We analyzed a sample of 356 forms containing information that Colorado law legally requires both licensed and unlicensed therapists to disclose to clients. The majority of forms contained the legally mandated information; fewer forms contained ethically desirable information. The average readability grade level was 15.74, corresponding to upper-level college, and 63.9% of the forms reached the highest (most difficult) readability grade of 17 +. Therapists are obeying the law, but do not appear to be taking advantage of the opportunity to (...) provide their clients useful information in an accessible way. (shrink)
Trucos del oficio de investigador es un libro coordinado por Daniel Guinea-Martin, y en el que colaboran doce investigadores. ¿Se pueden encontrar respuestas regladas sobre el oficio y la tarea de investigar? Todos nosotros sabemos —tal vez con hartazgo—, que es un debate permanente cuestionar si la virtud se puede enseñar. Recordamos por ejemplo que Sócrates repetía obsesivamente esta pregunta a cualquier ciudadano ateniense. ¿Qué es la virtud? ¿En qué se cifra la virtud del médico? ¿Cuál es la virtud (...) del poeta? ¿Estás seguro de que lo sabes? ¿En qué consiste realizar tu oficio con virtud? Sí, es cierto, rumiaba sin cesar lo mismo, y con esto basta para acordarse de la tarea de Sócrates; su virtud era tal que todos nos acordarnos de su pericia siglos después. (shrink)
In recent years quantum probability models have been used to explain many aspects of human decision making, and as such quantum models have been considered a viable alternative to Bayesian models based on classical probability. One criticism that is often leveled at both kinds of models is that they lack a clear interpretation in terms of psychological mechanisms. In this paper we discuss the mechanistic underpinnings of a quantum walk model of human decision making and response time. The quantum walk (...) model is compared to standard sequential sampling models, and the architectural assumptions of both are considered. In particular, we show that the quantum model has a natural interpretation in terms of a cognitive architecture that is both massively parallel and involves both co-operative (excitatory) and competitive (inhibitory) interactions between units. Additionally, we introduce a family of models that includes aspects of the classical and quantum walk models. (shrink)
This article examines four leading multi-stakeholder labour monitoring organizations. All operating in the maquiladora industry, these organizations are viewed in light of the growing global trend toward industry self-regulation, or what has been referred to as the 'global out-sourcing of regulation'. Their Board compositions, codes of conduct and monitoring and enforcement strategies are all examined as a means of tentatively positioning these organizations along an 'egoist-instrumentalist-moralist' ethical culture continuum. Such a framing provides insights into the perceived salience of these organizations' (...) broader stakeholders, the effectiveness of codes of conduct on workplace practices more generally, and the role that ethics plays in the governance and accountability of these increasingly important types of organizations. (shrink)
Inductive generalization, where people go beyond the data provided, is a basic cognitive capability, and it underpins theoretical accounts of learning, categorization, and decision making. To complete the inductive leap needed for generalization, people must make a key ‘‘sampling’’ assumption about how the available data were generated. Previous models have considered two extreme possibilities, known as strong and weak sampling. In strong sampling, data are assumed to have been deliberately generated as positive examples of a concept, whereas in weak sampling, (...) data are assumed to have been generated without any restrictions. We develop a more general account of sampling that allows for an intermediate mixture of these two extremes, and we test its usefulness. In two experiments, we show that most people complete simple one-dimensional generalization tasks in a way that is consistent with their believing in some mixture of strong and weak sampling, but that there are large individual differences in the relative emphasis different people give to each type of sampling. We also show experimentally that the relative emphasis of the mixture is influenced by the structure of the available information. We discuss the psychological meaning of mixing strong and weak sampling, and possible extensions of our modeling approach to richer problems of inductive generalization. (shrink)
The word έρμηνεία means expression and interpretation of a thought, from which the word ‘hermeneutics’ comes. Some authors (Kerényi, 1963; Verjat, 2004) maintain that subsequently the name Hermes, the Greek god, came from this same root. Hermes was the brother of Apollo and Athene, the son of Zeus and Maia, from which it could be deduced that he is paired by lineage with images of light on the one hand and darkness and opacity on the other (Duque, 1994). Both metaphors (...) remind us that the expression and interpretation of thoughts may follow either a rational or an irrational order. However, the function that this divinity fulfilled in ancient Greece is not so hypothetical: ‘hermas’ were the stones marking the boundaries between lands. Likewise, it is equally indisputable that Hermes was the messenger of the gods and also taken as a sort of patron of thieves, since no sooner was he born than he stole some of their most characteristic belongings from several gods, with which he is usually portrayed. Therefore, if we examine the varied facets antiquity perceived in this divinity in the light of, and in conjunction with the word ‘hermeneutic’, we may infer from the latter that he is full of contrasts, because finally we must take account of different things: [he] takes and brings announcements and prophecies, marks limits and distances and, at the same time, it seems that wherever he bursts in upon the scene things never stay as they are or where they are – as a result of theft or, in short, alteration. (shrink)
Las definiciones de argumentación son tan variadas como las distintas posiciones existentes en torno a la pregunta de qué hacemos exactamente cuando argumentamos y cuándo estamos, de hecho, argumentando. Incluso el mismo autor puede ofrecer más de una definición de lo que entiende por argumentación; en parte, porque el problema de la argumentación no se circunscribe a un solo ámbito, ni del conocimiento ni de la vida práctica.
Revisiting the history of relativity Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9466-4 Authors Lewis Pyenson, Department of History, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008-5242, USA Sean F. Johnston, School of Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Glasgow, Rutherford-McCowan Building, Dumfries, Glasgow, Scotland G2 0RB, UK Alberto A. Martínez, Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station B7000, Austin, TX 78712-0220, USA Richard Staley, Department of the History of Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 226 Bradley Memorial Building, 1225 Linden Drive, Madison, WI (...) 53706-1528, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796 Journal Volume Volume 20 Journal Issue Volume 20, Number 1. (shrink)
La cuestión de la justicia global en el ámbito de la bioética no es una cuestión baladí, en ella nos jugamos la dignidad a escala planetaria y la dignidad de todos y cada uno de los seres humanos en particular. El paradigma para pensar el mundo ya no es la confrontación Este-Oeste, ni incluso Norte-Sur. Los problemas, con sus posibilidades y limitaciones en la forma de abordarlos, tienen dimensiones globales. Urge una rearticulación de los discursos parcelados y compartimentados pues, desde (...) ellos, resulta extremadamente difícil seguir abordando las cuestiones que afectan a la vida descontextualizándolas del entorno global. En la misma medida tampoco se puede pensar apropiadamente la justicia sin las condiciones práctico-materiales concretas que, a nivel vital, vienen determinadas por el factum de lo global. Ni se puede abordar una ética de la vida y para la vida sin atender a referencias globales y criterios de justicia. Todo ello plantea un nuevo esquema en el que la tríada vida-globalidad-justicia ha de ser abordada también desde la Bioética Teológica. O, lo que es lo mismo, la Teología Moral no puede prescindir hoy de esa triple conexión emergente so pena de que traicione su propio estatuto de servicio. La intención de fondo en todo ello no es sino estimular la búsqueda, el diálogo y la cooperación de los bioeticistas, tanto de índole secular como teológica, en la tarea ineludiblemente humana de cuidar la fragilidad vital en todas sus dimensiones. Francisco J. Alarcos Martínez, nacido en 1963 en Cúllar (Granada), terminó los estudios de Teología en la Facultad de Teología de Granada (1986). Licenciado en Teología moral (1999) por la U. P. Comillas (Madrid), con premio extraordinario, realiza el Máster en Bioética en la misma Universidad. Se doctoró en la Facultad de Teología de Granada (2004) en la cual es profesor de Bioética y secretario de la Cátedra Andaluza de Bioética, dependiente de la misma Facultad. Además, es director del Centro de Estudios Teológico-Pastorales de Guadix (Granada) y profesor de moral en el mismo. Interviene también como profesor invitado en diversos Máster, así como en cursos monográficos sobre Bioética. Entre sus publicaciones se encuentran: Para vivir la ética en la vida pública (2000), Bioética y pastoral de la salud (2002), Co-autor de 10 palabras clave en humanizar la salud (2002), Ed. de La moral cristiana como propuesta. Homenaje al profesor Eduardo López Azpitarte (2004). Su dedicación académica la compagina con la praxis pastoral como presbítero secular en la diócesis de Guadix-Baza. (shrink)
Resumen Este artículo examina el papel de la ficción como laboratorio mental, que ayuda al filósofo a plantear y discutir los diferentes análisis creados en el campo de la filosofía de la mente. De manera particular se enfoca en algunos de los cuentos que Daniel Dennett ha contado acerca del problema de la conciencia. Es por eso que este artículo también intenta responder preguntas como: ¿Cuál es la relación entre la conciencia y el Centro de Gravedad Narrativo propuesto por (...) Dennett? ¿La mente está hecha de historias? ¿Puede haber un uso semántico en el habla de una inteligencia artificial que no posee experiencia corporal del mundo? Palabras clave: ficción; cuerpo; mente; conciencia; self; creencias; semántica. Fiction, Body and Mind: The Dennett CaseThis paper examines the role of fiction as a mental laboratory that helps the philosopher to pose and discuss the various analyses created in the philosophy of mind. It focuses particularly on some of the tales that Daniel Dennett has told about the problem of consciousness. That is why this paper also attempts to answer questions such as: What is the relation of consciousness to Dennett’s Center of Narrative Gravity? Is the mind made of stories? Can there be a semantic use in speech of an artificial inteligence that does not have a bodily experience of the world? Keywords : Fiction; Body; Mind; Consciousness; Self; Beliefs; Semantics. (shrink)
In this article, we illustrate experimentally an important consequence of the stochastic component in choice behaviour which has not been acknowledged so far. Namely, its potential to produce ‘regression to the mean’ (RTM) effects. We employ a novel approach to individual choice under risk, based on repeated multiple-lottery choices (i.e. choices among many lotteries), to show how the high degree of stochastic variability present in individual decisions can distort crucially certain results through RTM effects. We demonstrate the point in the (...) context of a social comparison experiment. (shrink)
Transpersonal psychology first emerged as an academic discipline in the 1960s and has subsequently broadened into a range of transpersonal studies. Jorge Ferrer (2002) has called for a 'revisioning' of transpersonal theory, dethroning inner experience from its dominant role in defining and validating spiritual reality. In the current paradigm he detects a lingering Cartesianism, which subtly entrenches the very subject-object divide that transpersonalists seek to overcome. This paper outlines the development and current shape of the transpersonal movement, compares Ferrer's epistemology (...) with the heterophenomenology of Daniel Dennett, and speculates on the integration of the latter into transpersonal theory. (shrink)
Daniel Russell's Practical Intelligence and the Virtues is principally a defense of the Aristotelian claim that phronesis is part of every unqualified virtue—a defense of what Russell calls "hard virtue theory" and "hard virtue ethics." The main support for this is the further claim that we would be unable to act well reliably, or form our character reliably, without phronesis performing its "twin roles": correctly identifying the mean of each virtue, and integrating the mean of each virtue with those (...) of others so as to enable us to act in an overall virtuous manner. In following Russell's argument for these claims, we find much else of interest, including a persuasive account of right action and a resurrection of the old doctrine of cardinal virtues. Here I seek first to give readers a sense of the range and depth of this important book by summarizing the main lines of its argument. But I also raise some critical points, the most substantive of which concern his treatments of the unity of the virtues and of responsibility for character. (shrink)
Daniel Dennett has argued that consciousness can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of physical entities and processes. In some of his most recent publications, he has made this case by casting doubts on purely conceptual thought experiments and proposing his own thought experiments to "pump" the intuition that consciousness can be physical. In this paper, I will summarize Dennett's recent defenses of physicalism, followed by a careful critique of his position. The critique presses two flaws in Dennett's defense (...) of physicalism. First, I will rebut his case against the traditional conceptual arguments against physicalism. Second, I will present some empirical grounds (empirical scientific findings on blind sight and tactile vision substitute systems) for thinking that a crucial move in the argument against physicalism is well-supported. For someone, like Dennett, who finds conceptual arguments dubious, the empirical findings make it exceptionally difficult to deny the anti-physicalist argument. (shrink)
¿Qué es razonar?, ¿qué es interpretar?, ¿cómo podemos estar seguros de que determinadas interpretaciones, en ciertos contextos políticos, sociales, culturales, etc., son más razonables que otras? Estas preguntas se encuentran en el origen de dos tradiciones de pensamiento: la hermenéutica y la analítica.
One of the most influential philosophical voices in the consciousness studies community is that of Daniel Dennett. Outside of consciousness studies, Dennett is well-known for his work on numerous topics, such as intentionality, artificial intelligence, free will, evolutionary theory, and the basis of religious experience. (Dennett, 1984, 1987, 1995c, 2005) In 1991, just as researchers and philosophers were beginning to turn more attention to the nature of consciousness, Dennett authored his Consciousness Explained. Consciousness Explained aimed to develop both a (...) theory of consciousness and a powerful critique of the then mainstream view of the nature of consciousness, which Dennett called,. (shrink)
In The illusion of conscious will , Daniel Wegner offers an exciting, informative, and potentially threatening treatise on the psychology of action. I offer several interpretations of the thesis that conscious will is an illusion. The one Wegner seems to suggest is "modular epiphenomenalism": conscious experience of will is produced by a brain system distinct from the system that produces action; it interprets our behavior but does not, as it seems to us, cause it. I argue that the evidence (...) Wegner presents to support this theory, though fascinating, is inconclusive and, in any case, he has not shown that conscious will does not play a crucial causal role in planning, forming intentions, etc. This theory's potential blow to our self-conception turns out to be a glancing one. (shrink)
Questions about Leibniz's views on the ontological status of the corporeal world have been at the center of debate in Leibniz scholarship for more than two decades, and one of the major players in these debates has been Daniel Garber. Having sketched his influential position in a number of articles over the years, he now gives full expression to his view in this highly anticipated and long-awaited book.
The article is a critical notice of Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad. Garber presents a developmental reading of Leibniz's metaphysics that focuses on Leibniz's evolving analysis of body and force as the key to his account of substance. Garber claims that Leibniz shifts from an early theory of body to a theory of corporeal substance in his middle years, and only develops a theory of monads in his later writings—and that even then Leibniz looks not to abandon the (...) scheme of corporeal substances but to reconcile it with that of monads. The present article considers several challenges to Garber's interpretation, questioning, among other things, Garber's claims about development and Garber's account of Leibniz's primary arguments for the theory of monads. The article concludes that while crucial elements of the standard interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist can be defended against Garber's critique, the original traditional view that takes the theory of monads as the first and most fundamental principle of Leibniz's metaphysics is no longer sustainable. (shrink)
In A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics , Daniel Doviak develops a novel agent-based theory of right action that treats the rightness (or deontic status) of an action as a matter of the action’s net intrinsic virtue value (net-IVV)—that is, its balance of virtue over vice. This view is designed to accommodate three basic tenets of commonsense morality: (i) the maxim that “ought” implies “can,” (ii) the idea that a person can do the right thing for the wrong (...) reason, and (iii) the idea that a virtuous person can have “mixed motives.” In this paper, I argue that Doviak’s account makes an important contribution to agent-based virtue ethics, but it needs to be supplemented with a consequentialist account of the efficacy of well-motivated actions—that is, it should be transformed into a mixed (motives-consequences) account, while retaining its net-IVV calculus. This is because I believe that there are right-making properties external to an agent’s psychology which it is important to take into account, especially when an agent’s actions negatively affect other people. To incorporate this intuition, I add to Doviak’s net-IVV calculus a scale for outcomes . The result is a mixed view which accommodates tenets (ii) and (iii) above, but allows for (i) to fail in certain cases. I argue that, rather than being a defect, this allowance is an asset because our intuitions about ought-implies-can break down in cases where an agent is grossly misguided, and our theory should track these intuitions. (shrink)
We have never entirely agreed with Daniel Cohnitz on the status and rôle of thought experiments. Several years ago, enjoying a splendid lunch together in the city of Ghent, we cheerfully agreed to disagree on the matter; and now that Cohnitz has published his considered opinion of our views, we are glad that we have the opportunity to write a rejoinder and to explicate some of our disagreements. We choose not to deal here with all the issues that Cohnitz (...) raises, but rather to restrict ourselves to three specific points. (shrink)
Escribir hoy en día un libro sobre hermenéutica, que tal hermenéutica se refiera a la desarrollada por G. Gadamer en su conocido Verdad y método y que se pretenda añadir algo nuevo a lo mucho escrito sobre el tema parecería, a primera vista, empresa irrealizable. Que ambas pretensiones inspiren la sólida monografía de María G. Navarro —titulada Interpretar y argumentar— constituye empresa audaz y arriesgada, plena de coraje innovador, que provoca admiración, curiosidad e interés. Contra lo que pudiera parecer a (...) primera vista, el libro contiene un alto componente de originalidad y creatividad, debido a la estratagema metodoló-gica de que se sirve la autora. A saber, una hermenéutica in obliquo, estrategia consistente en interpretar a la hermenéutica gadameriana a través del prisma de la lógica de la argumentación. (shrink)
El libro de María González Navarro se presenta a sí mismo como una “nueva hermenéutica” (23). La novedad involucra dos aspectos: uno que llamaremos metateórico y otro hermenéutico en propiedad. Hablando metateóricamente, el libro presenta una hermenéutica gadameriana vigorizada y robustecida por las teorías pragma-dialécticas de la argumentación. Desde el punto de vista hermenéutico propiamente dicho, la novedad reposa en que se considera que la interpretación correcta está indesligablemente vinculada a la argumentación abductiva.
Allhoff, Fritz, Patrick Lin, and Daniel Moore. 2010. What is nanotechnology and why does it matter? From science to ethics Content Type Journal Article Pages 209-211 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9289-z Authors Jennifer Kuzma, University of Minnesota, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, 301 19th Ave So, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 2.
Democracy requires a rather large tolerance for confusion and a secret relish for dissent. I am delighted to respond to Daniel Dombrowski’s book Rawls and Religion. Dombrowski and I share a number of what he would call comprehensive doctrine, such as the ethical treatment of animals, the relational worldview of process thought, and the idiosyncratic love of pacifism. So, immediately I was drawn in and claimed Dombrowski as a kindred spirit. With so many commonalities, including an interest in political (...) philosophy and religion, I approached this book with a built-in desire to engage with and respect his thinking. To be honest, I wondered if I would be able to critically engage Dombrowski’s book given our .. (shrink)
Contemporary Philosophy in Focus will offer a series of introductory volumes to many of the dominant philosophical thinkers of the current age. Each volume will consist of newly commissioned essays that will cover all the major contributions of a preeminent philosopher in a systematic and accessible manner. Author of such groundbreaking and influential books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel C. Dennett has reached a huge general and professional audience that extends way beyond the confines of academic (...) philosophy. He has made significant contributions to the study of consciousness, the development of the child's mind, cognitive ethnology, explanation in the social sciences, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory. This volume is the only truly introductory collection that traces these connections, explores the implications of Dennett's work, and furnishes the non-specialist with a fully-rounded account of why Dennett is such an important voice on the philosophical scene. (shrink)
Daniel Garber’s Leibniz: Body, Substance and Monad . When I first entered graduate school Dan’s previous book Descartes’s Metaphysical Physics had recently appeared, and it made a huge and lasting impression on me. All of a sudden I saw Descartes’s project in a much different, more intriguing light. This Garber fella had managed to open up a new area of Descartes’s thought to me, to tease out with great care his philosophical arguments, and to situate both in a broader (...) historical context in which they seemed to me at least much more at home. In short, Dan’s Descartes’s book is one of the main reasons why I work on Leibniz. And now we have his rich, learned, and provocative book on Leibniz to wrestle with. I am certain that it will similarly inspire another generation of early modern scholars as well – hopefully they won’t all be moved to work on Kant! (shrink)
In Setting Limits, Daniel Callahan advances the provocative thesis that age be a limiting factor in decisions to allocate certain kinds of health services to the elderly. However, when one looks at available data, one discovers that there are many more elderly women than there are elderly men, and these older women are poorer, more apt to live alone, and less likely to have informal social and personal supports than their male counterparts. Older women, therefore, will make the heaviest (...) demand on health care resources. If age were to become a limiting factor, as Dr. Callahan suggests it should, the limits that will be set are limits that will affect women more drastically than they affect men. This review essay examines the implications of Callahan's thesis for elderly women. (shrink)
According to Daniel Flage, Berkeley thinks that all necessary truths are founded on acts of will that assign meanings to words. After briefly commenting on the air of paradox contained in the title of Flage’s paper, and on the historical accuracy of Berkeley’s understanding of the abstractionist tradition, I make some remarks on two points made by Flage. Firstly, I discuss Flage’s distinction between the ontological ground of a necessary truth and our knowledge of a necessary truth. Secondly, I (...) discuss Flage’s attempt to show that, according to Berkeley, the resemblance relation does not constitute a necessary connection. (shrink)
(2001). Corpuscular alchemy and the tradition of Aristotle's Meteorology, with special reference to Daniel Sennert. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 145-153. doi: 10.1080/02698590120059013.
A taped conversational interview with Daniel Dennett and Bill Uzgalis covers a wide range of topics arising from Dennett’s thoughts about computing and human beings. The background of Dennett’s work is explored as are his views about mind-brain identity theory, artificial intelligence, functionalism, human exceptionalism, animal culture, language, pain, freedom and determinism, and quality of life.
In this discussion note I clarify the motivation behind my original paper "Social Mechanisms, Causal Inference and the Policy Relevance of Social Science." I argue that one of the tasks of philosophers of social science is to draw attention to methodological problems that are often forgotten or overlooked. Then I show that my original paper does not make the mistake or fallacy that Daniel Steel suggests in his comment on it. Key Words: social mechanisms causal inference social (...) policy. (shrink)