Search results for 'DSM' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  42
    Jonathan Y. Tsou (2016). Natural Kinds, Psychiatric Classification and the History of the DSM. History of Psychiatry 27.
    This paper addresses philosophical issues concerning whether mental disorders are natural kinds and how the DSM should classify mental disorders. I argue that some mental disorders (e. (...)g., schizophrenia, depression) are natural kinds in the sense that they are natural classes constituted by a set of stable biological mechanisms. I subsequently argue that a theoretical and causal approach to classification would provide a superior method for classifying natural kinds than the purely descriptive approach adopted by the DSM since DSM-III. My argument suggests that the DSM should classify natural kinds in order to provide predictively useful (i.e., projectable) diagnostic categories and that a causal approach to classification would provide a more promising method for formulating valid diagnostic categories. (shrink)
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  2.  76
    Şerife Tekin & Melissa Mosko (2015). Hyponarrativity and Context-Specific Limitations of the DSM-5. Public Affairs Quarterly 29 (1).
    his article develops a set of recommendations for the psychiatric and medical community in the treatment of mental disorders in response to the recently published fifth edition (...)
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  3.  26
    Markus Heinimaa (2002). Incomprehensibility: The Role of the Concept in DSM-IV Definition of Schizophrenic Delusions. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5 (3):291-295.
    In this paper the role of incomprehensibility in the conceptualization of the DSM-IV definition of delusion is discussed. According to the analysis, the conceptual dependence of (...)DSM-IV definition of delusion on incomprehensibility is manifested in several ways and infested with ambiguity. Definition of bizarre delusions is contradictory and gives room for two incompatible readings. Also the definition of delusion manifests internal inconsistencies and its tendency to account for delusions in terms of misinterpretation is bound to miss the content of the traditional comprehension of delusionality. It is suggested that the ambiguities in defining delusions has to do with the question whether psychiatric practice is better accounted for in terms of the grammar of incorrectness or of incomprehensibility. (shrink)
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  4.  6
    Paul Healy (2011). DSM Diagnosis and Beyond: on the Need for a Hermeneutically-Informed Biopsychosocial Framework. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 14 (2):163-175.
    While often dubbedthe bible of contemporary psychiatryand widely hailed as providinga benchmarkfor the profession, on closer inspection the DSM is seen to be (...)
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  5.  43
    Jonathan Y. Tsou (2015). DSM-5 and Psychiatry's Second Revolution: Descriptive Vs. Theoretical Approaches to Psychiatric Classification. In Steeves Demazeux & Patrick Singy (eds.), The DSM-5 in Perspective: Philosophical Reflections on the Psychiatric Babel. Springer 43-62.
    A large part of the controversy surrounding the publication of DSM-5 stems from the possibility of replacing the purely descriptive approach to classification favored by the (...)DSM since 1980. This paper examines the question of how mental disorders should be classified, focusing on the issue of whether the DSM should adopt a purely descriptive or theoretical approach. I argue that the DSM should replace its purely descriptive approach with a theoretical approach that integrates causal information into the DSMs descriptive diagnostic categories. The paper proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I examine the goals (viz., guiding treatment, facilitating research, and improving communication) associated with the DSMs purely descriptive approach. In the second section, I suggest that the DSMs purely descriptive approach is best suited for improving communication among mental health professionals; however, theoretical approaches would be superior for purposes of treatment and research. In the third section, I outline steps required to move the DSM towards a hybrid system of classification that can accommodate the benefits of descriptive and theoretical approaches, and I discuss how the DSMs descriptive categories could be revised to incorporate theoretical information regarding the causes of disorders. I argue that the DSM should reconceive of its goals more narrowly such that it functions primarily as an epistemic hub that mediates among various contexts of use in which definitions of mental disorders appear. My analysis emphasizes the importance of pluralism as a methodological means for avoiding theoretical dogmatism and ensuring that the DSM is a reflexive and self-correcting manual. (shrink)
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  6.  3
    Pierangelo di Vittorio, Michel Minard & François Gonon (2013). Les virages du DSM : enjeux scientifiques, économiques et politiques. Hermes 66:, [ p.].
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  7. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2011). The Importance of History for Philosophy of Psychiatry: The Case of the DSM and Psychiatric Classification. Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (3):446-470.
    Abstract Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and seeks (...)
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  8. Rachel Cooper (2004). What is Wrong with the DSM? History of Psychiatry 15 (1):5-25.
    The DSM is the main classification of mental disorders used by psychiatrists in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. Although widely used, the DSM has (...)
