22 found
Order:
Disambiguations:
David J. Buller [21]David Joseph Buller [1]David Buller [1]
See also:
Profile: David J. Buller (Northern Illinois University)
  1. David J. Buller (2005). Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature. MIT Press.
    In the carefully argued central chapters of Adapting Minds, Buller scrutinizes several of evolutionary psychology's most highly publicized "...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   60 citations  
  2.  15
    David J. Buller (ed.) (1999). Function, Selection, and Design. State University of New York Press.
    A complete sourcebook for philosophical discussion of the nature of function in biology.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  3. David J. Buller & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (3):307-25.
    Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically specified” modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its “modules” are neither genetically specified nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain’s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain’s information-processing structures. The brain’s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the “modules” that result (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  4.  63
    David J. Buller (1998). Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical Survey. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 13 (4):505-527.
    Formulations of the essential commitment of the etiological theory of functions have varied significantly, with some individual authors' formulations even varying from one place to another. The logical geography of these various formulations is different from what is standardly assumed; for they are not stylistic variants of the same essential commitment, but stylistic variants of two non-equivalent versions of the etiological theory. I distinguish these “strong” and “weak” versions of the etiological theory (which differ with respect to the role of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  5. David J. Buller (2005). Evolutionary Psychology: The Emperor's New Paradigm. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):277-283.
    For some evolutionary psychology is merely a field of inquiry, but for others it is a robust paradigm involving specific theories about the nature and evolution of the human mind. Proponents of this paradigm claim to have made several important discoveries regarding the evolved architecture of the mind. Highly publicized discoveries include a cheater-detection module, a psychological sex difference in jealousy, and motivational mechanisms underlying parental love and its lapses, which purportedly result in child maltreatment. In this article, I argue (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  6. David J. Buller (1997). Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (Or: In Defense of "Narrow" Functions). Philosophy of Science 64 (1):74-95.
    Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  22
    David J. Buller, Jerry Fodor & Tessa L. Crume (2005). The Emperor is Still Under-Dressed. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (11):508-510.
    Replies to Letters from Cosmides et al. (regarding cheater detection), Buss and Haselton (regarding sex differences in jealousy), and Daly and Wilson (regarding child abuse).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8. David Buller (1995). On the 'Standard' Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Papers 24 (2):111-125.
    What has sometimes been called the "standard" argument for fatalism never achieved the critical popularity of Richard Taylor's (1962) infamous argument. But it has enjoyed far greater longevity. In De Fato Cicero (1960) tells us it was known in ancient Greece as the "idle argument", for it purports to show the futility of attempting to control one's fate and, hence, those persuaded by it could be led to a life of inaction and idleness. Even with such antiquated credentials, however, the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9.  42
    David J. Buller (1999). Defreuding Evolutionary Psychology: Adaptation and Human Motivation. In Valerie Gray Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Philosophy. MIT Press 99--114.
  10.  83
    David J. Buller (2005). Get Over: Massive Modularity. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):881-891.
  11. David J. Buller (2002). Function and Design Revisited. In Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins & Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Clarendon Press
    Several analyses of biological function — for example, those of Williams, Millikan, and Kitcher — identify an item’s function with what natural selection designed it to do. Allen and Bekoff have disagreed, claiming that natural design is a special case of biological function. I argue that Allen and Bekoff’s account of natural design is unduly restrictive and that it fails to mark a principled distinction between function and design. I distinguish two approaches to the phenomenon of natural design — the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  12.  2
    David J. Buller (2016). Truth, by Chase Wrenn. Teaching Philosophy 39 (1):69-72.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  39
    David J. Buller & Thomas R. Foster (1992). The New Paradox of Temporal Transience. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):357-366.
    McTaggart raised a famed paradox regarding the transientist conception of time, the idea that the present moves into the future to overtake future events (or, alternatively, that future events move into the present) and past events recede further and further into the past as time goes on. Schlesinger has recently attempted an ingenious transientist solution to McTaggart's paradox. We will argue that Schlesinger's solution to McTaggart's paradox itself gives rise to a new, yet perfectly parallel, paradox which can only be (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  43
    David J. Buller (1993). Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm, or, Why Do You Think They Call It Artificial Intelligence? [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-81.
    The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational models is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  3
    David J. Buller, A Guided Tour of Evolutionary Psychology. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  21
    David J. Buller (1992). "Narrow"-Mindedness Breeds Inaction. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):59-70.
    Discussion of Fodor's doctrine of 'methodological solipsism' and Stich's principle of autonomy' has been concerned to show that these principles are incompatible with psychological theories which appeal to states with content (e.g. beliefs and desires). Concern with these issues, and the subsequent attempt to develop a notion of 'narrow' content which is solipsistic or autonomous, has, I believe, obscured a more fundamental issue: No theory which satisfies these principles would ever be able to explain behavior under descriptions which are in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  7
    David J. Buller (1993). Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm (Or: Why Do You Think They Call Itartificial Intelligence?). [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 3 (2):155-181.
    The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational models is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism). I argue that these ideas are not jointly tenable. I discuss the kinds of empirical evidence available to cognitive scientists for (dis)confirming computational models of cognition and argue that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. David J. Buller (2006). Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature. A Bradford Book.
    Was human nature designed by natural selection in the Pleistocene epoch? The dominant view in evolutionary psychology holds that it was -- that our psychological adaptations were designed tens of thousands of years ago to solve problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors. In this provocative and lively book, David Buller examines in detail the major claims of evolutionary psychology -- the paradigm popularized by Steven Pinker in The Blank Slate and by David Buss in The Evolution of Desire -- and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. David J. Buller (2009). Evolutionary Psychology. In Michael Ruse & Joseph Travis (eds.), Evolution: The First Four Billion Years. Harvard University Press 557-560.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. David J. Buller (2006). Evolutionary Psychology: A Critique. In Elliott Sober (ed.), Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, 3rd ed. MIT Press 197-214.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. David J. Buller (2007). Review Symposium: Life After Evolutionary Psychology: Author's Response. Metascience 16:17-24.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. David J. Buller (2007). Varieties of Evolutionary Psychology. In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography