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Profile: Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal)
  1. Daniel Laurier, The Publicity of Thought and Language.
    The sceptical problem of Kripkenstein pertains to both the notions of content of thought and linguistic meaning in such a way that if the sceptical solution allowed us to conclude that language is essentially public, then we should also be able to conclude that thought is essentially public. But, when addressing the question of the way in which one could, under this hypothesis, reach the conclusion that thought is essentially public, there would seem to be two possible types of answers. (...)
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  2. Daniel Laurier, In Search of Objective Agent Rationality.
    The purpose of this paper is to offer an account of what an agent's being rational to do or think something might amount to, which doesn't reduce to saying that it consists in this agent's doing or thinking something that is rational for him. In the first section, I call attention to the fact that such a distinction between agent rationality and action or belief rationality is widely admitted, I reject the idea that it could be interpreted as a distinction (...)
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  3. Daniel Laurier (forthcoming). What Does Intentional Normativism Require? Philosophical Explorations.
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  4. Daniel Laurier (2013). Les Raisons Épistémiques Sont-Elles Instrumentales? Dialogue 52 (2):211-231.
    In a recent article (2011), Steglich-Petersen claims to be able to provide a teleological account of the nature of epistemic reasons which (i) avoids the standard objections to this kind of approach and (ii) is compatible with the evidentialist claim that epistemic reasons always trump non-epistemic reasons (assuming there are such reasons). I argue that his proposal is unable to do justice to the idea that epistemic reasons are constituted by the evidence, and more generally, that it is incoherent to (...)
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  5. Daniel Laurier (2011). Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because Constraint. Dialogue 50 (02):315-331.
    ABSTRACT: I explain and rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption that the normative supervenes on the non-normative.
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  6. Daniel Laurier (2009). À la Défense du Déontologisme Doxastique. Dialogue 48 (01):37-.
    ABSTRACT: I offer a refutation of the standard argument according to which we have no doxastic obligation because we do not have the kind of voluntary control over our beliefs required for having obligations. I then propose an interpretation of the distinction between epistemic and practical reasons for belief which can be generalised to other attitudes such as intention, and seems to imply (i) that mental acts such as judgements and decisions never count as intentional actions, and (ii) that these (...)
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  7. Daniel Laurier (2009). Making "Reasons" Explicit: How Normative is Brandom's Inferentialism. Abstracta 5 (2):79-99.
    This paper asks whether Brandom (1994) has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on which his normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom's claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This leads me to replace Brandom's (...)
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  8. Daniel Laurier (2008). Mind-Dependence, Irrealism and Superassertibility. Philosophia Scientiae 12 (1):143-157.
    In section 1, I explain why a specifically Dummettian conception of realism will be relevant only in a restricted range of cases. In section 2, I suggest that Crispin Wright could be read as holding that the truth of certain judgements depends on our capacity to know it only if their being true consists in their being superassertible. In section 3, I point out that insisting on knowability, as both Dummett and Wright do, prevents one from seeing that their are (...)
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  9. Daniel Laurier (2008). Review of Maria Cristina Amoretti, Nicla Vassallo (Eds.), Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation: On the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (11).
  10. Daniel Laurier (2008). Sommes-nous tous des épiphénomènes ? Philosophiques 35 (1):119-125.
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  11. Daniel Laurier (2007). Essential Dependence and Realism. Sorites 19:41-50.
    It has recently been suggested that realism about some subject matter is best construed as the claim that the facts pertaining to this subject matter are essentially independent from the mind, in a sense to be explained, and not as the admittedly weaker claim that they are modally independent from the mind. In this paper, I argue that this proposal is liable to trivialize the realist's position and is biased against his irrealist opponent.
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  12. Daniel Laurier (2005). Between Phenomenalism and Objectivism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:189-214.
    Brandom (1994) claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.
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  13. Daniel Laurier (2005). Between Phenomenalism and Objectivism: An Examination of R. Brandom's Account of the Objectivity of Discursive Deontic Statuses. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:189-214.
    Brandom claims to have succeeded in showing how certain kinds of social practices can institute objective deontic statuses and confer objective conceptual contents on certain performances. This paper proposes a reconstruction of how, on Brandom’s views, this is supposed to come about, and a critical examination of the explicit arguments offered in support for this claim.
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  14. Daniel Laurier (2005). Free Content Nonconceptual Contents Vs Nonconceptual States. Grazer Philosophische Studien 68:23-43.
    The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can (...)
     
