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  1.  12
    James L. McClelland, Matthew M. Botvinick, David C. Noelle, David C. Plaut, Timothy T. Rogers, Mark S. Seidenberg & Linda B. Smith (2010). Letting Structure Emerge: Connectionist and Dynamical Systems Approaches to Cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (8):348-356.
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  2.  5
    Craig R. M. McKenzie, John T. Wixted, David C. Noelle & Gohar Gyurjyan (2001). Relation Between Confidence in Yes–No and Forced-Choice Tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 130 (1):140.
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    David C. Noelle (1999). Explicit to Whom? Accessibility, Representational Homogeneity, and Dissociable Learning Mechanisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):777-778.
    Distinguishing explicit from implicit knowledge on the basis of the active representation of certain propositional attitudes fails to provide an explanation for dissociations in learning performance under implicit and explicit conditions. This suggests an account of implicit and explicit knowledge grounded in the presence of multiple learning mechanisms, and multiple brain systems more generally. A rough outline of a connectionist account of this kind is provided.
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    David C. Noelle (1998). Is the Dynamical Hypothesis Falsifiable? On Unification in Theories of Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):647-648.
    The dynamical hypothesis is strong in that, for it to be true, every cognitive phenomenon must be best modeled by a dynamical system. Depending on how it is interpreted, however, the hypothesis may be seen as probably false or even unfalsifiable. Strengthening the hypothesis to require unification, or at least coherence, across models in different cognitive domains alleviates this problem.
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