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Profile: David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney)
  1. David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Blackwell Pub..
    David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson’s popular introduction to philosophy of mind and cognition is now available in a fully revised and updated edition. Ensures that the most recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are brought together into a coherent, accessible whole. Revisions respond to feedback from students and teachers and make the volume even more useful for courses. New material includes: a section on Descartes’ famous objection to materialism; extended treatment of connectionism; coverage of the view (...)
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  2.  91
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2015). On Metaphysical Analysis. In Jonathan Schaffer & Barry Loewer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Wiley Blackwell
    Metaphysics is largely an a priori business, albeit a business that is sensitive to the findings of the physical sciences. But sometimes what the physical sciences tell us about our own world underdetermines what we should think about the metaphysics of how things actually are, and even how they could be. This chapter has two aims. The first is to defend a particular conception of the methodology of a priori metaphysics by, in part, exemplifying that methodology and revealing its results. (...)
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  3. David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). How Do We Know It is Now Now? Analysis 64 (3):199–203.
  4. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). The Physics of Extended Simples. Analysis 66 (3):222–226.
    The idea that there could be spatially extended mereological simples has recently been defended by a number of metaphysicians also takes the idea seriously). Peter Simons goes further, arguing not only that spatially extended mereological simples are possible, but that it is more plausible that our world is composed of such simples, than that it is composed of either point-sized simples, or of atomless gunk. The difficulty for these views lies in explaining why it is that the various subvolumes of (...)
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  5. David Braddon-Mitchell (2003). Qualia and Analytical Conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):111-135.
  6. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (1997). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. Blackwell.
    The philosophy of mind and cognition has been transformed by recent advances in what is loosely called cognitive science. This book is a thoroughly up-to-date introduction to and account of that transformation, in which the many strands in contemporary cognitive science are brought together into a coherent philosophical picture of the mind. The book begins with discussions of the pre-history of contemporary philosophy of mind - dualism, behaviourism, and early versions of the identity theory of mind - and moves through (...)
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  7. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (2006). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson’s popular introduction to philosophy of mind and cognition is now available in a fully revised and updated edition. Ensures that the most recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are brought together into a coherent, accessible whole. Revisions respond to feedback from students and teachers and make the volume even more useful for courses. New material includes: a section on Descartes’ famous objection to materialism; extended treatment of connectionism; coverage of the view (...)
     
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  8.  84
    David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). Masters of Our Meanings. Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):133-52.
    The two-dimensional framework in semantics has the most power and plausibility when combined with a kind of global semantic neo-descriptivism. If neo-descriptivism can be defended on the toughest terrain - the semantics of ordinary proper names - then the other skirmishes should be easier. This paper defends neo-descriptivism against two important objections: that the descriptions may be inaccessibly locked up in sub-personal modules, and thus not accessible a priori, and that in any case all such modules bottom out in purely (...)
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  9. David Braddon-Mitchell (2001). Lossy Laws. Noûs 35 (2):260–277.
  10.  93
    David Braddon-Mitchell (2013). 10. Fighting the Zombie of the Growing Salami1. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:351.
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  11. David Braddon-Mitchell & Caroline West (2004). What is Free Speech? Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (4):437-460.
    It is widely held that free speech is a distinctive and privileged social kind. But what is free speech? In particular, is there any unified phenomenon that is both free speech and which is worthy of the special value traditionally attached to free speech? We argue that a descendent of the classic Millian justification of free speech is in fact a justification of a more general social condition; and, via an argument that 'free speech' names whatever natural social kind is (...)
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  12. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). How to Be a Conventional Person. The Monist 87 (4):457 - 474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in (...)
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  13. David Braddon-Mitchell & Caroline West (2001). Temporal Phase Pluralism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):59-83.
    Some theories of personal identity allow some variation in what it takes for a person to survive from context to context; and sometimes this is determined by the desires of person-stages or the practices of communities.This leads to problems for decision making in contexts where what is chosen will affect personal identity.‘Temporal Phase Pluralism’ solves such problems by allowing that there can be a plurality of persons constituted by a sequence of person stages. This illuminates difficult decision making problems when (...)
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  14. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (1997). The Teleological Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):474-89.
  15.  17
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (forthcoming). On Time and the Varieties of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science.
    This paper proffers an account of why interdisciplinary research on, inter alia, the nature of time can be fruitful even if the disciplines in question have different explanatory pro-jects. We suggest that the special sciences perform a subject setting role for lower-level disciplines such as physics. In essence, they tell us where, amongst a theory of the physical world, we should expect to locate phenomena such as temporality; they tell us what it would take for there to be time. Physical (...)
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  16.  53
    David Braddon-Mitchell (2005). The Subsumption of Reference. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):157-178.
    How can the reference of theoretical terms be stable over changes of theory? I defend an approach to this that does not depend on substantive metasemantic theories of reference. It relies on the idea that in contexts of use, terms may play a role in a theory that in turn points to a further (possibly unknown) theory. Empirical claims are claims about the nature of the further theories, and the falsification of these further theories is understood not as showing that (...)
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  17. David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). The Loneliness of Stages. Analysis 64 (3):235–242.
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  18.  53
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (2009). Introducing the Canberra Plan. In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press 1--20.
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  19.  41
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). Talking About a Universalist World. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):499-534.
    The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are the ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘will (...)
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  20.  95
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (1997). Ramsification and Glymour’s Counterexample. Analysis 57 (3):167–169.
  21.  63
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (2002). A Pyrrhic Victory for Teleonomy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):372-77.
  22.  75
    David Braddon-Mitchell (2012). Review of 'An Introduction to Philosophical Methods', by Chris Daly. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):608 - 611.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 3, Page 608-611, September 2012.
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  23. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (2006). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction. Wiley-Blackwell.
    David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson’s popular introduction to philosophy of mind and cognition is now available in a fully revised and updated edition. Ensures that the most recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are brought together into a coherent, accessible whole. Revisions respond to feedback from students and teachers and make the volume even more useful for courses. New material includes: a section on Descartes’ famous objection to materialism; extended treatment of connectionism; coverage of the view (...)
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  24.  79
    David Braddon-Mitchell & J. Fitzpatrick (1990). Explanation and the Language of Thought. Synthese 83 (1):3-29.
    In this paper we argue that the insistence by Fodor et. al. that the Language of Thought hypothesis must be true rests on mistakes about the kinds of explanations that must be provided of cognitive phenomena. After examining the canonical arguments for the LOT, we identify a weak version of the LOT hypothesis which we think accounts for some of the intuitions that there must be a LOT. We then consider what kinds of explanation cognitive phenomena require, and conclude that (...)
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  25. David Braddon-Mitchell, Freedom and Binding Consequentialism.
    The paper proposes a new version of direct act consequentialism that will provide the same evaluations of the rightness of acts as indirect disposition, motive or character consequentialism, thus reconciling the coherence of direct consequentialism with the plausible results in cases of indirect consequentialism. This is achieved by seeing that adopting certain kinds of moral dispositions causally constrains our future acts, so that the maximizing acts ruled out by the disposition can no longer be chosen. Thus when we act we (...)
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  26.  35
    David Braddon-Mitchell & K. Jackson (1999). The Divide-and-Conquer Path to Analytic Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):71-89.
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  27.  81
    Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). There Is No Simpliciter Simpliciter. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249 - 278.
    This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family of (...)
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  28.  58
    David Braddon-Mitchell (1993). The Microstructural Causation Hypothesis. Erkenntnis 39 (2):257 - 283.
    I argue against a priori objections to the view that causation may be reducible to some micro-structural process in principle discoverable by physics. I distinguish explanation from causation, and argue that the main objections to such a reduction stem from conflating these two notions. Explanation is the collection of pragmatically relevant, possibly counterfactual information about causation; and causation is to be identified in a necessary a posteriori way with whatever physical processes underwrite our explanatory claims.
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  29.  64
    David Braddon-Mitchell (2005). Conceptual Stability and the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms. Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):859-868.
  30.  62
    David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). Folk Theories of the Third Kind. Ratio 17 (3):277-293.
    The idea of a folk theory has played many important roles in much recent philosophy. To do the work they are designed for, they need to be both internal features of agents who possess them, and yet scrutable without the full resources of empirical cognitive science. The worry for the theorist of folk theories, is that only one of these desiderata is met in each plausible conception of a folk theory. This paper outlines a third conception that meets them both.1.
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  31. David Braddon-Mitchell (2009). Naturalistic Analysis and the a Priori. In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press
     
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  32. David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
     
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  33. David Braddon-Mitchell (forthcoming). Mastering Meaning. Philosophical Studies.
     
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  34.  44
    David Braddon-Mitchell (2006). Believing Falsely Makes It So. Mind 115 (460):833-866.
    that there is something rationally or conceptually defective in judging that an act is right without being in any way motivated towards it—is one which has tended to lead either to error theories of ethics on the one hand, or acceptance of the truth of internalism on the other. This paper argues that it does play a kind of subject-setting role, but that our responses to cases can be rationalised without requiring that internalism is true for ethical realism to be (...)
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  35.  36
    David Braddon-Mitchell (1998). Metarepresentation. Mind and Language 13 (1):29-34.
    The paper makes three points about the modularity of folk psychology and the significance of metarepresentation: The hope that metarepresentation may provide a principled divide between intentional and merely representational systems focuses on a divide of mechanism. I suggest that we also look for a divide of task: the difference could be a principled difference in the task performed by the systems, not in how the task is performed. There is no incompatibility between the hypothesis that folk psychology is modular (...)
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  36.  2
    Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell (2007). There is No Simpliciter Simpliciter. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249-278.
    This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family of (...)
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  37.  1
    David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). Talking About a Universalist World. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):499-534.
    The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are the (...)
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  38.  1
    David Braddon-Mitchell (2006). Index of MIND Vol. 115 Nos 1–4, 2006. Mind 114 (460):460.
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  39. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.) (2008). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. A Bradford Book.
    Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis is a tool for locating in the scientifically given world objects and properties we quantify over in (...)
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  40. David Braddon-Mitchell (2003). Morning, Cabbages. Literature & Aesthetics 13 (1).
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  41. David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.) (2001). The Canberra Plan. Oxford University Press.
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  42. David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (2007). The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Second Edition. Blackwell.
     
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