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Profile: David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney)
  1. David Braddon-Mitchell, Freedom and Binding Consequentialism.
    The paper proposes a new version of direct act consequentialism that will provide the same evaluations of the rightness of acts as indirect disposition, motive or character consequentialism, thus reconciling the coherence of direct consequentialism with the plausible results in cases of indirect consequentialism. This is achieved by seeing that adopting certain kinds of moral dispositions causally constrains our future acts, so that the maximizing acts ruled out by the disposition can no longer be chosen. Thus when we act we (...)
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  2. David Braddon-Mitchell (forthcoming). Mastering Meaning. Philosophical Studies.
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  3. David Braddon-Mitchell (2013). 10. Fighting the Zombie of the Growing Salami1. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:351.
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  4. David Braddon-Mitchell (2012). Review of 'An Introduction to Philosophical Methods', by Chris Daly. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):608 - 611.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 3, Page 608-611, September 2012.
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  5. David Braddon-Mitchell (2009). Naturalistic Analysis and the a Priori. In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Mit Press.
     
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  6. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.) (2009). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Mit Press.
    A new program of philosophical analysis that reconciles a certain account of analysis with philosophical naturalism is applied to a range of philosophical ...
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  7. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (2009). Introducing the Canberra Plan. In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Mit Press. 1--20.
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  8. David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
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  9. David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Blackwell Pub..
    David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson’s popular introduction to philosophy of mind and cognition is now available in a fully revised and updated edition. Ensures that the most recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are brought together into a coherent, accessible whole. Revisions respond to feedback from students and teachers and make the volume even more useful for courses. New material includes: a section on Descartes’ famous objection to materialism; extended treatment of connectionism; coverage of the view (...)
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  10. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (2007). The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Second Edition. Blackwell.
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  11. Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). There Is No Simpliciter Simpliciter. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249 - 278.
    This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family of (...)
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  12. Arun Balasubramaniam, Gabor Betegh, Jochen Bojanowski, David Braddon-Mitchell, Geoffrey Brennan, Ho-Gun Chung, Gerald Cohen, Ion Copoeru, Alexander Fidora & Dorothea Frede (2006). Visiting Professors From Abroad, 2006–2007. Review of Metaphysics 60:231-237.
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  13. David Braddon-Mitchell (2006). Believing Falsely Makes It So. Mind 115 (460):833-866.
    that there is something rationally or conceptually defective in judging that an act is right without being in any way motivated towards it—is one which has tended to lead either to error theories of ethics on the one hand, or acceptance of the truth of internalism on the other. This paper argues that it does play a kind of subject-setting role, but that our responses to cases can be rationalised without requiring that internalism is true for ethical realism to be (...)
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  14. David Braddon-Mitchell (2006). Index of MIND Vol. 115 Nos 1–4, 2006. Mind 114:460.
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  15. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (2006). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  16. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). Talking About a Universalist World. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):499 - 534.
    The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are (...)
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  17. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). The Physics of Extended Simples. Analysis 66 (3):222–226.
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  18. David Braddon-Mitchell (2005). Conceptual Stability and the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms. Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):859-868.
  19. David Braddon-Mitchell (2005). The Subsumption of Reference. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):157-178.
    How can the reference of theoretical terms be stable over changes of theory? I defend an approach to this that does not depend on substantive metasemantic theories of reference. It relies on the idea that in contexts of use, terms may play a role in a theory that in turn points to a further (possibly unknown) theory. Empirical claims are claims about the nature of the further theories, and the falsification of these further theories is understood not as showing that (...)
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  20. David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). Folk Theories of the Third Kind. Ratio 17 (3):277-293.
  21. David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). How Do We Know It is Now Now? Analysis 64 (3):199–203.
  22. David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). Masters of Our Meanings. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):133-52.
    The two-dimensional framework in semantics has the most power and plausibility when combined with a kind of global semantic neo-descriptivism. If neo-descriptivism can be defended on the toughest terrain - the semantics of ordinary proper names - then the other skirmishes should be easier. This paper defends neo-descriptivism against two important objections: that the descriptions may be inaccessibly locked up in sub-personal modules, and thus not accessible a priori, and that in any case all such modules bottom out in purely (...)
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  23. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). How to Be a Conventional Person. The Monist 87 (4):457 - 474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in (...)
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  24. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). The Loneliness of Stages. Analysis 64 (3):235–242.
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  25. David Braddon-Mitchell & Caroline West (2004). What is Free Speech? Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (4):437-460.
    It is widely held that free speech is a distinctive and privileged social kind. But what is free speech? In particular, is there any unified phenomenon that is both free speech and which is worthy of the special value traditionally attached to free speech? We argue that a descendent of the classic Millian justification of free speech is in fact a justification of a more general social condition; and, via an argument that 'free speech' names whatever natural social kind is (...)
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  26. David Braddon-Mitchell (2003). Qualia and Analytical Conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):111-135.
  27. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (2002). A Pyrrhic Victory for Teleonomy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):372-77.
  28. David Braddon-Mitchell (2001). Lossy Laws. Noûs 35 (2):260–277.
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  29. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.) (2001). The Canberra Plan. Oxford University Press.
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  30. David Braddon-Mitchell & Caroline West (2001). Temporal Phase Pluralism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):59-83.
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  31. David Braddon-Mitchell & K. Jackson (1999). The Divide-and-Conquer Path to Analytic Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):71-89.
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  32. David Braddon-Mitchell (1998). Metarepresentation. Mind and Language 13 (1):29-34.
  33. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (1997). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Blackwell.
    Blackwell, 2006 Review by Daniel Whiting, Ph.D. on Apr 3rd 2007 Volume: 11, Number: 14.
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  34. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (1997). The Teleological Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):474-89.
  35. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (1997). Ramsification and Glymour’s Counterexample. Analysis 57 (3):167–169.
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  36. David Braddon-Mitchell (1993). The Microstructural Causation Hypothesis. Erkenntnis 39 (2):257 - 283.
    I argue against a priori objections to the view that causation may be reducible to some micro-structural process in principle discoverable by physics. I distinguish explanation from causation, and argue that the main objections to such a reduction stem from conflating these two notions. Explanation is the collection of pragmatically relevant, possibly counterfactual information about causation; and causation is to be identified in a necessary a posteriori way with whatever physical processes underwrite our explanatory claims.
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  37. David Braddon-Mitchell & J. Fitzpatrick (1990). Explanation and the Language of Thought. Synthese 83 (1):3-29.
    In this paper we argue that the insistence by Fodor et. al. that the Language of Thought hypothesis must be true rests on mistakes about the kinds of explanations that must be provided of cognitive phenomena. After examining the canonical arguments for the LOT, we identify a weak version of the LOT hypothesis which we think accounts for some of the intuitions that there must be a LOT. We then consider what kinds of explanation cognitive phenomena require, and conclude that (...)
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