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  9.  5
    T. L. Schwartz (2013). Psychopharmacological Practice: The DSM Versus The Brain. Mens Sana Monographs 11 (1):25.
    In 1952, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) system of creating, validating, studying and employing a diagnostic system in clinical psychiatric practice was introduced. (...)
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  10. Guy A. Boysen (2011). Revision of the DSM and Conceptual Expansion of Mental Illness: An Exploratory Analysis of Diagnostic Criteria. Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (4):295-315.
    The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders contains the official diagnostic criteria for recognized mental illnesses. Some have asserted that DSM revisions have caused the boundaries (...)
     
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  11.  11
    Bernard Gert (1990). Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition of Mental Disorder. Analyse & Kritik 12 (1):34-46.
    I provide an account of irrationality that takes the concept of an irrational action as more basic than that of an irrational belief. While explaining the various (...)
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  12.  3
    Arthur Maciel Nunes Gonçalves, Clarissa de Rosalmeida Dantas & Claudio E. M. Banzato (2016). Values and DSM-5: Looking at the Debate on Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome. BMC Medical Ethics 17 (1):1-8.
    BackgroundAlthough values have increasingly received attention in psychiatric literature over the last three decades, their role has been only partially acknowledged in psychiatric classification endeavors. The review (...)
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  13.  9
    S. Nassir Ghaemi (2009). Nosologomania: DSM & Karl Jaspers' Critique of Kraepelin. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 4 (1):10.
    Emil Kraepelin's nosology has been reinvented, for better or worse. In the United States, the rise of the neo-Kraepelinian nosology of DSM-III resuscitated Kraepelin's (...)work but also differed from many of his ideas, especially his overtly biological ontology. This neo-Kraepelinian system has led to concerns regarding overdiagnosis of psychiatric syndromes (. (shrink)
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  14.  58
    Dr H. Stefan Bracha & Dr Jack D. Maser (2008). Anxiety and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Context of Human Brain Evolution:A Role for Theory in Dsm-V? Cogprints.
    Thehypervigilance, escape, struggle, tonic immobilityevolutionarily hardwired acute peritraumatic response sequence is important for clinicians to understand. Our commentary supplements the useful article on human tonic (...)
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  15.  55
    Dr H. Stefan Bracha (2006). Human Brain Evolution and the "Neuroevolutionary Time-Depth Principle:" Implications for the Reclassification of Fear-Circuitry-Related Traits in Dsm-V and for Studying Resilience to Warzone-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Philosophical Explorations.
    The DSM-III, DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 have judiciously minimized discussion of etiologies to distance clinical psychiatry from Freudian psychoanalysis. With this goal mostly achieved (...), discussion of etiological factors should be reintroduced into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition. A research agenda for the DSM-V advocated the "development of a pathophysiologically based classification system". The author critically reviews the neuroevolutionary literature on stress-induced and fear circuitry disorders and related amygdala-driven, species-atypical fear behaviors of clinical severity in adult humans. Over 30 empirically testable/falsifiable predictions are presented. It is noted that in DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10, the classification of stress and fear circuitry disorders is neither mode-of-acquisition-based nor brain-evolution-based. For example, snake phobia and dog phobia are clustered together. Similarly, research on blood-injection-injury-type-specific phobia clusters two fears different in their innateness: 1) an arguably ontogenetic memory-trace-overconsolidation-based fear and 2) a hardwired fear of the sight of one's blood or a sharp object penetrating one's skin. Genetic architecture-charting of fear-circuitry-related traits has been challenging. Various, non-phenotype-based architectures can serve as targets for research. In this article, the author will propose one such alternative genetic architecture. This article was inspired by the following: A) Nesse's "Smoke-Detector Principle", B) the increasing suspicion that the "smooth" rather than "lumpy" distribution of complex psychiatric phenotypes may in some cases be accounted for by oligogenic transmission, and C) insights from the initial sequence of the chimpanzee genome and comparison with the human genome by the Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium published in late 2005. Neuroevolutionary insights relevant to fear circuitry symptoms that primarily emerge overconsolidationally are presented. Also introduced is a human-evolution-based principle for clustering innate fear traits. The "Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle" of innate fears proposed in this article may be useful in the development of a neuroevolution-based taxonomic re-clustering of stress-triggered and