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Daniel Lim [16]Daniel F. Lim [1]
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Profile: Daniel Lim (Renmin University)
  1.  12
    Daniel Lim (forthcoming). Doing, Allowing, and the Problem of Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-17.
    Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: the doing-allowing distinction exists and the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. In this paper I try to undermine both of these claims. Against I argue that some of the most influential analyses of the doing-allowing distinction face grave difficulties and that these difficulties are (...)
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  2. Daniel Lim (2009). Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language. By Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, and John Searle. Zygon 44 (4):1003-1005.
  3.  33
    Daniel Lim (2014). Occasionalism and Non-Reductive Physicalism: Another Look at the Continuous Creation Argument. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):39-57.
    Malebranche’s so-called conservation is continuous creation (CCC) argument has been celebrated as a powerful and persuasive argument for Occasionalism—the claim that only God has and exercises causal powers. In this paper I want to examine the CCC argument for Occasionalism by comparing it to Jaegwon Kim’s so-called Supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. Because the arguments have deep similarities it is interesting and fruitful to consider them in tandem. First I argue that both the CCC argument and the Supervenience argument turn (...)
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  4.  36
    Daniel Lim (2008). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. By Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown. Zygon 43 (3):748-753.
  5.  18
    Daniel Lim (2014). Brain Simulation and Personhood: A Concern with the Human Brain Project. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 16 (2):77-89.
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  6.  9
    Daniel Lim & Wang Hao (2014). Can Mary's Qualia Be Epiphenomenal? Res Philosophica 91 (3):503-512.
    Frank Jackson famously argued, with his so-called Knowledge Argument , that qualia are non-physical. Moreover, he argued that qualia are epiphenomenal. Some have objected that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA. One way of developing this objection, following Neil Campbell , is to argue that epiphenomenalism is at odds with the kind of behavioral evidence that makes the soundness of KA plausible. We argue that Campbell’s claim that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA is false.
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  7.  23
    Daniel Lim (2011). Exclusion, Overdetermination, and Vacuity. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):57-64.
    Jaegwon Kim argues that if mental properties are irreducible with respect to physical properties then mental properties are epiphenomenal. I believe this conditional is false and argue that mental properties, along with their physical counterparts, may overdetermine their effects. Kim contends, however, that embracing overdetermination in the mental case, due to supervenience, renders the attribution of overdetermination vacuous. This way of blocking the overdetermination option, however, makes the attribution of mental epiphenomenalism equally vacuous. Furthermore, according to Kim’s own logic, physical (...)
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  8.  10
    Daniel Lim (2014). Can a Dualist Adopt Bennett's Strategy? Philosophical Forum 45 (3):251-271.
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  9. Daniel Lim & Hao Wang (2014). Can Mary's Qualia Be Epiphenomenal? Res Philosophica 91 (3):503-512.
    Frank Jackson (1982) famously argued, with his so-called Knowledge Argument (KA), that qualia are non-physical. Moreover, he argued that qualia are epiphenomenal. Some have objected that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA. One way of developing this objection, following Neil Campbell (2003; 2012), is to argue that epiphenomenalism is at odds with the kind of behavioral evidence that makes the soundness of KA plausible. We argue that Campbell’s claim that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA is (...)
     
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  10.  8
    Daniel F. Lim (2013). Causal Exclusion and Overdetermination. International Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):353-369.
    Jaegwon Kim argues that if mental properties are irreducible with respect to physical properties, then mental properties are epiphenomenal. I believe that this conditional is false and argue that mental properties, along with their physical counterparts, may causally overdetermine their effects. Kim contends, however, that embracing causal overdetermination in the mental case should be resisted for at least three reasons: it is implausible, it makes mental properties causally dispensable, and it violates the Causal Closure Principle. I believe, however, that each (...)
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  11.  9
    Daniel Lim (2013). Why Not Overdetermination? Heythrop Journal 54 (2):668-677.
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  12. Daniel Lim (2011). Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument From Consciousness. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):439 - 450.
    In his so-called argument from consciousness (AC), J. P. Moreland argues that the phenomenon of consciousness furnishes us with evidence for the existence of God. In defending AC, however, Moreland makes claims that generate an undesirable tension. This tension can be posed as a dilemma based on the contingency of the correlation between mental and physical states. The correlation of mental and physical states is either contingent or necessary. If the correlation is contingent then epiphenomenalism is true. If the correlation (...)
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  13. Daniel Lim (2015). Exclusion. In God and Mental Causation. Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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  14. Daniel Lim (2015). God. In God and Mental Causation. Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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  15.  1
    Daniel Lim, God and Mental Causation.
    J.P. Moreland’s so-called Argument from Consciousness for the existence of God is examined. One of its key premises, the contingency of the mind–body relation, is at odds with the possibility of mental causation. The AC may be rescued from this problem by adapting some of the lessons learned in Chap. 3 concerning one of the Non-reductive Physicalist solutions to the Supervenience Argument.
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  16. Daniel Lim (2015). Occasionalism. In God and Mental Causation. Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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  17. Daniel Lim (2015). Overdetermination. In God and Mental Causation. Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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