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Dan Zahavi [158]Daniel Zahavi [1]
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Profile: Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen)
  1.  23
    Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2012). The Phenomenological Mind. Routledge.
    This volume introduces fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology.
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  2.  71
    Dan Zahavi (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...
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  3. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2007). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge.
    The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity Interesting and important examples are used throughout, including phantom limb syndrome, blindsight (...)
     
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  4. Dan Zahavi (2011). Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.
    Quite a number of the philosophical arguments and objections currently being launched against simulation (ST) based and theory-theory (TT) based approaches to mindreading have a phenomenological heritage in that they draw on ideas found in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Stein, Gurwitsch, Scheler and Schutz. Within the last couple of years, a number of ST and TT proponents have started to react and respond to what one for the sake of simplicity might call the phenomenological proposal (PP). This (...)
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  5.  70
    Dan Zahavi (2016). The End of What? Phenomenology Vs. Speculative Realism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):289-309.
    Phenomenology has recently come under attack from proponents of speculative realism. In this paper, I present and assess the criticism, and argue that it is either superficial and simplistic or lacks novelty.
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  6.  96
    Dan Zahavi (1999). Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation. Northwestern University Press.
    ... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...
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  7. Dan Zahavi (2008). Simulation, Projection and Empathy. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):514-522.
    Simulationists have recently started to employ the term "empathy" when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler's classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding - in particular the understanding of emotional expressions - that are not (...)
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  8.  77
    Dan Zahavi (2003). Husserl's Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.
    It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic. The continuing publication of Husserl’s manuscripts has made it necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon (...)
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  9. Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel (2015). For-Me-Ness: What It is and What It is Not. In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Routledge 36-53.
    The alleged for-me-ness or mineness of conscious experience has been the topic of considerable debate in recent phenomenology and philosophy of mind. By considering a series of objections to the notion of for-me-ness, or to a properly robust construal of it, this paper attempts to clarify to what the notion is committed and to what it is not committed. This exercise results in the emergence of a relatively determinate and textured portrayal of for-me-ness as the authors conceive of it.
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  10. Dan Zahavi (2014). Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. OUP Oxford.
    Dan Zahavi engages with classical phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and a range of empirical disciplines to explore the nature of selfhood. He argues that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed or dependent upon others, but accepts that certain dimensions of the self and types of self-experience are other-mediated.
     
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  11.  96
    Dan Zahavi (2011). Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz. Inquiry 53 (3):285-306.
    When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have—according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various thinkers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will contrast Lipps' account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of a revival in (...)
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  12.  73
    Philippe Rochat & Dan Zahavi (2011). The Uncanny Mirror: A Re-Framing of Mirror Self-Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):204-213.
    Mirror self-experience is re-casted away from the cognitivist interpretation that has dominated discussions on the issue since the establishment of the mirror mark test. Ideas formulated by Merleau-Ponty on mirror self-experience point to the profoundly unsettling encounter with one’s specular double. These ideas, together with developmental evidence are re-visited to provide a new, psychologically and phenomenologically more valid account of mirror self-experience: an experience associated with deep wariness.
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  13. Dan Zahavi (2006). Two Takes on a One-Level Account of Consciousness. Psyche 12 (2).
    My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences.
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  14.  76
    Dan Zahavi (2014). Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality. Topoi 33 (1):129-142.
    The article explores and compares the accounts of empathy found in Lipps, Scheler, Stein and Husserl and argues that the three latter phenomenological thinkers offer a model of empathy, which is not only distinctly different from Lipps’, but which also diverge from the currently dominant models.
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  15. Dan Zahavi (2004). Phenomenology and the Project of Naturalization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):331-47.
    In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine and evaluate some possible alternatives.
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  16. Dan Zahavi (ed.) (2001). Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique. Ohio University Press.
    __Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity __analyzes the transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity and argues that an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity was a _conditio sine qua non_ for a phenomenological philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts, Dan Zahavi examines Husserl's reasons for this conviction and delivers a detailed analysis of his radical and complex concept of intersubjectivity, showing that precisely his (...)
     
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  17.  14
    Dan Zahavi (2007). Expression and Empathy. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press 25--40.
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  18.  41
    Dan Zahavi (2001). Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):151-167.
    Drawing on the work of Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Sartre, this article presents an overview of some of the diverse approaches to intersubjectivity that can be found in the phenomenological tradition. Starting with a brief description of Scheler's criticism of the argument from analogy, the article continues by showing that the phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity involve much more than a 'solution' to the 'traditional' problem of other minds. Intersubjectivity doesn't merely concern concrete face-to-face encounters between individuals. It is also (...)
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  19. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  20. Dan Zahavi (2001). Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):151-67.
    Drawing on the work of Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Sartre, this article presents an overview of some of the diverse approaches to intersubjectivity that can be found in the phenomenological tradition. Starting with a brief description of Scheler’s criticism of the argument from analogy, the article continues by showing that the phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity involve much more than a ‘solution’ to the ‘traditional’ problem of other minds. Intersubjectivity doesn’t merely concern concrete face-to-face encounters between individuals. It is also (...)
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  21. Dan Zahavi, Evan Thompson & Mark Siderits (eds.) (2011). Self, No Self? Perspectives From Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press.
    Self, No Self? is the first book of its kind. It brings together leading philosophical scholars of the Indian and Tibetan traditions with leading Western philosophers of mind and phenomenologists to explore issues about consciousness and selfhood from these multiple perspectives.
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  22. Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi (1998). Phenomenal Consciousness and Self-Awareness: A Phenomenological Critique of Representational Theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):687-705.
    Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for pheno- menological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, (...)
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  23. Dan Zahavi (2012). The Time of the Self. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):143-159.
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  24. Dan Zahavi (2004). Back to Brentano? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):66-87.
    For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis (...)
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  25.  14
    Dan Zahavi & Philippe Rochat (2015). Empathy≠Sharing: Perspectives From Phenomenology and Developmental Psychology. Consciousness and Cognition 36:543-553.
  26. Dan Zahavi (2005). Intentionality and Experience. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):299-318.
    Since the publication of Chalmer’s influential work, The Conscious Mind , it has been customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and the first-person perspective, the ‘easy problems of consciousness’ mainly concern the notion of intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking the experiential dimension into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the nature of subjectivity (...)
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  27. Louis Sass, Josef Parnas & Dan Zahavi (2011). Phenomenological Psychopathology and Schizophrenia: Contemporary Approaches and Misunderstandings. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (1):1–23.
    The phenomenological approach to schizophrenia has undergone something of a renaissance in Anglophone psychiatry in recent years. There has been a proliferation of works that focus on the nature of subjectivity in schizophrenia and related disorders, and that take inspiration from the work of such German and French philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, and such classical psychiatrists as Minkowski, Blankenburg, and Binswanger (Rulf 2003; Sass 2001a, 2001b). This trend includes predominantly theoretical articles, which typically incorporate clinical material as well (...)
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  28. Dan Zahavi (2003). Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 157--180.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore (...)
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  29.  44
    Dan Zahavi (2013). Naturalized Phenomenology: A Desideratum or a Category Mistake? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72:23-42.
    If we want to assess whether or not a naturalized phenomenology is a desideratum or a category mistake, we need to be clear on precisely what notion of phenomenology and what notion of naturalization we have in mind. In the article I distinguish various notions, and after criticizing one type of naturalized phenomenology, I sketch two alternative takes on what a naturalized phenomenology might amount to and propose that our appraisal of the desirability of such naturalization should be more positive, (...)
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  30. Dan Zahavi (2004). Husserl's Noema and the Internalism-Externalism Debate. Inquiry 47 (1):42 – 66.
    In a number of papers, Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre have claimed that Husserl is an internalist. In this paper, it is argued that their interpretation is based on two questionable assumptions: (1) that Husserl's noema should be interpreted along Fregean lines, and (2) that Husserl's transcendental methodology commits him to some form of methodological solipsism. Both of these assumptions are criticized on the basis of the most recent Husserl-research. It is shown that Husserl's concept of noema can be interpreted (...)
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  31. Dan Zahavi (2007). Killing the Straw Man: Dennett and Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):21-43.
    Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative (...)
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  32.  34
    Dan Zahavi (2015). Self and Other: From Pure Ego to Co-Constituted We. Continental Philosophy Review 48 (2):143-160.
    In recent years, the social dimensions of selfhood have been discussed widely. Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? These questions are explored in the following contribution.
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  33. Dan Zahavi (2002). First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-Awareness: Some Reflections on the Relation Between Recent Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):7-26.
    The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.
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  34. Dan Zahavi (2009). Is the Self a Social Construct? Inquiry 52 (6):551-573.
    There is a long tradition in philosophy for claiming that selfhood is socially constructed and self-experience intersubjectively mediated. On many accounts, we consequently have to distinguish between being conscious or sentient and being a self. The requirements that must be met in order to qualify for the latter are higher. My aim in the following is to challenge this form of social constructivism by arguing that an account of self which disregards the fundamental structures and features of our experiential life (...)
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  35.  14
    Dan Zahavi & Andreas Roepstorff (2011). Faces and Ascriptions: Mapping Measures of the Self. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):141-148.
