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Profile: Daniel Cohnitz (University of Tartu)
  1. Daniel Cohnitz, Wann Ist Eine Definition von 'Kunst' Gut?
    n diesem Kapitel soll das Problem ›Was genstand dieses Kapitels. Wir werden sehen, ist Kunst?‹, wie es sich für die analytische dass sich diese Adäquatheitsbedingungen aus Kunstphilosophie stellt, erläutert und eine Reiunserer Auffassung von analytischer Philosohe von »Adäquatheitsbedingungen« für seine phie heraus begründen lassen. Dieses zweite möglichen Lösungen formuliert werden. Adä- Kapitel bereitet also gewissermaßen den theoquatheitsbedingungen sind dabei Anforderunretischen Boden für die Folgekapitel. gen, die wir an eine potentielle Problemlösung Wie aus der Charakterisierung der analystellen und die eine Bewertung (...)
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  2. Daniel Cohnitz, The Logic of Negative Conceivability.
    Analytic epistemology is traditionally interested in rational reconstructions of cognitive pro- cesses. The purpose of these rational reconstructions is to make plain how a certain cognitive process might eventually result in knowledge or justi?ed beliefs, etc., if we pre-theoretically think that we have such knowledge or such justi?ed beliefs. Typically a rational reconstruction assumes some (more or less) unproblematic basis of knowledge and some justi?cation-preserving inference pattern and then goes on to show how these two su ce to generate the (...)
     
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  3. Daniel Cohnitz, What is Wrong with Arguments From Reference?
    Sometimes philosophers draw philosophically significant conclusions from theories of references. This practice has been attacked [Sti96, BS98, Bis03, MMNS] for two different reasons. One line of attack against arguments from reference tries to show that they are invalid, the other attempts to show that empirical results from social psychology undermine all such arguments. In this paper I show that this criticism of arguments from reference is misplaced. There is nothing wrong in principle with arguments from reference.
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  4. Daniel Cohnitz & Teresa Marques (2014). Disagreements. Erkenntnis 79 (1):1-10.
    This special issue of Erkenntnis is devoted to the varieties of disagreement that arise in different areas of discourse, and the consequences we should draw from these disagreements, either concerning the subject matter and its objectivity, or concerning our own views about this subject matter if we learn, for example, that an epistemic peer disagrees with our view. In this introduction we sketch the background to the recent philosophical discussions of these questions, and the location occupied therein by the articles (...)
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  5. Daniel Cohnitz, Peter Pagin & Marcus Rossberg (2014). Monism, Pluralism and Relativism: New Essays on the Status of Logic. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 79 (2):201-210.
  6. Manuel Bremer & Daniel Cohnitz (2013). Saint Vitus Dance. In William Irwin (ed.), Black Sabbath and Philosophy: Mastering Reality. Wiley. 87--95.
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  7. Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja (2013). Meta-Externalism Vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500.
    We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta- internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation.
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  8. Daniel Cohnitz & Jaan Kangilaski (2013). Understanding a Sentence Does Not Entail Knowing its Truth‐Conditions: Why the Epistemological Determination Argument Fails. Dialectica 67 (2):223-242.
    The determination argument is supposed to show that a sentence's meaning is at least a truth-condition. This argument is supposed to rest on innocent premises that even a deflationist about truth can accept. The argument comes in two versions: one is metaphysical and the other is epistemological. In this paper we will focus on the epistemological version. We will argue that the apparently innocent first premise of that version of the argument is not as innocent as it seems. If the (...)
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  9. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). In Defence of Antecedent Physicalism. In A. Newen & R. van Riel (eds.), Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry. CSLI.
  10. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). Philosophy Without Intuitions, by Herman Cappelen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 242 Pp. [REVIEW] Disputatio (33):546-553.
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  11. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). Thought Experiments Outside Science. [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (online first):1-5.
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  12. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge. In Greg Restall & Gillian Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic. MacMillan.
  13. Daniel Cohnitz (2009). Logical Consequence for Nominalists. Theoria 24 (2):147-168.
    It has repeatedly been argued that nominalistic programmes in the philosophy of mathematics fail, since they will at some point or other involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we will argue that this is not the case. Using an idea of Nelson Goodman andW.V. Quine’s which they developed in Goodman and Quine (1947) and supplementing it with means that should be nominalistically acceptable, we present a way to explicate logical consequence in (...)
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  14. Daniel Cohnitz (2009). The Unity of Goodman's Thought. In G. Ernst, J. Steinbrenner & O. Scholz (eds.), From Logic to Art: Themes from Nelson Goodman. Ontos. 7--33.
    I argue that Goodman’s philosophy should not be characterised in opposition to the philosophy of the logical empiricists, but is more fruitfully interpreted as a continuation of their philosophical programme. In particular, understanding Goodman’s philosophy as a continuation of the ideal language tradition makes explicable how a radical ontological relativist could be such a staunch nominalist at the same time.
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  15. Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist (2009). The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):1-14.
    As we write this, philosophers all over the world are in a state of temporary, collective self-scrutiny. Tey are poring over the results of the PhilPapers Survey, conducted by David Chalmers and David Bourgeta grand-scale survey of the professions views on 30 major philosophical issues, ranging from aesthetic value to zombies. More than 3000 people have responded, andmanymore are currently absorbing and analyzing the results.
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  16. Daniel Cohnitz, Sören Häggqvist, Kristoffer Ahlstrom, Joshua Earlenbough, Bernard Molyneaux, Mark Fedyk, Jussi Haukioja, Jonathan Ichikawa & Sebastian Lutz (2009). The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2.
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  17. Marcus Rossberg & Daniel Cohnitz (2009). Logical Consequence for Nominalists. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 24 (2):147-168.
    It is often claimed that nominalistic programmes to reconstruct mathematics fail, since they will at some point involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we use an idea of Goodman and Quine to develop a nominalistically acceptable explication of logical consequence.
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  18. Daniel Cohnitz (2008). Daniel Ørsteds "Gedankenexperiment": eine Kantianische Fundierung der Infinitesimalrechnung? Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte von "Gedankenexperiment" und zur Mathematikgeschichte des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts. Kant-Studien 99 (4):407-433.
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  19. Daniel Cohnitz (2008). Ørsteds „Gedankenexperiment“: eine Kantianische Fundierung der Infinitesimalrechnung? Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte von ‚Gedankenexperiment' und zur Mathematikgeschichte des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts. Kant-Studien 99 (4):407-433.
  20. Daniel Cohnitz (2007). Science (of) Fiction: Zur Zukunft des Gedankenexperiments in der Philosophie des Geistes. In P. Spät (ed.), Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Mentis.
    Egal was der heutige Tag auch bringen mag, der 1. April 2063 wird zumindest als der Tag in die Geschichte des Wissenschaftsjournalismus eingehen, der die bisher aufwändigste Berichterstattung erfahren hat. So viele Kamerateams, wie hier vor den Toren der Australian National University in Canberra, hat bisher kein wissenschaftliches Experiment anziehen können. Selbst der Knüller des Vorjahres, als es einer 48jährigen Hausfrau in einem Vorort von London gelang, mit einfachsten Küchenutensilien einen kleinen Kalte-Fusion-Reaktor herzustellen, der den Staubsauger und die Mikrowelle zuverlässig (...)
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  21. Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist (2007). Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie. In M. Staschok (ed.), Abstrakt - Exakt - Obskur: Philosophische Gedankenexperimente & Kunst. Logos.
    Sie halten gerade ein Buch in Ihren H¨anden. Vielleicht liegt es auch auf dem Tisch vor Ihnen, w¨ahrend Sie diese Worte lesen. Aber woher wissen Sie, dass Sie ein Buch vor sich haben? Nun, Sie sehen es nat¨urlich mit eigenen Augen. Vermutlich f¨uhlen Sie auch das Gewicht des Buches, das gegen Ihre Haut dr¨uckt, w¨ahrend sie es in H¨anden halten, und h¨oren das Rascheln der Seiten, wenn Sie umbl¨attern. Dar¨uber hinaus sind Sie wach und (so vermuten wir mal) einigermaßen n¨uchtern, (...)
     
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  22. Daniel Cohnitz (2006). Discussions. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 37 (2):373-392.
    In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that (...)
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  23. Daniel Cohnitz (2006). Poor Thought Experiments? A Comment on Peijnenburg and Atkinson. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):373 - 392.
    In their paper, 'When are thought experiments poor ones?' (Peijnenburg and Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are "poor" ones with "disastrous consequences" and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the (...)
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  24. Daniel Cohnitz & Marcus Rossberg (2006). Nelson Goodman. Acumen.
    (R. Schwartz, “In Memoriam Nelson Goodman (August 7, 1906—November 25, 1998)", Erkenntnis 50 (1999), 7410, esp. 8) . With Goodman's car, Quine took almost all of his students from his seminar on Carnap's Logische Syntax to Baltimore.
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  25. Daniel Cohnitz (2005). Is Compositionality an a Priori Principle? In M. Wening, E. Machery & G. Schurz (eds.), The Compositionality of Concepts and Meanings: Foundational Issues. Ontos.
    When reasons are given for compositionality, the arguments usually purport to establish compositionality in an almost a priori manner. I will rehearse these arguments why one could think that compositionality is a priori true, or almost a priori true, and will find all of them inconclusive. This, in itself, is no reason against compositionality, but a reason to try to establish or defend the principle on other than quasi-a priori grounds.
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  26. Manuel Bremer & Daniel Cohnitz (2004). Information and Information Flow. Ontos Verlag.
    This book is conceived as an introductory text into the theory of syntactic and semantic information, and information flow.
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  27. Daniel Cohnitz (2004). Why Consistentism Won’T Work. In E. Weber & T. DeMey (eds.), Modal Epistemology. Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgie vor Wetenschappen en Kunsten.
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  28. Michael Anacker, Marc Breuer & Daniel Cohnitz (2003). BIBLIOGRAPHY. Zeitschriftenschau. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 34 (1):371-405.
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  29. Daniel Cohnitz (2003). Modal Skepticism: Philosophical Thought Experiments and Modal Epistemology. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 10.
     
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  30. Daniel Cohnitz (2003). Personal Identity and the Methodology of Imaginary Cases. In Klaus Petrus (ed.), Human Persons. Ontos.
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  31. Daniel Cohnitz (2003). Two-Dimensionalism and the Metaphysical Possibility of Zombies. In B. Löwe, W. Malzkorn & T. Räsch (eds.), Foundations of The Formal Sciences II. Applications of Mathematical Logic in Philosophy and Linguistics [Trends in Logic]. Kluwer. 55--62.
  32. Daniel Cohnitz & Barry Smith (2003). Assessing Ontologies: The Question of Human Origins and Its Ethical Significance. In E. Runggaldier & C. Kanzian (eds.), Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach. öbv&hpt.
    In their paper “Sixteen Days” Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard try to answer the question: when does a human being begin to exist? In this paper we will address some methodological issues connected with this exercise in ontology. We shall begin by sketching the argument of “Sixteen Days”. We shall then attempt to characterize what is special about the ontological realism of “Sixteen Days” as contrasted to the linguistic constructivism which represents the more dominant current in contemporary analytic philosophy. This (...)
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  33. Daniel Cohnitz, Explanations Are Like Salted Peanuts. Why You Can't Cut the Route Toward Further Reduction.
    This paper is a defense of an elaborated ideal explanatory text conception against criticism as put forward by Bob Batterman. It is argued that Batterman's critique of "philosophical" accounts of scientific explanation is inadequate.
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  34. Daniel Cohnitz (2002). Explanations Are Like Salted Peanuts. In A. Beckermann & C. Nimtz (eds.), Argument und Analyse: Proceedings of GAP4. Mentis.
    Take a look at these four situations: Figure 1 All of these situations have certain features in common: in all of them an explanation is asked for, in all of them an explanation is given, and all these explanations are literally false (although in different ways).
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  35. Michael Anacker, Daniel Cohnitz, Michael Flacke & Ralf Goeres (2001). Bibliography Zeitschriftenschau. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 32 (2):371-405.
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  36. Daniel Cohnitz, Poor Thought Experiments?
    In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and Atkinson 2003), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in (...)
     
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