Can one consistently deny the permissibility of abortion while endorsing the killing of human embryos for the sake of stem cell research? The question is not trivial; for even if one accepts that abortion is prima facie wrong in all cases, there are significant differences with many of the embryos used for stem cell research from those involved in abortion—most prominently, many have been abandoned in vitro, and appear to have no reasonably likely meaningful future. On these grounds one might (...) think to maintain a strong position against abortion but endorse killing human embryos for the sake of stem cell research and its promising benefits. I will argue, however, that these differences are not decisive. Thus, one who accepts a strong view against abortion is committed to the moral impermissibility of killing human embryos for the sake of stem cell research. I do not argue for the moral standing of either abortion or the killing of embryos for stem cell research; I only argue for the relation between the two. Thus the conclusion is relevant to those with a strong view in favor of the permissibility of killing embryos for the sake of research as much as for those who may strongly oppose abortion; neither can consider their position in isolation from the other. (shrink)
Some recent views of action have claimed that a correct conceptual account of action must include second-order motivational states. This follows from the fact that first-order motivational states such as desires account for action or mere behavior in which the agent's participation is lacking; thus, first-order motivational states cannot by themselves account for action in which the agent participates, so-called full-blooded action. I argue that representing the agent's participation by means of second-order states is bound to fail because it misrepresents (...) what an agent is doing when acting in the full-blooded sense. I begin by characterizing full-blooded action and explaining the failure of first-order accounts to explain it. I next show that while second-order accounts have some success in explaining full-blooded action, they fail to distinguish it from action which exhibits motivational alienation. I then argue that even if this problem were resolved, the second-order accounts more fundamentally misrepresent full-blooded action by depicting such action in an introverted manner. I conclude by considering a sketch of agency and full-blooded action that does not rely on second-order states and by addressing a primary concern thought to favor the second-order accounts, the concern of agent causation. (shrink)
Ethics in business has been an increasingly controversial and important topic of discussion over the last decade. Debate continues about whether ethics should be a part of business, but also includes how business can implement ethical theory in day-to-day operations. Most discussions focus on either traditional moral philosophy, which offers little of practical value for the business community, or psychological theories of moral reasoning, which have been shown to be flawed and incomplete. The theory presented here is called the Developmental (...) Self-Valuing Theory, and adapts the general psychological theory of Albert Bandura for ethics in business. In this theory, individuals first learn moral values from associations with others who are significant in their lives. Secondly, self-regulation is learned through a process of self-observation, self-judgment and self-reaction. Thirdly, the individual must believe that he can act ethically. Situational constraints and inducements, as well as positive and negative consequences for specific behaviors, will also affect the level of ethical performance. Each of these elements is examined and combined to achieve a practical method for increasing the level of ethics in corporate activity through selection, training and situational enhancement. (shrink)
Wesley Wildman: Religious philosophy as multidisciplinary comparative inquiry: envisioning a future for the philosophy of religion Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11153-012-9339-4 Authors Jeppe Sinding Jensen, Department of Culture and Society, Faculty of Arts, Aarhus University, Tasingegade 3, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark Journal International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Online ISSN 1572-8684 Print ISSN 0020-7047.
This article describes how a unique high school programme, not formally designed to teach moral principles or character lessons, contributed substantially to the character education of its students. Graduates over 20 years old were interviewed ( n =106) and completed a questionnaire ( n =204). Findings suggest the programme teachers helped students develop character attributes by providing a desirable character education environment. A majority of students reported that the programme was personalised, practical and, in many cases, life changing. A majority (...) of the students also indicated that the programme helped them develop an appreciation and respect for others and the environment, while helping them prepare for higher education. We present this programme as a model for character education at the high school level. Details are presented so that the programme can be replicated in other settings. We conclude that the success of this programme can be understood in terms of teachers' willingness to encourage students to take responsibility for their lives, and their learning through modeling of high character values, use of an integrated and experiential curriculum, and employment of a dialogical perspective on active education. (shrink)
From a certain philosophical perspective, one that is at least as old as Plato but which is addressed also by Aristotle and Kant, business ethics – to the extent that it is marketed as form of enlightened self-interest — constitutes a Thrasymachean compromise: to argue that it is to our advantage to conduct business ethically, perhaps even advantageous to the bottom-line, comes curiously close to endorsing what Plato called the 'shadow of virtue' — i.e., of becoming temperate for the sake (...) of illtemperance. And yet it also seems true that moralistic campaigns to achieve the impossible, e.g., pursuing justice for its own sake or eradicating egoism, often "detract from attaining really important things." This essay explores the need, in business ethics as well as elsewhere, to make — what Dewey and Niebuhr considered to be — painful if not principled philosophical compromises in order to secure is a society in which there would be "enough justice to avoid complete disaster.". (shrink)
When it comes to conflict over risk management priorities in food production, a number of observers, including myself, have called for some sort of public deliberation as a means of resolving the moral disagreements underlying such conflicts. This paper asks how, precisely, such deliberation might be facilitated. It is shown that representative democracy and the liberal regulation that most Western democracies adhere to place important constraints on public deliberation. The challenge is to find forums for public deliberation that can operate (...) within these constraints while still making a constructive contribution. (shrink)
This paper presents the idea of a decision-support system for a livestock farm, called “ethical accounting”, to be used as an extension of traditional cost accounting. “Ethical accounting” seeks to make available to the farmer information about how his decisions affect the interests of farm animals, consumers and future generations. Furthermore, “ethical accounting” involves value-based planning. Thus, the farmer should base his choice of production plan on reflections as to his fundamental objectives, and he should make his final decision only (...) after having seriously considered the various consequences for the affected parties. (shrink)
In this collection of interviews, Derrick Jensen discusses the destructive dominant culture with ten people who have devoted their lives to undermining it. Whether it is Carolyn Raffensperger and her radical approach to public health, or Thomas Berry on perceiving the sacred; be it Kathleen Dean Moore reminding us that our bodies are made of mountains, rivers, and sunlight; or Vine Deloria asserting that our dreams tell us more about the world than science ever can, the activists and philosophers (...) interviewed in How Shall I Live My Life? each bravely present a few of the endless forms that resistance can and must take. (shrink)
The dialogue is concerned to do two things. In the first place it seeks to display the extreme difficulty of discussing conceptual issues with students whose academic backgrounds are the social sciences. Its point is not to criticize any element of those disciplines per se, but to illustrate the sort of misunderstandings which many beginning students appear to acquire from them. The second point is to offer a reminder that perhaps the part of philosophizing which requires the most care is (...) the stating of just the question which one wishes to raise ? the getting into position, as it were, to think to any end. (shrink)
Numerous studies provide evidence that brief training programmes have been successful in quickly advancing moral reasoning in specific areas. In most of these studies children are asked to respond to moral dilemmas that are presented while in a highly structured laboratory setting (Bandura and McDonald, 1963; Jensen and Hafen, 1973; Jensen and Hughston, 1972; Jensen and Rytting, 1972; Jensen and Vance, 1972). At the present time it is uncertain if such training approaches are effective outside the (...) laboratory in a natural context such as the classroom. The purpose of this study was to determine the effectiveness of brief training programmes in the classroom using an indirect approach where the correct responses are not directly identified and reinforced. Two areas of moral thinking were selected for testing: children's reasons for doing good and delay of gratification. (shrink)
In December’s Quadrant James Franklin asked “Is Jensenism compatible with Christianity?” and claimed of Sydney Anglicans that they “fear the gospels, for the gospel message is inconvenient”. This brand of “narrow” “Bible-based” Christianity pits Paul against Jesus, he says; engages in selective reading of the Bible; and creates “an inwardlooking and recent sect.”.
The recent publication of Dewey's seminar lectures on Hegel's philosophy of spirit, which he delivered in Chicago in 1897, contributes significantly to the ongoing task of more accurately appreciating the confluence of historical influences that shaped the trajectory of classical American philosophy. Dewey's 1897 Hegel lectures are situated within their philosophical context by two seminal essays describing the relevance of recent scholarship to the philosophical or historical question of Dewey's ambivalent indebtedness to Hegel. In their essays, Shook and Good emphasize (...) the positive roles that certain Hegelian themes played in Dewey's mature thought—that is, in texts produced many years after Dewey's alleged .. (shrink)
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general (...) methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein. (shrink)
It is common to define egalitarianism in terms of an inequality ordering, which is supposed to have some weight in overall evaluations of outcomes. Egalitarianism, thus defined, implies that levelling down makes the outcome better in respect of reducing inequality; however, the levelling down objection claims there can be nothing good about levelling down. The priority view, on the other hand, does not have this implication. This paper challenges the common view. The standard definition of egalitarianism implicitly assumes a context. (...) Once this context is made clear, it is easily seen that egalitarianism could be defined alternatively in terms of valuing a benefit to a person inversely to how well off he is relative to others. The levelling down objection does not follow from this definition. Moreover, the common definition does not separate egalitarian orderings from prioritarian ones. It is useful to do this by requiring that on egalitarianism, additively separable orderings should be excluded. But this requirement is stated as a condition on the alternative definition of egalitarianism, from which the levelling down objection does not follow. (shrink)
Is it legitimate for a business to concentrate on profits under respect for the law and ethical custom? On the one hand, there seems to be good reasons for claiming that a corporation has a duty to act for the benefit of all its stakeholders. On the other hand, this seems to dissolve the notion of a private business; but then again, a private business would appear to be exempted from ethical responsibility. This is what Kenneth Goodpaster has called the (...) stakeholder paradox: either we have ethics without business or we have business without ethics. Through a different route, I reach the same solution to this paradox as Goodpaster, namely that a corporation is the instrument of the shareholders only, but that shareholders still have an obligation to act ethically responsibly. To this, I add discussion of Friedman’s claim that this responsibility consists in increasing profits. I show that most of his arguments fail. Only pragmatic considerations allow to a certain extent that some of the ethical responsibility is left over to democratic regulation. (shrink)
A number of researchers have begun to demonstrate that the widely discussed ?Knobe effect? (wherein participants are more likely to think that actions with bad side-effects are brought about intentionally than actions with good or neutral side-effects) can be found in theory of mind judgments that do not involve the concept of intentional action. In this article we report experimental results that show that attributions of knowledge can be influenced by the kinds of (non-epistemic) concerns that drive the Knobe effect. (...) Our findings suggest there is good reason to think that the epistemic version of the Knobe effect is a theoretically significant and robust effect, and that the goodness or badness of side-effects can often have greater influence on participant knowledge attributions than explicit information about objective probabilities. Thus, our work sheds light on important ways in which participant assessments of actions can affect the epistemic assessments participants make of agents? beliefs. (shrink)
This paper analyzes the number of procedural and substantive tension points with which a conscientious whistleblower struggles. Included in the former are such questions as: (1) Am I properly depicting the seriousness of the problem? (2) Have I secured the information properly, analyzed it appropriately, and presented it fairly? (3) Are my motives appropriate? (4) Have I tried fully enough to have the problem corrected within the organization? (5) Should I blow the whistle while still a member of the organization (...) or after having left it? (6) Should I keep anonymity? (7) How ethical is it to assume the role of a judge? (8) How ethical is it to set in motion an act which will likely be very costly to many people? Substantive tension points include such questions as: (1) How fully am I living up to my moral obligations to my organization and my colleagues? (2) Am I appropriately upholding the ethical standards of my profession? (3) How adversely will my action affect my family and other primary groups? (4) Am I being true to myself? (5) How will my action affect the health of such basic values as freedom of expression, independent judgment, courage, fairness, cooperativeness, and loyalty? (shrink)
The Commission's recentinterpretation of the Precautionary Principleis used as starting point for an analysis ofthe moral foundation of this principle. ThePrecautionary Principle is shown to have theethical status of an amendment to a liberalprinciple to the effect that a state only mayrestrict a person's actions in order to preventunacceptable harm to others. The amendmentallows for restrictions being justified even incases where there is no conclusive scientificevidence for the risk of harmful effects.However, the liberal tradition has seriousproblems in determining when a (...) risk of harm isunacceptable. Nevertheless, reasonable liberalarguments in favor of precaution can be basedon considerations of irreversible harm andgeneral fear of harm. But it is unclear whenthere considerations can be overridden. (shrink)
Consider a sequence of outcomes of descending value, A > B > C > . . . > Z. According to Larry Temkin, there are reasons to deny the continuity axiom in certain cases, i.e. cases of triplets of outcomes A, B and Z, where A and B differ little in value, but B and Z differ greatly. But, Temkin argues, if we assume continuity for cases, i.e. cases where the loss is small, we can derive continuity for the case (...) by applying the axiom of substitution and the axiom of transitivity. The rejection of continuity for cases therefore renders the triad of continuity in cases, the axiom of substitution and the axiom of transitivity inconsistent. (shrink)
