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Profile: David Barrett (University of Arkansas, Fayetteville)
Profile: David Barrett (University of Arkansas, Fayetteville)
  1.  26
    David Barrett & Eric Funkhouser (forthcoming). Robust, Unconscious Self-Deception: Strategic and Flexible. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of (...)
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  2. David Barrett (2013). Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):325-346.
    In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role. The present article attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory. In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though (...)
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  3.  37
    David Barrett (2014). Functional Analysis and Mechanistic Explanation. Synthese 191 (12):2695-2714.
    Piccinini and Craver (Synthese 183:283–311, 2011) argue for the surprising view that psychological explanation, properly understood, is a species of mechanistic explanation. This contrasts with the ‘received view’ (due, primarily, to Cummins and Fodor) which maintains a sharp distinction between psychological explanation and mechanistic explanation. The former is typically construed as functional analysis, the analysis of some psychological capacity into an organized series of subcapacities without specifying any of the structural features that underlie the explanandum capacity. The latter idea, of (...)
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  4. David Barrett (2013). Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):325-346.
    In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role. The present article attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory. In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though (...)
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  5. David B. Barrett, J. D. Y. Peel & John S. Mbiti (1971). Schism and Renewal in Africa. Religious Studies 7 (1):90-91.
     
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  6. David Barrett (2014). Consciousness, Attention, and Working Memory: An Empirical Evaluation of Prinz's Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):7-29.
    A popular issue in mind is to explain why conscious mental states are conscious. Prinz (2012) defends three claims in an effort to make such an explanation: (i)mental states become conscious when and only when we attend to them; (ii)attention is a process by which mental states become available to working memory; so (iii) mental states are conscious when and only when they become available to working memory. Here I attack Prinz's theory, made explicit in (iii), by showing that there (...)
     
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  7.  4
    David V. Barrett (2004). Developers Target Catholic Mansion. The Chesterton Review 30 (3/4):415-417.
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  8.  1
    David P. Barrett (1980). Marxism, the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union: Three Critiques by Hu Hanmin. Chinese Studies in History 14 (2):47-49.
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  9. David B. Barrett (1984). World Christian Encyclopaedia: A Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in the Modern World A.D. 1900-2000. Religious Studies 20 (3):510-511.
     
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