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  1. Dan Lloyd, Art and Science Meet with Novel Results.
    adiant Cool" has the makings of a gripping noir thriller: a missing body, a tough-talking female sleuth and a mustachioed Russian agent mixed up in a shadowy plot to take over the world. But the novel, by Dan Lloyd, a neurophilosopher at Trinity College in Hartford, is also a serious work of scholarship, the unlikely vehicle for an abstruse new theory of consciousness.
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  2. Dan Lloyd, A Neuro-Noir Journey to the Centre of the Mind.
    It wasn't that hard to be a polymath in ancient Greece. All it meant, when you come down to it, was that you could write a poem, speak classical Greek (not very difficult in the circumstances) and understand the mechanics of the Archimedes' screw. Today it's not so easy. Arts and sciences have, for the most part, diverged to an alarming extent, with those on the arts side likely to be as hard-pressed to explain the technologies that increasingly govern our (...)
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  3. Dan Lloyd, Context, Conversation, Community.
    Not too long ago I came across a notebook from my first year in college. The course was Philosophy 101, and the first author we read was Plato. Reading my own scribbles 25 years later, I was surprised to see that my dutifully recorded lecture notes remained fairly accurate in their portrayal of the Meno. But in the middle of a page on Plato I found the following comment: "Vittgenstein ‹ private language argument." Here was my first encounter with the (...)
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  4. Dan Lloyd, My Strategic Plan.
    As Trinity marches boldly into the Future, I offer a few very strategic new ideas designed to enhance and position Trinity in a preeminently enhanced position. Submitted for your consideration.
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  5. Dan Lloyd, Sojourning in the Art World: Service Learning in the Philosophy of Art.
    Not too long ago the trustees of my college decided to update the artistic holdings of our campus, and to this end they set out to acquire a contemporary work of art for permanent display in the College art museum. Not being timid, the trustees wanted a challenging, cutting-edge work, preferably from the West Coast, but they felt they lacked the expertise to find and buy the right piece. As it happened, a few of them had heard of my interest (...)
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  6. Valtteri Arstila & Dan Lloyd (eds.) (2014). Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality. The Mit Press.
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  7. Dan Lloyd (2012). Many Times Over: A Brief Reply to Lee and Klincewicz. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):711-712.
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  8. Dan Lloyd (2012). Neural Correlates of Temporality: Default Mode Variability and Temporal Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):695-703.
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  9. Dan Lloyd (2012). Through a Glass Darkly: Schizophrenia and Functional Brain Imaging. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):257-274.
    To william james, conscious life was a stream; to Edmund Husserl, a flow. These metaphors point to the marvelous continuity of experience as it weaves through the world of thought and things. We might similarly talk about the flow of the body, as I reach for my cup of coffee. A physiologist could decompose the action, isolating the contribution of each muscle and joint to the whole. This functional analysis would constitute one form of explanation of the movement. As we (...)
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  10. Dan Lloyd (2012). Time After Time. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins Pub. Co.. 88--1.
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  11. Dan Lloyd (2011). Is "Cognitive Neuroscience" an Oxymoron? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):283-286.
    Could "cognitive neuroscience" be an oxymoron? "Cognitive" and "neuroscience" cohere only to the extent that the entities identified as "cognitive" can be coordinated with entities identified as neural. This coordination is typically construed as intertheoretic reduction between "levels" of scientific description. On the cognitive side, folk psychological concepts crystallize into behavioral taxonomies, which are further analyzed into purported cognitive capacities. These capacities are expressed or operationalized in paradigmatic experimental tasks. These cogs comprise a stable ontology, sustaining more than a century (...)
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  12. Dan Lloyd (2011). Mind as Music. Frontiers in Psychology 2.
    Cognitive neuroscience typically develops hypotheses to explain phenomena that are localized in space and time. Determining functions of brain regions in spatial and temporal isolation is generally regarded as the first step toward understanding the conjoint operation of the whole brain. In other words, if the task of cognitive neuroscience is to interpret the neural code, then the first step has been semantic, searching for the meanings (functions) of localized elements, prior to exploring neural syntax, the mutual constraints among elements (...)
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  13. Dan Lloyd (2010). Grand Challenges in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology: After Psychology? Frontiers in Psychology 1:9.
    Grand challenges in theoretical and philosophical psychology: after psychology?
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  14. Dan Lloyd (2009). When Time is Out of Joint: Schizophrenia and Functional Neuroimaging. In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oup Oxford.
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  15. Dan Lloyd (2007). Civil Schizophrenia. In Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. Mit Press.
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  16. Dan Lloyd (2007). 14 Civil Schizophrenia. In Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. Mit Press. 323.
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  17. Dan Lloyd (2004). A Novel Theory. The Philosophers' Magazine 26 (26):49-50.
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  18. Dan Lloyd (2004). Radiant Cool: A Novel Theory of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    An innovative theory of consciousness, drawing on the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and supported by brain-imaging, presented in the form of a hardboiled ...
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  19. Axel Dietrich, Christopher Gauker, Noel Hendrickson, Jon Kass, Kenneth Livingston, Dan Lloyd, Peter Mandik, Katie McGovern, Thomas Polger & Teed Rockwell (2003). In Addition to Editorial Board Members, the Editors of Brain and Mind Often Call on External Reviewers to Referee Submitted Manuscripts. For Volume 4, the Following Philosophers and Scientists Lent Their Expertise and Time to Referee Papers: Anthony Chemero. Brain and Mind 4 (399).
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  20. Dan Lloyd (2003). Double Trouble for Gestalt Bubbles. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):417-418.
    The “Gestalt Bubble” model of Lehar is not supported by the evidence offered. The author invalidly concludes that spatial properties in experience entail an explicit volumetric spatial representation in the brain. The article also exaggerates the extent to which phenomenology reveals a completely three-dimensional scene in perception.
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  21. Dan Lloyd (2002). Functional MRI and the Study of Human Consciousness. Journal Of Cognitive Neuroscience 14 (6):818-831.
    & Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the begin with single-subject (preprocessed) scan series, and study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consider the patterns of all voxels as potential multivariate consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much encodings of phenomenal information. Twenty-seven subjects of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis from the four studies were analyzed with multivariate of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed methods, revealing analogues of phenomenal structures, datasets from the (...)
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  22. Dan Lloyd (2002). Studying the Mind From the Inside Out. Brain and Mind 3 (1):243-59.
    Good research requires, among other virtues,(i) methods that yield stable experimentalobservations without arbitrary (post hoc)assumptions, (ii) logical interpretations ofthe sources of observations, and (iii) soundinferences to general causal mechanismsexplaining experimental results by placing themin larger explanatory contexts. In TheNew Phrenology , William Uttal examines theresearch tradition of localization, and findsit deficient in all three virtues, whetherbased on lesion studies or on new technologiesfor functional brain imaging. In this paper Iconsider just the arguments concerning brainimaging, especially functional MagneticResonance Imaging. I think (...)
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  23. Dan Lloyd (2000). Beyond “the Fringe”: A Cautionary Critique of William James. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):629-637.
  24. Dan Lloyd (2000). Popping the Thought Balloon. In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press. 169--99.
    Many recovering dualists find that the old Cartesian demons are hard to exorcise. Dual substance abuse manifests itself not only as metaphysical dualism, but as a pervasive epistemological framework that creates an unhealthy codependent relationship between scientific realism and phenomenology. Daniel Dennett has led philosophers to recognize many of the symptoms of creeping crypto Cartesianism. In this paper, I try to take Dennett to the limit: Descartes lives on, I argue, in the very heart of cognitive science, in the concept (...)
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  25. Dan Lloyd (2000). Terra Cognita: From Functional Neuroimaging to the Map of the Mind. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (1):93-116.
    For more than a century the paradigm inspiringcognitive neuroscience has been modular and localist.Contemporary research in functional brain imaginggenerally relies on methods favorable to localizingparticular functions in one or more specific brainregions. Meanwhile, connectionist cognitive scientistshave celebrated the computational powers ofdistributed processing, and pioneered methods forinterpreting distributed representations. This papertakes a connectionist approach to functionalneuroimaging. A tabulation of 35 PET (positronemission tomography) experiments strongly indicatesdistributed function for at least the ''medium sized''anatomical units, the cortical Brodmann areas. Moreimportant, when these PET (...)
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  26. Dan Lloyd (1999). Consciousness Should Not Mean, but Be. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):158-159.
    O'Brien & Opie's vehicle hypothesis is an attractive framework for the study of consciousness. To fully embrace the hypothesis, however, two of the authors' claims should be extended: first, since phenomenal content is entirely dependent on occurrent brain events and only contingently correlated with external events, it is no longer necessary to regard states of consciousness as representations. Second, the authors' insistence that only stable states of a neural network are conscious seems ad hoc.
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  27. Dan Lloyd (1998). The Fables of Lucy R.: Association and Dissociation in Neural Networks. In Dan J. Stein & J. Ludick (eds.), Neural Networks and Psychopathology. Cambridge University Press. 248--273.
    According to Aristotle, "to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind," (Poetics 1448b). But even as he affirms the unbounded human capacity for integrating new experience with existing knowledge, he alludes to a significant exception: "The sight of certain things gives us pain, but we enjoy looking at the most exact images of them, whether the forms of animals which we greatly despise or of corpses." Our capacity (...)
