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  1. Daniel Kahneman & Cass R. Sunstein, Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law.
    Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do; what makes the moral domain is distinctive is its foundations in the emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies that define indignation. The intuitive system of cognition, System I, is typically responsible for indignation; the more reflective system, System II, may or may not provide an override. Moral dumbfounding and moral numbness are often a product of moral intuitions that people are unable to justify. An understanding of indignation helps to (...)
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  2. Daniel Kahneman & Jack L. Knetsch (forthcoming). Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction. Environmental Values.
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  3. Carey K. Morewedge & Daniel Kahneman (2010). Associative Processes in Intuitive Judgment. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):435-440.
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  4. Daniel Kahneman (2009). Can We Trust Our Intuitions? In Alex Voorhoeve (ed.), Conversations on Ethics. Oxford University Press.
     
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  5. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick (2007). Frames and Brains: Elicitation and Control of Response Tendencies. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):45-46.
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  6. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick (2005). A Model of Heuristic Judgment. In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge Univ Pr. 267--293.
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  7. Daniel Kahneman & Jason Riis (2005). Living, and Thinking About It: Two Perspectives on Life. In Felicia A. Huppert, Nick Baylis & Barry Keverne (eds.), The Science of Well-Being. Oup Oxford. 285--304.
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  8. Daniel Kahneman (2000). A Psychological Point of View: Violations of Rational Rules as a Diagnostic of Mental Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):681-683.
    The target article focuses exclusively on System 2 and on reasoning rationality: the ability to reach valid conclusions from available information, as in the Wason task. The decision-theoretic concept of coherence rationality requires beliefs to be consistent, even when they are assessed one at a time. Judgment heuristics belong to System 1, and help explain the incoherence of intuitive beliefs.
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  9. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler (2000). Normative Feelings Produced by Market Processes. In Raymond Boudon & Mohamed Cherkaoui (eds.), Central Currents in Social Theory. Sage Publications. 6--4.
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  10. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman (2000). The Notion of Cognitive Bias. In Raymond Boudon & Mohamed Cherkaoui (eds.), Central Currents in Social Theory. Sage Publications. 8--349.
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  11. Daniel Kahneman (1997). New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption. Legal Theory 3 (2):105-124.
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  12. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman (1993). Probabilistic Reasoning. In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Mit Press. 43--68.
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  13. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1983). Can Irrationality Be Intelligently Discussed? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):509.
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  14. Daniel Kahneman (1982). Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Eds. In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
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  15. Daniel Kahneman & Paul Slovic (1982). Amos Tversky, Eds. 1982. In Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
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  16. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
    The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important...
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  17. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1982). A Reply to Evans. Cognition 12 (3):325-326.
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  18. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1982). On the Study of Statistical Intuitions. Cognition 11 (2):123-141.
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  19. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1982). Variants of Uncertainty. Cognition 11 (2):143-157.
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  20. Daniel Kahneman (1981). Who Shall Be the Arbiter of Our Intuitions? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-340.
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  21. Daniel Kahneman (1979). Mechanisms That Produce Critical Durations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (2):265-266.
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  22. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1979). On the Interpretation of Intuitive Probability: A Reply to Jonathan Cohen. Cognition 7 (December):409-11.
  23. Anat Ninio & Daniel Kahneman (1974). Reaction Time in Focused and in Divided Attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology 103 (3):394.
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  24. Daniel Kahneman & W. Scott Peavler (1969). Incentive Effects and Pupillary Changes in Association Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (2p1):312.
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  25. Daniel Kahneman, Bernard Tursky, David Shapiro & Andrew Crider (1969). Pupillary, Heart Rate, and Skin Resistance Changes During a Mental Task. Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (1p1):164.
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  26. Daniel Kahneman, Joel Norman & Michael Kubovy (1967). Critical Duration for the Resolution of Form: Centrally or Peripherally Determined? Journal of Experimental Psychology 73 (3):323.
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  27. Daniel Kahneman (1966). Time-Intensity Reciprocity Under Various Conditions of Adaptation and Backward Masking. Journal of Experimental Psychology 71 (4):543.
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  28. Daniel Kahneman & Joel Norman (1964). The Time-Intensity Relation in Visual Perception as a Function of Observer's Task. Journal of Experimental Psychology 68 (3):215.
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