73 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
Daniel Whiting [72]Daniel J. Whiting [1]
See also:
Profile: Daniel Whiting (University of Southampton)
  1. Daniel Whiting (2014). Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8:1-22.
    Objective reasons are given by the facts. Subjective reasons are given by one’s perspective on the facts. Subjective reasons, not objective reasons, determine what it is rational to do. In this paper, I argue against a prominent account of subjective reasons. The problem with that account, I suggest, is that it makes what one has subjective reason to do, and hence what it is rational to do, turn on matters outside or independent of one’s perspective. After explaining and establishing this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  2. Daniel Whiting (2013). Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press
    That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, the criticism (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  3. Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Daniel Whiting (2014). Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action. In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press
    Subjects appear to take only evidential considerations to provide reason or justification for believing. That is to say that subjects do not take practical considerations—the kind of considerations which might speak in favour of or justify an action or decision—to speak in favour of or justify believing. This is puzzling; after all, practical considerations often seem far more important than matters of truth and falsity. In this paper, I suggest that one cannot explain this, as many have tried, merely by (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Daniel Whiting (2013). Truth: The Aim and Norm of Belief. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):121-136.
    Invited contribution to The Aim of Belief, a special issue of Teorema, guest-edited by J. Zalabardo.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  6. Daniel Whiting (2010). Should I Believe the Truth? Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.
    Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi raise a number of serious objections to this view. In this paper, I concede that Bykvist and Hattiangadi's criticisms might be effective against the formulation of the norm of truth that they consider, but suggest that an alternative is available. After outlining that alternative, I argue that it is not vulnerable to objections parallel to those (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
  7. Daniel Whiting (2016). Against Second‐Order Reasons. Noûs 49 (4).
    A normative reason for a person to φ is a consideration which favours φing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person φs. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons to φ for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I then (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8.  33
    Daniel Whiting (2013). The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False). Philosophy 8 (2):219-242.
    It is commonplace to claim that it is good to believe the truth. In this paper, I reject that claim and argue that the considerations which might seem to support it in fact support a quite distinct though superficially similar claim, namely, that it is bad to believe the false. This claim is typically either ignored completely or lumped together with the previous claim, perhaps on the assumption that the two are equivalent, or at least that they stand or fall (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  9.  18
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting, If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought To?, You Ought To?
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  57
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (2016). Reasons and Guidance. Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):214-235.
    Many philosophers accept a response constraint on normative reasons: that p is a reason for you to φ only if you are able to φ for the reason that p. This constraint offers a natural way to cash out the familiar and intuitive thought that reasons must be able to guide us, and has been put to work as a premise in a range of influential arguments in ethics and epistemology. However, the constraint requires interpretation and faces putative counter-examples due (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Daniel Whiting (2010). Particular and General: Wittgenstein, Linguistic Rules, and Context. In The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan
    Wittgenstein famously remarks that ‘the meaning of a word is its use’ (PI §43). Whether or not one views this as gesturing at a ‘theory’ of meaning, or instead as aiming primarily at dissuading us from certain misconceptions of language that are a source of puzzlement, it is clear that Wittgenstein held that for certain purposes the meaning of an expression could profitably be characterised as its use. Throughout his later writings, however, Wittgenstein’s appeal to the notion of use pulls (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting (2014). The Normativity of Belief. Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
    This is a survey of recent debates concerning the normativity of belief. We explain what the thesis that belief is normative involves, consider arguments for and against that thesis, and explore its bearing on debates in metaethics.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  13.  44
    Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting (2014). The Normativity of Belief. Analysis 74 (4):698-713.
    This is a survey of recent debates concerning the normativity of belief. We explain what the thesis that belief is normative involves, consider arguments for and against that thesis, and explore its bearing on debates in metaethics.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  14. Daniel Whiting (2013). It's Not What You Said, It's the Way You Said It: Slurs and Conventional Implicatures. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):364-377.
    In this paper, I defend against a number of criticisms an account of slurs, according to which the same semantic content is expressed in the use of a slur as is expressed in the use of its neutral counterpart, while in addition the use of a slur conventionally implicates a negative, derogatory attitude. Along the way, I criticise competing accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of slurs, namely, Hom's 'combinatorial externalism' and Anderson and Lepore's 'prohibitionism'.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  15. Daniel Whiting (2009). Is Meaning Fraught with Ought? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (4):535-555.
    According to Normativism, linguistic meaning is intrinsically normative (I shall explore what this amounts to below). One, though not the only, reason for Normativism’s importance is that it bears on the prospects of providing an account of meaning in the terms available to the natural sciences. In turn, since linguistic behaviour is inextricably bound up with both non linguistic behaviour and the psychological attitudes informing it, Normativism might (if true) pose a serious challenge to the project of accommodating creatures such (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  16. Daniel Whiting (2007). The Normativity of Meaning Defended. Analysis 67 (294):133–140.