    The ‘self’ is increasingly used as a variable in cognitive experiments and correlated with activity in particular areas in the brain. At first glance, this seems to transform the self from an ephemeral theoretical entity to something concrete and measurable. However, the transformation is by no means unproblematic. We trace the development of two important experimental paradigms in the study of the self, self-face recognition and the adjective self ascription task. We show how the experimental instrumentalization has gone hand in (...)
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  36.  31
    Ingar Brinck, Vasu Reddy & Dan Zahavi, The Primacy of the We?
    How should we conceive of the foundations of sociality? A much debated question concerns whether it is concrete interpersonal encounters or the existence of a primitive plural self, a we, which constitutes the basis for joint action and intending together. A related question concerns whether intersubjectivity or the sharing of a common world is more fundamental for making sense of the notions of joint agency and collective intentionality. In other words, to use locutions employed by classical phenomenologists, is ‘being-for-others’ or (...)
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  37. Dan Zahavi (2008). Internalism, Externalism, and Transcendental Idealism. Synthese 160 (3):355 - 374.
    The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in (...)
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  38. Dan Zahavi (2007). Perception of Duration Presupposes Duration of Perception - or Does It? Husserl and Dainton on Time. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):453 – 471.
    In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl's classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton's and Husserl's respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat opportunity to appraise (...)
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  39. Dan Zahavi (1996). Husserl Und Die Transzendentale Intersubjektivität Eine Antwort Auf Die Sprachpragmatische Kritik.
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  40.  17
    Dan Zahavi (2003). Phenomenology of Self. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press 56--75.
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  41.  38
    Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2008). The (in)Visibility of Others: A Reply to Herschbach. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):237-244.
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  42.  4
    Dan Zahavi (forthcoming). Openness Versus Interdependence: A Reply to Kyselo. Philosophical Psychology:1-2.
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  43.  7
    Dan Zahavi (2015). Phenomenology of Reflection: Section III, Chapter 2, Universal Structures of Pure Consciousness. In Andrea Staiti (ed.), Commentary on Husserl's "Ideas I". De Gruyter 177-194.
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  44. Dan Zahavi (2004). Time and Consciousness in the Bernau Manuscripts. Husserl Studies 20 (2):99-118.
    Even a cursory glance in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein makes it evident that one of Husserl’s major concerns in his 1917-18 reflections on time-consciousness was how to account for the constitution of time without giving rise to an infinite regress. Not only does Husserl constantly refer to this problem in Husserliana XXXIII – as he characteristically writes at one point “Überall drohen, scheint es, unendliche Regresse” – but he also takes care to distinguish between several different regresses. One (...)
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  45. Dan Zahavi, Intersubjectivity in Sartre's Being and Nothingness.
    Sartre’s analysis of intersubjectivity in the third part of Being and Nothingness is guided by two main motives1. First of all, Sartre is simply expanding his ontological investigation of the essential structure of and relation between the for-itself (pour-soi) and the in-itself (en-soi). For as he points out, I need the Other in order fully to understand the structure of my own being, since the for-itself refers to the for-others (EN 267/303, 260/298); moreover, as he later adds, a treatment of (...)
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  46. Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (2007). Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology. In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press 67--87.
    Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousness? What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? What (...)
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  47. Dan Zahavi (2001). Schizophrenia and Self-Awareness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (4):339-341.
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  48. Dan Zahavi (2005). Being Someone. Psyche 11 (5).
    My discussion will focus on what is arguable the main claim of Being No One: That no such things as selves exist in the world and that nobody ever was or had a self. In discussing to what extent Metzinger can be said to argue convincingly for this claim, I will also comment on his methodological use of pathology and briefly make some remarks vis-à-vis his understanding and criticism of phenomenology.
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  49. Dan Zahavi (2007). Self and Other: The Limits of Narrative Understanding. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):179-.
    If the self – as a popular view has it – is a narrative construction, if it arises out of discursive practices, it is reasonable to assume that the best possible avenue to self-understanding will be provided by those very narratives. If I want to know what it means to be a self, I should look closely at the stories that I and others tell about myself, since these stories constitute who I am. In the following I wish to question (...)
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  50.  26
    Dan Zahavi & Josef Parnas (2003). Conceptual Problems in Infantile Autism Research: Why Cognitive Science Needs Phenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.
    Until recently, cognitive research in infantile autism primarily focussed on the ability of autistic subjects to understand and predict the actions of others. Currently, researchers are also considering the capacity of autists to understand their own minds. In this article we discuss selected recent contributions to the theory of mind debate and the study of infantile autism, and provide an analysis of intersubjectivity and self-awareness that is informed both by empirical research and by work in the phenomenological tradition. This analysis (...)
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