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Profile: Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (University of Hertfordshire)
  1. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (forthcoming). Introduction: The Third Wittgenstein Conference. Philosophia.
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  2. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (forthcoming). Wittgenstein and Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly.
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  3. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2013). On Coliva's Judgmental Hinges. Philosophia 41 (1):13-25.
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  4. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2013). Wittgenstein's Razor: The Cutting Edge of Enactivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):263-280.
    If I had to say what the single most important contribution Wittgenstein made to philosophy was, it would be to have revived the animal in us: the animal that is there in every fiber of our human being, and therefore also in our thinking and reasoning. This means, his pushing us to realize that we are animals not only genealogically, but as evolved human beings—whether neonate, or language-possessing, civilized, law-abiding, fully fledged adults. Constitutionally, and in everything we do, still fundamentally (...)
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  5. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Volker A. Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.) (2013). Mind, Language and Action: Contributions to the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
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  6. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2009). Abbreviations of Works by Wittgenstein. Philosophia 37 (4):563-564.
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  7. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2009). Introduction to Proceedings Issue of The Third Wittgenstein. Philosophia 37 (4):557-62.
    This introduces the special issue of Philosophia which constitutes the Proceedings of the Inaugural Conference of the British Wittgenstein Society (BWS), on 'The Third Wittgenstein', held at the University of Hertfordshire (Hatfield, UK) on 7-8 June 2008. The Introduction briefly argues for the idea of a 'third Wittgenstein', and summarizes the contributions of the volume.
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  8. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2009). Introduction to Proceedings Issue of Third Wittgenstein. Philosophia 37 (4):557-562.
    This introduces the special issue of Philosophia which constitutes the Proceedings of the Inaugural Conference of the British Wittgenstein Society (BWS), on 'The Third Wittgenstein', held at the University of Hertfordshire (Hatfield, UK) on 7-8 June 2008. The Introduction briefly argues for the idea of a 'third Wittgenstein', and summarizes the contributions of the volume.
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  9. Daniéle Moyal-Sharrock (2009). The Fiction of Paradox: Really Feeling for Anna Karenina. In Ylva Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist & Michael McEachrane (eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan.
    How is it that we can be moved by what we know does not exist? In this paper, I examine the so-called 'paradox of fiction', showing that it fatally hinges on cognitive theories of emotion such as Kendall Walton's pretend theory and Peter Lamarque's thought theory. I reject these theories and acknowledge the concept-formative role of genuine emotion generated by fiction. I then argue, contra Jenefer Robinson, that this 'éducation sentimentale' is not achieved through distancing, but rather through the engagement (...)
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  10. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2009). Wittgenstein and the Memory Debate. New Ideas in Psychology Special Issue: Mind, Meaning and Language: Wittgenstein’s Relevance for Psychology 27:213-27.
    This paper surveys the impact on neuropsychology of Wittgenstein's elucidations of memory. Wittgenstein discredited the storage and imprint models of memory, dissolved the conceptual link between memory and mental images or representations and, upholding the context-sensitivity of memory, made room for a family resemblance concept of memory, where remembering can also amount to doing or saying something. While neuropsychology is still generally under the spell of archival and physiological notions of memory, Wittgenstein's reconceptions can be seen at work in its (...)
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  11. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2008). Review of David Pears, Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).
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  12. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2008). Review of Fergus Kerr, "Work on Oneself&Quot;: Wittgenstein. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (10).
  13. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (ed.) (2007). Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This anthology focuses on the extraordinary contributions Wittgenstein made to several areas in the philosophy of psychology - contributions that extend to psychology, psychiatry, sociology and anthropology. To bring them a richly-deserved attention from across the language barrier, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock has translated papers by eminent French Wittgensteinians. They here join ranks with more familiar renowned specialists on Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology. While revealing differences in approach and interests, this coming together of some of the best minds on the subject discloses a (...)
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  14. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2007). The Good Sense of Nonsense: A Reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus as Nonself-Repudiating. Philosophy 82 (1):147-177.
    This paper aims to return Wittgenstein's Tractatus to its original stature by showing that it is not the self-repudiating work commentators take it to be, but the consistent masterpiece its author believed it was at the time he wrote it. The Tractatus has been considered self-repudiating for two reasons: it refers to its own propositions as ‘nonsensical’, and it makes what Peter Hacker calls ‘paradoxical ineffability claims’ – that is, its remarks are themselves instances of what it says (...)
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  15. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2007). Wittgenstein on Psychological Certainty. In , Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan.
    As is well known, Wittgenstein pointed out an asymmetry between first- and third-person psychological statements: the first, unlike the latter, involve observation or a claim to knowledge and are constitutionally open to uncertainty. In this paper, I challenge this asymmetry and Wittgenstein's own affirmation of the constitutional uncertainty of third-person psychological statements, and argue that Wittgenstein ultimately did too. I first show that, on his view, most of our third-person psychological statements are noncognitive; they stem from a subjective certainty: a (...)
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  16. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock & William H. Brenner (eds.) (2007). Readings on Wittgenstein's On Certainty. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This anthology is the first devoted exclusively to On Certainty. The essays are grouped under four headings: the Framework, Transcendental, Epistemic and Therapeutic readings, and an introduction helps explain why these readings need not be seen as antagonistic. Contributions from W.H. Brenner, Alice Crary, Michael Kober, Edward Minar, Howard Mounce, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Thomas Morawetz, D.Z. Phillips, Duncan Pritchard, Rupert Read, Anthony Rudd, Joachim Schulte, Avrum Stroll, Michael Williams.
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  17. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2005). Quand les mots sont des actes: Les «énoncés spontanés» chez Wittgenstein et la dissolution du problème corps-esprit. Revue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 137 (1).
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  18. Daniéle Moyal-Sharrock (2004). Introduction: The Idea of a Third Wittgenstein. In Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (ed.), The Third Wittgenstein: The Post-Investigations Works. Ashgate. 1--120.
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  19. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2004). Understanding Wittgenstein's on Certainty. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This radical reading of Wittgenstein's third and last masterpiece, On Certainty, has major implications for philosophy. It elucidates Wittgenstein's ultimate thoughts on the nature of our basic beliefs and his demystification of scepticism. Our basic certainties are shown to be nonepistemic, nonpropositional attitudes that, as such, have no verbal occurrence but manifest themselves exclusively in our actions. This fundamental certainty is a belief-in, a primitive confidence or ur-trust whose practical nature bridges the hitherto unresolved categorial gap between belief and action.
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  20. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (ed.) (2004). The Third Wittgenstein: The Post-Investigations Works. Ashgate.
    This book also provides new and illuminating accounts of difficult concepts, such as patterns of life, experiencing meaning, meaning blindness, lying and ...
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  21. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2003). Logic in Action: Wittgenstein's Logical Pragmatism and the Impotence of Scepticism. Philosophical Investigations 26 (2):125-148.
    So-called 'hinge propositions', Wittgenstein's version of our basic beliefs, are not propositions at all, but heuristic expressions of our bounds of sense which, as such, cannot meaningfully be said but only show themselves in what we say and do. Yet if our foundational certainty is necessarily an ineffable, enacted certainty, any challenge of it must also be enacted. Philosophical scepticism – being a mere mouthing of doubt – is impotent to unsettle a certainty whose salient conceptual feature is that it (...)
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  22. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2000). Words as Deeds: Wittgenstein's ''Spontaneous Utterances'' and the Dissolution of the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):355 – 372.
    Wittgenstein demystified the notion of 'observational self-knowledge'. He dislodged the long-standing conception that we have privileged access to our impressions, sensations and feelings through introspection, and more precisely eliminated knowing as the kind of awareness that normally characterizes our first-person present-tense psychological statements. He was not thereby questioning our awareness of our emotions or sensations, but debunking the notion that we come to that awareness via any epistemic route. This makes the spontaneous linguistic articulation of our sensations and impressions nondescriptive. (...)
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  23. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2000). Wittgenstein Distinguished: A Response to Pieranna Garavaso. Philosophical Investigations 23 (1):54–69.
    I take issue with Pieranna Garavaso’s contention - lodged in a rapprochement between Wittgenstein and Quine - that for Wittgenstein, there is no sharp categorial distinction between logical and empirical propositions, but only one of degree. I argue that Garavaso’s conclusion results from a misunderstanding of the river-bed analogy in On Certainty (96-99). When Wittgenstein maintains there is not a sharp boundary between propositions of logic and empirical propositions, he does not imply that there is not a sharp categorial difference (...)
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