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  28. Dan Lloyd (1997). Consciousness and its Discontents. Communication and Cognition 30 (3-4):273-284.
    Our heads are full of representations, according to cognitive science. It might seem inevitable that conscious states are a type of brain-based representation, but in this paper I argue that representation and consciousness each form conceptually distinct domains. Representational content depends on context, usually causal, as shown by familiar cases in which context varies while brain states do not -- twin earth cases and brains-in-vats, for example. But these same cases show that conscious content does not depend on context. The (...)
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  29. Dan Lloyd, Twilight of the Zombies.
    A philosophical zombie is a being indistinguishable from an ordinary human in every observable respect, but lacking subjective consciousness. Zombiehood implies *linguistic indiscriminability*, the zombie tendency to talk and even do philosophy of mind in language indiscriminable from ordinary discourse. Zombies thus speak *Zombish*, indistinguishable from English but radically distinct in reference for mental terms. The fate of zombies ultimately depends on whether Zombish can be consistently interpreted. If it can be interpreted consistently, then zombies remain possible, but no test (...)
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  30. Dan Lloyd (1996). Consciousness, Connectionism, and Cognitive Neuroscience: A Meeting of the Minds. Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):61-78.
    Accounting for phenomenal structure—the forms, aspects, and features of conscious experience—poses a deep challenge for the scientific study of consciousness, but rather than abandon hope I propose a way forward. Connectionism, I argue, offers a bi-directional analogy, with its oft-noted “neural inspiration” on the one hand, and its largely unnoticed capacity to illuminate our phenomenology on the other. Specifically, distributed representations in a recurrent network enable networks to superpose categorical, contextual, and temporal information on a specific input representation, much as (...)
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  31. Dan Lloyd (1996). Commentary on Searle and the 'Deep Unconscious'. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (3):201-202.
  32. Dan Lloyd (1996). Commentary on Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):127-128.
  33. Dan Lloyd (1995). Access Denied. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261.
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  34. Dan Lloyd (1995). Consciousness: A Connectionist Manifesto. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 5 (2):161-85.
    Connectionism and phenomenology can mutually inform and mutually constrain each other. In this manifesto I outline an approach to consciousness based on distinctions developed by connectionists. Two core identities are central to a connectionist theory of consciouness: conscious states of mind are identical to occurrent activation patterns of processing units; and the variable dispositional strengths on connections between units store latent and unconscious information. Within this broad framework, a connectionist model of consciousness succeeds according to the degree of correspondence between (...)
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  35. Dan Lloyd (1994). Connectionist Hysteria: Reducing a Freudian Case Study to a Network Model. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):69-88.
  36. Dan Lloyd (1992). Toward an Identity Theory of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):215-216.
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  37. Dan Lloyd (1991). Consciousness: Only Introspective Hindsight? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):686-687.
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  38. Dan Lloyd (1991). Leaping to Conclusions: Connectionism, Consciousness, and the Computational Mind. In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer. 444--459.
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  39. Dan Lloyd (1991). Review: From Brain to Memory. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):115 - 118.
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  40. Dan Lloyd (1990). Loose Connections: Four Problems in Searie's Argument for the “Connection Principle”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):615-616.
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  41. Dan Lloyd (1989). Extending the “New Hegemony” of Classical Conditioning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1):152.
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  42. Dan Lloyd (1989). Parallel Distributed Processing and Cognition: Only Connect? In Simple Minds. MIT Press.
     
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  43. Dan Lloyd (1989). Simple Minds. MIT Press.
    Drawing on philosophy, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, Simple Minds explores the construction of the mind from the matter of the brain.
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  44. Dan Lloyd (1989). What is Representation? A Reply to Smythe. Behaviorism 17 (2):151-154.
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  45. Dan Lloyd (1988). Connectionism in the Golden Age of Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):42.
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  46. Dan Lloyd (1987). Cognitive Modeling: Of Gedanken Beasts and Human Beings. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):442.
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  47. Dan Lloyd (1987). Mental Representation From the Bottom Up. Synthese 70 (January):23-78.
    Commonsense psychology and cognitive science both regularly assume the existence of representational states. I propose a naturalistic theory of representation sufficient to meet the pretheoretical constraints of a "folk theory of representation", constraints including the capacities for accuracy and inaccuracy, selectivity of proper objects of representation, perspective, articulation, and "efficacy" or content-determined functionality. The proposed model states that a representing device is a device which changes state when information is received over multiple information channels originating at a single source. The (...)
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  48. Dan Lloyd (1986). The Limits of Cognitive Liberalism. Behaviorism 14 (1):1-14.
  49. Dan Lloyd (1985). Frankenstein's Children: Artificial Intelligence and Human Value. Metaphilosophy 16 (4):307-318.
  50. Dan Lloyd (1985). Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 5 (8):350-351.
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