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David Braun [37]David M. Braun [7]David P. Braun [1]
  1. David Braun, Indexicals.
    Indexicals are linguistic expressions whose reference shifts from context to context: some paradigm examples are ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘today’,‘he’, ‘she’, and ‘that’. Two speakers who utter a single sentence that contains an indexical may say different things. For instance, Fred and Wilma say different things when they utter the sentence ‘I am female’. Many philosophers (following David Kaplan 1989a) hold that indexicals have two sorts of meaning. The first sort of meaning is often called ‘character’ or ‘linguistic meaning’; the second (...)
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  2. David Braun, 379. Isbn 0-19-514528-3. $35.00.
    This excellent book is aptly titled, for in it Scott Soames systematically discusses and greatly extends the semantic views that Saul Kripke presented in Naming and Necessity . As Soames does this, he touches on a wide variety of semantic topics, all of which he treats with his characteristically high degree of clarity, depth, and precision. Anyone who is interested in the semantic issues raised by..
     
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  3. David Braun (forthcoming). Desiring, Desires, and Desire Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Delia Graff Fara (2013) maintains that many desire ascriptions underspecify the content of the relevant agent’s desire. She argues that this is inconsistent with certain initially plausible claims about desiring, desires, and desire ascriptions. This paper defends those initially plausible claims. Part of the defense hinges on metaphysical claims about the relations among desiring, desires, and contents.
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  4. David Braun (2013). Contextualism About 'Might' and Says-That Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):485-511.
    Contextualism about ‘might’ says that the property that ‘might’ expresses varies from context to context. I argue against contextualism. I focus on problems that contextualism apparently has with attitude ascriptions in which ‘might’ appears in an embedded ‘that’-clause. I argue that contextualists can deal rather easily with many of these problems, but I also argue that serious difficulties remain with collective and quantified says-that ascriptions. Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne atempt to deal with these remaining problems, but I argue that (...)
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  5. David Braun (2013). Invariantism About 'Can' and 'May' (as Well as 'Might'). Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (2):181-185.
    Braun (Linguistics & Philosophy 35, 461–489, 2012) argued for a non- relativist, invariantist theory of ‘might’. Yanovich (Linguistics & Philosophy, 2013) argues that Braun’s theory is inconsistent with certain facts concerning diachronic meaning changes in ‘might’, ‘can’, and ‘may’. This paper replies to Yanovich’s objection.
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  6. David Braun (2012). An Invariantist Theory of 'Might' Might Be Right. Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (6):461-489.
    Invariantism about ‘might’ says that ‘might’ semantically expresses the same modal property in every context. This paper presents and defends a version of invariantism. According to it, ‘might’ semantically expresses the same weak modal property in every context. However, speakers who utter sentences containing ‘might’ typically assert propositions concerning stronger types of modality, including epistemic modality. This theory can explain the phenomena that motivate contextualist theories of epistemic uses of ‘might’, and can be defended from objections of the sort that (...)
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  7. David Braun (2012). Character, and Beyond. In Gillian Russell Delia Graff Fara (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 9.
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  8. David Braun (2012). 10 Knowing How and Knowing Answers. Philosophical Inquiry 36 (1):244.
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  9. David Braun (2011). Implicating Questions. Mind and Language 26 (5):574-595.
    I modify Grice's theory of conversational implicature so as to accommodate acts of implicating propositions by asking questions, acts of implicating questions by asserting propositions, and acts of implicating questions by asking questions. I describe the relations between a declarative sentence's semantic content (the proposition it semantically expresses), on the one hand, and the propositions that a speaker locutes, asserts, and implicates by uttering that sentence, on the other. I discuss analogous relations between an interrogative sentence's semantic content (the question (...)
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  10. David Braun (2011). Knowing How and Knowing Answers. In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, Usa. 244.
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  11. David Braun (2008). Complex Demonstratives and Their Singular Contents. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (1):57-99.
    This paper presents a semantic and pragmatic theory of complex demonstratives. According to this theory, the semantic content of a complex demonstrative, in a context, is simply an object, and the semantic content of a sentence that contains a complex demonstrative, in a context, is a singular proposition. This theory is defended from various objections to direct reference theories of complex demonstratives, including King's objection from quantification into complex demonstratives.
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  12. David Braun (2008). Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):335 - 358.
    This paper presents a number of objections to Jeffrey King's quantificational theory of complex demonstratives. Some of these objections have to do with modality, whereas others concern attitude ascriptions. Various possible replies are considered. The debate between quantificational theorists and direct reference theorists over complex demonstratives is compared with recent debates concerning definite descriptions.
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  13. David Braun (2008). Persisting Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 141 (3):243 - 262.
    This paper presents a number of objections to Jeffrey King's quantificational theory of complex demonstratives. Some of these objections have to do with modality, whereas others concern attitude ascriptions. Various possible replies are considered. The debate between quantificational theorists and direct reference theorists over complex demonstratives is compared with recent debates concerning definite descriptions.
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  14. David Braun & Theodore Sider (2007). Vague, So Untrue. Noûs 41 (2):133 - 156.
    According to an old and attractive view, vagueness must be eliminated before semantic notions — truth, implication, and so on — may be applied. This view was accepted by Frege, but is rarely defended nowadays.1 This..
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  15. David Braun (2006). Illogical, but Rational. Noûs 40 (2):376–379.
    Stephen Schiffer (200x) says that Nathan Salmon and I are committed to the special-case consequence. He also says that it is possible for (1)-(3) to be true.
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  16. David Braun (2006). Kripke's Revenge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 128 (3):669 - 682.
    Millianism says that the semantic content of a name (or indexical) is simply its referent. This thesis arises within a general, powerful research program, the propositionalist approach to semantics, which sets as a goal for philosophical semantics an assignment of entities – semantic contents – to bits of language, culminating in the assignment of propositions to sentences. Communication, linguistic competence, truth conditions, and other semantic phenomena are ultimately explained in terms of semantic contents.
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  17. David Braun (2006). Names and Natural Kind Terms. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 490--515.
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  18. David Braun (2006). Now You Know Who Hong Oak Yun Is. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):24-42.
    Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall. And now you know who Hong Oak Yun is. For if someone were to ask you ‘Who is Hong Oak Yun?’, you could answer that Hong Oak Yun is a person who is over three inches tall, and you would know what you were saying. So you know an answer to the question ‘Who is Hong Oak Yun?’, and that is sufficient for knowing who Hong Oak Yun is. (...)
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  19. David M. Braun, Comment on David Chalmers' "Probability and Propositions".
    Propositions are the referents of the ‘that’-clauses that appear in the direct object positions of typical ascriptions of assertion, belief, and other binary cognitive relations. In that sense, propositions are the objects of those cognitive relations. Propositions are also the semantic contents (meanings, in one sense ) of declarative sentences, with respect to contexts. They are what sentences semantically express, with respect to contexts. Propositions also bear truth-values. The truth-value of a sentence, in a context, is the truth-value of the (...)
     
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  20. Theodore Sider & David Braun (2006). Review: Kripke's Revenge. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 128 (3):669 - 682.
    Millianism says that the semantic content of a name (or indexical) is simply its referent. This thesis arises within a general, powerful research program, the propositionalist approach to semantics, which sets as a goal for philosophical semantics an assignment of entities — semantic contents — to bits of language, culminating in the assignment of propositions to sentences. Communication, linguistic competence, truth conditions, and other semantic phenomena are ultimately explained in terms of semantic contents. Over 100 years ago Frege (1952/1892) pointed (...)
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  21. David Braun (2005). Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names. Noûs 39 (4):596–631.
    John Stuart Mill (1843) thought that proper names denote individuals and do not connote attributes. Contemporary Millians agree, in spirit. We hold that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its referent. We also think that the semantic content of a declarative sentence is a Russellian structured proposition whose constituents are the semantic contents of the sentence’s constituents. This proposition is what the sentence semantically expresses. Therefore, we think that sentences containing proper names semantically express singular propositions, which (...)
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  22. David Braun (2005). Empty Names, Mythical Names, Fictional Names. Noûs 39:596-631.
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  23. David Braun (2004). Consciousness and Cognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):484–491.
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  24. David Braun (2003). Scott Soames. 2002. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (3):367-379.
  25. Jeffrey D. Parrish, David P. Braun & Robert S. Unnasch (2003). Are We Conserving What We Say We Are? Measuring Ecological Integrity Within Protected Areas. Bioscience 53 (9):851.
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  26. David M. Braun (2002). Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):65-81.
    We use names to talk about objects. We use predicates to talk about properties and relations. We use sentences to attribute properties and relations to objects. We say things when we utter sentences, often things we believe.
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  27. David Braun & Jennifer Saul (2002). Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations. Philosophical Studies 111 (1):1 - 41.
    Many competent speakers initially judge that (i) is true and (ii) isfalse, though they know that (iii) is true. (i) Superman leaps more tallbuildings than Clark Kent. (ii) Superman leaps more tall buildings thanSuperman. (iii) Superman is identical with Clark Kent. Semanticexplanations of these intuitions say that (i) and (ii) really can differin truth-value. Pragmatic explanations deny this, and say that theintuitions are due to misleading implicatures. This paper argues thatboth explanations are incorrect. (i) and (ii) cannot differ intruth-value, yet (...)
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  28. John H. Dreher, Can There Be Brute, Contingent Moral Facts, David Braun, Attitude Ascriptions, Mark Crimmins, Thing Talk Moonlighting & Michael Nelson (2002). Selected Papers Presented in 2001 at the 75th Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association Edited By: Laurie Shrage. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 108:339-340.
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  29. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Explanation. Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
    Many philosophers think that the Substitution Objection decisively refutes Russellianism. This objection claims that sentences (1) and (2) can differ in truth value. Therefore, it says, the sentences express different propositions, and so Russellianism is false.
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  30. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Prediction. Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105.
    Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavior, but argue that if Russellianism weretrue, then this would not be so. (...)
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  31. David Braun, Jeffrey C. King & Edward N. Zalta (2001). The Metaphysics of Reference. Philosophical Perspectives 15:253-359.
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  32. David Braun (2000). Coming to Our Senses. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):489-492.
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  33. David Braun (2000). Review of Devitt 1996. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60:489-92.
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  34. David M. Braun (2000). Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  35. David M. Braun (1998). Understanding Belief Reports. Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
    In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory is Russellianism, sometimes also called `neo-Russellianism', `Millianism', `the direct reference theory', `the "Fido"-Fido theory', or `the naive theory'. The objection concernssubstitution of co-referring names in belief sentences. Russellianism implies that any two belief sentences, that differ only in containing distinct co-referring names, express the same proposition (in any given context). Since `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' both refer to the planet Venus, this view implies that (...)
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  36. David Braun (1997). Review of Austin (1990) and Yourgrau (1990). [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7:247-302.
  37. David Braun (1996). Demonstratives and Their Linguistic Meanings. Noûs 30 (2):145-173.
    In this paper, I present a new semantics for demonstratives. Now some may think that David Kaplan (1989a,b) has already given a more than satisfactory semantics for demonstratives, and that there is no need for a new one. But I argue below that Kaplan's theory fails to describe the linguistic meanings of 'that' and other true demonstratives. My argument for this conclusion has nothing to do with cognitive value, belief sentences, or other such contentious matters in semantics and the philosophy (...)
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  38. David Braun (1995). Katz on Names Without Bearers. Philosophical Review 104 (4):553-576.
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  39. David Braun (1995). What is Character? Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (3):241--273.
  40. David M. Braun (1995). Causally Relevant Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 9:447-75.
    In this paper I present an analysis of causal relevance for properties. I believe that most of us are already familiar with the notion of a causally relevant property. But some of us may not recognize it "under that description." So I begin below with some intuitive explanations and some illustrative examples.
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  41. David Braun (1994). Structured Characters and Complex Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 74 (2):193--219.
    A structured character is a semantic value of a certain sort. Like the more familiar Kaplanian characters, structured characters determine the contents of expressions in contexts. But unlike Kaplanian characters, structured characters also have constituent structures. The semantic theories with which most of us are acquainted do not mention structured characters. But I argue in this paper that these familiar semantic theories fail to make obvious distinctions in meaning---distinctions that can be made by a theory that uses structured characters. Thus (...)
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  42. David Braun (1993). Empty Names. Noûs 27 (4):449-469.
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  43. Barbara Abbott, Nicholas Asher, Jay Atlas, Kent Bach, Chris Barker, Stephen Barker, Renate Bartsch, Jonathan Bennett, Steven Borr & David Braun (1992). Linguistics Managing Editor. Linguistics and Philosophy 15:679-680.
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  44. David M. Braun (1991). Content, Causation, and Cognitive Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (December):375-89.
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  45. David M. Braun (1991). Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):289 - 305.