In February 1992, The (Portland) Oregonian announced it would no longer use sports team names that readers may find offensive, such as Redskins, Redmen, Indians, and Braves. Many journalists have criticized The Oregonian's decision, calling it an abandonment of the journalistic principles of objectivity and neutrality. This article addresses the ethical/political issues involved in the controversy through an examination of commentaries by journalists published in newspapers and public comments made by journalists critical of The Oregonian. After evaluating the explicit and (...) implicit assumptions behind those criticisms of The Oregonian, a defense of the newspaper's decision that relies on more overtly political arguments than the paper's managers used will be offered. (shrink)
This paper aims to reexamine Nietzsche’s early interpretation of Heraclitus in an attempt to resolve some longstanding scholarly misconceptions. Rather than articulate similarities or delineate the lines of influence, this study engages Nietzsche’s interpretation itself in its historical setting, for the first time acknowledging the contextual framework in which he was working. This framework necessarily combines Nietzsche’s reading in philology, post-Kantian scientific naturalism, and of the romantic worldviews of Schopenhauer and Wagner. What emerges is not the acceptance of the metaphysical-flux (...) doctrine so much as a natal form of his physiognomic theory ofperspectivism, a naturalistic and anti-teleological conception of flux, and a theory of justice as cosmodicy. (shrink)
Abstract: In this article, I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, which I call enlightened value maximization. Enlightened value maximization utilizes much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximization of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders, and specifies long-term value maximization or value seeking as the firm’s objective. This proposal therefore solves the problems that arise (...) from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, which is the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory, explaining how this theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard that gives no score—that is, no single-valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organization or division (and it must be consistent with the organization’s strategy), and as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organization it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm. (shrink)
The paper takes as its starting point Donna Haraway’s suggestion, “The actors are cyborg, nature is coyote, and the geography is elsewhere”. It discusses first the understanding of the cyborg promoted by Haraway as illustrating an ontological non-humanist disposition, rather than a periodizing claim. The second part of the paper examines some instances of low-tech cyborg identities, which have emerged in developing countries (elsewhere) as a consequence of development initiatives. The paper argues that the quite literal attempts to develop cyborgs (...) in such countries gives rise to developments not foreseen or controllable by the development industries. If cyborg identities are developing and minds and bodies shaped in the frictions between culture, technology, economy, and development projects and activities then what are the implications for cognitive studies. In the final part of the paper this question is considered and it is suggested that cognitive studies would do well to expand their analytical foci to take into account cyborg bodies and minds found “elsewhere”. (shrink)
Mental and behavioral disorders represent a significant portion of the public health burden in all countries. The human cost of these disorders is immense, yet treatment options for sufferers are currently limited, with many patients failing to respond sufficiently to available interventions and drugs. High quality ontologies facilitate data aggregation and comparison across different disciplines, and may therefore speed up the translation of primary research into novel therapeutics. Realism-based ontologies describe entities in reality and the relationships between them in such (...) a way that – once formulated in a suitable formal language – the ontologies can be used for sophisticated automated reasoning applications. Reference ontologies can be applied across different contexts in which different, and often mutually incompatible, domain-specific vocabularies have traditionally been used. In this contribution we describe the Mental Functioning Ontology (MF) and Mental Disease Ontology (MD), two realism-based ontologies currently under development for the description of humanmental functioning and disease. We describe the structure and upper levels of the ontologies and preliminary application scenarios, and identify some open questions. (shrink)
Self-organized criticality (SOC) is based upon the idea that complex behavior can develop spontaneously in certain multi-body systems whose dynamics vary abruptly. This book is a clear and concise introduction to the field of self-organized criticality, and contains an overview of the main research results. The author begins with an examination of what is meant by SOC, and the systems in which it can occur. He then presents and analyzes computer models to describe a number of systems, and he explains (...) the different mathematical formalisms developed to understand SOC. The final chapter assesses the impact of this field of study, and highlights some key areas of new research. The author assumes no previous knowledge of the field, and the book contains several exercises. It will be ideal as a textbook for graduate students taking physics, engineering, or mathematical biology courses in nonlinear science or complexity. (shrink)
Abstract. In this essay, I describe my Cultural-Developmental Template Approach to moral psychology. This theory draws on my research with the Three Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity, and the work of many other scholars. The cultural-developmental synthesis suggests that the Ethic of Autonomy emerges early in people's psychological lives, and continues to hold some importance across the lifespan. But Autonomy is not alone. The Ethic of Community too emerges early and appears to increase in importance across the life course. (...) Then, it also seems that in most places and at most times, the Ethic of Divinity has found a voice—and in some traditions this ethic may become audible in adolescence. Ethics of Autonomy, Community, and Divinity, then, may have universal roots in the human condition. However, they are also clearly culturally and historically situated. Cultural communities—whether defined by religious, national, or other boundaries—vary in how they prioritize the three ethics and the extent to which they reinforce their development. (shrink)
What follows from the suggestion to pay attention to what is in-between science and politics? Karen François’s paper “In-between science and politics” follows Latour in arguing for the need for political theory to get out of the Platonic cave that it still inhabits. Political theory needs to be brought into the wild through empirical studies of how science and politics in fact intermix. And the Latourian proposition needs to be strengthened by focusing on the embodied knowledges that enable situated objectivities (...) to emerge. Though worthwhile, these arguments are weakened by a superficial treatment of political theory and by a lack of attention to the difficulties involved in combining Latourian actor-network theory with the “strong objectivity” of standpoint theory. Most problematically the paper purports to define as an agenda (exploring the in-between of science and politics) what whole fields of inquiry have already been in full swing exploring for quite a while. The ‘turn to ontology’ in STS and social anthropology and the development of ‘empirical philosophy’ suggests what might be at stake in such explorations. (shrink)
In this article, six demoralising processes in the context of the company are identified. These processes promote a realm of ‘being-with’, in which outcomes of human interaction are evaluated on rational grounds, and on whether or not a particular action accorded with stipulated ethical rules. Thereby the realm of ‘being-for’, in which individuals are supported to take increased responsibility, is marginalized. The conclusion made is that not only do the demoralizing processes systematically produce moral distance between humans, which weakens individual (...) spontaneous outbursts of sympathy to take increased moral responsibility, they also promise to release individuals from their moral ambivalence by declaring organised action morally indifferent. Organisational action is, in other words, declared as adiaphoric – beyond good and evil. (shrink)
Several studies have indicated that scientists are likely to have an outlook on both facts and values that are different to that of lay people in important ways. This is one significant reason it is currently believed that in order for scientists to exercise a reliable ethical reflection about their research it is necessary for them to engage in dialogue with other stakeholders. This paper reports on an exercise to encourage a group of scientists to reflect on ethical issues without (...) the presence of external stakeholders. It reports on the use of a reflection process with scientists working in the area of animal disease genomics (mainly drawn from the EADGENE EC Network of Excellence). This reflection process was facilitated by using an ethical engagement framework, a modified version of the Ethical Matrix. As judged by two criteria, a qualitative assessment of the outcomes and the participants’ own assessment of the process, this independent reflective exercise was deemed to be successful. The discussions demonstrated a high level of complexity and depth, with participants demonstrating a clear perception of uncertainties and the context in which their research operates. Reflection on stakeholder views and values appeared to be embedded within the discussions. The finding from this exercise seems to indicate that even without the involvement of the wider stakeholder community, valuable reflection and worthwhile discourse can be generated from ethical reflection processes involving only scienitific project partners. Hence, the previous assumption that direct stakeholder engagement is necessary for ethical reflection does not appear to hold true in all cases; however, other reasons for involving a broad group of stakeholders relating to governance and social accountability of science remain. (shrink)
The following essay aims at a revisionist reading of Hegel’s “Faith and Knowledge.” Whereas Kant found it necessary to limit [aufheben] reason in order to make room for faith, a principle adopted though significantly revised by Jacobi (and Schleiermacher) and Fichte, Hegel reverses this religious dictum. Ostensibly critical of the theological truce of the times, between a brand of reason no longer worthy of the name and a faith no longer worth the bother, Hegel’s 1802 essay constitutes his first sustained (...) effort to reflect himself out of—or beyond—the limits of reflectivity itself. (shrink)
A common objection to the Molinist account of divine providence states that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) lack grounds. Some Molinists appeal to brute counterfactual facts about the subject of the CCF in order to ground CCFs. Others argue that CCFs are grounded by the subject's actions in nearby worlds. In this article, I argue that Open Theism's account of divine providence employs would-probably conditionals that are most plausibly grounded by either brute facts about the subject of these conditionals or (...) non-actual entities. As a result, Open Theism's revision of the traditional notion of divine providence is unmotivated. The Molinist can ground CCFs just as easily as the Openist can ground would-probably conditionals but the Molinist has the advantage of maintaining a robust account of divine providence. (shrink)
A physiological model for short-term memory (STM) based on dual theta (5–10 Hz) and gamma (20–60 Hz) oscillation was proposed by Lisman and Idiart (1995). In this model a memory is represented by groups of neurons that fire in the same gamma cycle. According to this model, capacity is determined by the number of gamma cycles that occur within the slower theta cycle. We will discuss here the implications of recent reports on theta oscillations recorded in humans performing the Sternberg (...) task. Assuming that the oscillatory memory models are correct, these findings can help determine STM capacity. (shrink)
The general public in Europe seems tohave lost its confidence in food safety. Theremedy for this, as proposed by the Commissionof the EU, is a scientific rearmament. Thequestion, however, is whether more science willbe able to overturn the public distrust.Present experience seems to suggest thecontrary, because there is widespread distrustin the science-based governmental controlsystems. The answer to this problem is thecreation of an independent scientificFood Authority. However, we argue thatindependent scientific advice alone is unlikelyto re-establish public confidence. It is muchmore (...) important to make the scientific advicetransparent, i.e., to state explicitlythe factual and normative premises on which itis based. Risk assessments are based on arather narrow, but well-defined notion of risk.However, the public is concerned with a broadervalue context that comprises both benefits andrisks. Transparency and understanding of thepublic's perception of food risks is anecessary first step in establishing theurgently required public dialogue about thecomplex value questions involved in foodproduction. (shrink)
The 2000 BSE Inquiry report points out that the most serious failure of the UK Government was one of risk communication. This paper argues that the government''s failure to communicate the risks BSE posed to humans to a large degree can be traced back to a lack of transparency in the first risk assessment by the Southwood Working Party. This lack of transparency ensured that the working party''s risk characterization and recommendations were ambiguous and thus hard to interpret. It also (...) meant that uncertainties were not addressed in a satisfactory way. In the recommendations, the attitude to uncertainty was implicit rather than explicit.The risk communication based on the report amplified these flaws. Most importantly, it did not address the uncertainty at all. Apparently, the reason for this was fear of overreaction by the public. However, the result was counter-productive, because the risk communication did not then appear trustworthy. Later risk assessments and risk communication omitted to correct these flaws. Indeed, the fact that, following receipt of new information, advisory experts and policy makers had changed their views of the risk to humans was never clearly communicated to the public. There seemed to be little faith in the public''s ability to reach a balanced judgment regarding the uncertainties. (shrink)
John Finnis claims that in order to judge actions we must approach them from the perspective of the acting person, so that the moral evaluation of actions appears to become private. This paper examines Elizabeth Anscombe’s claim that interior intentions can be discovered through exterior actions. Because deliberation is shaped by the causal features of the world, these causal structures can, when viewed from the outside, serve as a window into the private life of the mind. Therefore, we can usually (...) determine someone’s intention through his observable actions, so that the moral character of actions can become public by way of signs. Causal connections are both effects of intention and causes of intention. Neither of these relations by itself serves as an adequate sign of intention, but the combination of these two (causal structures both as effects and as causes of intention) can serve as signs of intention. (shrink)
Martin Rhonheimer’s The Perspective of Morality: Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics offers a bold summary of Thomistic virtue ethics, laid upon some not-so-Thomistic foundations, culminating in questionable, perhaps even dangerous, conclusions concerning actions evil in themselves. As anintroduction to ethical thought, the book covers a wide range of topics, including happiness, freedom, the nature of human actions, the moral virtues, conscience, the principles of practical reason, consequentialism, Kantian ethics, and much more. For some of these topics Rhonheimer provides a (...) helpful summary of the ethics of Aquinas, sprinkled with thoughtful reflections for the modern age. For other topics Rhonheimer introduces questionable interpretations and developments of Aquinas, written with obscurity and lack of precision. This article provides some suggested alternatives to Rhonheimer’s account, especially with regard to the origin of the first practical principles. (shrink)
The virtue of higher discernment (gnome) is able to discern when a particular rule must be set aside for some higher principle. Aquinas compares the failure of a particular principle to the production of monsters or defective animals. Most of those who treat of the exceptions to rules ignore this analogy, yet it provides important insights into the virtue of gnome and exceptions to rules. A defective animal is a monster only in relation to the particular cause of the power (...) of reproduction; in relation to a higher cause it is proper and well ordered. Similarly, an exception to a general rule is a kind of monster in relation to that rule, but inrelation to a higher principle it is a well-ordered act. (shrink)
A semantical definition of abstract logics is given. It is shown that the Craig interpolation property implies the Beth definability property, and that the Souslin-Kleene interpolation property implies the weak Beth definability property. An example is given, showing that Beth does not imply Souslin-Kleene.
This essay provides a pastpostmodem phenomenological account of a good idea. It is a short experiment in what Foucault calls, “the unchanging pedagogical origins of dialectics.” The ‘ostensible’ question considered is: What follows in the wake of nihilism? Scribbling in the margins, a metaphor for the classical task of the public intellectual, is one way of nudging the reader into the periphery of writing.
Using NORC annual survey data, the authors selected 21 questions describing respondent attitudes toward job, life in general, and financial status. Respondents were catigorized as management, white collar, blue collar, and those not affiliated with business organizations. Attitudes were compared across the four occupational groups. Little dissatisfaction was found in any but the blue collar group. Management as a group, and men as well as women managers showed high levels of satisfaction, with few significant differences found in responses by (...) men and women. This study does not support the earlier finding of widespread alienation in business firms. (shrink)
We show that every sufficiently iterable countable mouse has a unique iteration strategy whose associated iteration maps are lexicographically minimal. This enables us to extend the results of [3] on the good behavior of the standard parameter from tame mice to arbitrary mice.
What counts as an intuitively plausible set theoretic content (notion, axiom or theorem) has been a matter of much debate in contemporary philosophy of mathematics. In this paper I develop a critical appraisal of the issue. I analyze first R. B. Jensen's positions on the epistemic status of the axiom of constructibility. I then formulate and discuss a view of intuitiveness in set theory that assumes it to hinge basically on mathematical success. At the same time, I present accounts (...) of set theoretic axioms and theorems formulated in non-strictly mathematical terms, e.g., by appealing to the iterative concept of set and/or to overall methodological principles, like unify and maximize, and investigate the relation of the latter to success in mathematics. (shrink)
Assuming 0 ♯ does not exist, we present a combinatorial approach to Jensen's method of coding by a real. The forcing uses combinatorial consequences of fine structure (including the Covering Lemma, in various guises), but makes no direct appeal to fine structure itself.
Where AR is the set of arithmetic Turing degrees, 0 (ω ) is the least member of { $\mathbf{\alpha}^{(2)}|\mathbf{a}$ is an upper bound on AR}. This situation is quite different if we examine HYP, the set of hyperarithmetic degrees. We shall prove (Corollary 1) that there is an a, an upper bound on HYP, whose hyperjump is the degree of Kleene's O. This paper generalizes this example, using an iteration of the jump operation into the transfinite which is based on (...) results of Jensen and is detailed in [3] and [4]. In $\S1$ we review the basic definitions from [3] which are needed to state the general results. (shrink)
Partial models of the theory New Foundations (NF) introduced by Quine have already appeared in the literature, but in every model the membership set of NF is missing. On the other hand, Jensen showed that "NF + Urelements" is consistent with respect to ZF and, in the model built there, the membership set of the theory exists. Here we build a partial model of NF from the one of Jensen in which the membership set exists.
Totally revised and updated, written especially for students, the third edition of Geography – History and Concepts is the definitive undergraduate introduction to the history, philosophy and methodology of Human Geography. Accessible and comprehensive, the work comprises five sections: - What is Geography?: a historical overview of the discipline and an explanation of its organization - The Foundations of Geography: examines Geography from Antiquity to the early modern period; the discussion includes detailed explanations of environmental determinism; the French School; landscape; (...) and regional studies - Paradigms and Revolutions: includes an analysis of Kuhn’s paradigm of scientific knowledge that introduces the discussion of the quantitative revolution in the late sixties – this section examines the new human geography, as well as reviewing criticisms of quantification - Positivism and its Critics: defines positivism and empiricism and offers a comprehensive expostion of humanist and structuralist criticisms of these methodologies; concludes with a critical discussion of structuration theory, realism and postmodernism - Processes in Place and Space: an introduction to core themes and concepts in current geographical though: including space, place, and feminism. Illustrated throughout, with summaries, notes for further reading and a concept glossary of Geography – History and Concepts will be essential reading for undergraduates in Geography. (shrink)
The main object of criticism of present-day medical ethics is the standard view of the relationship between theory and practice. Medical ethics is more than the application of moral theories and principles, and health care is more than the domain of application of moral theories. Moral theories and principles are necessarily abstract, and therefore fail to take account of the sometimes idiosyncratic reality of clinical work and the actual experiences of practitioners. Suggestions to remedy the illnesses of contemporary medical ethics (...) focus on re-establishing the connection between the internal and external morality of medicine. This article discusses the question how to develop a theoretical perspective on medical ethical issues that connects philosophical reflection with the everyday realities of medical practice. Four steps in a comprehensive approach of medical ethics research are distinguished: (1) examine health care contexts in order to obtain a better understanding of the internal morality of these practices; this requires empirical research; (2) analyze and interpret the external morality governing health care practices; sociological study of prevalent values, norms, and attitudes concerning medical-ethical issues is required; (3) creation of new theoretical perspectives on health care practices; Jensen's theory of healthcare practices will be useful here; (4) develop a new conception of bioethics that illuminates and clarifies the complex interaction between the internal and external morality of health care practices. Hermeneutical ethics can be helpful for integrating the experiences disclosed in the empirical ethical studies, as well as utilizing the insights gained from describing the value-contexts of health care practices. For a critical and normative perspective, hermeneutical ethics has to examine and explain the moral experiences uncovered, in order to understand what they tell us. (shrink)
How can the development of ideas in a scientific field be studied over time? We apply unsupervised topic modeling to the ACL Anthology to analyze historical trends in the field of Computational Linguistics from 1978 to 2006. We induce topic clusters using Latent Dirichlet Allocation, and examine the strength of each topic over time. Our methods find trends in the field including the rise of probabilistic methods starting in 1988, a steady increase in applications, and a sharp decline of research (...) in semantics and understanding between 1978 and 2001, possibly rising again after 2001. We also introduce a model of the diversity of ideas, topic entropy, using it to show that COLING is a more diverse conference than ACL, but that both conferences as well as EMNLP are becoming broader over time. Finally, we apply Jensen-Shannon divergence of topic distributions to show that all three conferences are converging in the topics they cover. (shrink)
Let A and B be subsets of the reals. Say that A κ ≥ B, if there is a real a such that the relation "x ∈ B" is uniformly Δ 1 (a, A) in L[ ω x,a,A 1 , x,a,A]. This reducibility induces an equivalence relation $\equiv_\kappa$ on the sets of reals; the $\equiv_\kappa$ -equivalence class of a set is called its Kleene degree. Let K be the structure that consists of the Kleene degrees and the induced partial order (...) K ≥. A substructure of K that is of interest is P, the Kleene degrees of the Π 1 1 sets of reals. If sharps exist, then there is not much to P, as Steel [9] has shown that the existence of sharps implies that P has only two elements: the degree of the empty set and the degree of the complete Π 1 1 set. Legrand [4] used the hypothesis that there is a real whose sharp does not exist to show that there are incomparable elements in P; in the context of V = L, Hrbacek has shown that P is dense and has no minimal pairs. The Hrbacek results led Simpson [6] to make the following conjecture: if V = L, then p forms a universal homogeneous upper semilattice with 0 and 1. Simpson's conjecture is shown to be false by showing that if V = L, then Godel's maximal thin Π 1 1 set is the infimum of two strictly larger elements of P. The second main result deals with the notion of jump in K. Let A' be the complete Kleene enumerable set relative to A. Say that A is low-n if A (n) has the same degree as $\varnothing^{(n)}$ , and A is high-n if A (n) has the same degree as $\varnothing^{(n + 1)}$ . Simpson and Weitkamp [7] have shown that there is a high (high-1) incomplete Π 1 1 set in L. They have also shown that various other Π 1 1 sets are neither high nor low in L. Legrand [5] extended their results by showing that, if there is a real x such that x # does not exist, then there is an element of P that, for all n, is neither low-n nor high-n. In § 2, ZFC is used to show that, for all n, if A is Π 1 1 and low-n then A is Borel. The proof uses a strengthened version of Jensen's theorem on sequences of admissible ordinals that appears in [7, Simpson-Weitkamp]. (shrink)
The mutual influence of science and values in biology is exhibited in several cases from the biological literature. It is argued in a number of cases, from R. A. Fisher's argument for the optimality of a 50:50 sex ratio to A. Jensen's defense of a genetic basis for intelligence, and including work on the evolution of sexual dimorphism and muted aggression, that the credence accorded the views is disproportionate with their theoretical and empirical warrant. It is, furthermore, suggested that (...) the proper explanation for the attraction and persistence of such views lies in their conformity with ideological norms. There is thus an important, if circumscribed, role for ideological critique in the evaluation of scientific theories; in particular, it lies in the explanation of the acceptance and persistence of scientific views, given independent grounds for questioning their justifiability. (shrink)
Contributing Authors: Lilli Alanen & Frans Svensson, David Alm, Gustaf Arrhenius, Gunnar Björnsson, Luc Bovens, Richard Bradley, Geoffrey Brennan & Nicholas Southwood, John Broome, Linus Broström & Mats Johansson, Johan Brännmark, Krister Bykvist, John Cantwell, Erik Carlson, David Copp, Roger Crisp, Sven Danielsson, Dan Egonsson, Fred Feldman, Roger Fjellström, Marc Fleurbaey, Margaret Gilbert, Olav Gjelsvik, Kathrin Glüer & Peter Pagin, Ebba Gullberg & Sten Lindström, Peter Gärdenfors, Sven Ove Hansson, Jana Holsanova, Nils Holtug, Victoria Höög, Magnus Jiborn, Karsten (...) Klint Jensen, Sigurður Kristinsson, Isaac Levi, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, David Makinson, Anna-Sofia Maurin, Philippe Mongin, Kevin Mulligan, Lennart Nordenfelt, Jonas Olson, Erik J. Olsson, Ingmar Persson, Johannes Persson, Björn Petersson, Philip Pettit, Hans Rott, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Krister Segerberg, John Skorupski, Howard Sobel, Fredrik Stjernberg, Fred Stoutland, Caj Strandberg, Pär Sundström, Folke Tersman, Torbjörn Tännsjö, Peter Vallentyne, Bruno Verbeek, Stella Villarmea, and Michael J. Zimmerman. (shrink)
Merleau-Ponty’s explication of concrete or practical movement by way of the Schneider case could be read as ending up close to automatism, neglecting its flexibility and plasticity in the face of obstacles. It can be contended that he already goes off course in his explication of Schneider’s condition. Rasmus Jensen has argued that he assimilates a normal person’s motor intentionality to the patient’s, thereby generating a vacuity problem. I argue that Schneider’s difficulties with certain movements point to a means (...) of broadening Merleau-Ponty’s account of concrete movement, one that he broaches without exploiting. What could do more work is his recognition of a transposition capacity - and hence of a plasticity - in the healthy body’s skill schema. As well as avoiding vacuity, he could forestall the appearance of a dichotomy between practical coping and creativity. (shrink)
Milton Friedman’s famous comment on Corporate Social Responsibility is that “there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game.” I reply to Friedman, Michael Jensen, and others, in argument that accepts their implicit premise—that business can be a virtuous mechanism of free society—but that denies their delimitation of responsibility. The reply hinges upon precisely the virtue of (...) “freedom” these authors clearly consider intrinsically valuable. In the extreme case where maximizing profits would place government underthreat, such activity will not coincide with maximizing social value and would undermine the freedoms these authors claim to value. Responsibilities will also apply in less extreme cases, if we develop Amartya Sen’s argument showing that, “we have to see individual freedom as a social commitment.”. (shrink)
Interest in the notion of the possible financial sacrifice suffered by socially responsible investment (SRI) fund investors for considering ethical, social and environmental issues in their investment decisions has spawned considerable academic interest in the performance of SRI funds. Both the Australian and international research literature have yielded largely mixed results. However, several of these studies are hampered by methodological problems which can obscure the significance of reported results, such as the use of small sample sizes, inconsistencies in the time (...) frames selected to analyse performance and different modelling frameworks used to estimate investment returns. This study attempts to redress some of these issues by investigating the returns performance of 89 ethical funds in Australia over the period 1986–2005. Using a multi-factor CAPM model [Fama, E. F., and K. R. French (1996) J. Finance 51(1), 55] (which controls for factors such as size, book-to-market value and momentum) we find that ethical funds significantly under-perform the market in Australia, particularly in the most recent 5 years of our sample period (2000–2005). Risk adjusted returns (using Jensen’s alpha) indicate that average annual underperformance is around 1.52% in the 2000–2005 period for our sample and .88% over the whole sample period. Our results contrast with many previous studies (both Australian and international), which have not found statistically significant differences in the performance of ethical funds relative to market benchmarks and/or a matched sample of conventional funds. (shrink)
We show that the modal propositional logic G, originally introduced to describe the modality "it is provable that", is also sound for various interpretations using filters on ordinal numbers, for example the end-segment filters, the club filters, or the ineffable filters. We also prove that G is complete for the interpretation using end-segment filters. In the case of club filters, we show that G is complete if Jensen's principle □ κ holds for all $\kappa ; on the other hand, (...) it is consistent relative to a Mahlo cardinal that G be incomplete for the club filter interpretation. (shrink)
The history of building automated theorem provers for higher-order logic is almost as old as the field of deduction systems itself. The first successful attempts to mechanize and implement higher-order logic were those of Huet [13] and Jensen and Pietrzykowski [17]. They combine the resolution principle for higher-order logic (first studied in [1]) with higher-order unification. The unification problem in typed λ-calculi is much more complex than that for first-order terms, since it has to take the theory of αβη-equality (...) into account. As a consequence, the higher-order unification problem is undecidable and sets of solutions need not even always have most general elements that represent them. Thus the mentioned calculi for higher-order logic have take special measures to circumvent the problems posed by the theoretical complexity of higher-order unification. In this paper, we will exemplify the methods and proof- and model-theoretic tools needed for extending first-order automated theorem proving to higherorder logic. For the sake of simplicity take the tableau method as a basis (for a general introduction to first-order tableaux see part I.1) and discuss the higherorder tableau calculi HT and HTE first presented in [19]. The methods in this paper also apply to higher-order resolution calculi [1, 13, 6] or the higher-order matings method of Peter [3], which extend their first-order counterparts in much the same way. Since higher-order calculi cannot be complete for the standard semantics by Gödel’s incompleteness theorem [11], only the weaker notion of Henkin models [12] leads to a meaningful notion of completeness in higher-order logic. It turns out that the calculi in [1, 13, 3, 19] are not Henkin-complete, since they fail to capture the extensionality principles of higher-order logic. We will characterize the deductive power of our calculus HT (which is roughly equivalent to these calculi) by the semantics of functional Σ-models. To arrive at a calculus that is complete with respect to Henkin models, we build on ideas from [6] and augment HT with tableau construction rules that use the extensionality principles in a goal-oriented way.. (shrink)