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  15. Daniel Laurier (2005). Mind, Davidson and Reality. Principia 9 (1-2):125-157.
    The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irrealism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general haracterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show that most candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of intentional realism which is not, is a (...)
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  16. Daniel Laurier (2005). Pragmatics, Pittsburgh Style. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):141-160.
    I give a rough outline of Brandom¿s scorekeeping account of conceptual content. The account is meant to be phenomenalist, normativist, expressively complete and non-circular; the question is how and to what extent it succeeds in meeting these goals.
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  17. Daniel Laurier (2004). La Publicité Et l'Interdépendance du Langage Et de la Pensée. Dialogue 43 (2):281-315.
    I clarify in what sense one might want to claim that thought or language are public. I distinguish among four forms that each of these claims might take, and two general ways of establishing them that might be contemplated. The first infers the public character of thought from the public character of language, and the second infers the latter from the former. I show that neither of these stategies seems to be able to dispense with the claim that thought and (...)
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  18. Daniel Laurier (2004). Nonconceptual Contents Vs Nonconceptual States. Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):23-43.
    The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can (...)
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  19. Daniel Laurier (2004). Qu'est-ce qui est non-conceptuel, l'etat ou son contenu? Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 6:77-9.
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  20. Daniel Laurier (2004). Reasons, Contents, and Experiences. Disputatio 1 (17):1 - 21.
  21. Daniel Laurier (2003). Entre la rime et la raison. Précis de L'Esprit et la nature. Philosophiques 30 (2):407-410.
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  22. Daniel Laurier (2003). Réponses À Mes Critiques. Philosophiques 30 (2):421-424.
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  23. Daniel Laurier (2002). L'esprit Et la Nature.
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  24. Daniel Laurier (2001). Non-Conceptually Contentful Attitudes in Interpretation. Sorites 13 (October):6-22.
    Brandom's book Making It Explicit defends Davidson's claim that conceptual thought can arise only on the background of a practice of mutual interpretation, without endorsing the further view that one can be a thinker only if one has the concept of a concept. This involves giving an account of conceptual content in terms of what Brandom calls practical deontic attitudes. In this paper, I make a plea for the conclusion that these practical attitudes are best seen as intentional, but non-conceptually (...)
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  25. Daniel Laurier (2000). Le Paradoxe de Wittgenstein Et le Communautarisme. Dialogue 39 (02):263-.
    The solution to the paradox which Kripke attibutes to Wittgenstein is supposed to lead to the conclusion that there is a sense in which thought and language are essentially social phenomena. In the following, I argue that both the and the character of this solution can be questioned, though without having to agree with Davidson, according to whom the solution to this paradox does not depend on any notion of a common language.
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  26. Daniel Laurier (2000). Que Sera Sera. Dialectica 54 (4):247–264.
    Having suggested that a salient feature of philosophical naturalism is to deny that there are non‐natural norms, I make a distinction between a moderate naturalism, which admits the existence of natural norms , and a radical naturalism which denies it . On the assumption that intentional facts are irreducibly normative, their existence would thus seem to raise a problem for moderate epistemological naturalism. I argue that no non‐trivial naturalistic explanation of conceptual intentionality is to be possible unless it is denied (...)
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  27. Daniel Laurier (1999). On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of Indeterminacy. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. 229--248.
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  28. Daniel Laurier (1998). L'analyse théologique du contenu intentionnel. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4):660-690.
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  29. Daniel Laurier (1998). L'analyse téléologique du contenu intentionnel: l'écueil du désir: l'écueil du désir. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4):624-659.
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  30. Daniel Laurier (1996). Davidson Et la Philosophie du Langage Pascal Engel Collection «L'interrogation Philosophique» Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994, Xx, 357 P. [REVIEW] Dialogue 35 (02):402-.
  31. Daniel Laurier (1996). Naturaliser L'Intentionnalité. Essai de Philosophic de la Psychologie Élisabeth Pacherie Collection «Psychologie Et Sciences de la Pensée» Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1993, Xx, 300 P. [REVIEW] Dialogue 35 (02):406-.
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  32. Daniel Laurier (1994). Pangloss, L'Erreur Et La Divergence. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:345-372.
    The theory of radical interpretation, as based on the principle of charity, sets a priori limits on the possibility that different agents have different beliefs, and on the possibility that one has false beliefs. David Papineau put forward a teleological approach to intentional states which, he claims, doesn’t have these unacceptable consequences. Having distinguished half a dozen of different forms that the problem of radical interpretation might take, I show that Papineau’s approach is not radically different from those based on (...)
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  33. Daniel Laurier & François Lepage (1994). Essais sur le langage et l'intentionnalité, coll. « Analytiques ». Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 184 (4):525-527.
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  34. Frédéric Nef & Daniel Laurier (1994). Le langage. Une approche philosophique. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 184 (4):533-536.
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  35. Daniel Laurier (1993). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes Fred Dretske Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1988, Xi, 165 P. Dialogue 32 (03):629-.
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  36. Daniel Laurier (1993). "Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes", Par Fred Dretske. [REVIEW] Dialogue 32:629.
     