fear-circuitry disorders in DSM-V. Four broad clusters of evolved fear circuits are proposed based on their time-depths: 1) Mesozoic circuits hardwired by wild-type alleles driven to fixation by Mesozoic selective sweeps; 2) Cenozoic circuits relevant to many specific phobias; 3) mid Paleolithic and upper Paleolithic circuits ; 4) Neolithic circuits. More importantly, the author presents evolutionary perspectives on warzone-related PTSD, Combat-Stress Reaction, Combat-related Stress, Operational-Stress, and other deployment-stress-induced symptoms. The Neuroevolutionary Time-depth Principle presented in this article may help explain the dissimilar stress-resilience levels following different types of acute threat to survival of oneself or one's progency. PTSD rates following exposure to lethal inter-group violence are usually 5-10 times higher than rates following large-scale natural disasters such as forest fires, floods, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes. The author predicts that both intentionally-caused large-scale bioevent-disasters, as well as natural bioevents such as SARS and avian flu pandemics will be an exception and are likely to be followed by PTSD rates approaching those that follow warzone exposure. During bioevents, Amygdala-driven and locus-coeruleus-driven epidemic pseudosomatic symptoms may be an order of magnitude more common than infection-caused cytokine-driven symptoms. Implications for the red cross and FEMA are discussed. It is also argued that hospital phobia as well as dog phobia, bird phobia and bat phobia require re-taxonomization in DSM-V in a new "overconsolidational disorders" category anchored around PTSD. The overconsolidational spectrum category may be conceptualized as straddling the fear circuitry spectrum disorders and the affective spectrum disorders categories, and may be a category for which Pitman's secondary prevention propranolol regimen may be specifically indicated as a "morning after pill" intervention. Predictions are presented regarding obsessive-compulsive disorder and "culture-bound" acute anxiety symptoms. Also discussed are insights relevant to pseudoneurological symptoms and to the forthcoming Dissociative-Conversive disorders category in DSM-V, including what the author terms fright-triggered acute pseudo-localized symptoms. Speculations based on studies of the human abnormal-spindle-like, microcephaly-associated gene, the microcephaly primary autosomal recessive gene, and the forkhead box p2 gene are made and incorporated into what is termed "The pre-FOXP2 Hypothesis of Blood-Injection-Injury Phobia." Finally, the author argues for a non-reductionistic fusion of "distal neurobiology" with clinical "proximal neurobiology," utilizing neurological heuristics. It is noted that the value of re-clustering fear traits based on behavioral ethology, human-phylogenomics-derived endophenotypes and on ontogenomics can be confirmed or disconfirmed using epidemiological or twin studies and psychiatric genomics. (shrink)
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  16. Louis Charland, Moral Nature of the Dsm-IV Cluster B Personality Disorders.
    Moral considerations do not appear to play a large role in discussions of the DSM-IV personality disorders and debates about their empirical validity. Yet philosophical analysis (...)reveals that the Cluster B personality disorders, in particular, may in fact be moral rather than clinical conditions. This finding has serious consequences for how they should be treated and by whom. (shrink)
     
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  17.  1
    Michael Pitman (2014). Mental Disorders, Brain Disorders, Neurodevelopmental Disorders: Challenges for the Philosophy of Psychopathology After DSM-5. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):131-144.
    The publication of DSM-5 has been accompanied by a fair amount of controversy. Amongst DSMs most vocalinsidercritics has been Thomas Insel, Director of the (...) US National Institute of Mental Health. Insel has publicly criticised DSMs adherence to a symptom-based classification of mental disorder, and used the weight of the NIMH to back a rival research strategy aimed at a more biology-based diagnostic classification. This strategy is part of Insels vision of a future, more preventative psychiatry in which mental disorders are not only understood as biological disorders of the brain, but also as neurodevelopmental disorders. This paper examines the interest and merit of Insels views of mental and neurodevelopmental disorder for the philosophy of psychopathology, with a special focus of his neurodevelopmental model of schizophrenia. Pitmansmoderate materialismwill be used both as a philosophical lens through which to examine Insels position, as well as an example of a philosophical framework that may require updating and revision in the light of moves towards a neurodevelopmental conception of mental disorder. (shrink)
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  18. Guy A. Boysen (2007). An Evaluation of the DSM Concept of Mental Disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):157-173.
    The stated purpose of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is to classify mental disorders. However, no tenable operational definition of mental disorder is offered (...)
     
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  19.  30
    Leslie Forman & Wendy Wakefield Davis (1994). Dsm-IV Meets Philosophy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):207-218.
    The authors discuss some of the conceptual issues that must be considered in using and understanding psychiatric classification. DSM-IV is a practical and common sense nosology (...)of psychiatric disorders that is intended to improve communication in clinical practice and in research studies. DSM-IV has no philosophic pretensions but does raise many philosphical questions. This paper describes the development of DSM-IV and the way in which it addresses a number of philosophic issues: nominalism vs. realism, epistemology in science, the mind/body dichotomy, the definition of mental disorders, and dimensional vs. categorical classification. Keywords: DSM-IV, Nosology, psychiatric classification CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
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  20.  9
    A. Frances, A. H. Mack, M. B. First, T. A. Widiger, R. Ross, L. Forman & W. W. Davis (1994). DSM-IV Meets Philosophy. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (3):207-218.
    The authors discuss some of the conceptual issues that must be considered in using and understanding psychiatric classification. DSM-IV is a practical and common sense nosology (...)of psychiatric disorders that is intended to improve communication in clinical practice and in research studies. DSM-IV has no philosophic pretensions but does raise many philosphical questions. This paper describes the development of DSM-IV and the way in which it addresses a number of philosophic issues: nominalism vs. realism, epistemology in science, the mind/body dichotomy, the definition of mental disorders, and dimensional vs. categorical classification. (shrink)
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  21.  4
    Stuart Kirk & Herb Kutchins (1994). The Myth of the Reliability of DSM. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (1-2):71-86.
    When it was published in 1980, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, third edition - universally known as DSM-III - embodied a new method for identifying (...) psychiatric illness. The manual's authors and their supporters claimed that DSM-III's development was guided by scientific principles and evidence and that its innovative approach to diagnosis greatly ameliorated the problem of the unreliability of psychiatric diagnoses. In this paper we challenge the conventional wisdom about the research data used to support this claim. Specifically, we argue that the rhetoric of science, more than the scientific data, was used convincingly by the developers of DSM-III to promote their new manual. We offer a re-analysis of the data gathered in the original DSM-III field trials in light of the interpretations that had been offered earlier for the reliability studies of others. We demonstrate how the standards for interpreting reliability were dramatically shifted over time in a direction that made it easier to claim success with DSM-III when, in fact, the data were equivocal. (shrink)
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  22.  10
    Bernard Gert (1992). A Sex Caused Inconsistency in Dsm-III-R: The Definition of Mental Disorder and the Definition of Paraphilias. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):155-171.
    The DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder is inconsistent with the DSM-III-R definition of paraphilias. The former requires the suffering or increased risk of suffering (...)some harm while the latter allows that deviance, by itself, is sufficient to classify a behavioral syndrome as a paraphilia. This inconsistency is particularly clear when examining the DSM-III-R account of a specific paraphilia, Transvestic Fetishism. The author defends the DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder and argues that the DSM-III-R definition of paraphilias should be changed. He recommends that the diagnostic criteria for specific paraphilias, particularly that for Transvestic Fetishism, be changed to make them consistent with the DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder. Keywords: diagnoses, disease, paraphilia, philosophy, psychiatry CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
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  23.  8
    M. D. Pickersgill (2014). Debating DSM-5: Diagnosis and the Sociology of Critique. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (8):521-525.
    The development of the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disordersthe DSM-5has reenergised and driven further forward (...)critical discourse about the place and role of diagnosis in mental health. The DSM-5 has attracted considerable criticism, not least about its role in processes of medicalisation. This paper suggests the need for a sociology of psychiatric critique. Sociological analysis can help map fields of contention, and cast fresh light on the assumptions and nuances of debate around the DSM-5; it underscores the importance of diagnosis to the governance of social and clinical life, as well as the wider discourses critical commentaries connect with and are activated by. More normatively, a sociology of critique can indicate which interests and values are structuring the dialogues being articulated, and just how diverse clinical opinion regarding the DSM can actually be. This has implications for the considerations of health services and policy decision-makers who might look to such debates for guidance. (shrink)
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  24.  12
    Steen Halling & Mical Goldfarb (1996). The New Generation of Diagnostic Manuals (Dsm-Iii, Dsm-Iii-R aNd Dsm-Iv) : an Overvi Ew an D a pHenomenologically Based Critique. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 27 (1):49-71.
    Given the extraordinary influence of the DSM-III and its successors, the DSM-III-R and the DSM-IV, it behooves humanistically oriented practitioners to appraise these new (...)manuals most carefully. Toward this end, we discuss the goals that have guided the manuals' development and provide an overview of their basic structure. This is followed by a phenomenologically based critique, evaluating the claim that these manuals are "descriptive" and "atheoretical." We conclude with a discussion of five guiding principles for phenomenological diagnosis and assessment. (shrink)
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  25.  4
    S. Pearce (2014). DSM-5 and the Rise of the Diagnostic Checklist. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (8):515-516.
    The development and publication of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition produced a peak in mainstream media interest in psychiatry, and a large and (...)
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  26.  3
    Karen Ritchie (1989). The Little Woman Meets Son of Dsm-III. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (6):695-708.
    The author discusses conceptual problems in psychiatry, illustrated by a debate over inclusion of a new disorder, masochistic personality disorder, in DSM-III-R, the manual of psychiatric (...) diagnoses. While the DSM committee has attempted to avoid assumptions about theory and values in an attempt to be scientific, this has proved impossible, as theory is an integral part of scientific observation and values are a prerequisite for any judgment. The foundation for psychiatry cannot be theoryit can only be patient need. Keywords: psychiatry, diagnosis, disease, illness, mental illness, women CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
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  27. David H. Jacobs (2011). Is the DSM's Formulation of Mental Disorder a Technical-Scientific Term? Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (1):63-79.
    Although theIntroductionto the DSM makes it clear that the presence ofclinicaldistress or impairment is insufficient for a diagnosis ofmental disorder” , in practice (...) the clinician is completely unshackled from the conceptual definition and is free to decide on a case-by-case basis ifenoughdistress or impairment is present, regardless of circumstances, to judge thatmental disordercan be diagnosed. It is argued that reference to a biological or psychological dysfunction cannot raisemental disorderfrom a judgment quite likeThis is pornography, not literatureto a technicalscientific term becausebiological dysfunctionmust be tied to an outcome that is itself less ambiguous thanmental disorder,” andpsychological dysfunctionerroneously assumes that how people are supposed to think, feel, and act, regardless of circumstances, can be as uncontentious as ideas about physical well being, and in addition erroneously assumes that human behavior can be causally explained. (shrink)
     
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  28. Edward Shorter (2015). What Psychiatry Left Out of the Dsm-5: Historical Mental Disorders Today. Routledge.
    _Choice Recommended Read_ _What Psychiatry Left Out of the DSM-5: Historical Mental Disorders Today_ covers the diagnoses that the _Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders_ (...)failed to include, along with diagnoses that should not have been included, but were. Psychiatry as a field is over two centuries old and over that time has gathered great wisdom about mental illnesses. Today, much of that knowledge has been ignored and we have diagnoses such as "schizophrenia" and "bipolar disorder" that do not correspond to the diseases found in nature; we have also left out disease labels that on a historical basis may be real. Edward Shorter proposes a history-driven alternative to the DSM. (shrink)
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  29. Duff Waring (1998). Making Us Crazy. DSM: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental Disorders. [REVIEW] Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (4):437-446.
    The Malleus Maleficarum was a detailed manual for Dominican witch-hunters. It codified specific criteria for identifying witches and guidelines for their application. It elaborated a system (...)of symptoms that indicated illness caused by witchcraft . These symptoms were seen as the visible projections of a vast and complex organization of behavior. Since the existence of witches was presupposed by those who used the manual, its criteria were confirmed repeatedly during the Inquisition. Once the Malleus was published, its diagnostic system acquired a momentum of its own and generated its own evidence . Its authors saw physicians as experts at distinguishing physical illnesses from those caused by witchcraft. The authors began the manual by asserting that belief in the existence of witches is an essential part of the Catholic faith. Priests and inquisitors were not to doubt the existence of witches . Like the Malleus Maleficarum, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual is a detailed text which codifies specific criteria for identifying people who are seen as abnormal. It codifies guidelines for applying these criteria and elaborates a system of symptoms that indicates illnesses known as mental disorders. These symptoms are seen as the visible projections of a vast and complex organization of behavior. Since the existence of these disorders is presupposed by many of those who use the manual, its criteria are confirmed repeatedly in the diagnostic process. Once DSM was published , its diagnostic system acquired a momentum of its own and has generated its own evidence. Its authors regard psychiatrists as experts at applying the manualís criteria. They are also seen as experts at distinguishing mental disorders from other illnesses. Belief in the existence of mental disorders is an essential part of the psychiatric faith. (shrink)
     
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  30.  14
    Michael Strand (2011). Where Do Classifications Come From? The DSM-III, the Transformation of American Psychiatry, and the Problem of Origins in the Sociology of Knowledge. Theory and Society 40 (3):273-313.
