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  1. Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
    This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will.
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  2.  29
    Daniel C. Dennett (ed.) (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Bradford Books.
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  3.  9
    Daniel C. Dennett (2014). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.
    _Content and Consciousness_ is an original and ground-breaking attempt to elucidate a problem integral to the history of Western philosophical thought: the relationship of the mind and body. In this formative work, Dennett sought to develop a theory of the human mind and consciousness based on new and challenging advances in the field that came to be known as cognitive science. This important and illuminating work is widely-regarded as the book from which all of Dennett’s future ideas developed. It is (...)
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  4. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Consciousness Explained. Penguin.
    Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.
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  5. Daniel C. Dennett (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  6. Daniel Clement Dennett (2003). Freedom Evolves. Viking.
    Daniel C. Dennett is a brilliant polemicist, famous for challenging unexamined orthodoxies. Over the last thirty years, he has played a major role in expanding our understanding of consciousness, developmental psychology, and evolutionary theory. And with such groundbreaking, critically acclaimed books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize finalist), he has reached a huge general and professional audience. In this new book, Dennett shows that evolution is the key to resolving the ancient problems (...)
     
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  7. Daniel C. Dennett (1968/1986). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.
  8. Daniel C. Dennett (1984). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. MIT Press.
    Essays discuss reason, self-control, self-definition, time, cause and effect, accidents, and responsibility, and explain why people want free will.
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  9. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Real Patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
    Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the (...)
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  10. Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Escape From the Cartesian Theater. Reply to Commentaries on Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183-247.
    Damasio remarks, it "informs virtually all research on mind and brain, explicitly or implicitly." Indeed, serial information processing models generally run this risk (Kinsbourne, 1985). The commentaries provide a wealth of confirming instances of the seductive power of this idea. Our sternest critics Block, Farah, Libet, and Treisman) adopt fairly standard Cartesian positions; more interesting are those commentators who take themselves to be mainly in agreement with us, but who express reservations or offer support with arguments that betray a continuing (...)
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  11.  17
    Daniel C. Dennett (1983). Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
    Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable data - is sketched. The (...)
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  12. Daniel C. Dennett (1976). Conditions of Personhood. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press
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  13.  18
    Daniel C. Dennett & Jon Hodge (1997). Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):435-438.
  14.  4
    Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Darwin's Dangerous Idea. Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):169-174.
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  15. Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett (2011). Consciousness Cannot Be Separated From Function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
    Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
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  16.  41
    Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Kinds of Minds. Basic Books.
  17. Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional Systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  18. Daniel C. Dennett (2005). Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in ...
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  19.  29
    Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett (2009). The Evolution of Misbelief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493.
    From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in (...)
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  20.  9
    Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle & Daniel N. Robinson (2007). Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language. Columbia University Press.
    In _Neuroscience and Philosophy_ three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_, which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond. Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of (...)
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  21.  21
    Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Beliefs About Beliefs [P&W, SR&B]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):568.
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  22.  67
    Daniel C. Dennett, Who's On First?
    There is a pattern of miscommunication bedeviling the people working on consciousness that is reminiscent of the classic Abbott and Costello ‘ Who ’ s on First?’ routine. With the best of intentions, people are talking past each other, seeing major disagreements when there are only terminological or tactical preferences — or even just matters of emphasis — that divide the sides. Since some substantive differences also lurk in this confusion, it is well worth trying to sort out. Much of (...)
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  23. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Vs Folk Science and Belief Vs Opinion. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press 135--148.
    Let us begin with what all of us here agree on: folk psychology is not immune to revision. It has a certain vulnerability in principle. Any particular part of it might be overthrown and replaced by some other doctrine. Yet we disagree about how likely it is that that vulnerability in principle will turn into the actual demise of large portions--or all--of folk psychology. I am of the view that folk psychology is here for the long haul, and for some (...)
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  24.  91
    Daniel C. Dennett (1982). How to Study Human Consciousness Empirically, or, Nothing Comes to Mind. Synthese 53 (2):159-80.
  25.  64
    Daniel C. Dennett (1998). Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds. Cambridge: MIT Press.
    This book brings together his essays on the philosphy of mind, artificial intelligence, and cognitive ethology that appeared in inaccessible journals from 1984...
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  26. Daniel C. Dennett (1984). Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI. In C. Hookway (ed.), Minds, Machines and Evolution. Cambridge University Press
     
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  27. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Quining Qualia. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press
    " Qualia " is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the (...)
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  28. Daniel C. Dennett (1986). The Logical Geography of Computational Approaches: A View From the East Pole. In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press
  29. Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? Cognition 79 (1):221-37.
    Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of (...)
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  30.  14
    Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Why Not the Whole Iguana? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (1):103.
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  31. Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
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  32.  7
    Matthew M. Hurley, Daniel C. Dennett & Reginald B. Adams (2011). Inside Jokes: Using Humor to Reverse-Engineer the Mind. The MIT Press.
    Why do we spend so much of our time passing on amusing anecdotes, making wisecracks,watching The Simpsons? In Inside Jokes, Matthew Hurley, DanielDennett, and Reginald Adams offer an evolutionary and cognitive perspective.
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  33. Daniel C. Dennett (1981). True Believers : The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works. In A. F. Heath (ed.), Scientific Explanation: Papers Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford. Clarendon 150--167.
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  34. Daniel C. Dennett (1986). Julian Jaynes' Software Archaeology. Canadian Psychology 27:149-54.
  35. Daniel C. Dennett (1992). The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity. In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Lawrence Erlbaum 4--237.
    What is a self? I will try to answer this question by developing an analogy with something much simpler, something which is nowhere near as puzzling as a self, but has some properties in common with selves. What I have in mind is the center of gravity of an object. This is a well-behaved concept in Newtonian physics. But a center of gravity is not an atom or a subatomic particle or any other physical item in the world. It has (...)
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  36. Daniel C. Dennett & Alvin Plantinga (2011). Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? OUP Usa.
    An enlightening discussion that will motivate students to think critically, the book opens with Plantinga's assertion that Christianity is compatible with evolutionary theory because Christians believe that God created the living world, and it is entirely possible that God did so by using a process of evolution.
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  37. Daniel C. Dennett (1995). The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):322-26.
    Knock-down refutations are rare in philosophy, and unambiguous self-refutations are even rarer, for obvious reasons, but sometimes we get lucky. Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge. Then, like cartoon characters, they hang there in mid-air, until they notice what they have done and gravity takes over. Just such a boon is the philosophers' concept of a zombie, a strangely attractive notion that sums up, in one leaden lump, almost everything that (...)
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  38.  1
    Daniel Dennett (1988). Why Creative Intelligence is Hard to Find. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):253.
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  39. Daniel C. Dennett (1976). Are Dreams Experiences? Philosophical Review 73 (April):151-71.
  40.  10
    Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Learning and Labeling. Mind and Language 8 (4):540-548.
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  41.  10
    Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Escape From the Cartesian Theater. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):234-247.
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  42. Daniel Dennett (2011). Intentional Systems Theory. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
  43. Daniel C. Dennett (2007). Heterophenomenology Reconsidered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):247-270.
    Descartes’ Method of Radical Doubt was not radical enough. –A. Marcel (2003, 181) In short, heterophenomenology is nothing new; it is nothing other than the method that has been used by psychophysicists, cognitive psychologists, clinical neuropsychologists, and just about everybody who has ever purported to study human consciousness in a serious, scientific way. –D. Dennett (2003, 22).
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  44. Daniel C. Dennett (1990). The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50:177-194.
    I want to explore four different exercises of interpretation: (1) the interpretation of texts (or hermeneutics), (2) the interpretation of people (otherwise known as "attribution" psychology, or cognitive or intentional psychology), (3) the interpretation of other artifacts (which I shall call artifact hermeneutics), (4) the interpretation of organism design in evolutionary biology--the controversial interpretive activity known as adaptationism.
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  45. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Evolution, Error and Intentionality. In The Intentional Stance. MIT Press
    Sometimes it takes years of debate for philosophers to discover what it is they really disagree about. Sometimes they talk past each other in long series of books and articles, never guessing at the root disagreement that divides them. But occasionally a day comes when something happens to coax the cat out of the bag. "Aha!" one philosopher exclaims to another, "so that's why you've been disagreeing with me, misunderstanding me, resisting my conclusions, puzzling me all these years!".
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  46. Daniel C. Dennett (2002). How Could I Be Wrong? How Wrong Could I Be? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):13-16.
    One of the striking, even amusing, spectacles to be enjoyed at the many workshops and conferences on consciousness these days is the breathtaking overconfidence with which laypeople hold forth about the nature of consciousness Btheir own in particular, but everybody =s by extrapolation. Everybody =s an expert on consciousness, it seems, and it doesn =t take any knowledge of experimental findings to secure the home truths these people enunciate with such conviction.
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  47.  34
    Daniel C. Dennett (1981). Making Sense of Ourselves. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):63-81.
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  48. Daniel C. Dennett (2007). Atheism and Evolution. In Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 135--148.
  49. Daniel C. Dennett (2003). Who's on First? Heterophenomenology Explained. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9):19-30.
    There is a pattern of miscommunication bedeviling the people working on consciousness that is reminiscent of the classic Abbott and Costello 'Who's on First?' routine. With the best of intentions, people are talking past each other, seeing major disagreements when there are only terminological or tactical preferences -- or even just matters of emphasis -- that divide the sides. Since some substantive differences also lurk in this confusion, it is well worth trying to sort out. Much of the problem seems (...)
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  50. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). "Epiphenomenal" Qualia? In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's something about Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. Little, Brown 127-136.
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