. [deleted]Dupuy Franca, Clarke Adam, Barry Robert, McCarthy Rory & Selikowitz Mark (2013). EEG Activity of Men and Women with DSM-5 Adult AD/HD. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 15.0
  42. K. W. Fulford (forthcoming). Report to the Chair of the DSM-VI Task Force From the Editors of. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology.score: 15.0
  43. K. W. M. Fulford & N. Sartorius (2009). The Secret History of ICD and the Hidden Future of DSM. In Matthew Broome Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives.score: 15.0
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  44. Bernard Gert (1990). Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition of Mental Disorder. Analyse and Kritik 12:34-46.score: 15.0
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  45. David H. Jacobs (2011). Is the DSM's Formulation of Mental Disorder a Technical-Scientific Term? Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (1):63-79.score: 15.0
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  46. [deleted]Bolduc M. (2010). Neuropsychological Assessment of Delusional Disorder (DSM-IV). Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 4.score: 15.0
  47. Fred Newman & Kenneth Gergen (1999). Debates on the Issue of Psychological Diagnosis Have Been Raging for Decades. In Recent Times, Both Sides in the Debate Have Become More Stubborn and Self-Righteous. The Critics, Especially, Appear to Be Ineffectual and Impotent. Poking Fun at the More Ludicrous of the Hundreds of Categories of Mental Disorder Catalogued in the DSM-IV (the Fourth Edition of the. [REVIEW] In Lois Holzman (ed.), Performing Psychology: A Postmodern Culture of the Mind. Routledge. 73.score: 15.0
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  48. J. Parnas Iv (2012). The DSM-IV and the Founding Prototype of Schizophrenia: Are We Regressing to a Pre-Kraepelinian Nosology. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford.score: 15.0
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  49. Harold Alan Pincus (2012). Evaluating DSM-III: Structure, Process and Outcomes. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. Oup Oxford. 141.score: 15.0
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  50. Jeffrey S. Poland, Barbara von Eckardt & Will Spaulding (1994). Problems with the DSM Approach to Classifying Psychopathology. In George Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.score: 15.0
     
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