Search results for 'Damian Keil' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  13
    Damian Keil & Keith Davids (2000). Lifting the Screen on Neural Organization: Is Computational Functional Modeling Necessary? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):544-545.
    Arbib et al.'s comprehensive review of neural organization, over-relies on modernist concepts and restricts our understanding of brain and behavior. Reliance on terms like coding, transformation, and representation perpetuates a “black-box approach” to the study of the brain. Recognition is due to the authors for attempting to introduce postmodern concepts such as chaos and self-organization to the study of neural organization. However, confusion occurs in the implementation of “biologically rooted” schema theory in which schemas are viewed as computer programs. The (...)
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  2.  19
    Frank Keil, Derek E Lyons, Laurie R Santos and Frank C Keil.
    uniquely human ability. We are thus left with a fascinating question: if not imitation, what are mirror neurons for? Recent..
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  3. Frank Keil, Frank C. Keil, Ph.D.
    At the most general level I am interested in how we come to make sense of the world around us. Much of this research involves asking how intuitive explanations and understandings emerge in development and how they are related to notions of cause, mechanism and agency. These relations are linked to broader questions of what concepts are, how they change with development and increasing expertise and how they are structured in adults.
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  4.  23
    Frank C. Keil & Robert A. Wilson (2000). The Shadows and Shallows of Explanation. In Frank C. Keil & Robert A. Wilson (eds.), Minds and Machines. MIT Press. 137-159.
    Reprinted, with modification, from Wilson and Keil 1998.
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  5.  53
    Geert Keil (2001). Rorty und der Eliminative Materialismus – eine Mesalliance? In Thomas Schäfer, Udo Tietz & Rüdiger Zill (eds.), Hinter den Spiegeln. Beiträge zur Philosophie Richard Rortys. Suhrkamp 56-72.
    Im Beitrag von Geert Keil geht es um das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern Rortys frühes Eintreten für den Eliminativen Materialismus mit seinen entspannten Auffassungen zum Status der Wissenschaften vereinbar ist. Allgemein sieht Rorty die Wissenschaften als eine Reihe etablierter sozialer Praktiken an, als Werkzeuge, mit bestimmten Teilen der Welt zurechtzukommen. Dieses pragmatistisch-instrumentalistische Wissenschaftsverständnis steht in auffallendem Kontrast zu der Rolle, die den Naturwissenschaften im Rahmen des Eliminativen Materialismus zufallen soll. Dieser Lösungsvorschlag (...)
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  6.  16
    Hans-Johann Glock, Kathrin Glüer & Geert Keil (2003). Introduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66:1-5.
    Introduction to a collection of essays that celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Quine's paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Contributor: Herbert Schnädelbach, Paul A. Boghossian, Kathrin Glüer, Verena Mayer, Christian Nimtz, Åsa Maria Wikforss, Hans-Johann Glock, Peter Pagin, Tyler Burge, Geert Keil und Donald Davidson.
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  7.  20
    Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (eds.) (2000). Naturalismus. Suhrkamp.
    Mit Beiträgen von Gerhard Vollmer, Dirk Koppelberg, Stephen Stich, W. v. O. Quine, Ansgar Beckermann, Dirk Hartmann und Rainer Lange, Mircea Flonta, Geert Keil, Peter Simons, Andreas Kemmerling, Lynne R. Baker, Holm Tetens und Peter Janich.
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  8.  13
    Frank Keil, Philosophical Psychology.
    To cite this Article: Keil, Frank C. (2008) 'Space—The Primal Frontier? Spatial Cognition and the Origins of Concepts', Philosophical Psychology, 21:2, 241 —.
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  9. Geert Keil (2004). Kausalität zwischen Physik und deskriptiver Metaphysik. Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 29 (3):287-294.
    The short paper continues a debate on free will, causation and laws of nature between the author and the German philosopher Peter Rohs (opened in a previous issue of the same journal). Both Keil and Rohs are libertarians, but they disagree on a number of metaphysical issues. Keil maintains that causation is a relation between changes, i.e. time-consuming events, not between instantaneous states. Against Davidson’s “principle of the nomological character of causality”, Keil holds that no exceptionless laws (...)
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  10.  22
    Herbert Schnädelbach, Heiner Hastedt & Geert Keil (eds.) (2009). Was Können Wir Wissen, Was Sollen Wir Tun?: Zwölf Philosophische Antworten. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag.
    Der akademischen Philosophie wird manchmal nachgesagt, sie suche Antworten auf Fragen, die außer Philosophen niemanden umtreiben. In diesem Band sind »zwölf philosophische Antworten« auf Fragen versammelt, die sich jeder irgendwann einmal stellt und über die professionelle Philosophen lediglich etwas schärfer und gründlicher nachdenken. Die Autoren dieses Bandes greifen pointiert, allgemeinverständlich und mit philosophischem Vertiefungsanspruch aktuelle Kontroversen auf. Sie erheben dabei den Anspruch, philosophisch argumentativ sowohl dem Zeitgeistrelativismus als auch der Dominanz empirischer Wissenschaften entgegenzutreten. Es ist keineswegs „alles bloß Ansichtssache“; denn (...)
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  11. John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, Paul G. Keil & Amanda J. Barnier (2010). The Psychology of Memory, Extended Cognition, and Socially Distributed Remembering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):521-560.
    This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, (...)
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  12. Brian Timneylf & Kathy Keil (1996). Horses Are Sensitive to Pictorial Depth Cues. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview 25--1121.
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  13.  16
    M. Damian (2001). Congruity Effects Evoked by Subliminally Presented Primes: Automaticity Rather Than Semantic Processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology 27:154-165.
  14. Celia B. Harris, Paul Keil, John Sutton, Amanda Barnier & Doris McIlwain (2011). We Remember, We Forget: Collaborative Remembering in Older Couples. Discourse Processes 48 (4):267-303.
    Transactive memory theory describes the processes by which benefits for memory can occur when remembering is shared in dyads or groups. In contrast, cognitive psychology experiments demonstrate that social influences on memory disrupt and inhibit individual recall. However, most research in cognitive psychology has focused on groups of strangers recalling relatively meaningless stimuli. In the current study, we examined social influences on memory in groups with a shared history, who were recalling a range of stimuli, from word lists to personal, (...)
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  15.  7
    Leonid Rozenblit & Frank Keil (2002). The Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An Illusion of Explanatory Depth. Cognitive Science 26 (5):521-562.
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  16.  84
    Geert Keil (2010). Über den Homunkulus-Fehlschluss. E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 14.
    Ein Homunkulus im philosophischen Sprachgebrauch ist eine postulierte menschenähnliche Instanz, die ausdrücklich oder unausdrücklich zur Erklärung der Arbeitsweise des menschlichen Geistes herangezogen wird. Als Homunkulus-Fehlschluß wird die Praxis bezeichnet, Prädikate, die auf kognitive oder perzeptive Leistungen einer ganzen Person zutreffen, auch auf Teile von Personen oder auf subpersonale Vorgänge anzuwenden, was typischerweise zu einem Regreß führt. Der vorliegende Beitrag erörtert den Homunkulus-Fehlschluß zunächst in argumentationstheoretischer Hinsicht und stellt dabei ein Diagnoseschema auf. Dann werden zwei Anwendungsfelder erörtert: Instanzenmodelle der Psyche (Platon, (...)
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  17. Geert Keil (2005). How the Ceteris Paribus Laws of Physics Lie. In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature's Principles. Springer 167-200.
    After a brief survey of the literature on ceteris paribus clauses and ceteris paribus laws (1), the problem of exceptions, which creates the need for cp laws, is discussed (2). It emerges that the so-called skeptical view of laws of nature does not apply to laws of any kind whatever. Only some laws of physics are plagued with exceptions, not THE laws (3). Cp clauses promise a remedy, which has to be located among the further reactions to the skeptical view (...)
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  18. Geert Keil (2007). What Do Deviant Causal Chains Deviate From? In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intention, Deliberation and Autonomy. Ashgate 69-90.
    The problem of <span class='Hi'>deviant</span> causal chains is endemic to any theory of action that makes definitional or explanatory use of a causal connection between an agent’s beliefs and pro-attitudes and his bodily movements. Other causal theories of intentional phenomena are similarly plagued. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, to defend Davidson’s defeatism. In his treatment of <span class='Hi'>deviant</span> causal chains, Davidson makes use of the clause “in the right way” to rule out causal waywardness, but he regards (...)
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  19.  47
    Geert Keil (2003). Über den Einwand einer anderen möglichen Vernunft. In Dietrich Böhler, Matthias Kettner & Gunnar Skirbekk (eds.), Reflexion und Verantwortung. Auseinandersetzungen mit Karl-Otto Apel. Suhrkamp 65-82.
  20.  17
    Frank Keil (1998). Two Dogmas of Conceptual Empiricism: Implications for Hybrid Models of the Structure of Knowledge. Cognition 65 (2-3):103-135.
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  21.  6
    Frank C. Keil (1990). Constraints on Constraints: Surveying the Epigenetic Landscape. Cognitive Science 14 (1):135-168.
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  22.  20
    Frank C. Keil (2010). The Feasibility of Folk Science. Cognitive Science 34 (5):826-862.
    If folk science means individuals having well worked out mechanistic theories of the workings of the world, then it is not feasible. Laypeople’s explanatory understandings are remarkably coarse, full of gaps, and often full of inconsistencies. Even worse, most people overestimate their own understandings. Yet recent views suggest that formal scientists may not be so different. In spite of these limitations, science somehow works and its success offers hope for the feasibility of folk science as well. The success of science (...)
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  23.  4
    Frank C. Keil, Courtney Stein, Lisa Webb, Van Dyke Billings & Leonid Rozenblit (2008). Discerning the Division of Cognitive Labor: An Emerging Understanding of How Knowledge Is Clustered in Other Minds. Cognitive Science 32 (2):259-300.
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  24.  8
    Jonathan F. Kominsky & Frank C. Keil (2014). Overestimation of Knowledge About Word Meanings: The “Misplaced Meaning” Effect. Cognitive Science 38 (8):1604-1633.
    Children and adults may not realize how much they depend on external sources in understanding word meanings. Four experiments investigated the existence and developmental course of a “Misplaced Meaning” effect, wherein children and adults overestimate their knowledge about the meanings of various words by underestimating how much they rely on outside sources to determine precise reference. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that children and adults show a highly consistent MM effect, and that it is stronger in young children. Study 3 (...)
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  25.  93
    Brent Strickland, Matthew Fisher, Frank Keil & Joshua Knobe (2014). Syntax and Intentionality: An Automatic Link Between Language and Theory-of-Mind. Cognition 133 (1):249–261.
    Three studies provided evidence that syntax influences intentionality judgments. In Experiment 1, participants made either speeded or unspeeded intentionality judgments about ambiguously intentional subjects or objects. Participants were more likely to judge grammatical subjects as acting intentionally in the speeded relative to the reflective condition (thus showing an intentionality bias), but grammatical objects revealed the opposite pattern of results (thus showing an unintentionality bias). In Experiment 2, participants made an intentionality judgment about one of the two actors in a partially (...)
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  26.  32
    Geert Keil (2014). Wie fängt (man) eine Handlung an? In Anne-Sophie Spann & Daniel Wehinger (eds.), Vermögen und Handung. Der dispositionale Realismus und unser Selbstverständnis als Handelnde. Mentis 135-157.
    Das Verb „anfangen“ lässt sich sowohl mit einem Akteur an Subjektstelle als auch subjektlos verwenden. Sogenannte subjektlose Sätze wie „Es fängt zu regnen an“ haben freilich ein grammatisches Subjekt, aber auf die Rückfrage „Wer oder was fängt zu regnen an?“ ist die einzig mögliche Antwort „Es“ unbefriedigend. Das grammatische Subjekt fungiert in solchen Sätzen lediglich als synkategorematischer Ausdruck. Menschliche Akteure können in gehaltvollerem Sinn etwas anfangen, zum Beispiel Streit, oder, wie es bei Kant heißt, „eine Reihe von Begebenheiten“. Mit dem (...)
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  27.  4
    Daniel J. Simons & Frank C. Keil (1995). An Abstract to Concrete Shift in the Development of Biological Thought: The Insides Story. Cognition 56 (2):129-163.
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  28.  17
    James M. Beale & Frank C. Keil (1995). Categorical Effects in the Perception of Faces. Cognition 57 (3):217-239.
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  29.  29
    Frank Keil (2003). Folkscience: Coarse Interpretations of a Complex Reality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (8):368-373.
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  30.  36
    Geert Keil (2000). Naturalismus und Intentionalität. In Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (eds.), Naturalismus. Suhrkamp 187-204.
    Naturalism in theoretical philosophy comes in three kinds: metaphysical, scientific and semantical. Metaphysical naturalism holds that only natural things exist, scientific (or methodological) naturalism holds that the methods of natural science provide the only avenue to truth, semantic (or analytic) naturalism tries to provide sufficient nonintentional conditions for intentional phenomena. The paper argues that analytic naturalism does not render metaphysical or scientific naturalism obsolete, but can be understood as a further step in elaborating upon these programmes. The intentional idiom of (...)
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  31.  32
    Geert Keil (2000). Indexikalität und Infallibilität. In Audun Ofsti, Peter Ulrich & Truls Wyller (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism: The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Mentis
    Some, if not all statements containing the word 'I' seem to be 'immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun' (Shoemaker). This immunity, however, is due to the fact that the pronoun 'I' plays no identifying role in the first place. Since no identification takes place here, the alleged immunity to misidentification should come as no surprise. But there is a second immunity thesis, which captures the peculiarity of 'I' better: The first-person pronoun is immune to reference-failure. Some (...)
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  32.  30
    Geert Keil (2007). Making Something Happen. Where Causation and Agency Meet. In Francesca Castellani & Josef Quitterer (eds.), Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences. Mentis 19-35.
    1. Introduction: a look back at the reasons vs. causes debate. 2. The interventionist account of causation. 3. Four objections to interventionism. 4. The counterfactual analysis of event causation. 5. The role of free agency. 6. Causality in the human sciences. -- The reasons vs. causes debate reached its peak about 40 years ago. Hempel and Dray had debated the nature of historical explanation and the broader issue of whether explanations that cite an agent’s reasons are causal or not. Melden, (...)
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  33.  4
    Geert Keil (2016). Von der Kunstlehre des Verstehens zur radikalen Interpretation. In Andreas Arndt & Jörg Dierken (eds.), Friedrich Schleiermachers Hermeneutik. Interpretationen und Perspektiven. De Gruyter 197-224.
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  34.  29
    G. Keil (2005). Eine fulminante Lehnstuhlkritik der Neurowissenschaften. Uber: Max R. Bennett/Peter M. S. Hacker: Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie:951.
  35. Frank Keil (2005). Doubt, Deference, and Deliberation: Understanding and Using the Division of Cognitive Labour. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. OUP Oxford 143.
     
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  36.  33
    Frank C. Keil & Robert A. Wilson (2000). Explanation and Cognition. MIT Press.
    These essays draw on work in the history and philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind and language, the development of concepts in children, conceptual..
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  37.  19
    George E. Newman & Frank C. Keil, Where's the Essence? Developmental Shifts in Children's Beliefs About Internal Features.
    The present studies investigated children’s and adults’ intuitive beliefs about the physical nature of essences. Adults and children (ranging in age from 6 to 10 years old) were asked to reason about two different ways of determining an unknown object’s category: taking a tiny internal sample from any part of the object (distributed view of essence), or taking a sample from one specific region (localized view of essence). Results from three studies indicated that adults strongly endorsed the distributed view, and (...)
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  38.  95
    Paul Bloom & Frank C. Keil (2001). Thinking Through Language. Mind and Language 16 (4):351–367.
    What would it be like to have never learned English, but instead only to know Hopi, Mandarin Chinese, or American Sign Language? Would that change the way you think? Imagine entirely losing your language, as the result of stroke or trauma. You are aphasic, unable to speak or listen, read or write. What would your thoughts now be like? As the most extreme case, imagine having been raised without any language at all, as a wild child. What—if anything—would it be (...)
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  39.  27
    Benjamin M. Rottman, Jonathan F. Kominsky & Frank C. Keil (2014). Children Use Temporal Cues to Learn Causal Directionality. Cognitive Science 38 (3):489-513.
    The ability to learn the direction of causal relations is critical for understanding and acting in the world. We investigated how children learn causal directionality in situations in which the states of variables are temporally dependent (i.e., autocorrelated). In Experiment 1, children learned about causal direction by comparing the states of one variable before versus after an intervention on another variable. In Experiment 2, children reliably inferred causal directionality merely from observing how two variables change over time; they interpreted Y (...)
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  40.  1
    Niklas Ihssen & Andreas Keil (2009). The Costs and Benefits of Processing Emotional Stimuli During Rapid Serial Visual Presentation. Cognition and Emotion 23 (2):296-326.
  41.  72
    Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil (eds.) (1999). MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. MIT Press.
  42.  6
    Markus F. Damian, Gabriella Vigliocco & Willem J. M. Levelt (2001). Effects of Semantic Context in the Naming of Pictures and Words. Cognition 81 (3):B77-B86.
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  43.  23
    Geert Keil (2002). Der Nullpunkt der Orientierung. In Audun Øfsti, Peter Ulrich & Truls Wyller (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism: The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Mentis 9-29.
    The indexical sentence “I am here now” can be used any time and anywhere by anyone to say something true. Rather than yielding a special kind of infallible knowledge, this fact indicates that every speaker or thinker has a zero of an egocentric coordinate system at his disposal. Many idealist philosophers assume that this egocentric zero can be further reduced. The ability to make a de se-reference with the first person pronoun, they claim, need not involve spatiotemporal self-localization. The paper (...)
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  44.  25
    Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (2000). Naturalismus. In Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (eds.), Naturalismus. Suhrkamp 7-45.
    Survey article which introduces a collection of essays on philosophical naturalism, mainly dealing with the question what “naturalism” means in contemporary philosophy. Structure of the article: 1. History of Ideas/History of the Problems, 2. Man as a Part of Nature, 3. The Explanatory Primacy of the Natural Sciences, 4. Naturalism and Unity of Science, 5. The Consideration of Empirical Knowledge, 6. Naturalism, Science and Common Sense.
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  45.  48
    Celia Harris, Amanda Barnier, John Sutton & Paul Keil (2010). How Did You Feel When the Crocodile Hunter Died?’: Voicing and Silencing in Conversation. Memory 18 (2):170-184.
    Conversations about the past can involve voicing and silencing; processes of validation and invalidation that shape recall. In this experiment we examined the products and processes of remembering a significant autobiographical event in conversation with others. Following the death of Australian celebrity Steve Irwin, in an adapted version of the collaborative recall paradigm, 69 participants described and rated their memories for hearing of his death. Participants then completed a free recall phase where they either discussed the event in groups of (...)
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  46.  90
    Geert Keil (2001). How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and Events. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):43-62.
    Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged “causal gap”, it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. On (...)
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  47.  31
    Celia B. Harris, John Sutton, Paul Keil & Amanda Barnier, Collaborative Remembering: When Can Remembering With Others Be Beneficial?
    Experimental memory research has traditionally focused on the individual, and viewed social influence as a source of error or inhibition. However, in everyday life, remembering is often a social activity, and theories from philosophy and psychology predict benefits of shared remembering. In a series of studies, both experimental and more qualitative, we attempted to bridge this gap by examining the effects of collaboration on memory in a variety of situations and in a variety of groups. We discuss our results in (...)
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  48.  16
    Grant Gutheil, Alonzo Vera & Frank C. Keil (1998). Do Houseflies Think? Patterns of Induction and Biological Beliefs in Development. Cognition 66 (1):33-49.
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  49.  9
    Gabriella Vigliocco, David P. Vinson, Markus F. Damian & Willem Levelt (2002). Semantic Distance Effects on Object and Action Naming. Cognition 85 (3):B61-B69.
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  50.  43
    Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil (1998). The Shadows and Shallows of Explanation. Minds and Machines 8 (1):137-159.
    We introduce two notions–the shadows and the shallows of explanation–in opening up explanation to broader, interdisciplinary investigation. The shadows of explanation refer to past philosophical efforts to provide either a conceptual analysis of explanation or in some other way to pinpoint the essence of explanation. The shallows of explanation refer to the phenomenon of having surprisingly limited everyday, individual cognitive abilities when it comes to explanation. Explanations are ubiquitous, but they typically are not accompanied by the depth that we might, (...)
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