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  1. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.) (2014). Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oup Oxford.
    This volume examines the implications of developments in the science of ethics for philosophical theorizing about moral psychology and human agency. These ten new essays in empirically informed philosophy illuminate such topics as responsibility, the self, and the role in morality of mental states such as desire, emotion, and moral judgement.
     
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  2. Daniel Jacobson, Fitting Attitude Theories of Value. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2010). Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect. In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press. 585--613.
     
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  4. Justin D. Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2009). Regret and Irrational Action. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  5. Daniel Jacobson (2008). Review of Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (3).
  6. Daniel Jacobson (2008). Utilitarianism Without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill. Philosophical Review 117 (2):159-191.
    This essay argues, flouting paradox, that Mill was a utilitarian but not a consequentialist. First, it contends that there is logical space for a view that deserves to be called utilitarian despite its rejection of consequentialism; second, that this logical space is, in fact, occupied by John Stuart Mill. The key to understanding Mill's unorthodox utilitarianism and the role it plays in his moral philosophy is to appreciate his sentimentalist metaethics—especially his account of wrongness in terms of fitting guilt and (...)
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  7. Daniel Jacobson (2007). Freedom of Speech : Why Freedom of Speech Includes Hate Speech. In Jesper Ryberg, Thomas S. Petersen & Clark Wolf (eds.), New Waves in Applied Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
     
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  8. Zed Adams, Daniel Farnham, Ian Farrell, Daniel Jacobson & Paul B. Thompson (2006). Book Notes. [REVIEW] Ethics 116 (2):445-450.
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  9. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2006). Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:99-126.
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  10. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2006). Sensibility Theory and Projectivism. In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. 186--218.
  11. Daniel Jacobson (2006). Review of Henry R. West (Ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Mill's Utilitarianism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (7).
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  12. Daniel Jacobson & Justin D'Arms (2006). Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press.
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  13. Daniel Jacobson (2005). Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation. In Matthew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Blackwell. 342--355.
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  14. Daniel Jacobson (2005). Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):387 - 409.
    Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism (...)
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  15. Daniel Jacobson & Justin D'Arms (2005). Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:99-126.
    According to Cicero, “all emotions spring from the roots of error: they should not be pruned or clipped here and there, but yanked out” (Cicero 2002: 60). The Stoic enthusiasm for the extirpation of emotion is radical in two respects, both of which can be expressed with the claim that emotional responses are never appropriate. First, the Stoics held that emotions are incompatible with virtue , since the virtuous man will retain his equanimity whatever his fate. Grief is always vicious, (...)
     
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  16. Daniel Jacobson (2004). The Academic Betrayal of Free Speech. Social Philosophy and Policy 21 (2):48-80.
    “ 'Free speech' is just the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish to advance”—or so literary theorist and professor of law Stanley Fish has claimed. This cynical dictum is one of several skeptical challenges to freedom of speech that have been extremely influential in the American academy. I will follow the skeptics' lead by distinguishing between two broad styles of critique: the progressive and the postmodern. Fish's dictum, however, like many of the bluntest (...)
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  17. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2003). VIII. The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism). Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:127-145.
    Sentimentalist theories in ethics treat evaluative judgments as somehow dependent on human emotional capacities. While the precise nature of this dependence varies, the general idea is that evaluative concepts are to be understood by way of more basic emotional reactions. Part of the task of distinguishing between the concepts that sentimentalism proposes to explicate, then, is to identify a suitably wide range of associated emotions. In this paper, we attempt to deal with an important obstacle to such views, which arises (...)
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  18. Daniel Jacobson (2003). J.S. Mill and the Diversity of Utilitarianism. Philosophers' Imprint 3 (2):1-18.
    Mill's famous proportionality statement of the Greatest Happiness Principle (GHP) is commonly taken to specify his own moral theory. And the discussion in which GHP is embedded -- Chapter 2 of Utilitarianism -- predominates the interpretation of Mill's normative philosophy. Largely because of these suppositions, Mill is traditionally read as a particular kind of utilitarian: a maximizing act-consequentialist. This paper argues that the canonical status accorded to Utilitarianism is belied by the text itself, as well as by its historical context, (...)
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  19. Emmett L. Bradbury, Anne W. Eaton, Sandra Jane Fairbanks, Jeffrey R. Flynn, Daniel Jacobson, Kenton F. Machina, Michael Pakaluk, Sebastian G. Rand, Lloyd Steffen & Patricia H. Werhane (2002). Book Notes. [REVIEW] Ethics 113 (1):191-198.
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  20. Daniel Jacobson (2002). An Unsolved Problem for Slote's Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. Philosophical Studies 111 (1):53 - 67.
    According to Slote's ``agent-based'' virtue ethics, the rightness orwrongness of an act is determined by the motive it expresses. Thistheory has a problem with cases where an agent can do her duty onlyby expressing some vicious motive and thereby acting wrongly. In sucha situation, an agent can only act wrongly; hence, the theory seemsincompatible with the maxim that `ought' implies `can'. I argue thatSlote's attempt to circumvent this problem by appealing to compatibilism is inadequate. In a wide range of psychologically (...)
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  21. Daniel Jacobson (2002). Review of Robert Hinde, Why Good is Good: The Sources of Morality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (9).
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  22. Daniel Jacobson (2001). Georgia Warnke, Legitimate Differences: Interpretation in the Abortion Controversy and Other Public Debates:Legitimate Differences: Interpretation in the Abortion Controversy and Other Public Debates. Ethics 111 (3):653-655.
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  23. Daniel Jacobson (2001). Speech and Action. Legal Theory 7 (2):179-201.
    The fundamental tenet of the liberal conception of free speech is the principle of content neutrality, which Mill espoused in claiming that 1 On this view, the immorality, the falsity, and even the harmfulness of an opinion are not good reasons to censor it. s persuasion may be, not only of the falsity but of the pernicious consequenceslose their immunitys justification can be doubted. But I will not discuss these issues, on which there is already an immense literature, any further (...)
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  24. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). Sentiment and Value. Ethics 110 (4):722-748.
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  25. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  26. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ”Appropriateness' of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65--90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  27. Daniel Jacobson (2000). Mill on Liberty, Speech, and the Free Society. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (3):276–309.
  28. Daniel Jacobson (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  29. Daniel Jacobson (1999). Jerrold Levinson, Ed., Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection:Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Ethics 110 (1):215-219.
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  30. Daniel Jacobson (1997). In Praise of Immoral Art. Philosophical Topics 25 (1):155-199.
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  31. Daniel Jacobson (1996). Sir Philip Sidney's Dilemma: On the Ethical Function of Narrative Art. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (4):327-336.
  32. Daniel Jacobson (1995). Freedom of Speech Acts? A Response to Langton. Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1):64–78.
  33. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (1994). Expressivism, Morality, and the Emotions. Ethics 104 (4):739-763.
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  34. Daniel Jacobson (1994). Ethical Perspective: On Narrative Art and Moral Perception. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Horace recommended that poets "mingle the useful and the sweet"; but the champions of an ethical function for art have yet to explain how moral and aesthetic values can truly be mingled. Their proposed ethical functions too often seem irrelevant to what we most care about in art. Moreover, we need an explanation of what art has to show us that is of ethical significance, and that we don't already know. ;The answer is to be found in the "thick concepts" (...)
     
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