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Dan Moller [21]Daniel Möller [1]
  1. Dan Moller, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 67.
    Consider our attitude toward painful and pleasant experiences depend- ing on when they occur. A striking but rarely discussed feature of our attitude which Derek Parfit has emphasized is that we strongly wish painful experiences to lie in our past and pleasant experiences to lie in our future. Our asymmetrical attitudes toward future and past pains and pleasures can be forcefully illustrated by means of a thought-experiment described by Derek Parfit which I will paraphrase as follows.
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  2. Dan Moller, Moral Risk.
    It is natural for those with permissive attitudes toward abortion to suppose that, if they have examined all of the arguments they know against abortion and have concluded that they fail, their moral deliberations are at an end. Surprisingly, this is not the case, as I argue. This is because the mere risk that one of those arguments succeeds can generate a moral reason that counts against the act. If this is so, then liberals may be mistaken about the morality (...)
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  3. Dan Moller (2014). The Boring. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (2):181-191.
    This article discusses the aesthetic concept of boringness, of which there has been relatively little philosophical discussion, especially along its objective, nonpsychological dimensions. I begin by confronting skepticism about the validity of judgments about boringness and rebut suggestions to the effect that these judgments are inevitably compromised by mistakes or vices of the audience. The article then develops an account focused on certain kinds of reasonable expectations we form in a given aesthetic context. I go on to confront the question (...)
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  4. Dan Moller (2013). The Epistemology of Popularity and Incentives. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):148-156.
    This paper discusses two epistemic principles that are important to buyers and sellers: the appeal to popularity and the appeal to incentive structures. I point out the various ways these principles are defeasible, and then offer some examples of them at work in the contexts of hiring, politics and the arts. Finally, I consider why these principles are generally neglected, and conclude that our neglect is unwarranted on both epistemic and moral grounds.
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  5. Dan Moller (2013). Troy Jollimore, Love's Vision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 197 Pp. ISBN: 9780691148724. $35.00 (Hbk.). [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (5):686-688.
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  6. Dan Moller (2011). Anticipated Emotions and Emotional Valence. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (9).
    This paper addresses two questions: first, when making decisions about what to do, does the mere fact that we will feel regretful or guilty or proud afterward give us reason to act? I argue that these emotions of self-assessment give us little or no reason to act. The second question concerns emotional valence--how desirable or undesirable our emotions are. What is it that determines the valence of an emotion like regret? I argue that the valence of emotions, and indeed of (...)
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  7. Dan Moller (2011). A Simple Argument Against Design. Religious Studies 47 (4):513 - 520.
    This paper presents a simple argument against life being the product of design. The argument rests on three points, (1) We can conceive of the debate in terms of likelihoods, in the technical sense -how probable the design hypothesis renders our evidence, versus how probable the competing Darwinian hypothesis renders that evidence. (2) God, as traditionally conceived, had many more options by which to bring about life as we observe it than were available to natural selection. That is, the relevant (...)
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  8. Dan Moller (2011). Wealth, Disability, and Happiness. Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2):177-206.
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  9. Dan Moller (2010). The Pyrrhonian Skeptic's Telos. Ancient Philosophy 24 (2):425 - 441.
    Early on in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH), Sextus Empiricus offers an account of τὸ τέλος τῆς σκεπτικῆς—the aim or final end of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Having previously explained such crucial aspects of Pyrrhonism as the sense in which Skeptics do not hold any beliefs and what its constitutive principles are, in sections I 25-30 Sextus turns to what he seems to regard as the equally important matter of what the aim of Skepticism is. He tells us, An aim [τέλος] is (...)
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  10. Dan Moller (2009). Book Reviews:Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance. [REVIEW] Ethics 119 (3):606-611.
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  11. Dan Moller (2009). Meta-Reasoning and Practical Deliberation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):653 - 670.
    Sometimes there is evidence about what we would decide to do from an improved deliberative position—one in which we have better information, say, or are subject to less bias, or are able to consider the relevant facts with greater vividness. I argue that in such situations we should act on that evidence, and that there are some important ethical and prudential applications for this idea. Following through with this suggestion allows us to respond to the fact that we are prone (...)
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  12. Dan Moller (2007). Love and Death. Journal of Philosophy 104 (6):301-316.
    Empirical evidence indicates that bereaved spouses are surprisingly muted in their responses to their loss, and that after a few months many of the bereaved return to their emotional baseline. Psychologists think this is good news: resilience is adaptive, and we should welcome evidence that there is less suffering in the world. I explore various reasons we might have for regretting our resilience, both because of what resilience tells us about our own significance vis-à-vis loved ones, and because resilience may (...)
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  13. Dan Moller (2006). Killing and Dying. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):235 - 247.
    Everyone agrees that killing a fully developed person is normally wrong. And there is similar agreement that death is bad for the one who dies, though philosophers have been puzzled about how to explain this.2 But how is the wrongness of killing related to the badness of dying? The trivial answer is that killing is wrong precisely because it inflicts the badness of death upon the victim. Or, to put it another way, killing is wrong because it harms the victim (...)
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  14. Dan Moller (2006). Should We Let People Starve – for Now? Analysis 66 (291):240–247.
    Many philosophers believe that just as moral reasons do not diminish in force across space, so they do not diminish across time, and that we should accordingly be neutral between the interests of present people and future people. This allows them to make the plausible claim that we should not discount the interests of future generations when making decisions about things like consuming scarce resources.1 However, when this outlook is combined with a small number of fairly weak assumptions, it becomes (...)
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  15. Dan Moller (2005). The Marriage Commitment—Reply to Landau. Philosophy 80 (02):279 - 284.
    The Bachelor's Argument against marriage, as I described it in this journal,1 says that marriage involves taking an imprudent risk of finding oneself committed to a relationship with someone one does not love. The evidence indicates that many people who marry eventually find themselves without the feelings for the other person which made a marital relationship seem worthwhile in the first place; and were that to happen to us, it would seem highly undesirable nonetheless to be locked into a relationship (...)
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  16. Dan Moller (2004). The Pyrrhonian Skeptic's Telos. Ancient Philosophy 24 (2):425-441.
  17. Dan Moller (2003). An Argument Against Marriage. Philosophy 78 (01):79 - 91.
    There is an obvious, perhaps even trite, argument against getting married which deserves our attention. Reduced to a crude sketch, the argument is simply that, (a) most of us view the prospect of being married in the absence of mutual love with something like horror or at least great antipathy; (b) the mutual love between us and our spouse existing at the inception of our marriage may very well fail to persist; and hence (c) when we marry we are putting (...)
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  18. Daniel Möller (2003). Dödens Demokrati. Om En Tanke I 1600-Talets Förgängelsediktning. Res Publica 61:79-94.
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  19. Dan Moller (2002). Parfit on Pains, Pleasures, and the Time of Their Occurrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):67 - 82.
    Consider our attitude toward painful and pleasant experiences depending on when they occur. A striking but rarely discussed feature of our attitude which Derek Parfit has emphasized is that we strongly wish painful experiences to lie in our past and pleasant experiences to lie in our future. Our asymmetrical attitudes toward future and past pains and pleasures can be forcefully illustrated by means of a thought-experiment described by Parfit (1984, 165) which I will paraphrase as follows: You are in the (...)
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