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Profile: Daniel Kostic (IHPST (CNRS/ Université Paris I Sorbonne))
  1.  19
    Daniel Kostic (2016). The Topological Realization. Synthese 1:1-24.
    In this paper, I argue that the newly developed network approach in neuroscience and biology provides a basis for formulating a unique type of realization, which I call topological realization. Some of its features and its relation to one of the dominant paradigms of realization and explanation in sciences, i.e. the mechanistic one, are already being discussed in the literature. But the detailed features of topological realization, its explanatory power and its relation to another prominent view of realization, namely the (...)
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  2.  5
    Daniel Kostić (forthcoming). Mechanistic and Topological Explanations: An Introduction. Synthese:1-10.
    In the last 20 years or so, since the publication of a seminal paper by Watts and Strogatz :440–442, 1998), an interest in topological explanations has spread like a wild fire over many areas of science, e.g. ecology, evolutionary biology, medicine, and cognitive neuroscience. The topological approach is still very young by all standards, and even within special sciences it still doesn’t have a single methodological programme that is applicable across all areas of science. That is why this special issue (...)
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  3. Daniel Kostić (forthcoming). Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Topoi:1-7.
    I argue that the hard problem of consciousness occurs only in very limited contexts. My argument is based on the idea of explanatory perspectivalism, according to which what we want to know about a phenomenon determines the type of explanation we use to understand it. To that effect the hard problem arises only in regard to questions such as how is it that concepts of subjective experience can refer to physical properties, but not concerning questions such as what gives rise (...)
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  4.  46
    Daniel Kostic (2012). The Vagueness Constraint and the Quality Space for Pain. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.
    This paper is concerned with a quality space model as an account of the intelligibility of explanation. I argue that descriptions of causal or functional roles (Chalmers Levine, 2001) are not the only basis for intelligible explanations. If we accept that phenomenal concepts refer directly, not via descriptions of causal or functional roles, then it is difficult to find role fillers for the described causal roles. This constitutes a vagueness constraint on the intelligibility of explanation. Thus, I propose to use (...)
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