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  31.  2
    Stijn Vanheule & Ignaas Devisch (2014). Mental Suffering and the DSM-5: a Critical Review. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 20 (6):975-980.
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  32.  1
    D. J. Stein & R. M. Nesse (2015). Normal and Abnormal Anxiety in the Age of DSM-5 and ICD-11. Emotion Review 7 (3):223-229.
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  33.  12
    Lisa Cosgrove (2011). The DSM, Big Pharma, and Clinical Practice Guidelines: Protecting Patient Autonomy and Informed Consent. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 4 (1):11-25.
    Researchers, investigative journalists, community physicians, ethicists, and policy makers have voiced strong concerns about the integrity of medicine. Specifically, questions have been raised about the ways in (...)
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  34.  2
    Marga Reimer (2013). Moral Disorder In the DSM-IV?: The Cluster B Personality Disorders. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (3):203-215.
  35.  57
    Sabina Alam, Jigisha Patel & James Giordano (2012). Working Towards a New Psychiatry - Neuroscience, Technology and the DSM-5. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7 (1):1-.
    This Editorial introduces the thematic series on 'Toward a New Psychiatry: Philosophical and Ethical Issues in Classification, Diagnosis and Care' http://www.biomedcentral.com/series/newpsychiatry.
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  36. Darrel A. Regier (2012). Diagnostic Threshold Considerations for DSM-5. In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry Ii: Nosology. OUP Oxford
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  37.  1
    Dalena van Heugten – van der Kloet & Ton van Heugten (2015). The Classification of Psychiatric Disorders According to DSM-5 Deserves an Internationally Standardized Psychological Test Battery on Symptom Level. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  38.  25
    Massimiliano Aragona (2009). About and Beyond Comorbidity: Does the Crisis of the DSM Bring on a Radical Rethinking of Descriptive Psychopathology? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):29-33.
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  39.  5
    Elizabeth H. Flanagan & Roger K. Blashfield (2008). Should Clinicians' Views of Mental Illness Influence the DSM? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):285-287.
  40.  16
    Randolph M. Nesse & Eric D. Jackson (2011). Evolutionary Foundations for Psychiatric Diagnosis: Making DSM-V Valid. In Pieter R. Adriaens & Andreas de Block (eds.), Maladapting Minds: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Evolutionary Theory. Oxford University Press 167--191.
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  41.  38
    Marino Pérez-Álvarez, Louis A. Sass & José M. García-Montes (2009). More Aristotle, Less DSM: The Ontology of Mental Disorders in Constructivist Perspective. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (3):211-225.
  42.  6
    Stephen Y. Wilkerson (2009). Bradley E. Lewis, Psychiatry in the New Millennium: Review of Moving Beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New Psychiatry: The Birth of Postpsychiatry. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 30 (1):73-75.
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  43. K. W. M. Fulford & N. Sartorius (2009). The Secret History of ICD and the Hidden Future of DSM. In Matthew Broome Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives.
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  44.  1
    Gerald N. Grob (1999). Making Us Crazy: DSM: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental DisordersHerb Kutchins Stuart A. Kirk. Isis 90 (2):397-398.
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  45.  2
    Arthur Maciel Nunes Gonçalves, Clarissa de Rosalmeida Dantas & Claudio E. M. Banzato (forthcoming). Values and DSM-5: Looking at the Debate on Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome. Most Recent Articles: Bmc Medical Ethics.
    Although values have increasingly received attention in psychiatric literature over the last three decades, their role has been only partially acknowledged in psychiatric classification endeavors. The review (...)
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  46.  27
    Carol Steinberg Gould (2011). Why the Histrionic Personality Disorder Should Not Be in the DSM: A New Taxonomic and Moral Analysis. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 4 (1):26-40.
    The scene was pleasant on both sides. A cruder lover would have lost the view of her pretty ways and attitudes, and spoiled all by stupid attempts (...)
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    A. V. Horwitz (2015). The DSM-5 and the Continuing Transformation of Normal Sadness Into Depressive Disorder. Emotion Review 7 (3):209-215.
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    Elizabeth H. Flanagan Roger K. Blashfield (2007). Should Clinicians' Views of Mental Illness Influence the DSM? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 285-287.
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    Peter Horn (2008). Psychiatric Ethics Consultation in the Light of Dsm-V. HEC Forum 20 (4):315-324.
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    D. Pilgrim (2014). Historical Resonances of the DSM-5 Dispute: American Exceptionalism or Eurocentrism? History of the Human Sciences 27 (2):97-117.
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