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David J. Buller [19]David Buller [1]
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Profile: David J. Buller (Northern Illinois University)
  1. David J. Buller (2007). Varieties of Evolutionary Psychology. In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  2. David J. Buller, Edouard Machery & H. Clark Barrett (2006). Essay Review-Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature. In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan. 73--2.
     
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  3. David J. Buller (2005). Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature. MIT Press.
    In the carefully argued central chapters of Adapting Minds, Buller scrutinizes several of evolutionary psychology's most highly publicized "...
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  4. David J. Buller (2005). Detecting Cheating in the Wason Selection Task. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):277-283.
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  5. David J. Buller (2005). Evolutionary Psychology: The Emperor's New Paradigm. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):277-283.
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  6. David J. Buller (2005). Get Over: Massive Modularity. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):881-891.
  7. David J. Buller, Jerry Fodor & Tessa L. Crume (2005). The Emperor is Still Under-Dressed. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (11):508-510.
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  8. David J. Buller (2002). Function and Design Revisited. In Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Clarendon Press.
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  9. David J. Buller & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). C. Richard Chapman, Yoshio Nakamura and Chris-Topher N. Chapman/Pain and Folk Theory 209–222 Don Gustafson/on the Supposed Utility of a Folk Theory of Pain 223–228 Kenneth J. Sufka/Searching for a Common Ground: A Commentary on Resnik's Folk Psychology of Pain 229–231. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1:409-411.
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  10. David J. Buller & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (3):307-25.
    Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically specified” modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its “modules” are neither genetically specified nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain’s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain’s information-processing structures. The brain’s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the “modules” that result (...)
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  11. David J. Buller, A Guided Tour of Evolutionary Psychology. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
     
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  12. David J. Buller (1999). Defreuding Evolutionary Psychology: Adaptation and Human Motivation. In Valerie Gray Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Philosophy. MIT Press. 99--114.
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  13. David J. Buller (ed.) (1999). Function, Selection, and Design. State University of New York Press.
    A complete sourcebook for philosophical discussion of the nature of function in biology.
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  14. David J. Buller (1998). Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical Survey. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 13 (4):505-527.
    Formulations of the essential commitment of the etiological theory of functions have varied significantly, with some individual authors' formulations even varying from one place to another. The logical geography of these various formulations is different from what is standardly assumed; for they are not stylistic variants of the same essential commitment, but stylistic variants of two non-equivalent versions of the etiological theory. I distinguish these “strong” and “weak” versions of the etiological theory (which differ with respect to the role of (...)
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  15. David J. Buller (1997). Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (Or: In Defense of "Narrow" Functions). Philosophy of Science 64 (1):74-95.
    Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one (...)
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  16. David Buller (1995). On the 'Standard' Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Papers 24 (2):111-125.
    What has sometimes been called the "standard" argument for fatalism never achieved the critical popularity of Richard Taylor's (1962) infamous argument. But it has enjoyed far greater longevity. In De Fato Cicero (1960) tells us it was known in ancient Greece as the "idle argument", for it purports to show the futility of attempting to control one's fate and, hence, those persuaded by it could be led to a life of inaction and idleness. Even with such antiquated credentials, however, the (...)
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  17. David J. Buller (1993). Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm, or, Why Do You Think They Call It Artificial Intelligence? [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-81.
    The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational models is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that (...)
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  18. David J. Buller (1993). Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm (Or: Why Do You Think They Call Itartificial Intelligence?). [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-181.
    The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational models is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that (...)
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  19. David J. Buller (1992). "Narrow"-Mindedness Breeds Inaction. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):59-70.
    Discussion of Fodor's doctrine of 'methodological solipsism' and Stich's principle of autonomy' has been concerned to show that these principles are incompatible with psychological theories which appeal to states with content (e.g. beliefs and desires). Concern with these issues, and the subsequent attempt to develop a notion of 'narrow' content which is solipsistic or autonomous, has, I believe, obscured a more fundamental issue: No theory which satisfies these principles would ever be able to explain behavior under descriptions which are in (...)
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  20. David J. Buller & Thomas R. Foster (1992). The New Paradox of Temporal Transience. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):357-366.
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