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Profile: David DeVidi (University of Waterloo)
  1. David DeVidi (2004). An Introduction to Formal Logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):563-565.
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  2. David DeVidi (2004). Sur la preuve de consistance de Gauthier et le programme de Frege. Philosophiques 31 (1):215-220.
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  3. David DeVidi (2003). Lambert Karel. Free Logic: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, Xii+ 191 Pp. [REVIEW] Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):521-523.
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  4. David DeVidi & Tim Kenyon (2003). Analogues of Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495.
    An interesting recent reply to the Paradox of Knowability is Neil Tennant's proposal: to restrict the anti-realist's knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motivated by something other than the wish to save anti-realism from embarrassment. We examine Tennant's argument that his restriction is motivated by parallel considerations in cases that are neutral with respect to debates about realism. We conclude that the cases are not neutral, nor the (...)
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  5. K. Lambert & David DeVidi (2003). REVIEWS-Free Logic: Selected Essays. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):521-523.
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  6. John L. Bell, David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (2001). Logical Options: An Introduction to Classical and Alternative Logics. Broadview Press.
    Logical Options introduces the extensions and alternatives to classical logic which are most discussed in the philosophical literature: many-sorted logic, second-order logic, modal logics, intuitionistic logic, three-valued logic, fuzzy logic, and free logic. Each logic is introduced with a brief description of some aspect of its philosophical significance, and wherever possible semantic and proof methods are employed to facilitate comparison of the various systems. The book is designed to be useful for philosophy students and professional philosophers who have learned some (...)
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  7. David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (2001). Knowability and Intuitionistic Logic. Philosophia 28 (1-4):319-334.
  8. David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (1999). On Confusions About Bivalence and Excluded Middle. Dialogue 38 (04):785-.
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  9. David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (1999). Tarski on “Essentially Richer” Metalanguages. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):1-28.
    It is well known that Tarski proved a result which can be stated roughly as: no sufficiently rich, consistent, classical language can contain its own truth definition. Tarski's way around this problem is to deal with two languages at a time, an object language for which we are defining truth and a metalanguage in which the definition occurs. An obvious question then is: under what conditions can we construct a definition of truth for a given object language. Tarski claims that (...)
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  10. David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (1997). In Intuitionistic Modal Logic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):201 – 213.
  11. David Devidi (1995). Intuitionistic Ε- and Τ-Calculi. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 41 (4):523-546.
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  12. David Devidi & Graham Solomon (1995). Tolerance and Metalanguages in Carnap'slogical Syntax of Language. Synthese 103 (1):123 - 139.
    Michael Friedman has recently argued that Carnap'sLogical Syntax of Language is fundamentally flawed in a way that reveals the ultimate failure of logical positivism. Friedman's argument depends crucially on two claims: (1) that Carnap was committed to the view that there is a universal metalanguage and (2) that given what Carnap wanted from a metalanguage, in particular given that he wanted a definition of analytic for an object language, he was in fact committed to a hierarchy of stronger and stronger (...)
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