7 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Daniel Guevara [7]Daniel Edward Guevara [1]
See also:
Profile: Daniela Guevara (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)
  1. Daniel Guevara (2011). The Role of Intuition in Some Ethically Hard Cases. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):149 - 167.
    Among the hardest cases in the ethics of killing are those in which one innocent person poses a lethal threat to another. I argue in favour of the intuition that lethal self-defence is permissible in these cases, despite the difficulties that some philosophers (e.g., Otsuka and McMahan) have raised about it. Philosophers writing in this area?including those sympathetic to the intuition (e.g. Thomson and Kamm)?have downplayed or ignored an essential and authoritative role for intuition per se (as against discursive general (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Daniel Guevara (2009). Kant and the Power of Imagination (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (4):pp. 629-630.
    Kant and the Power of the Imagination discusses some neglected literature from the early German Romantic period—one major text that Kneller discusses was not published until the manuscript, lost for decades, resurfaced at an auction in New York in the 1960s. Kneller argues that this unduly neglected literature makes a productive and illuminating contribution to Kant’s program in the three Critiques. More particularly, she argues that it contributes to our understanding of the true philosophical potential of the role of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Daniel Guevara (2009). The Will as Practical Reason and the Problem of Akrasia. Review of Metaphysics 62 (3):525-550.
    This article argues for the possibility of aggressive akrasia, or the akrasia rooted in “unqualified knowingness.” The aggressive akratic acts knowledgeably and voluntarily for a bad end. Many philosophers reject the very possibility of aggressive akrasia given a prior commitment to closely identifying the will with practical reason, thereby effectively dismissing the possibility of an agent’s full responsibility for a morally evil act. Hence, these philosophers try to explain akrasia by challenging the voluntariness of the akratic’s action, or his knowledge, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Daniel Guevara (2008). Rebutting Formally Valid Counterexamples to the Humean “is-Ought” Dictum. Synthese 164 (1):45-60.
    Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples. But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive about (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Daniel Guevara (2000). Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Daniel Guevara (1999). The Impossibility of Supererogation in Kant's Moral Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):593 - 624.
    It is common to think that certain acts are supererogatory, especially certain heroic or saintly self-sacrifices for the good. The idea seems to have an ordinary and clear application. Nothing shows this better than the well-known cases which J. O. Urmson adduced. Urmson argued that no major moral theory could give a proper account of the supererogatory character of such acts, and that therefore none could account for "all the facts of morality," as he put it. But his arguments were (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Daniel Guevara (1997). The Two Standpoints on the Will. Kantian Review 1 (1):82-114.
    Kant argues that we must regard the will from two mutually exclusive standpoints. One is the natural standpoint, according to which the will is determined entirely by natural causes in conformity with natural law. The other is the standpoint of freedom, according to which the will transcends the laws of nature and is free to determine itself in conformity with its own law. Kant's idea is that a complete account of the will necessarily involves both standpoints, shifting between the two. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation