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  1. David M. Armstrong (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Routledge.
    This classic work of recent philosophy was first published in 1968, and remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In A Materialist Theory of the Mind , D. M. Armstrong provided insight into the debate surrounding the relationship of the mind and body. He put forth a detailed materialist account of all the main mental phenomena, including perception, sensation, belief, the will, introspection, mental images, and consciousness. This causal analysis of (...)
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  2. David M. Armstrong (2007). How Do Particulars Stand to Universals? In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. OUP Oxford
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  3. David Malet Armstrong (1978). A Theory of Universals. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume Ii. Cambridge University Press.
  4.  57
    David M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm (1984). Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. Blackwell.
  5.  21
    David Armstrong, Revisions, and Quiddities.
    I used to think of the connection between a particular and a universal that it instantiates as a contingent one. Now I think that this is not quite right. This revision, as I now see it, is not a very large one. I still think that the states of affairs that unite particulars and universals are contingent beings. But the connection within states of affairs is, in a certain way, necessary.
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  6. David M. Armstrong (1963). Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? Philosophical Review 62 (4):417-32.
  7. David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):1-12.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
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  8. David Armstrong, Combinatorialism Revisited.
    The object of this paper is to argue once again for the combinatorial account of possibility defended in earlier work. But there I failed fully to realise the dialectical advantages that accrue once one begins by assuming the hypothesis of logical atomism, the hypothesis that postulates simple particulars and simple universals at the bottom of the world. Logical atomism is, I incline to think, no better than ‘speculative cosmology’ as opposed to ‘analytic ontology’, to use Donald Williams’ terminology. It is, (...)
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  9. David M. Armstrong (1970). The Nature of Mind. In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan
  10. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Open Door: Counterfactual Versus Singularist Theories of Causation. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 175--185.
  11.  71
    David Malet Armstrong (1999). The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  12. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press.
    The emphasis is always on the arguments used, and the way one position develops from another. By the end of the book the reader is afforded both a grasp of the state of the controversy, and how we got there.
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  13.  29
    David M. Armstrong (1961). Perception And The Physical World. Humanities Press.
  14. David Malet Armstrong (1978). Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I. Cambridge University Press.
  15.  57
    David Armstrong (2005). Reply to Simons and Mumford. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):271 – 276.
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  16.  27
    David M. Armstrong (1968). The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Humanities Press.
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  17. David M. Armstrong (1996). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Psyche 2 (1):31--4.
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  18. David M. Armstrong (1981). What is Consciousness? In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press
  19. David Malet Armstrong (1991). What Makes Induction Rational? Dialogue 30 (4):503-11.
  20. David M. Armstrong (1979). Three Types of Consciousness. In Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69) 235.
  21.  76
    David Armstrong (2003). Truthmakers for Modal Truths. In Hallvard Lillehammer Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (ed.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. Routledge 12-24.
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  22. David Malet Armstrong (1968). The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism. Analysis 29 (2):48--9.
    The paper tries to rebut an objection to materialism. Anti-Materialists have argued that mental processes do not appear to be mere physical processes in the brain, And that secondary qualities such as sounds do not appear to be mere vibrations in the air. So materialists must admit that introspection and perception involve at least the illusion of the falsity of materialism. Using the headless woman illusion as a model, It is shown how the illusion is generated, And that it is (...)
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  23.  85
    David M. Armstrong (1962). Bodily Sensations. Routledge.
  24.  75
    David Armstrong (1980). Identity Through Time. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel 67-78.
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  25. David M. Armstrong (1981). The Causal Theory of the Mind. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Cornell University Press
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  26. David M. Armstrong (1987). Smart and the Secondary Qualities. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell
     
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  27.  44
    David M. Armstrong (2010). The Causal Theory of Properties. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  28. David M. Armstrong (1991). Searle's Neo-Cartesian Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Issues 1:67-71.
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  29.  65
    David Malet Armstrong (1969). Dispositions Are Causes. Analysis 30 (1):23-26.
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  30. David M. Armstrong (1973). Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of Mind. Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93.
    A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.
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  31.  52
    David M. Armstrong (2004). In Defence of the Cognitivist Theory of Perception. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):19-26.
  32. David M. Armstrong (2000). The 'Thermometer' View of Knowledge. In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. OUP Oxford
     
