21 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Dan López de Sa (ICREA-Universitat de Barcelona)
  1. Dan López de Sa, (Indexical) Relativism About Values: A Presuppositional Defense.
    A general characterization of relativism about values is presented, in terms of there being conceivable irremovable divergences that are faultless in that domain. An indexical version of relativism is distinguished, which is entailed by the the Lewisian, flexible account of values. The paper offers a defense of indexical relativism from the objection that it cannot account for the facts involving intuitions about disagreement, revealed in ordinary disputes about values. The defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to the Lewisian proposal, to (...)
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Dan López de Sa, Response-Dependencies: Colors and Values Dan López de Sa.
    Tesis doctoral presentada en el departament de Lògica Història i Filosofia de la Ciencia de la Universitat de Barcelona per optar al títol de Doctor en Filosofia.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Dan López de Sa (forthcoming). Expressing Disagreement: A Presuppositional Indexical Contextualist Relativist Account. Erkenntnis:1-13.
    Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Dan López de Sa (2014). Audience in Context. Erkenntnis 79 (1):241-253.
    In recent discussions on contextualism and relativism, some have suggested that audience-sensitivity motivates a content relativist version of radical relativism, according to which a sentence as said at a context can have different contents with respect to the different perspectives from where it is assessed. The first aim of this note is to illustrate how this is not so. According to Egan himself, the phenomenon motivates at least refinement of the characteristic moderate contention that features of a single context determine (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Dan López de Sa (2014). Lewis Vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many. Synthese 191 (6):1105-1117.
    Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Dan López de Sa (2013). Lewis Vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many. Synthese 191 (6):1-13.
    Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Dan López de Sa (2013). Vagueness as Semantic Indecision: Metaphysical Vagueness Vs Indeterminate Reference. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 14 (2):197-209.
    After presenting a negative characterization of metaphysical vagueness and the main tenets of the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, the paper critically discusses the objection that such a view requires that at least some vagueness not be just constituted by semantic indecision—but rather by the metaphysical vagueness of some semantic relations themselves submitted by Trenton Merricks and, more recently, Nathan Salmon.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Dan López De Sa (2010). How to Respond to Borderline Cases. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oup Oxford.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Dan López de Sa (2010). Relativismo y operadores. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 29 (1):81-94.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 273-282.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Dan López de Sa (2009). Relativizing Utterance-Truth? Synthese 170 (1):1-5.
    In recent years, some people have held that a radical relativist position is defensible in some philosophically interesting cases, including future contingents, predicates of personal taste, evaluative predicates in general, epistemic modals, and knowledge attributions. The position is frequently characterized as denying that utterance-truth is absolute. I argue that this characterization is inappropriate, as it requires a metaphysical substantive contention with which moderate views as such need not be committed. Before this, I also offer a more basic, admittedly less exciting (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Dan López de Sa (2008). Presuppositions of Commonality: An Indexical Relativist Account of Disagreement. In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Dan López de Sa (2007). The Chief Supreme Court Justice: A Metaphysical Puzzle? Critica 39 (115):61-68.
    What are things like the Supreme Court? Gabriel Uzquiano has defended that they are groups, entities which are somehow composed of members (at certain times) but which, unlike sets (or pluralities), allow for fluctuation in membership. The main alternative holds that ¿the Supreme Court¿ refers (at any time) to the set (or plurality) of their members (at the time). Uzquiano motivates his view by posing a metaphysical puzzle for this reductive alternative. I argue that a parallel reasoning would also find (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Dan López de Sa (2007). The Many Relativisms and the Question of Disagreement. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):269 – 279.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Dan López de Sa (2006). Por Qué la Aposterioridad No (Basta, Según Kripke, Ni) Basta (Why Aposteriority is Not (Enough According to Kripke, nor is) Enough). Theoria 21 (3):245-255.
    Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Dan López de Sa (2006). Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (57):245-256.
    Es conocido que Keipke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de lo conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicción alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Dan López de Sa (2006). The Case Against Evaluative Realism. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (57):277-294.
    In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitibve causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Dan López de Sa (2006). Values Vs. Secondary Qualities. Teorema 25 (1):197-210.
    McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two inter- pretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about val- ues would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does pro- vide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Dan López de Sa (2005). Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From" Truth and Objectivity", de Crispin Wright. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 24 (2):125-129.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Dan López de Sa (2003). The Non-Circularity Constraint: Peacocke Vs. Peacocke. Teorema 22:85-93.
    According to the view that Peacocke elaborates in A Study of Concepts (1992), a concept can be individuated by providing the conditions a thinker must satisfy in order to possess that concept. Hence possessions conditions for concepts should be specifiable in a way that respects a non-circularity constraint. In a more recent paper “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality” (1998a) Peacocke argues against his former view, in the light of the phenomenon of rationally accepting principles which do not follow from what (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Dan López de Sa (2000). Non-Objective Truths: Comments on Kölbel's Criterion for Objectivity. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 15 (38):209-228.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation