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Dana K. Nelkin [18]Dana Kay Nelkin [10]
  1. Dana K. Nelkin (forthcoming). Moral Luck. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  2. Dana Kay Nelkin (2014). Moral Responsibility, Conversation, and Desert: Comments on Michael McKenna's Conversation and Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 171 (1):63-72.
    In this paper, I engage with several of the intriguing theses Michael McKenna puts forward in his Conversation and Responsibility. For example, I examine McKenna’s claim that the fact that an agent is morally responsible for an action and the fact that an agent is appropriately held responsible explain each other. I go on to argue that despite the importance of the ability to hold people responsible, an agent’s being morally responsible for an action is explanatorily fundamental, and in this (...)
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  3. David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin (2013). Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1:284-313.
    This essay explores a conception of responsibility at work in moral and criminal responsibility. Our conception draws on work in the compatibilist tradition that focuses on the choices of agents who are reasons-responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Our conception brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative (...)
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  4. Dana Kay Nelkin (2013). Desert, Fairness, and Resentment. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-16.
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  5. Dana Kay Nelkin (2013). Précis of Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):443-450.
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  6. Dana Kay Nelkin (2013). Replies to Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):476-491.
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  7. Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2013). So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short. Noûs 48 (3).
    According to the classical Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), there is a morally significant difference between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Versions of DDE have been defended in a variety of creative ways, but there is one difficulty, the so-called “closeness problem”, that continues to bedevil all of them. The problem is that an agent's intention can always be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from almost any situation, including those that have (...)
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  8. Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2013). Three Cheers for Double Effect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):125-158.
    The doctrine of double effect, together with other moral principles that appeal to the intentions of moral agents, has come under attack from many directions in recent years, as have a variety of rationales that have been given in favor of it. In this paper, our aim is to develop, defend, and provide a new theoretical rationale for a secular version of the doctrine. Following Quinn (1989), we distinguish between Harmful Direct Agency and Harmful Indirect Agency. We propose the following (...)
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  9. Dana Kay Nelkin (2011). Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Nelkin presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately reaffirming our conception of ourselves as agents. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility begins with a defense of the rational abilities view, according to which one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. The view is (...)
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  10. Dana Kay Nelkin (2011). Sher , George . Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness .New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 168. $99.00 (Cloth); $24.95 (Paper). [REVIEW] Ethics 121 (3):675-680.
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  11. Dana Kay Nelkin (2009). Responsibility, Rational Abilities, and Two Kinds of Fairness Arguments. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):151 – 165.
    In this paper, I begin by considering a traditional argument according to which it would be unfair to impose sanctions on people for performing actions when they could not do otherwise, and thus that no one who lacks the ability to do otherwise is responsible or blameworthy for his or her actions in an important sense. Interestingly, a parallel argument concluding that people are not responsible or praiseworthy if they lack the ability to do otherwise is not as compelling. Watson, (...)
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  12. Dana K. Nelkin (2008). Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending an Asymmetrical View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):497-515.
    Abstract: In this paper, I defend a view according to which one is responsible for one's actions to the extent that one has the ability to do the right thing for the right reasons. The view is asymmetrical in requiring the ability to do otherwise when one acts badly or for bad reasons, but no such ability in cases in which one acts well for good ones. Despite its intuitive appeal, the view's asymmetry makes it a target of both of (...)
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  13. Dana K. Nelkin (2007). Do We Have a Coherent Set of Intuitions About Moral Responsibility? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259.
    I believe that the data is both fascinating and instructive, but in this paper I will resist the conclusion that we must give up Invariantism, or, as I prefer to call it, Unificationism. In the process of examining the challenging data and responding to it, I will try to draw some larger lessons about how to use the kind of data being collected. First, I will provide a brief description of some influential theories of responsibility, and then explain the threat (...)
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  14. Dana K. Nelkin (2007). Good Luck to Libertarians. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):173 – 184.
    In this review essay on Mele's Free Will and Luck, I evaluate the 'daring soft libertarian' view presented in the heart of the book, and in particular the way that it provides an answer to the objection that introducing indeterminism into one's view of freedom merely adds an element of luck and so undermines freedom. I also compare the view's strengths and weaknesses to those of traditional libertarian views. Finally, I consider the 'zygote' argument that Mele takes to be his (...)
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  15. Dana K. Nelkin (2005). Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):181–206.
    In conclusion, then, the situationist literature provides a rich area of exploration for those interested in freedom and responsibility. Interestingly, it does not do so primarily because it is situationist in the sense of supporting the substantive thesis about the role of character traits. Rather it is because it makes us wonder whether we really do act on a regular basis with the particular normative, epistemic,and reactive capacities that are central to our identity as free and responsible agents.
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  16. Dana K. Nelkin (2004). Deliberative Alternatives. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):215-240.
    There are powerful skeptical challenges to the idea that we are free. And yet, it seems simply impossible for us to shake the sense that we really are free. Some are convinced that the skeptical challenges are insurmountable and resign themselves to living under an illusion, while others argue that the challenges can be met. Even among those who believe that our sense of ourselves as free is at least roughly accurate, there are deep differences of opinion concerning what freedom (...)
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  17. Dana K. Nelkin (2004). Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
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  18. Dana K. Nelkin (2004). Irrelevant Alternatives and Frankfurt Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 121 (1):1-25.
    In rejecting the Principle of AlternatePossibilities (PAP), Harry Frankfurt makes useof a special sort of counterfactual of thefollowing form: ``he wouldn''t have doneotherwise even if he could have''''. Recently,other philosophers (e.g., Susan Hurley (1999,2003) and Michael Zimmerman (2002)) haveappealed to a special class of counterfactualsof this same general form in defending thecompatibility of determinism andresponsibility. In particular, they claim thatit can be true of agents that even if they aredetermined, and so cannot do otherwise, theywouldn''t have done otherwise even if (...)
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  19. Dana K. Nelkin (2004). The Sense of Freedom. In Joseph K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press. 105.
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  20. Dana K. Nelkin (2002). Self-Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):384-406.
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  21. Dana K. Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2002). Warfield's New Argument for Incompatibilism. Analysis 62 (2):104-107.
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  22. Dana K. Nelkin (2001). Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality. Psyche 7 (13).
    Siewert identifies a special kind of conscious experience, phenomenal consciousness, that is the sort of consciousness missing in a variety of cases of blindsight. He then argues that phenomenal consciousness has been neglected by students of consciousness when it should not be. According to Siewert, the neglect is based at least in part on two false assumptions: (i) phenomenal features are not intentional and (ii) phenomenal character is restricted to sensory experience. By identifying an essential tension in Siewert's characterization of (...)
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  23. Dana K. Nelkin (2001). The Consequence Argument and the "Mind" Argument. Analysis 61 (2):107-115.
  24. Dana K. Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2001). How to Solve Blum's Paradox. Analysis 61 (269):91-94.
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  25. Dana K. Nelkin (2000). The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality. Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.
  26. Dana K. Nelkin (2000). Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom. Journal of Philosophy 97 (10):564-576.
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