Search results for 'Daniel Clement Dennett' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Books by Daniel Dennett (2002). Brief Annotated Bibliography of Works by and About Daniel Dennett. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press.score: 1680.0
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  2. Daniel C. Dennett (2008). Daniel C. Dennett Autobiography Part 3. Philosophy Now 70:24-25.score: 1640.0
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  3. Daniel C. Dennett (2008). Daniel Dennett: Autobiography, Part 1. Philosophy Now 68:22-26.score: 1440.0
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  4. Daniel C. Dennett (2008). Daniel Dennett Autobiography, Part 2. Philosophy Now 69:21-25.score: 1440.0
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  5. Daniel Clement Dennett (2003). Freedom Evolves. Viking.score: 1290.0
    Daniel C. Dennett is a brilliant polemicist, famous for challenging unexamined orthodoxies. Over the last thirty years, he has played a major role in expanding our understanding of consciousness, developmental psychology, and evolutionary theory. And with such groundbreaking, critically acclaimed books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize finalist), he has reached a huge general and professional audience. In this new book, Dennett shows that evolution is the key to resolving (...)
     
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  6. Daniel Dennett, Reply by Dennett to D'Souza Wall Street Journal Essay.score: 540.0
    If Dinesh D'Souza knew just a little bit more philosophy, he would realize how silly he appears when he accuses me of committing what he calls "the Fallacy of the Enlightenment." and challenges me to refute Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself. I don't need to refute this; it has been lambasted so often and so well by other philosophers that even self-styled Kantians typically find one way or another of excusing themselves from defending it. And speaking of fallacies, D'Souza contradicts (...)
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  7. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). Do Animals Have Beliefs? In H. Roitblat & Jean-Arcady Meyer (eds.), Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.score: 520.0
    In Herbert Roitblat, ed., _Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Sciences_ , MIT Press, 1995. Daniel C. Dennett <blockquote> Do Animals Have Beliefs? </blockquote> According to one more or less standard mythology, behaviorism, the ideology and methodology that reigned in experimental psychology for most of the century, has been overthrown by a new ideology and methodology: cognitivism. Behaviorists, one is told, didn't take the mind seriously. They ignored--or even denied the existence of--mental states such as beliefs and desires, and mental (...)
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  8. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). Is Perception the "Leading Edge" of Memory? In A. Spafadora (ed.), Iride: Luoghi Della Memoria E Dell'oblio.score: 520.0
    Daniel C. Dennett Is Perception the 'Leading Edge' of Memory? Consciousness appears to us to consist of a sequence of contentful items, arranged in a sequence, the so-called "stream of consciousness," in which each item in turn bursts quite suddenly into consciousness and thereby enters memory, perhaps only briefly to be remembered, and then forgotten. I think that hidden in this comfortable and largely innocent picture of consciousness is a deep and seductive mistake. I intend to expose and (...)
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  9. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). Is Perception the "Leading Edge" of Memory? In A. Spafadora (ed.), Iride: Luoghi Della Memoria E Dell'oblio.score: 520.0
    Daniel C. Dennett
    Is Perception the 'Leading Edge' of Memory?
    Consciousness appears to us to consist of a sequence of contentful items, arranged in a sequence, the so-called "stream of consciousness," in which each item in turn bursts quite suddenly into consciousness and thereby enters memory, perhaps only briefly to be remembered, and then forgotten. I think that hidden in this comfortable and largely innocent picture of consciousness is a deep and seductive mistake. I intend to (...)
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  10. Daniel C. Dennett & Alvin Plantinga (2011). Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? OUP USA.score: 520.0
    One of today's most controversial and heated issues is whether or not the conflict between science and religion can be reconciled. In Science and Religion: Are They Compatible?, renowned philosophers Daniel C. Dennett and Alvin Plantinga expand upon the arguments that they presented in an exciting live debate held at the 2009 American Philosophical Association Central Division conference. An enlightening discussion that will motivate students to think critically, Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? opens with Plantinga's assertion that (...)
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  11. Daniel C. Dennett (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.score: 480.0
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  12. Luc Faucher (1999). Daniel Clement Dennett, La Diversité des Esprits: Une Approche de la Conscience Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 19 (2):97-99.score: 450.0
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  13. Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Living on the Edge. Inquiry 36 (1-2):135-59.score: 420.0
    In a survey of issues in philosophy of mind some years ago, I observed that "it is widely granted these days that dualism is not a serious view to contend with, but rather a cliff over which to push one's opponents." (Dennett, 1978, p.252) That was true enough, and I for one certainly didn't deplore the fact, but this rich array of essays tackling my book amply demonstrates that a cliff examined with care is better than a cliff ignored. (...)
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  14. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Precis of the Intentional Stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):13-25.score: 360.0
    The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited (and is virtually unavoidable) in artificial (...)
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  15. Charles R. Clement (1993). Extractive Reserves Examined Non-Timber Products From Tropical Forests: Evaluation of a Conservation and Development Strategy Daniel C. Nepstad Stephan Schwartzman. Bioscience 43 (9):644-646.score: 360.0
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  16. Daniel C. Dennett (2007). Heterophenomenology Reconsidered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):247-270.score: 300.0
    Descartes’ Method of Radical Doubt was not radical enough. –A. Marcel (2003, 181) In short, heterophenomenology is nothing new; it is nothing other than the method that has been used by psychophysicists, cognitive psychologists, clinical neuropsychologists, and just about everybody who has ever purported to study human consciousness in a serious, scientific way. –D. Dennett (2003, 22).
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  17. Daniel C. Dennett (2005). Natural Freedom. Metaphilosophy 36 (4):449-458.score: 300.0
    Three critics of Freedom Evolves (Dennett 2003) bring out important differences in philosophical outlook and method. Mele’s thought experiments are supposed to expose the importance, for autonomy, of personal history, but they depend on the dubious invocation of mere logical or conceptual possibility. Fischer defends the Basic Argument for incompatibilism, while Taylor and I choose to sidestep it instead of disposing of it. Where does the burden of proof lie? O’Connor’s candid expression of allegiance to traditional ideas that I (...)
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  18. Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Evolution, Teleology, Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):89-391.score: 300.0
    No response that was not as long and intricate as the two commentaries combined could do justice to their details, so what follows will satisfy nobody, myself included. I will concentrate on one issue discussed by both commentators: the relationship between evolution and teleological (or intentional) explanation. My response, in its brevity, may have just one virtue: it will confirm some of the hunches (or should I say suspicions) that these and other writers have entertained about my views. For more (...)
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  19. N. Humphrey & Daniel C. Dennett (1989). Speaking for Ourselves. Raritan 9:68-98.score: 300.0
    _Raritan: A Quarterly Review_ , IX, 68-98, Summer 1989. Reprinted (with footnotes), _Occasional Paper #8_ , Center on Violence and Human Survival, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York, 1991; Daniel Kolak and R. Martin, eds., _Self & Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues_ , Macmillan, 1991.
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  20. Richard Griffin & Daniel C. Dennett, What Does the Study of Autism Tell Us About the Craft of Folk Psychology?score: 300.0
    Autism is a neurodevelopmental condition characterized by difficulties in social interaction (APA, 2000). Successful social interaction relies, in part, on determining the thoughts and feelings of others, an ability commonly attributed to our faculty of folk or common-sense psychology. Because the symptoms of autism should be present by around the second birthday, it follows that the study of autism should tell us something about the early emerging mechanisms necessary for the development of an intact faculty of folk psychology. Our aims (...)
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  21. Daniel C. Dennett (1994). Tiptoeing Past the Covered Wagons. In U. Neisser & David A. Jopling (eds.), The Conceptual Self in Context: Culture, Experience, Self-Understanding. Cambridge University Press.score: 300.0
    David Carr complains, in "Dennett Explained, or The Wheel Reinvents Dennett," (Report #26), that I have ignored deconstructionism and Phenomenology. This charge is in some regards correct and in others not. Briefly, here is how my own encounters with these fields have looked to me.
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  22. Shannon Densmore & Daniel C. Dennett (1999). The Virtues of Virtual Machines. Philosophy and Phenemenological Research 59 (3):747-61.score: 300.0
    Paul Churchland's book (hereafter ER)is an entertaining and instructive advertisement for a "neurocomputational" vision of how the brain (and mind) works. While we agree with its general thrust, and commend its lucid pedagogy on a host of difficult topics, we note that such pedagogy often exploits artificially heightened contrast, and sometimes the result is a misleading caricature instead of a helpful simplification. In particular, Churchland is eager to contrast the explanation of consciousness that can be accomplished by his "aspiring new (...)
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  23. Daniel C. Dennett, Who's On First?score: 300.0
    There is a pattern of miscommunication bedeviling the people working on consciousness that is reminiscent of the classic Abbott and CostelloWhos on First?’ routine. With (...)the best of intentions, people are talking past each other, seeing major disagreements when there are only terminological or tactical preferencesor even just matters of emphasisthat divide the sides. Since some substantive differences also lurk in this confusion, it is well worth trying to sort out. Much of the problem seems to have been caused by some misdirection in my apologia for heterophenomenology (Dennett, 1982; 1991), advertised as an explicitly third-person approach to human consciousness, so I will try to make amends by first removing those misleading signposts and sending us back to the real issues. On the face of it, the study of human consciousness involves phenomena that seem to occupy something rather like another dimension: the private, subjective, ‘first-persondimension. Everybody agrees that this is where we start. What, then, is the relation between the standardthird-personobjective methodologies for studying meteors or magnets (or human metabolism or bone density), and the methodologies for studying human consciousness? Can the standard methods be extended in such a way as to do justice to the phenomena of human consciousness? Or do we have to find some quite radical or revolutionary alternative science? I have defended the hypothesis that there is a straightforward, conservative extension of objective science that handsomely covers the groundall the groundof human consciousness, doing justice to all the data without ever having to abandon the rules and constraints of the experimental method that have worked so well in the rest of science. This third-person methodology, dubbed heterophenomenology (phenomenology of another not oneself), is, I have claimed, the sound way to take the first person point of view as seriously as it can be taken.. (shrink)
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  24. Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Surprise, Surprise. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):982-982.score: 300.0
    The authors show that some long-standing confusions and problems can be avoided by thinking of perception in terms of sensorimotor contingencies, a close kin to my heterophenomenological approach (Dennett 1991). However, their claim that subjects do not have any commitments about the resolution of their visual fields is belied by the surprise routinely expressed by subjects when this is demonstrated to them.
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  25. Daniel C. Dennett, Look Out for the Dirty Baby.score: 300.0
    Back and forth swings the pendulum. It is remarkable that Baars can claim that “many scientists now feel that radical behaviorists tossed out the baby with the bathwater” while not being able to see that his own efforts threaten to be an instance of the complementary overshooting–what we might call covering a nice clean baby with dualistic dirt . Yes indeed, radical behaviorism of Skinner’s variety fell from grace some years ago, with the so-called cognitive revolution, to be replaced by (...)
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  26. Daniel C. Dennett, Altruists, Chumps, and Inconstant Pluralists.score: 300.0
    Anybody interested in evolutionary explanations of social phenomena (and every philosopher should be) will learn a lot from Unto Others. In addition to its cornucopia of fascinating empirical findings from biology and psychology, it is chock full of arresting perspectives, ingenious thought experiments, and clear expositions of difficult-indeed, treacherous-concepts that should be in every philosopher's kit. What philosophers will not learn, however, is the status of group selection in current evolutionary theory, because while Sober and Wilson (hereafter S&W) strive intelligently (...)