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  37. Daniel Laurier (1993). Representation and Reality Hilary Putnam Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1988, 136 P. Dialogue 32 (01):178-.
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  38. Daniel Laurier (1993). "Representation and Reality", Par Hilary Putnam. [REVIEW] Dialogue 32:178.
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  39. Daniel Laurier (1992). "Consciousness", Par William G. Lycan. [REVIEW] Dialogue 31:723.
     
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  40. Daniel Laurier (1992). Consciousness William G. Lycan Collection «A Bradford Book» Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1987, Xvi, 165 P. Dialogue 31 (04):723-.
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  41. Daniel Laurier (1992). Introduction À la Philosophie du Langage.
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  42. Daniel Laurier (1992). Rationality and Intentionality. Grazer Philosophische Studien 43:125-141.
    The view that in radical interpretation, the interpreter should aim at optimizing the rationality of agents is defended. A distinction and a parallel is drawn between linguistic interpretation and psychological interpretation. Both can be taken to be governed, in part, and in somewhat different ways, by a principle of rationality. Such approaches have been criticised on the ground that they make it impossible for a speaker or an agent to have wildly irrational or false beliefs. It is argued that the (...)
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  43. Daniel Laurier (1991). Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language: An Introduction Bjorn T. Ramberg Oxford, Blackwell, 1989, 153 P., 27,50$. Dialogue 30 (1-2):189-.
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  44. Daniel Laurier (1991). "Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language: An Introduction", Par Bjorn T. Ramberg. [REVIEW] Dialogue 30:189.
     
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  45. Daniel Laurier (1991). Essais Sur le Sens Et la Réalité.
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  46. Daniel Laurier (1990). Mark Johnson, "the Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason". [REVIEW] Dialogue 29 (3):477.
     
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  47. Daniel Laurier (1990). Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind George Lakoff Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 614 P. 29, 95 $The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason Mark Johnson Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 233 P. 27, 50 $. [REVIEW] Dialogue 29 (03):477-.
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  48. Daniel Laurier (1989). François Latraverse, La pragmatique : histoire et critique, Bruxelles, Mardaga, 1987, 267 p.François Latraverse, La pragmatique : histoire et critique, Bruxelles, Mardaga, 1987, 267 p. [REVIEW] Philosophiques 16 (2):446-450.
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  49. Daniel Laurier (1988). Les phénomènes mentaux ont-ils des effets physiques? (Le monisme anomal est-il un épiphénoménalisme ?). Hermes 3:109.
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  50. Daniel Laurier (1988). Note sur le puzzle de Kripke. Philosophiques 15 (1):31-39.
    Je soutiens que Kripke n'a pas réussi à montrer que certains principes plausibles gouvernant l'attribution de croyances, tels que les principes de décitation et de traduction, pouvaient nous conduire à attribuer des croyances de dicto contradictoires à un sujet réfléchi et linguistiquement compétent sans présupposer une théorie descriptive des noms propres ou des termes désignant des espèces naturelles. Les cas décrits par Kripke se réduisent à des variantes du problème de Quine concernant les croyances de re ou à des variantes (...)
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