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  33.  81
    David Armstrong & JeeLoo Liu, The Nature of Consciousness Handout.
    The mental: [I] The unconscious: A totally unconscious man has a mind and the mind is in various states. ___ He does not lack knowledge and beliefs. ___ He may be credited with memories and skills. ___ He may be credited with likes and dislikes, attitudes and emotions, current desires and current aims and purposes. He may be said to have certain traits of character and temperament. He may be said to be in certain moods..... [The mental states of a (...)
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  34.  24
    David M. Armstrong (1992). Properties. In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology. Kluwer 14--27.
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  35.  3
    David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):309-320.
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  36.  86
    David M. Armstrong (1968). The Headless Woman and the Defense of Materialism. Analysis 29:48-49.
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  37.  8
    David Armstrong, Rae Langton, Robert Audi, Jerrold Levinson, John Bacon, David Lewis, Rick Benitez, Gary Malinas, John Biro & Jeff Malpas (1995). The Editor and the Associate Editors Thank the Consulting Editors, the Members of the Editorial Board and the Following Philosophers for Their Help with Refereeing Papers During the Period July 1994 to June 1995. Adeney, Douglas Kennett, Jeanette Agar, Nicholas Lamarque, Peter. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4).
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  38. David M. Armstrong (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism: Nominalism and Realism Vol. I. Cambridge University Press.
  39. David Malet Armstrong (1989). C. B. Martin, Counterfactuals, Causality and Conditionals. In J. Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind and Reality; Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer 7-15.
     
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  40.  48
    David M. Armstrong (1975). Beliefs and Desires as Causes of Actions: A Reply to Donald Davidson. Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.
  41. David M. Armstrong (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism: A Theory of Universals Vol. II. Cambridge University Press.
  42.  45
    David M. Armstrong (1982). Metaphysics and Supervenience. Critica 42 (42):3-17.
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  43.  17
    David Armstrong (2011). Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship: Cicero Vs. The Herculaneum Papyri. In Jeffrey Fish & Kirk R. Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition. Cambridge University Press 105-128.
  44.  71
    David M. Armstrong (1955). Illusions of Sense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (August):88-106.
  45.  21
    David M. Armstrong (1956). Discussion: Berkeley's New Theory of Vision. Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (1):127-129.
    Most of the New Theory of Vision is an argument for a negative answer to Molyneux's question.// re primacy of vision in spatial perception: "most rational philosopher on this topic is Berkeley, whose New Theory of Vision presents in cogent detail the argument" (from Bennett 1966, p. 30, in note cites 41ff.).// Berkeley's criticisms of Locke: "If we really abstract from colour and hardness and all that 'belongs to sensation', so far from being left with 'pure' notions of extension and (...)
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  46.  65
    David M. Armstrong (1959). Mr Arthadeva and Naive Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.
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  47.  44
    David M. Armstrong (2002). Vérifacteurs pour des vérités modales. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2 (4):491-507.
    Revenant sur la question des vérifacteurs, D. Armstrong demande ici d'abord comment concilier le maximalisme et la relation de nécessitation. L'A. examine quel sens métaphysique donner à la notion d'implication, et s'il y a un sens à admettre une contingence de re. Il traite à ce niveau des possibilités pures, examine le cas des aliens chez David Lewis, puis pose la question de savoir s'il est contingent de dire qu'il y a de l'être plutôt que rien. L'exposé le conduit à (...)
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  48.  64
    David M. Armstrong (1963). Max Deutscher and Perception. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):246-249.
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  49.  49
    David M. Armstrong (1976). Incorrigibility, Materialism, and Causation. Philosophical Studies 30 (August):125-28.
  50.  47
    David M. Armstrong (1964). Vesey on Bodily Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):247-248.
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