27 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Damian Cox (Bond University)
  1. Damian Cox (2014). Reflections in a Mirror. Diametros 41:1-12.
    In this paper, I develop a solution to the puzzle of mirror perception: why do mirrors appear to reverse the image of an object along a left/right axis and not around other axes, such as the top/bottom axis? I set out the different forms the puzzle takes and argue that one form of it – arguably the key form – has not been satisfactorily solved. I offer a solution in three parts: setting out the conditions in which an apparent left/right (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Damian Cox (2013). Judging Character. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):387-398.
    A lot is at stake in character judgment. How we treat others is influenced by what kinds of persons we take them to be. Our rational plans of life depend upon our insights into our own character and the character of those close to us. Given the importance of the way we judge character, the virtues and vices of character judgment deserve much closer attention than they have received in the philosophical literature. Some philosophers have discussed duties of friendship and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Damian Cox & Michael P. Levine (2013). 7 Avatar: Racism and Prejudice on Pandora. In Dan Flory & Mary Bloodsworth-Lugo (eds.), Race, Philosophy, and Film. Routledge. 50--117.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Damian Cox (2012). Judgment, Deliberation, and the Self-Effacement of Moral Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (3):289-302.
    ExtractIn developing moral theories, philosophers seek to fulfill at least two tasks: to guide moral judgment and to guide moral deliberation. In moral judgment, moral agents assess moral status. In moral deliberation, moral agents decide how to act. It is important to work out how these two things are related. One suggestion is to posit a direct connection between them according to which moral agents are required to deliberate in terms of correct moral judgment. There are various ways of spelling (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Damian Cox (2011). Thinking Through Film: Doing Philosophy, Watching Movies. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Philosophy and film. Why film and philosophy? -- Philosophy and film spectatorship -- Epistemology and metaphysics. Knowing what's what in Total recall -- Ontology and The matrix -- It's all in the mind: AI artificial intelligence and robot love -- La jetee and the promise of time travel -- The human condition. Fate and choice: the philosophy of Minority report -- Personal identity: the case of Memento -- The spectacle of horror: Funny games -- Looking for meaning in all the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Mark Colyvan, Damian Cox & Katie Steele (2010). Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions. Noûs 44 (3):503-529.
  7. Damian Cox, Integrity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Damian Cox (2006). Agent-Based Theories of Right Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):505 - 515.
    In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Damian Cox (2006). Review of Gerald Vision, Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and its Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 47 (3):277-279.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Damian Cox (2006). Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and Its Critics By Gerald Vision. Philosophical Books 47 (3):277-279.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Damian Cox & Michael Levine (2006). Violinists Run Amuck in South Dakota: Screen Doors Down in the Badlands! Philosophical Papers 35 (2):267-281.
    Re-Reading: Judith Jarvis Thompson, 'A Defense of Abortion'.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Damian Cox (2005). Integrity, Commitment, and Indirect Consequentialism. Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1):61-73.
  13. Damian Cox & Michael Levine (2004). Believing Badly. Philosophical Papers 33 (3):309-328.
    This paper explores the grounds upon which moral judgment of a person's beliefs is properly made. The beliefs in question are non-moral beliefs and the objects of moral judgment are individual instances of believing. We argue that instances of believing may be morally wrong on any of three distinct grounds: (i) by constituting a moral hazard, (ii) by being the result of immoral inquiry, or (iii) by arising from vicious inner processes of belief formation. On this way of articulating the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Damian Cox (2003). Goodman and Putnam on the Making of Worlds. Erkenntnis 58 (1):33 - 46.
    Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze & Michael Levine (2003). Integrity and the Fragile Self. Ashgate.
    This book examines the centrality of integrity in relation to a variety of philosophical and psychological concerns that impinge upon the ethical life.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Damian Cox (2002). Truth, Value, and Consolation. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):413-424.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Damian Cox (2001). Cartesian Questions. International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2):241-242.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Damian Cox (2001). Realism and Epistemic Theories of Truth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):473-486.
    This paper explores the relation between epistemic conceptions of truth and different kinds of commitment to realism and antirealism. It argues that all epistemic conceptions of truth are versions of antirealism. Although epistemic conceptions of truth can make various concessions to realist intuition, these remain concessions only. One cannot concede all claims to antirealism and remain within the orbit of a genuinely epistemic conception of truth.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Damian Cox (2001). Review of Jean-Luc Marion, Cartesian Questions. [REVIEW] International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2):241-242.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Damian Cox (2000). Integrity and Politics. Professional Ethics, a Multidisciplinary Journal 8 (2):31-45.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Damian Cox (2000). Scepticism and the Interpreter. Philosophical Papers 29 (2):61-72.
    Abstract This paper defends an argument from interpretation against the possibility of massive error. The argument shares many important features with Donald Davidson's famous argument, but also key differences. I defend the argument against claims that it begs the question against scepticism and that it leaves the sceptic with an obvious means of escape.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Damian Cox, Marguerite LaCaze & M. P. Levine (1999). Should We Strive for Integrity? Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (4):519-530.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Damian Cox (1998). Metaphysical Realism and Idealisation. Philosophia 26 (3-4):465-487.
    Hilary Putnam's famous model-theoretic arguments have the virtue of presenting metaphysical realists with a clear challenge. On pain of embracing either an implausible antifallibilism or the radical indeterminacy of reference, metaphysical realists must appeal to metalinguistic levels of interpretation richer than our own in order to fix meaning. And sense must be made of this appeal. In this paper I begin the task of developing a version of metaphysical realism that takes up this challenge.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Damian Cox (1998). Review of Soren Haggqvist, Thought Experiments in Philosophy. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):120-132.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Damian Cox (1997). On the Value of Natural Relations. Environmental Ethics 19 (2):173-183.
    In “A Refutation of Environmental Ethics” Janna Thompson argues that by assigning intrinsic value to nonhuman elements of nature either our evaluations become (1) arbitrary, and therefore unjustified, or (2) impractical, or (3) justified and practical, but only by reflecting human interest, thus failing to be truly intrinsic to nonhuman nature. There are a number of possible responses to her argument, some of which have been made explicitly in reply to Thompson and others which are implicit in the literature. In (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Damian Cox (1997). Putnam, Equivalence, Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):155-170.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Damian Cox (1997). The Trouble with Truth-Makers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):45–62.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation