17 found
Order:
See also:
Profile: Dan López de Sa (ICREA-Universitat de Barcelona)
  1.  46
    Dan López de Sa (2007). The Many Relativisms and the Question of Disagreement. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):269 – 279.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  2.  39
    Dan López de Sa (2015). Expressing Disagreement: A Presuppositional Indexical Contextualist Relativist Account. Erkenntnis 80 (1):153-165.
    Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  28
    Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
  4. Dan López de Sa (2014). Lewis Vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many. Synthese 191 (6):1105-1117.
    Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  39
    Dan López de Sa (2013). Vagueness as Semantic Indecision: Metaphysical Vagueness Vs Indeterminate Reference. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 14 (2):197-209.
    After presenting a negative characterization of metaphysical vagueness and the main tenets of the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, the paper critically discusses the objection that such a view requires that at least some vagueness not be just constituted by semantic indecision—but rather by the metaphysical vagueness of some semantic relations themselves submitted by Trenton Merricks and, more recently, Nathan Salmon.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  1
    Dan López de Sa (2008). Rigidity for Predicates and the Trivialization Problem. Philosophers' Imprint 8.
    According to the simple proposal about rigidity for predicates, a predicate is rigid if it signifies the same property across the relevant worlds. Recent critics claim that this suffers from a trivialization problem: any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be trivially rigid, according to the proposal. In this paper a corresponding "problem" for ordinary singular terms is considered. A natural solution is provided by intuitions concerning the actual truth-value of identity statements involving them. The simple proposal for predicates is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7.  26
    Dan López de Sa (2014). Audience in Context. Erkenntnis 79 (1):241-253.
    In recent discussions on contextualism and relativism, some have suggested that audience-sensitivity motivates a content relativist version of radical relativism, according to which a sentence as said at a context can have different contents with respect to the different perspectives from where it is assessed. The first aim of this note is to illustrate how this is not so. According to Egan himself, the phenomenon motivates at least refinement of the characteristic moderate contention that features of a single context determine (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  51
    Dan López de Sa (2003). The Non-Circularity Constraint: Peacocke Vs. Peacocke. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-2):85-93.
    According to the view that Peacocke elaborates in A Study of Concepts (1992), a concept can be individuated by providing the conditions a thinker must satisfy in order to possess that concept. Hence possessions conditions for concepts should be specifiable in a way that respects a non-circularity constraint. In a more recent paper “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality” (1998a) Peacocke argues against his former view, in the light of the phenomenon of rationally accepting principles which do not follow from what (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  1
    Dan López De Sa (2006). Flexible Property Designators. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73:221-230.
    Th e simple proposal about rigidity for predicates can be stated thus: a predicate is rigid if its canonical nominalization signifi es the same property across the different possible worlds. I have tried elsewhere to defend such a proposal from the trivialization problem, according to which any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be rigid. Benjamin Schnieder (2005) aims fi rst to rebut my argument that some canonical nominalizations can be fl exible, then to provide fi ve arguments to the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10.  7
    Dan López de Sa (2006). Por Qué la Aposterioridad No (Basta, Según Kripke, Ni) Basta (Why Aposteriority is Not (Enough According to Kripke, nor is) Enough). Theoria 21 (3):245-255.
    Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  7
    Dan López De Sa (2013). The Aposteriori Response-Dependence of the Colors. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79.
    The paper proposes and defends the following characterization of response dependent property: a property is response-dependent iff there is a response-dependence biconditional for a concept signifying it which holds in virtue of the nature of the property. Finding out whether a property is such is to a large extent a posteriori matter. Finally, colors are response dependent: they are essentially tied to issuing the relevant experiences, so that having those experiences does give access to their, dispositional, nature. Finally, some important (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  16
    Dan López de Sa (2006). Values Vs. Secondary Qualities. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):197-210.
    McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two inter- pretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about val- ues would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does pro- vide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  12
    Dan López de Sa (2006). The Case Against Evaluative Realism. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (57):277-294.
    In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitibve causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  2
    Dan López De Sa (2010). How to Respond to Borderline Cases. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. OUP Oxford
    Some philosophers seem to think that borderline cases provide further cases of apparent faultless disagreement. This chapter argues against such a suggestion. It contends that with respect to borderline cases, people typically do not respond by taking a view, in contrast to what is the case in genuine cases of apparent faultless disagreement. It shows that the claim of the chapter is indeed respected, and is accounted for by paradigm cases of semantic and epistemic views on the nature of vagueness. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Dan López de Sa (2010). Relativismo y operadores. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):81-94.
    Critical notica (in Spanish) of *Relativism and Monadic Truth* (OUP 2009), by Cappelen and Hawthorne.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Dan López de Sa (2007). The Chief Supreme Court Justice: A Metaphysical Puzzle? Critica 39 (115):61-68.
    What are things like the Supreme Court? Gabriel Uzquiano has defended that they are groups, entities which are somehow composed of members (at certain times) but which, unlike sets (or pluralities), allow for fluctuation in membership. The main alternative holds that 'the Supreme Court' refers (at any time) to the set (or plurality) of their members (at the time). Uzquiano motivates his view by posing a metaphysical puzzle for this reductive alternative. I argue that a parallel reasoning would also find (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Dan López de Sa (2000). Non-Objective Truths: Comments on Kölbel's Criterion for Objectivity. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 15 (38):209-228.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography