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  1. Dan S. Felsenthal & Nicolaus Tideman (2013). Varieties of Failure of Monotonicity and Participation Under Five Voting Methods. Theory and Decision 75 (1):59-77.
    In voting theory, monotonicity is the axiom that an improvement in the ranking of a candidate by voters cannot cause a candidate who would otherwise win to lose. The participation axiom states that the sincere report of a voter’s preferences cannot cause an outcome that the voter regards as less attractive than the one that would result from the voter’s non-participation. This article identifies three binary distinctions in the types of circumstances in which failures of monotonicity or participation can occur. (...)
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  2. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, A Note on Measuring Voters' Responsibility.
    We consider a singular event of the following form: in a simple voting game, a particular division of the voters resulted in a positive outcome. We propose a plausible measure that quantifies the causal contribution of any given voter to the outcome. This measure is based on a conceptual analysis due to Braham [1], but differs from his solution to the problem of measuring causality of singular events.
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  3. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, Analysis of QM Rules in the Draft Constitution for Europe Proposed by the European Convention, 2003.
    We analyse and evaluate the qualified majority (QM) decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU that are included in the Draft Constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention [5]. We use a method similar to the one we used in [9] for the QM prescriptions made in the Treaty of Nice.
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  4. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, Analysis of QM Rule Adopted by the EU Inter-Governmental Conference Brussels, 18 June 2004.
    We analyse and evaluate the qualified majority (QM) decision rule for the Council of Ministers of the EU adopted at the EU Inter-Governmental Conference, Brussels, 18 June 2004 [1]. We compare this rule with the QM rule prescribed in the Treaty of Nice, and the rule included in the original draft Constitution proposed by the European Convention in July 2003. We use a method similar to the one we used in [3] and [4].
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  5. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, A Priori Voting Power : What is It All About?
    In this account, we explain the meaning of a priori voting power and outline how it is measured. We distinguish two intuitive notions as to what voting power means, leading to two approaches to measuring it. We discuss some philosophical and pragmatic objections, according to which a priori (as distinct from actual) voting power is worthless or inapplicable.
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  6. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, Misreporting Rules.
    In the voting-power literature the rules of decision of the US Congress and the UN Security Council are widely misreported as though abstention amounts to a `no' vote. The hypothesis (proposed elsewhere) that this is due to a specific cause, theory-laden observation, is tested here by examining accounts of these rules in introductory textbooks on American Government and International Relations, where that putative cause does not apply. Our examination does not lead to a conclusive outcome regarding the hypothesis, but reveals (...)
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  7. Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover & William Zwicker (1998). The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power. Theory and Decision 44 (1):83-116.
    If K is an index of relative voting power for simple voting games, the bicameral postulate requires that the distribution of K -power within a voting assembly, as measured by the ratios of the powers of the voters, be independent of whether the assembly is viewed as a separate legislature or as one chamber of a bicameral system, provided that there are no voters common to both chambers. We argue that a reasonable index – if it is to be used (...)
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  8. Dan S. Felsenthal & Mosh� Machover (1995). Postulates and Paradoxes of Relative Voting Power ? A Critical Re-Appraisal. Theory and Decision 38 (2):195-229.
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  9. Amnon Rapoport, Eythan Weg & Dan S. Felsenthal (1990). Effects of Fixed Costs in Two-Person Sequential Bargaining. Theory and Decision 28 (1):47-71.
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  10. Amnon Rapoport, Dan S. Felsenthal & Zeev Maoz (1988). Microcosms and Macrocosms: Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation Systems. Theory and Decision 24 (1):11-33.
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