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Daniel Gilman [8]Daniel J. Gilman [3]
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Profile: Daniel Gilman
  1. Daniel Gilman (1999). Network Stability and Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):155-156.
    A connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness needs to disambiguate its criteria for identifying the relevant vehicles. Moreover, a vehicle theory may appear entirely arbitrary in sorting between what are typically thought of as conscious and unconscious processes.
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  2. Daniel Gilman (1997). Consciousness and Mental Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):150-151.
    Block (1995t) has argued for a noncognitive and non- representational notion of phenomenal consciousness, but his putative examples of this phenomenon are conspicuous in their representational and functional properties while they do not clearly possess other phenomenal properties.
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  3. Daniel Gilman (1996). Optimization and Simplicity: Computational Vision and Biological Explanation. Synthese 107 (3):293 - 323.
    David Marr's theory of vision has been a rich source of inspiration, fascination and confusion. I will suggest that some of this confusion can be traced to discrepancies between the way Marr developed his theory in practice and the way he suggested such a theory ought to be developed in his explicit metatheoretical remarks. I will address claims that Marr's theory may be seen as an optimizing theory, along with the attendant suggestion that optimizing assumptions may be inappropriate for cognitive (...)
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  4. Daniel Gilman (1994). Pictures in Cognition. Erkenntnis 41 (1):87 - 102.
  5. Daniel Gilman (1994). Simplicity, Cognition and Adaptation: Some Remarks on Marr's Theory of Vision. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:454 - 464.
    A large body of research in computational vision science stems from the pioneering work of David Marr. Recently, Patricia Kitcher and others have criticized this work as depending upon optimizing assumptions, assumptions which are held to be inappropriate for evolved cognitive mechanisms just as anti-adaptationists (e.g., Lewontin and Gould) have argued they are inappropriate for other evolved physiological mechanisms. The paper discusses the criticism and suggests that it is, in part, misdirected. It is further suggested that the criticism leads to (...)
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  6. Daniel J. Gilman (1993). Optimization and Simplicity: Marr's Theory of Vision and Biological Explanation. Synthese 107 (3):293-323.
     
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  7. Daniel Gilman (1992). A New Perspective on Pictorial Representation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (2):174 – 186.
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  8. Daniel Gilman (1992). What's a Theory to Do... With Seeing? Or Some Empirical Considerations for Observation and Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):287-309.
    it to be an empirical fact that even the most basic human perception is heavily theory–laden. I offer critical examination of experimental evidence cited by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Churchland on behalf of this supposition. I argue that the empirical evidence cited is inadequate support for the claims in question. I further argue that we have empirical grounds for claiming that the Kuhnian discussion of perception is developed within an inadequate conceptual framework and that a version of the observation/theory distinction (...)
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  9. Daniel J. Gilman (1991). The Neurobiology of Observation. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):496-502.
    Paul Churchland has recently argued that empirical evidence strongly suggests that perception is penetrable to the beliefs or theories held by individual perceivers (1988). While there has been much discussion of the sorts of psychological cases he presents, little has been said about his arguments from neurology. I offer a critical examination of his claim that certain efferents in the brain are evidence against perceptual encapsulation. I argue that his neurological evidence is inadequate to his philosophical goals, both by itself (...)
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  10. Daniel Gilman (1990). Observation: An Empirical Discussion. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:355 - 364.
    Various claims for theory-laden perception have involved empirical as well as conceptual considerations. Thomas Kuhn cites New Look psychological research in discussing the role of a paradigm in perception (1970) and Paul Churchland (1988) appeals to biological evidence, as well as New Look sources similar to Kuhn's. This paper offers a critical examination of the empirical evidence cited by Kuhn and Churchland, including a look at the underlying experimental work. It also offers a comment on the application of such evidence (...)
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  11. Daniel J. Gilman (1988). Lines of Sight.
     
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