26 found
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  1. Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2008). Darwin's Mistake: Explaining the Discontinuity Between Human and Nonhuman Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):109-130.
    Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate (...)
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  2.  23
    Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk (2003). Chimpanzee Minds: Suspiciously Human? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):157-160.
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  3. Daniel J. Povinelli (2000). Folk Physics for Apes: The Chimpanzee's Theory of How the World Works. Oxford University Press.
    From an early age, humans know a surprising amount about basic physical principles, such as gravity, force, mass, and shape. We can see this in the way that young children play, and manipulate objects around them. The same behaviour has long been observed in primates - chimpanzees have been shown to possess a remarkable ability to make and use simple tools. But what does this tell us about their inner mental state - do they therefore share the same understanding to (...)
     
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  4. Derek C. Penn & Daniel J. Povinelli (2007). On the Lack of Evidence That Non-Human Animals Possess Anything Remotely Resembling a 'Theory of Mind'. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):731-744.
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  5.  58
    Shaun Gallagher & Daniel J. Povinelli (2012). Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and Adults. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):145-169.
    We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.
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  6.  64
    Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk (2006). We Don't Need a Microscope to Explore the Chimpanzee's Mind. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press 1-28.
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  7. Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk (2004). We Don't Need a Microscope to Explore the Chimpanzee's Mind. Mind and Language 19 (1):1-28.
    The question of whether chimpanzees, like humans, reason about unobservable mental states remains highly controversial. On one account, chimpanzees are seen as possessing a psychological system for social cognition that represents and reasons about behaviors alone. A competing account allows that the chimpanzee's social cognition system additionally construes the behaviors it represents in terms of mental states. Because the range of behaviors that each of the two systems can generate is not currently known, and because the latter system depends upon (...)
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  8.  7
    Lauren Bryant, Anna Coffey, Daniel J. Povinelli & John R. Pruett Jr (2013). Theory of Mind Experience Sampling in Typical Adults. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):697-707.
    We explored the frequency with which typical adults make Theory of Mind attributions, and under what circumstances these attributions occur. We used an experience sampling method to query 30 typical adults about their everyday thoughts. Participants carried a Personal Data Assistant that prompted them to categorize their thoughts as Action, Mental State, or Miscellaneous at approximately 30 pseudo-random times during a continuous 10-h period. Additionally, participants noted the direction of their thought and degree of socializing at the time of inquiry. (...)
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  9.  41
    Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli (forthcoming). Chimps as Secret Agents. Synthese:1-30.
    We provide an account of chimpanzee-specific agency within the context of philosophy of action. We do so by showing that chimpanzees are capable of what we call reason-directed action, even though they may be incapable of more full-blown action, which we call reason-considered action. Although chimpanzee agency does not possess all the features of typical adult human agency, chimpanzee agency is evolutionarily responsive to their environment and overlaps considerably with our own. As such, it is an evolved set of capacities (...)
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  10. Daniel J. Povinelli (2001). The Self: Elevated in Consciousness and Extended in Time. In Chris Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum 75-95.
  11.  5
    Daniel J. Povinelli (2001). On the Possibilities of Detecting Intentions Prior to Understanding Them. In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press 225--248.
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  12.  34
    Daniel J. Povinelli & Steve Giambrone (2000). Inferring Other Minds: Failure of the Argument by Analogy. Philosophical Topics 27 (1):167-202.
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  13. Jennier Vonk & Daniel J. Povinelli (2011). Social and Physical Reasoning in Human-Reared Chimpanzees : Preliminary Studies. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press
     
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  14. Daniel J. Povinelli (1987). Monkeys, Apes, Mirrors, Minds: The Evolution of Self-Awareness in Primates. Human Evolution 2:493-507.
  15.  34
    Daniel J. Povinelli & Jochen Barth (2005). Reinterpreting Behavior: A Human Specialization? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):712-713.
    Tomasello et al. argue that the “small difference that made a big difference” in the evolution of the human mind was the disposition to share intentions. Chimpanzees are said to understand certain mental states (like intentions), but not share them. We argue that an alternative model is better supported by the data: the capacity to represent mental states (and other unobservable phenomena) is a human specialization that co-evolved with natural language.
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  16.  6
    Daniel J. Povinelli & Laurie R. Godfrey (1993). The Chimpanzee's Mind: How Noble in Reason? How Absent of Ethics. In Matthew Nitecki & Doris Nitecki (eds.), Evolutionary Ethics. Suny Press 227--324.
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  17.  62
    Derek C. Penn, Patricia W. Cheng, Keith J. Holyoak, John E. Hummel & Daniel J. Povinelli (2009). There is More to Thinking Than Propositions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):221-223.
    We are big fans of propositions. But we are not big fans of the proposed by Mitchell et al. The authors ignore the critical role played by implicit, non-inferential processes in biological cognition, overestimate the work that propositions alone can do, and gloss over substantial differences in how different kinds of animals and different kinds of cognitive processes approximate propositional representations.
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  18.  13
    Daniel J. Povinelli, Christopher G. Prince & Todd M. Preuss (2005). Parent-Offspring Conflict and the Development of Social Understanding. In Peter Carruthers (ed.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York 239--253.
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  19.  38
    Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2008). Darwin's Triumph: Explaining the Uniqueness of the Human Mind Without a Deus Ex Machina. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):153-178.
    In our target article, we argued that there is a profound functional discontinuity between the cognitive abilities of modern humans and those of all other extant species. Unsurprisingly, our hypothesis elicited a wide range of responses from commentators. After responding to the commentaries, we conclude that our hypothesis lies closer to Darwin's views on the matter than to those of many of our contemporaries.
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  20.  10
    Daniel J. Povinelli & Sandra deBlois (1992). On Attributing Mental States to Monkeys: First, Know Thyself. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):164-166.
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  21.  4
    Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2012). So, Are We the Massively Lucky Species? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):236-237.
    We are in vehement agreement with most of Vaesen's key claims. But Vaesen fails to consider or rebut the possibility that there are deep causal dependencies among the various cognitive traits he identifies as uniquely human. We argue that is one such linchpin trait in the evolution of human tool use, social intelligence, language, and culture.
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  22.  6
    Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince (1996). Ontogeny, Evolution, and Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137.
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  23. Daniel J. Povinelli (1998). Are Animals Self-Aware? Maybe Not. Scientific American.
     
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  24.  1
    Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2009). Universal Grammar and Mental Continuity: Two Modern Myths. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (5):462-464.
    In our opinion, the discontinuity between extant human and nonhuman minds is much broader and deeper than most researchers admit. We are happy to report that Evans & Levinson's (E&L's) target article strongly corroborates our unpopular hypothesis, and that the comparative evidence, in turn, bolsters E&L's provocative argument. Both a Universal Grammar and the between human and nonhuman minds turn out to be modern myths.
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  25. Daniel J. Povinelli (1997). Panmorphism. In R. Mitchell, Nicholas S. Thompson & H. L. Miles (eds.), Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. Suny Press 92--103.
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  26. Daniel J. Povinelli, Jesse M. Bering & Steve Giambrone (2000). Toward a Science of Other Minds: Escaping the Argument by Analogy. Cognitive Science 24 (3):509-541.
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