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Profile: Daniel Halliday (Stanford University)
Profile: Daniel Halliday (University of Melbourne)
  1. Daniel Halliday (forthcoming). The Ethics of a Smoking Licence. Journal of Medical Ethics.
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  2. Daniel Halliday (2013). Holism About Value: Some Help for Invariabilists. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046.
    G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity holds that the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. Moore combined this principle with invariabilism about intrinsic value: An item’s intrinsic value depends solely on its bearer’s intrinsic properties, not on which wholes it has membership of. It is often said that invariabilism ought to be rejected in favour of what might be called ‘conditionalism’ about intrinsic value. This paper is an attempt to (...)
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  3. Daniel Halliday (2013). Is Inheritance Morally Distinctive? Law and Philosophy 32 (5):619-644.
    This paper examines a rarely-discussed argument for the right to bequeath wealth. This argument, popular among libertarians, asserts that opposition to the practice of inheritance is prone to over-generalize, such that opponents of inheritance cannot avoid condemning other uses of private property, like gift-giving. The argument is motivated by an interesting methodological claim, namely, that the morality of bequest ought to be evaluated from the perspective of the donor, and not evaluated in ways that invoke the effects of bequest on (...)
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  4. Daniel Halliday (2013). Justice and Taxation. Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1111-1122.
    This article provides a survey of various topics in which questions about taxation feature alongside questions about justice. It seeks to argue mainly that taxation is a rather fragmentary domain of inquiry about which it is hard to envisage the development of views about what justice requires with respect to tax policy in general. Guided by this idea, the article attempts to highlight some aspects of taxation whose connection with justice has been under-explored by philosophers, as well as to acquaint (...)
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  5. Daniel Halliday (2013). Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Pp. Ix + 208. [REVIEW] Utilitas 25 (1):121-132.
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  6. Daniel Halliday (2011). Book Review: Jonathan Wolff, 'Ethics and Public Policy: A Philosophical Inquiry'. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2011.12.16).
  7. Daniel Halliday (2007). Contextualism, Comparatives and Gradability. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):381 - 393.
    Contextualists about knowledge ascriptions perceive an analogy between the semantics they posit for “know(s)” and the semantics of comparative terms like “tall” and “flat”. Jason Stanley has recently raised a number of objections to this view. This paper offers a response by way of an alternative analogy with modified comparatives, which resolves most of Stanley’s objections. Rather than being ad hoc, this new analogy in fact fits better with platitudes about knowledge and facilitates a better understanding of the semantics of (...)
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  8. Daniel Halliday (2005). What Explains Our Intuitions About Knowledge Ascriptions? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):393–402.
    Epistemological contextualism is often defended by appealing to the context sensitivity of our intuitions about knowledge ascriptions. A popular invariantist response is to explain this feature by an appeal to pragmatic implicature. In this paper I argue that this rejoinder faces a hitherto underestimated problem relating to the fact that such supposed implicatures do not appear cancellable, contrary to what we should expect. I defend contextualism by demonstrating that the current invariantist explanation of this lack of cancellability is unsuccessful, owing (...)
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