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  27. Daniel C. Dennett, Review of Newell, Unified Theories of Cognition. [REVIEW]score: 300.0
    The time for unification in cognitive science has arrived, but who should lead the charge? The immunologist-turned-neuroscientist Gerald Edelman (1989, 1992) thinks that neuroscientists should lead--or more precisely that he should (he seems to have a low opinion of everyone else in cognitive science). Someone might think that I had made a symmetrically opposite claim in Consciousness Explained (Dennett, 1991): philosophers (or more precisely, those that agree with me!) are in the best position to see how to tie all (...)
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  28. Daniel Dennett & Christopher Viger, Is Hirsch or Wilson Confused? A Commentary on "The Pitfalls of Heritability ".score: 300.0
    In "The pitfalls of heritability," a review of Edward O. Wilson’s Consilience Times Literary Supplement, Feb 12, 1999, p33], Jerry Hirsch claims to have convicted Wilson of a "confusion about genetic similarity and difference." In his book, Wilson claims that if we assume that "a mere one thousand genes out of the fifty to a hundred thousand genes in the human genome were to exist in two forms in the population," the probability of any two humans--excluding identical siblings--having the same (...)
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  29. Daniel Dennett & Shannon Densmore (1999). The Virtues of Virtual Machines. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):747 - 761.score: 300.0
    Paul Churchland's book (hereafter ER)is an entertaining and instructive advertisement for a "neurocomputational" vision of how the brain (and mind) works. While we agree with its general thrust, and commend its lucid pedagogy on a host of difficult topics, we note that such pedagogy often exploits artificially heightened contrast, and sometimes the result is a misleading caricature instead of a helpful simplification. In particular, Churchland is eager to contrast the explanation of consciousness that can be accomplished by his "aspiring new (...)
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  30. Dan Sperber, Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett (2009). Culturally Transmitted Misbeliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):534.score: 300.0
    Most human beliefs are acquired through communication, and so are most misbeliefs. Just like the misbeliefs discussed by McKay & Dennett (M&D), culturally transmitted misbeliefs tend to result from limitations rather than malfunctions of the mechanisms that produce them, and few if any can be argued to be adaptations. However, the mechanisms involved, the contents, and the hypothetical adaptive value tend to be specific to the cultural case.
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  31. John Sutton, Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett (2009). Adaptive Misbeliefs and False Memories. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):535.score: 300.0
    McKay & Dennett (M&D) suggest that some positive illusions are adaptive. But there is a bidirectional link between memory and positive illusions: Biased autobiographical memories filter incoming information, and self-enhancing information is preferentially attended and used to update memory. Extending M&D's approach, I ask if certain false memories might be adaptive, defending a broad view of the psychosocial functions of remembering.
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  32. James R. Liddle, Todd K. Shackelford, Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett (2009). Are Beliefs the Proper Targets of Adaptationist Analyses? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):528.score: 300.0
    McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) description of beliefs, and misbeliefs in particular, is a commendable contribution to the literature; but we argue that referring to beliefs as adaptive or maladaptive can cause conceptual confusion. is inconsistently defined in the article, which adds to confusion and renders it difficult to evaluate the claims, particularly the possibility of.
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  33. Ara Norenzayan, Azim F. Shariff, Will M. Gervais, Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett (2009). The Evolution of Religious Misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):531.score: 300.0
    Inducing religious thoughts increases prosocial behavior among strangers in anonymous contexts. These effects can be explained both by behavioral priming processes as well as by reputational mechanisms. We examine whether belief in moralizing supernatural agents supplies a case for what McKay & Dennett (M&D) call evolved misbelief, concluding that they might be more persuasively seen as an example of culturally evolved misbelief.
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  34. C. Dennett Daniel (1995). Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why. Social Research 62 (3).score: 280.0
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  35. C. Dennett Daniel (2003). The Bright Stuff. Free Inquiry 23 (4).score: 280.0
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  36. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Real Patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.score: 240.0
    Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the (...)
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  37. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Quining Qualia. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    "Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. (...)
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  38. Daniel C. Dennett (1992). The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity. In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Lawrence Erlbaum. 4--237.score: 240.0
    What is a self? I will try to answer this question by developing an analogy with something much simpler, something which is nowhere near as puzzling as a self, but has some properties in common with selves. What I have in mind is the center of gravity of an object. This is a well-behaved concept in Newtonian physics. But a center of gravity is not an atom or a subatomic particle or any other physical item in the world. It has (...)
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  39. Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional Systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.score: 240.0
  40. Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.score: 240.0
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
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  41. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26.score: 240.0
    Knock-down refutations are rare in philosophy, and unambiguous self-refutations are even rarer, for obvious reasons, but sometimes we get lucky. Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge. Then, like cartoon characters, they hang there in mid-air, until they notice what they have done and gravity takes over. Just such a boon is the philosophers' concept of a zombie, a strangely attractive notion that sums up, in one leaden lump, almost everything that (...)
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  42. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). &Quot;epiphenomenal" Qualia? In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown. 127-136.score: 240.0
  43. Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Consciousness: How Much is That in Real Money? In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
  44. Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? Cognition 79 (1):221-37.score: 240.0
    Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of (...)
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  45. Daniel C. Dennett (2003). Explaining the "Magic" of Consciousness. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 1 (1):7-19.score: 240.0
    Is the view supported that consciousness is a mysterious phenomenon and cannot succumb, even with much effort, to the standard methods of cognitive science? The lecture, using the analogy of the magician’s praxis, attempts to highlight a strong but little supported intuition that is one of the strongest supporters of this view. The analogy can be highly illuminating, as the following account by LEE SIEGEL on the reception of her work on magic can illustrate it: “I’m writing a book on (...)
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  46. Daniel Dennett (2011). Intentional Systems Theory. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.score: 240.0
  47. Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Review of Searle, the Rediscovery of the Mind. [REVIEW] 90 (4):93-205.score: 240.0
    Everyone agrees that consciousness is a very special phenomenon, unique in several ways, but there is scant agreement on just how special it is, and whether or not an explanation of it can be accommodated within normal science. John Searle's view, defended with passion in this book, is highly idiosyncratic: what is special about consciousness is its "subjective ontology," but normal science can accommodate subjective ontology alongside (not within) its otherwise objective ontology. Once we clear away some widespread confusions about (...)
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  48. Daniel C. Dennett (2007). Philosophy as Naive Anthropology: Comment on Bennett and Hacker. In M. Bennett, D. C. Dennett, P. M. S. Hacker & J. R. & Searle (eds.), Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language. Columbia University Press.score: 240.0
    Bennett and Hacker’s _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_ (Blackwell, 2003), a collaboration between a philosopher (Hacker) and a neuroscientist (Bennett), is an ambitious attempt to reformulate the research agenda of cognitive neuroscience by demonstrating that cognitive scientists and other theorists, myself among them, have been bewitching each other by misusing language in a systematically “incoherent” and conceptually “confused” way. In both style and substance, the book harks back to Oxford in the early 1960's, when Ordinary Language Philosophy ruled, and Ryle and (...)
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  49. Daniel C. Dennett (1976). Are Dreams Experiences? Philosophical Review 73 (April):151-71.score: 240.0
  50. Daniel C. Dennett (1989). Murmurs in the Cathedral: Review of R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind. [REVIEW] Times Literary Supplement (September) 29.score: 240.0
    The idea that a computer could be conscious--or equivalently, that human consciousness is the effect of some complex computation mechanically performed by our brains--strikes some scientists and philosophers as a beautiful idea. They find it initially surprising and unsettling, as all beautiful ideas are, but the inevitable culmination of the scientific advances that have gradually demystified and unified the material world. The ideologues of Artificial Intelligence (AI) have been its most articulate supporters. To others, this idea is deeply repellent: philistine, (...)
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