Our main results are: Theorem 1. Con(ZFC + "every function $f : \omega_{1} \rightarrow \omega_1$ is dominated by a canonical function") implies Con(ZFC + "there exists an inaccessible limit of measurable cardinals"). [In fact equiconsistency holds.] Theorem 3. Con(ZFC + "there exists a non-regular uniform ultrafilter on ω1") implies Con(ZFC + "there exists an inaccessible stationary limit of measurable cardinals"). Theorem 5. Con (ZFC + "there exists an $\omega_{1}-sequence$ T of $\omega_{1}-complete$ uniform filters on ω1 s.t. every $A \subseteq \omega_1$ (...) is measurable w.r.t. a filter in T (Ulam property)") implies Con(ZFC + "there exists an inaccessible stationary limit of measurable cardinals"). We start with a discussion of the canonical functions and look at some combinatorial principles. Assuming the domination property of Theorem 1, we use the Ketonen diagram to show that $\omega_{2}^V$ is a limit of measurable cardinals in Jensen's core model $K_{MO}$ for measures of order zero. Using related arguments we show that $\omega_{2}^V$ is a stationary limit of measurable cardinals in $K_{MO}$ , if there exists a weakly normal ultrafilter on ω1. The proof yields some other results, e.g., on the consistency strength of weak*-saturated fiters on ω1, which are of interest in view of the classical Ulam problem. (shrink)
In this response to Steven Jensen’s ACPQ review essay of Martin Rhonheimer’s The Perspective of Morality, its author argues that Jensen failed to understand the proper subject matter, the inner logic, and the methodology of the book. As a result, he misread key passages while passing over others, with the result that his criticisms miss the mark. Correcting these misreadings provides the occasion to explain some key features of the book, namely its idea of integrating in a single (...) ethical theory eudaimonistic ethics and its theory of happiness with action theory, anthropology of action, a theory of practical reason, an account of the moral virtues, a doctrine of natural law, of prudence, of conscience, and of moral norms, disproving thereby Jensen’s misleading claim that the book rejects nature as a standard of ethics. (shrink)
The subtle, almost ineffable, and ineffable cardinals were introduced in an unpublished 1971 manuscript of R. Jensen and K. Kunen, and a number of basic facts were proved there. These concepts were extended to that of k-subtle, k-almost ineffable, and k-ineffable cardinals in [Ba75], where a highly developed theory is presented.
An ω-model (a model in which all natural numbers are standard) of the predicative fragment of Quine's set theory "New Foundations" (NF) is constructed. Marcel Crabbe has shown that a theory NFI extending predicative NF is consistent, and the model constructed is actually a model of NFI as well. The construction follows the construction of ω-models of NFU (NF with urelements) by R. B. Jensen, and, like the construction of Jensen for NFU, it can be used to construct (...) α-models for any ordinal α. The construction proceeds via a model of a type theory of a peculiar kind; we first discuss such "tangled type theories" in general, exhibiting a "tangled type theory" (and also an extension of Zermelo set theory with Δ 0 comprehension) which is equiconsistent with NF (for which the consistency problem seems no easier than the corresponding problem for NF (still open)), and pointing out that "tangled type theory with urelements" has a quite natural interpretation, which seems to provide an explanation for the more natural behaviour of NFU relative to the other set theories of this kind, and can be seen anachronistically as underlying Jensen's consistency proof for NFU. (shrink)
The efficiency argument for profit maximization says that corporations and their managers should maximize profits because this is the course of action that will lead to an or outcome (see e.g. Jensen 2001, 2002). In this paper, I argue that the fundamental problem with this argument is not that markets in the real world are less than perfect, but rather that the argument does not properly acknowledge the personal sphere. Morality allows each of us a sphere in which we (...) are free to pursue our personal interests, even if these are not optimal from the social point of view. But the efficiency argument does not come to terms with this feature of social life. (shrink)
activity” has been considered to play a major role in the short-term maintenance of memories. Many studies since then have provided support for this view and greatly advanced our knowledge of the effects of stimulus type and modality on delay activity and its temporal dynamics (Funahashi et al., 1993; Fuster et al., 2000; Romo et al., 1999). In humans, working memory has also been a subject of intense investigation using scalp and intracranial electroencephalography (EEG, iEEG) as well as magnetoencephalography (MEG), (...) which provide estimates of local population activity. The published findings include reports of systematic changes in signal amplitude during working memory in the theta (Raghavachari et al., 2001; Tesche and <span class='Hi'>Karhu</span>, 2000), alpha (Gevins et al., 1997; Working memory has been linked to elevated single Jensen et al., 2002), beta (Tallon-Baudry et al., 1999). (shrink)
Where $\underline{a}$ is a Turing degree and ξ is an ordinal $ , the result of performing ξ jumps on $\underline{a},\underline{a}^{(\xi)}$ , is defined set-theoretically, using Jensen's fine-structure results. This operation appears to be the natural extension through $(\aleph_1)^{L^\underline{a}}$ of the ordinary jump operations. We describe this operation in more degree-theoretic terms, examine how much of it could be defined in degree-theoretic terms and compare it to the single jump operation.
According to one prominent view of rationality, for the choice of alternative to be justified, it must be at least as good as other alternatives. Michael Jensen has recently invoked this view to argue that managers should act exclusively to maximize the long-run market value of economic enterprises. According to Jensen, alternative accounts of managerial responsibility, such as stakeholder theory, are to be rejected because they lack a single measure to compare alternatives as better or worse. Against (...) class='Hi'>Jensen’s account, this paper argues that choosing the alternative that is at least as good as other alternatives need not preclude managers from respecting considerations in addition to long-run market value. The paper argues that such considerations may be incorporated into managerial decision-making by introducing constraints and priorities into the process of maximizing long-run market value and by allowing for “clumpy” values. (shrink)
Before one can construct scales of minimal complexity in the Real Core Model, K(R), one needs to develop the fine-structure theory of K(R). In this paper, the fine structure theory of mice, first introduced by Dodd and Jensen, is generalized to that of real mice. A relative criterion for mouse iterability is presented together with two theorems concerning the definability of this criterion. The proof of the first theorem requires only fine structure; whereas, the second theorem applies to real (...) mice satisfying AD and follows from a general definability result obtained by abstracting work of John Steel on L(R). In conclusion, we discuss several consequences of the work presented in this paper relevant to two issues: the complexity of scales in K(R) and the strength of the theory ZF + AD + ¬ DC R. (shrink)
