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Profile: Dan Cavedon-Taylor (Oxford University)
  1.  39
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (forthcoming). Touching Voids: On the Varieties of Absence Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-12.
    Seeing one’s laptop to be missing, hearing silence and smelling fresh air; these are all examples of perceptual experiences of absences. In this paper I discuss an example of absence perception in the tactual sense modality, that of tactually perceiving a tooth to be absent in one’s mouth, following its extraction. Various features of the example challenge two recently-developed theories of absence perception: Farennikova’s memory-perception mismatch theory and Martin and Dockic’s meta-cognitive theory. I speculate that the mechanism underlying the experience (...)
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  2.  96
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2011). Perceptual Content and Sensorimotor Expectations. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):383-391.
    I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent- and object-active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent-active expectations over object-active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off-load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's role in (...)
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  3.  20
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2015). Photographic Phenomenology as Cognitive Phenomenology. British Journal of Aesthetics 55 (1):71-89.
    Photographic pictorial experience is thought to have a peculiar phenomenology to it, one that fails to accompany the pictorial experiences one has before so-called ‘hand-made’ pictures. I present a theory that explains this in terms of a common factor shared by beliefs formed on the basis of photographic pictorial experience and beliefs formed on the basis of ordinary, face-to-face, perceptual experience: the having of a psychologically immediate, non-inferential etiology. This theory claims that photographic phenomenology has less to do with photographs (...)
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  4.  72
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2009). Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller. Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.
    Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
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  5.  51
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2009). The Epistemic Status of Photographs and Paintings: A Response to Cohen and Meskin. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (2):230-235.
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  6.  7
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2015). The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of Human Touch. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):833-838.
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  7.  55
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2011). The Space of Seeing-In. British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (3):271-278.
    Recent work on seeing-in has taken a pluralist turn. There is variety among pictures, so we should expect variety among seeing-in. Dominic Lopes’s taxonomy of seeing-in is arguably the most thorough that is currently available. Lopes identifies five varieties of seeing-in. In this paper I identify a sixth: pseudo-actualism. This paper improves our current best taxonomy of seeing-in.
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  8.  62
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2010). In Defence of Fictional Incompetence. Ratio 23 (2):141-150.
    The claim that photographs are fictionally incompetent (i.e. that they can only depict those particulars they are appropriately causally related to) is argued by Noël Carroll, Gregory Currie, and Nigel Warburton to be falsified by cinematic works of fiction. In response I firstly argue that it does not follow from cinema's having a capacity for the representation of ficta that photography has a capacity for the representation of ficta. Secondly, and inspired by the work of Roger Scruton, I develop an (...)
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  9.  29
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2013). Photographically Based Knowledge. Episteme 10 (3):283-297.
    Pictures are a quintessential source of aesthetic pleasure. This makes it easy to forget that they are epistemically valuable no less than they are aesthetically so. Pictures are representations. As such, they may furnish us with knowledge of the objects they represent. In this article I provide an account of why photographs are of greater epistemic utility than handmade pictures. To do so, I use a novel approach: I seek to illuminate the epistemic utility of photographs by situating both photographs (...)
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  10.  24
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2013). Seeing and Retinal Stability: On a Sensorimotor Argument for the Necessity of Eye Movement for Sight. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):263 - 266.
    Sensorimotor theorists of perception have argued that eye movement is a necessary condition for seeing on the basis that subjects whose retinal images do not move undergo a form of blindness. I show that the argument does not work.
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  11.  7
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2014). Belief, Experience and the Act of Picture-Making. Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):1-14.
    Philosophical Explorations, Volume 17, Issue 1, Page 35-48, March 2014.
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