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  1. David A. Denby (2014). Essence and Intrinsicality. In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. de gruyter. 87-109.
    In the first half of this paper, I argue that essential properties are intrinsic and that this permits a modal analysis of essence that is immune the sort of objections raised by Fine (1994). In the second half, I argue that intrinsic properties collectively have a certain structure and that this accounts for some observations about essences: that things are essentially determinate; that things often have properties within a certain range essentially; and that the essential properties of things are their (...)
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  2. David A. Denby (2010). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties: A Reply to Hoffmann-Kolss. Mind 119 (475):773-782.
    In response to Hoffmann-Kolss, I modify my account of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties previously published in this journal. I also strengthen the reason I gave to think my account pins down the distinction uniquely.
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  3. David A. Denby (2008). Generating Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):191 - 207.
    Our knowledge of the most basic alternative possibilities can be thought of as generated recursively from what we know about the actual world. But what are the generating principles? According to one view, they are recombinational: roughly, alternative possibilities are generated by “patching together” parts of distinct worlds or “blotting out” parts of worlds to yield new worlds. I argue that this view is inadequate. It is difficult to state in a way that is true and non-trivial, and anyway fails (...)
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  4. David A. Denby (2007). A Note on Analysing Substancehood. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):473 – 484.
    I propose an analysis of the notion of a substance. I define two 'quasi-logical' independence relations, and state the analysis in terms of the distribution of these relations among substances and properties generally. This analysis treats the categories of substance and property as mutually dependent. To show that it (probably) states a sufficient condition for substance, I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium. This illustrates a promising general approach to analysing fundamental metaphysical notions.
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  5. David A. Denby (2006). In Defence of Magical Ersatzism. In Philosophical Quarterly. 161-74.
    In this paper, I attack David Lewis’s objection to a generic theory of modality he calls “Magical Ersatzism”. His objection takes the form of a dilemma directed at its linchpin, a relation he calls “selection”. This, he argues, must be either an internal or an external relation, but is unintelligible either way. However, his argument against classifying selection as internal is really just a version of the general problem of how we manage to grasp predicates in cases of underdetermination. This (...)
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  6. David A. Denby (2006). The Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties. Mind 115 (457):1-17.
    I propose an analysis of the metaphysically important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and, in the process, provide a neglected model for the analysis of recalcitrant distinctions generally. First, I recap some difficulties with Kim's well-known (1982) proposal and its recent descendants. Then I define two independence relations among properties and state a ‘quasi-logical’ analysis of the distinction in terms of them. Unusually, my proposal is holistic, but I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium and (...)
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  7. David A. Denby (2001). Determinable Nominalism. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):297--327.
    I present, motivate, and defend a theory of properties. Its novel feature is that it takes entire determinables-together-with-their-determinates as its units of analysis. This, I argue, captures the relations of entailment and exclusion among properties, solves the problem of extensionality, and points the way towards an actualist analysis of modality.
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