9 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Dan Marshall (University of Hong Kong)
  1. Dan Marshall, A Puzzle for Modal Realism (Talk).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Dan Marshall, Counterpart Theory and the Problem of Actuality (Talk).
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Dan Marshall (2013). Analyses of Intrinsicality Without Naturalness. Philosophy Compass 8 (2):186-197.
    Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. This article discusses three leading attempts to analyse this distinction that don’t appeal to the notion of nat-uralness: the duplication analysis endorsed by G. E. Moore and David Lewis, Peter Vallentyne’s analysis in terms of contractions of possible worlds, and the analysis of Gene Witmer, William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon in terms of grounding.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Dan Marshall (2013). Intrinsicality and Grounding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1).
    A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities and necessary connections between wholly distinct entities, on which it is plausible that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Dan Marshall (2012). Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness. Philosophy Compass 7 (8):531-542.
    Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in terms of the facts about naturalness. This article discusses the three most influential of these attempts, each of which involve David Lewis. These are Lewis's 1983 analysis, his 1986 analysis, and his joint 1998 analysis with Rae Langton.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Brian Weatherson & Dan Marshall (2012). Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Properties. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition).
    I have some of my properties purely in virtue of the way I am. (My mass is an example.) I have other properties in virtue of the way I interact with the world. (My weight is an example.) The former are the intrinsic properties, the latter are the extrinsic properties. This seems to be an intuitive enough distinction to grasp, and hence the intuitive distinction has made its way into many discussions in ethics, philosophy of mind, metaphysics and even epistemology. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Dan Marshall (2009). Can 'Intrinsic' Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):646-672.
    An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of 'intrinsic' that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Dan Marshall & Josh Parsons (2001). Langton and Lewis on 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):347-351.
  9. Dan Marshall, Yablo's Account of Intrinsicality.
    An intrinsic property is roughly a property something has in virtue of how it is, as opposed to how it is related to other things. More carefully, the property of being F is intrinsic iff, necessarily, for any x that is F , x is F in virtue of how it is, as opposed to how it is related to wholly distinct things, or how wholly distinct things are. An extrinsic property, on the other hand, is any property that is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation