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  1. Daniel R. Boisvert (forthcoming). Charles Leslie Stevenson. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  2. Daniel R. Boisvert (2013). Mark Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):234-236.
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  3. Daniel R. Boisvert (2008). Expressive‐assertivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):169-203.
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  4. Daniel R. Boisvert (2007). Hilary Putnam, Ethics Without Ontology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), Pp. IX + 129. Utilitas 19 (4):526-528.
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  5. Daniel R. Boisvert & Christopher M. Lubbers (2003). Frege's Commitment to an Infinite Hierarchy of Senses. Philosophical Papers 32 (1):31-64.
    Abstract Though it has been claimed that Frege's commitment to expressions in indirect contexts not having their customary senses commits him to an infinite number of semantic primitives, Terrence Parsons has argued that Frege's explicit commitments are compatible with a two-level theory of senses. In this paper, we argue Frege is committed to some principles Parsons has overlooked, and, from these and other principles to which Frege is committed, give a proof that he is indeed committed to an infinite number (...)
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  6. Daniel R. Boisvert (1999). The Trouble with Harrison's 'the Trouble with Tarski'. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):376-383.
    In ‘The Trouble with Tarski’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 1–22, Jonathan Harrison attacks ‘Tarski‐style’ truth theories for both formalized and natural languages, on the grounds that (1) truth cannot be a property of sentences; (2) if it could be, T‐sentences would have to be necessary truths, which they are not; and (3) T‐sentences are not necessarily true and can even can be false. I reply that (1) cannot be an objection to Tarskian truth theories, since these can be (...)
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