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  1. Christian List & Daniel Stoljar, What a Dualist Should Say About the Exclusion Argument.
    On one very simple formulation, the exclusion argument against dualism starts from the assertion that the following theses are inconsistent: (1) Being in pain causes me to wince. (2) Being in phys1 causes me to wince. (3) Being in pain is distinct from being in phys. (4) If being in pain causes me to wince, nothing distinct from being in pain causes me to wince. The dualist is then invited to agree that (1) and (2) are empirical claims that are (...)
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  2. Daniel Stoljar, For: The Dictionary of American Philosophers.
    THOMSON, Judith Jarvis (1929– ) Judith Jarvis Thomson received her BA from Barnard College in 1950, her MA from Cambridge University in 1956, and a Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1959. Her first teaching position was at Barnard where she was a lecturer from 1955–9, an instructor from 1959–60, and then Assistant Professor from 1960–2. In 1963, she moved to Boston, first as an Assistant Professor at Boston University (1963–4), and then to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she has (...)
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  3. Daniel Stoljar, To Appear in the Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    There is at least one element in Strawson’s extremely rich paper that seems to me be correct and important, and Strawson is absolutely right to bring it out. This is the point that people in philosophy of mind go around assuming that they know what the physical facts are, if not in detail then in outline: “…they think they know a lot about the nature of the physical” (p.2). This assumption is false, or at any rate implausible, or at any (...)
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  4. Daniel Stoljar, Consciousness.
    Consciousness is extremely familiar yet it is at the limits—beyond the limits, some would say—of what one can sensibly talk about or explain. Perhaps this is the reason its study has drawn contributions from many fields including psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, anthropology, cultural and literary theory, artificial intelligence, physics, and others. The focus of this entry is on: the varieties of consciousness, different problems that have been raised about these varieties, and prospects for progress on these problems.
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  5. Daniel Stoljar & Christian List, Does the Exclusion Argument Put Any Pressure on Dualism?
    The exclusion argument is widely thought to put considerable pressure on dualism if not to refute it outright. We argue to the contrary that, whether or not their position is ultimately true, dualists have a plausible response. The response focuses on the notion of ‘distinctness’ as it occurs in the argument: if 'distinctness' is understood one way, the exclusion principle on which the argument is founded can be denied by the dualist; if it is understood another way, the argument is (...)
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  6. Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (forthcoming). Festschrift for Ned Block. MIT.
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  7. Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (forthcoming). Themes From Block. MIT Press.
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  8. Daniel Stoljar (forthcoming). Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
    _the subject matter assumption_ . Perry suggests that the subject matter assumption is false.
     
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  9. Daniel Stoljar (forthcoming). Strawson's Realistic Monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    There is at least one element in Strawson.
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  10. Daniel Stoljar (2013). Four Kinds of Russellian Monism. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. 17.
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  11. Daniel Stoljar (2013). Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):745-752.
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  12. Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2012). Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and (...)
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  13. Daniel Stoljar (2012). Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):389-410.
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  14. Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (2012). Introspection and Consciousness: An Overview. In Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Introspection stands at the interface between two major currents in philosophy and related areas of science: on the one hand, there are metaphysical and scientific questions about the nature of consciousness; and on the other hand, there are normative and epistemological questions about the nature of self-knowledge. Introspection seems tied up with consciousness, to the point that some writers define consciousness in terms of introspection; and it is also tied up with self-knowledge, since introspection is the distinctive way in which (...)
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  15. Daniel Stoljar (2011). On the Self-Locating Response to the Knowledge Argument. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 155 (3):437-443.
    On the self-locating response to the knowledge argument Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9612-2 Authors Daniel Stoljar, Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT, 0200 Australia Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  16. Tyler Doggett & Daniel Stoljar (2010). Does Nagel's Footnote Eleven Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Philosophical Issues 20 (1):125-143.
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  17. Daniel Stoljar (2010). Physicalism. Routledge.
    The standard picture -- Form and alternatives -- The starting point view -- The theory view -- Hempel's dilemma -- The necessity view -- Is necessitation necessary? -- Is necessitation sufficient? -- Skeptics and true believers -- Arguments against physicalism -- Arguments for physicalism.
     
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  18. Daniel Stoljar (2010). Review of Christopher S. Hill, Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (9).
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  19. Daniel Stoljar (2009). Perception. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
     
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  20. Daniel Stoljar (2009). Précis of Ignorance and Imagination. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):748-755.
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  21. Daniel Stoljar (2009). Response to Alter and Bennett. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):775-784.
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  22. Daniel Stoljar (2009). The Argument From Revelation. In Robert Nola & David Braddon Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.
    1. Introduction The story of Canberra, the capital of Australia, is roughly as follows. In 1901, when what is called.
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  23. Daniel Stoljar, The Deflationary Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    According to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a statement is true is just to assert the statement itself. For example, to say that ‘snow is white’ is true, or that it is true that snow is white, is equivalent to saying simply that snow is white, and this, according to the deflationary theory, is all that can be said significantly about the truth of ‘snow is white’.
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  24. Daniel Stoljar (2007). Consequences of Intentionalism. Erkenntnis (Special Issue) 66 (1-2):247--70.
    Most of the recent discussion in philosophy of mind concerning intentionalism.
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  25. Daniel Stoljar (2007). Distinctions in Distinction. In Jesper Kallestrup & Jakob Hohwy (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Causation and Explanation in the Special Sciences. Oxford University Press.
    1.Puzzle According to a standard view in contemporary metaphysics, there are no necessary connections between distinct properties. But according to a standard view in philosophy of mind there are necessary connections between distinct properties. In short, we have a puzzle: standard metaphysics inconsistent with standard philosophy of mind. By ‘a standard view in contemporary metaphysics’ I mean, of course, Hume’s dictum that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. I don’t mean the historical Hume; whether the historical Hume held (...)
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  26. Daniel Stoljar (2007). Two Conceivability Arguments Compared. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44.
    The conclusion of this argument (hereafter ZA) entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. If it is possible that I have a zombie duplicate however, then it is possible that the physical truths are as they are and some psychological truth is different. Hence 3 entails that physicalism is false. The second conceivability argument is one that is almost as famous, though perhaps (...)
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  27. Daniel Stoljar (2006). Actors and Zombies. In Alex Byrne & J. Thomson (eds.), Content and Modalities: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press. 1.
    1. Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by the intersection of three topics: physicalism, the conceivability argument, and the necessary a posteriori. I will be concerned here (i) to describe (what I take to be) the consensus view of these topics; (ii) to explain why I think this account is mistaken; and (iii) to briefly sketch an alternative.
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  28. Daniel Stoljar (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson - 'Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):170-176.
  29. Daniel Stoljar (2006). Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Ignorance and Imagination advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, Stoljar argues, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view (...)
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  30. Daniel Stoljar (2006). Review: Should Moore Have Followed His Own Method? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 129 (3):609 - 618.
    I discuss Soames's proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore's moral philossophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be self-evident. The method in Moore's epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In view of the distance between something's being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames's proposal is mistaken.
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  31. Daniel Stoljar (2006). Should Moore Have Followed His Own Method? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 129 (3):609 - 618.
    I discuss Soames’s proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore’s moral philosophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be self-evident. The method in Moore’s epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In review of the distance between something’s being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames’s proposal is mistaken.
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  32. Daniel Stoljar (2005). Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts. Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.
    A phenomenal concept is the concept of a particular type of sensory or perceptual experience, where the notion of experience is understood phenomenologically. A recent and increasingly influential idea in philosophy of mind suggests that reflection on these concepts will play a major role in the debate about conscious experience, and in particular in the defense of physicalism, the thesis that psychological truths supervene on physical truths. According to this idea.
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  33. Daniel Stoljar (2005). Review of Colin McGinn, Consciousness and its Objects. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (2).
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  34. Martin Davies & Daniel Stoljar (2004). Introduction. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):1-10.
    The two-dimensional semantic framework, with its two-dimensional matrices of truth values, was developed for tense logic by Frank Vlach (1973), building on work by Hans Kamp (1971), and for modal logic by Lennart Åqvist (1973), Krister Segerberg (1973), and Bas van Fraassen (1977). Other antecedents of the contemporary use of the framework are found in formal work on contextdependence by Richard Montague (1968) and David Lewis (1970) and especially in David Kaplan’s distinction between character and content in ‘Demonstratives’ (published in (...)
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  35. Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2004). There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
    The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.
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  36. Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2004). There's Something About Mary. The Mit Press.
    Key papers on one of the most important and provocative thought experiments in philosophy of mind.
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  37. Daniel Stoljar, Peter Ludlow & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.) (2004). There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
    The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.
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  38. Daniel Stoljar (2004). The Argument From Diaphanousness. In M. Escurdia, Robert J. Stainton & Christopher D. Viger (eds.), Language, Mind and World: Special Issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Alberta Press. 341--90.
    1. Introduction In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, G.E.Moore observed that, "when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous" (1922; p.25). Many philosophers, but Gilbert Harman (1990, 1996) in particular, have suggested that this observation forms the basis of an argument against qualia, usually called the argument from diaphanousness or transparency.1 But even its friends concede that it is none too clear what the argument (...)
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  39. Michael Smith & Daniel Stoljar (2003). Is There a Lockean Argument Against Expressivism? Analysis 63 (1):76–86.
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  40. Daniel Stoljar (2003). Introduction. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. The Mit Press.
    Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of (...)
     
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  41. Daniel Stoljar (2003). Physicalism Plus Intentionalism Equals Error Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):790-791.
    Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) combine physicalism about color with intentionalism about color experience. I argue that this combination leads to an “error theory” about color experience, that is, the doctrine that color experience is systematically illusory. But this conflicts with another aspect of B&H's position, namely, the denial of error theory.
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  42. Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Introduction to There's Something About Mary. In Peter Ludlow, Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), There's Something About Mary.
    Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of (...)
     
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  43. Daniel Stoljar & Michael Smith (2003). Is There a Lockean Argument Against Expressivism? Analysis 63 (1):76 - 86.
    It is sometimes suggested that expressivism in meta-ethics is to be criticized on grounds which do not themselves concern meta-ethics in particular, but which rather concern philosophy of language more generally. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1998; see also Jackson and Pettit 1999, and Jackson 2001) have recently advanced a novel version of such an argument. They begin by noting that expressivism in its central form makes two claims—that ethical sentences are not truth evaluable, and that to assert an ethical (...)
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  44. Alan Hájek & Daniel Stoljar (2001). Crimmins, Gonzales and Moore. Analysis 61 (3):208–213.
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  45. Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms (...)
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  46. Daniel Stoljar (2001). The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):393-413.
    The conceivability argument (CA) against physicalism1 starts from the prem- ises that: (1) It is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, i.e., that there is someone who is physically identical to me and yet who lacks phenomenal con- sciousness; and (2) If it is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, then it is possible that I have a zombie-twin. These premises entail that physicalism is false, for physicalism is the claim—or can be assumed for our purposes to be the claim2—that.
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  47. Daniel Stoljar (2001). Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-81.
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  48. Daniel Stoljar & Alan Hájek (2001). Crimmins, Gonzales and Moore. Analysis 61 (3):208 - 213.
    Gonzales tells Mark Crimmins (1992) that Crimmins knows him under two guises, and that under his other guise Crimmins thinks him an idiot. Knowing his cleverness, but not knowing which guise he has in mind, Crimmins trusts Gonzales but does not know which of his beliefs to revise. He therefore asserts to Gonzales.
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