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  1. Lauren Bryant, Anna Coffey, Daniel J. Povinelli & John R. Pruett Jr (2013). Theory of Mind Experience Sampling in Typical Adults. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):697-707.
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  2. Shaun Gallagher & Daniel J. Povinelli (2012). Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and Adults. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):145-169.
    We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.
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  3. Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2012). So, Are We the Massively Lucky Species? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):236-237.
    We are in vehement agreement with most of Vaesen's key claims. But Vaesen fails to consider or rebut the possibility that there are deep causal dependencies among the various cognitive traits he identifies as uniquely human. We argue that is one such linchpin trait in the evolution of human tool use, social intelligence, language, and culture.
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  4. Jennier Vonk & Daniel J. Povinelli (2011). Social and Physical Reasoning in Human-Reared Chimpanzees : Preliminary Studies. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
     
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  5. Derek C. Penn, Patricia W. Cheng, Keith J. Holyoak, John E. Hummel & Daniel J. Povinelli (2009). There is More to Thinking Than Propositions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):221-223.
    We are big fans of propositions. But we are not big fans of the proposed by Mitchell et al. The authors ignore the critical role played by implicit, non-inferential processes in biological cognition, overestimate the work that propositions alone can do, and gloss over substantial differences in how different kinds of animals and different kinds of cognitive processes approximate propositional representations.
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  6. Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2009). Universal Grammar and Mental Continuity: Two Modern Myths. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (5):462-464.
    In our opinion, the discontinuity between extant human and nonhuman minds is much broader and deeper than most researchers admit. We are happy to report that Evans & Levinson's (E&L's) target article strongly corroborates our unpopular hypothesis, and that the comparative evidence, in turn, bolsters E&L's provocative argument. Both a Universal Grammar and the between human and nonhuman minds turn out to be modern myths.
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  7. Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2008). Darwin's Mistake: Explaining the Discontinuity Between Human and Nonhuman Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):109-130.
    Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate (...)
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  8. Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2008). Darwin's Triumph: Explaining the Uniqueness of the Human Mind Without a Deus Ex Machina. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):153-178.
    In our target article, we argued that there is a profound functional discontinuity between the cognitive abilities of modern humans and those of all other extant species. Unsurprisingly, our hypothesis elicited a wide range of responses from commentators. After responding to the commentaries, we conclude that our hypothesis lies closer to Darwin's views on the matter than to those of many of our contemporaries.
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  9. Derek C. Penn & Daniel J. Povinelli (2007). On the Lack of Evidence That Non-Human Animals Possess Anything Remotely Resembling a 'Theory of Mind'. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):731-744.
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  10. Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk (2006). We Don't Need a Microscope to Explore the Chimpanzee's Mind. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press. 1-28.
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  11. Daniel J. Povinelli & Jochen Barth (2005). Reinterpreting Behavior: A Human Specialization? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):712-713.
    Tomasello et al. argue that the “small difference that made a big difference” in the evolution of the human mind was the disposition to share intentions. Chimpanzees are said to understand certain mental states (like intentions), but not share them. We argue that an alternative model is better supported by the data: the capacity to represent mental states (and other unobservable phenomena) is a human specialization that co-evolved with natural language.
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  12. Daniel J. Povinelli, Christopher G. Prince & Todd M. Preuss (2005). Parent-Offspring Conflict and the Development of Social Understanding. In Peter Carruthers (ed.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 239--253.
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  13. Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk (2004). We Don't Need a Microscope to Explore the Chimpanzee's Mind. Mind and Language 19 (1):1-28.
    The question of whether chimpanzees, like humans, reason about unobservable mental states remains highly controversial. On one account, chimpanzees are seen as possessing a psychological system for social cognition that represents and reasons about behaviors alone. A competing account allows that the chimpanzee's social cognition system additionally construes the behaviors it represents in terms of mental states. Because the range of behaviors that each of the two systems can generate is not currently known, and because the latter system depends upon (...)
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  14. Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk (2003). Chimpanzee Minds: Suspiciously Human? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):157-160.
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  15. Daniel J. Povinelli (2001). On the Possibilities of Detecting Intentions Prior to Understanding Them. In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. Mit Press. 225--248.
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  16. Daniel J. Povinelli (2001). The Self: Elevated in Consciousness and Extended in Time. In Chris Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum. 75-95.
  17. Daniel J. Povinelli (2000). Folk Physics for Apes: The Chimpanzee's Theory of How the World Works. Oxford University Press.
    From an early age, humans know a surprising amount about basic physical principles, such as gravity, force, mass, and shape. We can see this in the way that young children play, and manipulate objects around them. The same behaviour has long been observed in primates - chimpanzees have been shown to possess a remarkable ability to make and use simple tools. But what does this tell us about their inner mental state - do they therefore share the same understanding to (...)
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  18. Daniel J. Povinelli & Steve Giambrone (2000). Inferring Other Minds: Failure of the Argument by Analogy. Philosophical Topics 27 (1):167-202.
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  19. Daniel J. Povinelli (1998). Are Animals Self-Aware? Maybe Not. Scientific American.
     
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  20. Daniel J. Povinelli (1997). Panmorphism. In R. Mitchell, Nicholas S. Thompson & H. L. Miles (eds.), Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. Suny Press. 92--103.
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  21. Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince (1996). Ontogeny, Evolution, and Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137.
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  22. Daniel J. Povinelli & Laurie R. Godfrey (1993). The Chimpanzee's Mind: How Noble in Reason? How Absent of Ethics. In Matthew Nitecki & Doris Nitecki (eds.), Evolutionary Ethics. Suny Press. 227--324.
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  23. Daniel J. Povinelli & Sandra deBlois (1992). On (Not) Attributing Mental States to Monkeys: First, Know Thyself. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):164-166.
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  24. Daniel J. Povinelli (1987). Monkeys, Apes, Mirrors, Minds: The Evolution of Self-Awareness in Primates. Human Evolution 2:493-507.