    Meaning, according to a significant number of philosophers, is an intrinsically normative notion.1 For this reason, it is suggested, meaning is not conducive to a naturalistic explanation. In this paper, I shall not address whether this is indeed so. Nor shall I present arguments in support of the normativity thesis (see Glock 2005; Kripke 1982). Instead, I shall examine and respond to two forceful objections recently (and independently) raised against it by Boghossian (2005), Hattiangadi (2006) and Miller (2006). Although I (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  17. Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
    It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief 's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief 's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief 's standard of correctness and the epistemic (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  18.  35
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting, If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought To?, You Ought To?
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Daniel Whiting (2013). Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion. Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.
    The view that truth is the norm of assertion has fallen out of fashion. The recent trend has been to think that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Objections to the knowledge view proceed almost exclusively by appeal to alleged counterexamples. While it no doubt has a role to play, such a strategy relies on intuitions concerning hypothetical cases, intuitions which might not be shared and which might shift depending on how the relevant cases are fleshed out. In this paper, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  20.  9
    Daniel Whiting, Against Second-Order Reasons.
    A normative reason for a person to? is a consideration which favours?ing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person?s. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons to? for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Daniel Whiting (2007). Between Old and New: Brandom's Analytic Pragmatism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):191-205.
    In his latest book, Between Saying and Doing, Robert Brandom aims to lay the foundations for a new approach to philosophy, 'analytic pragmatism', which as the name suggests aims to reconcile the insights of the pragmatists with the ambitions of the analytic tradition. To do so, Brandom offers what he describes as a ‘new metatheoretic conceptual apparatus’. In this paper, I raises questions concerning whether the method underlying that apparatus is really so new, and challenge the suggestion that the results (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Daniel Whiting (2013). What is the Normativity of Meaning? Inquiry:1-20.
    (2013). What is the Normativity of Meaning?. Inquiry. ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2013.852132.
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  8
    Daniel Whiting, Against Second-Order Reasons.
    A normative reason for a person to? is a consideration which favours?ing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person?s. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons to? for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Daniel Whiting, Introduction.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  92
    Daniel Whiting (2015). The Glass is Half Empty: A New Argument for Pessimism About Aesthetic Testimony. British Journal of Aesthetics 55 (1):91-107.
    Call the view that it is possible to acquire aesthetic knowledge via testimony, optimism, and its denial, pessimism. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for pessimism. It works by turning attention away from the basis of the relevant belief, namely, testimony, and toward what that belief in turn provides a basis for, namely, other attitudes. In short, I argue that an aesthetic belief acquired via testimony cannot provide a rational basis for further attitudes, such as admiration, and that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26.  8
    Daniel Whiting (2016). Against Second‐Order Reasons. Noûs 50 (4).
    A normative reason for a person to φ is a consideration which favours φing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person φs. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons to φ for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I then (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. Daniel Whiting (2009). On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning: Use, Meaning and Normativity. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):416-434.
    A number of prominent philosophers advance the following ideas: (1) Meaning is use. (2) Meaning is an intrinsically normative notion. Call (1) the use thesis, hereafter UT, and (2) the normativity thesis, hereafter NT. They come together in the view that for a linguistic expression to have meaning is for there to be certain proprieties governing its employment.1 These ideas are often associated with a third.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  22
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (2016). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  16
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (2016). Reasons and Guidance. Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):214-235.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  58
    Daniel Whiting (2015). Truth is the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn. Erkenntnis 80 (6):1245-1253.
    In a paper in this journal, I defend the view that truth is the fundamental norm for assertion and, in doing so, reject the view that knowledge is the fundamental norm for assertion. In a recent response, Littlejohn raises a number of objections against my arguments. In this reply, I argue that Littlejohn’s objections are unsuccessful.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31.  76
    Daniel Whiting (2015). Knowledge is Not Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason. Logos and Episteme 6:237-243.
    Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces a problem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Daniel Whiting (2012). Epistemic Value and Achievement. Ratio 25 (2):216-230.
    Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  33.  52
    Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Languages, Language-Games, and Forms of Life. In H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein. Wiley-Blackwell
    In this paper, after outlining the methodological role Wittgenstein's appeal to language-games is supposed to play, I examine the picture of language which his discussion of such games and their relations to what Wittgenstein calls forms of life suggests. It is a picture according to which language and its employment are inextricably connected to wider contexts—they are embedded in specific natural and social environments, they are tied to purposive activities serving provincial needs, and caught up in distinctive ways of life (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  34.  9
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (2016). Reasons and Guidance. Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):214-235.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  11
    Daniel Whiting, What is the Normativity of Meaning?
    There has been much debate over whether to accept the claim that meaning is normative. One obstacle to making progress in that debate is that it is not always clear what the claim amounts to. In this paper, I try to resolve a dispute between those who advance the claim concerning how it should be understood. More specifically, I critically examine two competing conceptions of the normativity of meaning, rejecting one and defending the other. Though the paper aims to settle (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  86
    Daniel Whiting (2006). Conceptual Role Semantics. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In the philosophy of language, conceptual role semantics (hereafter CRS) is a theory of what constitutes the meanings possessed by expressions of natural languages, or the propositions expressed by their utterance. In the philosophy of mind, it is a theory of what constitutes the contents of psychological attitudes, such as beliefs or desires. CRS comes in a variety of forms, not always clearly distinguished by commentators. Such versions are known variously as functional/causal/computational role semantics, and more broadly as use-theories of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  37. Daniel J. Whiting (2008). Conservatives and Racists: Inferential Role Semantics and Pejoratives. Philosophia 36 (3):375-388.
    According to inferential role semantics, for any given expression to possess a particular meaning one must be disposed to make or, alternatively, acknowledge as correct certain inferential transitions involving it. As Williamson points out, pejoratives such as ‘Boche’ seem to provide a counter-example to IRS. Many speakers are neither disposed to use such expressions nor consider it proper to do so. But it does not follow, as IRS appears to entail, that such speakers do not understand pejoratives or that they (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38. Daniel Whiting (2007). Inferentialism, Representationalism and Derogatory Words. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):191 – 205.
    In a recent paper, after outlining various distinguishing features of derogatory words, Jennifer Hornsby suggests that the phenomenon raises serious difficulties for inferentialism. Against Hornsby, I claim that derogatory words do not pose any insuperable problems for inferentialism, so long as it is supplemented with apparatus borrowed from Grice and Hare. Moreover, I argue, derogatory expressions pose difficulties for Hornsby's favoured alternative theory of meaning, representationalism, unless it too is conjoined with a similar Grice/Hare mechanism. So, the upshot of the (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39.  53
    Daniel Whiting (2006). Between Primitivism and Naturalism: Brandom's Theory of Meaning. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (3):3-22.
    Many philosophers accept that a naturalistic reduction of meaning is in principle impossible, since behavioural regularities or dispositions are consistent with any number of semantic descriptions. One response is to view meaning as primitive. In this paper, I explore Brandom’s alternative, which is to specify behaviour in non-semantic but normative terms. Against Brandom, I argue that a norm specified in non-semantic terms might correspond to any number of semantic norms. Thus, his theory of meaning suffers from the very same kind (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  40.  7
    Daniel Whiting (2016). A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief, by Allan Hazlett. Mind 125 (499):918-922.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  88
    Daniel Whiting (2008). The Use Of'use'. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):135-147.
    Many equate the meaning of a linguistic expression with its use. This paper investigates prominent objections to the equivalence claim and argues that they are unsuccessful. Once one suitably distinguishes the kind of use to be identified with meaning, the two do not diverge. Doing so, however, requires employing terms that are cognates of ‘meaning’ (if not ‘meaning’ itself). Nonetheless, I stress, this does not count against the equivalence claim. Moreover, one should not assume that the circularity on this occasion (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42. Daniel Whiting (ed.) (2010). The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
  43. Daniel Whiting (2011). Spinoza, the No Shared Attribute Thesis, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (3):543 - 548.
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 543-548, May 2011.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  20
    Daniel Whiting (2006). Meaning-Theories and the Principle of Humanity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):697-716.
    In this paper, I briefly outline the notion of a truth-conditional meaning-theory and introduce two prominent problems it faces. The“extensionality problem” arises because not all correct specifications of truth-conditions are meaning-giving. The “explanatory problem”concerns the extent to which truth-conditional meaning-theories can contribute to the task of clarifying the nature of linguistic meaning.The “principle of humanity” is supposed to resolve both issues simultaneously. I argue that it fails to do so.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  45.  8
    Daniel Whiting, Does Belief Aim at the Truth?
    It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief’s aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief’s aim using the notion of truth. In this paper, by considering whether they can account for belief’s standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  54
    Daniel Whiting (2007). Fregean Sense and Anti-Individualism. Philosophical Books 48 (3):233-240.
    The definitive version of this article is published in Philosophical Books 48.3 July 2007 pp. 233-240 by Blackwell Publishing, and is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47. Daniel Whiting (2008). Meaning Holism and de Re Ascription. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 575-599.
    According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression.1 Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Daniel Whiting (2011). Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.
    Abstract: According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non-paradoxical) instances of the schema:(DS) It is true that p if and only if p.According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth-conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like). On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non-negligible way (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  79
    Daniel Whiting (2009). Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-599.
    According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression.1 Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  92
    Daniel Whiting (2010). Particularly General and Generally Particular: Language, Rules and Meaning. Logique Et Analyse 53 (209):77-90.
    Semantic generalists and semantic particularists disagree over the role of rules or principles in linguistic competence and in the determination of linguistic meaning, and hence over the importance of the notions of a rule or of a principle in philosophical accounts of language. In this paper, I have argued that the particularist’s case against generalism is far from decisive and that by moderating the claims she makes on behalf of her thesis the generalist can accommodate many of the considerations that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 73