In Britain before 1911, the vast majority of the population provided medical care for themselves and had evolved a variety of schemes that checked the power of organized medicine and encouraged a steady improvement in standards. The evidence is that at the end of the nineteenth century about 5?6 percent of the population relied on the poor law, 10?15 percent on free care from charitable institutions, 75 percent on mutual aid, and the remainder paid fees to private doctors.
Argues that on an interpretation of the Enlightenment which emphasises its radical potential and importance for the development of democracy Catharine Macaulay should be recognised as a more centrally Enlightenment historian than David Hume.
In his commentary, Oaksford makes two main claims: (1) that the externalisation method used by Green, Over, and Pyne (1997) enforces the correlation observed between probability estimates and selection, and (2) that these estimates support the prediction of a downward revision of P(p) when P(p) > P(q). In this reply, we rebut claim 1 by describing the instructions more comprehensively, and claim 2 by reiterating the importance of making certain theoretical distinctions which Oaksford does not make. Our interest is (...) the psychological process of reaching decision: externalisation methods provide a means of exploring this process and of assessing the value of Bayesian approaches. (shrink)
Marian David defends the correspondence theory of truth against the disquotational theory of truth, its current major rival. The correspondence theory asserts that truth is a philosophically rich and profound notion in need of serious explanation. Disquotationalists offer a radically deflationary account inspired by Tarski and propagated by Quine and others. They reject the correspondence theory, insist truth is anemic, and advance an "anti-theory" of truth that is essentially a collection of platitudes: "Snow is white" is true if and (...) only if snow is white; "Grass is green" is true if and only if grass is green. According to disquotationalists the only profound insight about truth is that it lacks profundity. David contrasts the correspondence theory with disquotationalism and then develops the latter position in rich detail--more than has been available in previous literature--to show its faults. He demonstrates that disquotationalism is not a tenable theory of truth, as it has too many absurd consequences. (shrink)
G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area.
Hardman in press claims that the results of Green and Larking 1995 favour a mental rules theory account of performance in the selection task over a mental model theory account. This reply rebuts his claim.
Previous studies have investigated orthographic-to-phonological mapping during reading by comparing brain activation for (1) reading words to object naming, or (2) reading pseudowords (e.g. “phume”) to words (e.g. “plume”). Here we combined both approaches to provide new insights into the underlying neural mechanisms. In fMRI data from 25 healthy adult readers, we first identified activation that was greater for reading words and pseudowords relative to picture and color naming. The most significant effect was observed in the left putamen, extending to (...) both anterior and posterior borders. Second, consistent with previous studies, we show that both the anterior and posterior putamen are involved in articulating speech with greater activation during our overt speech production tasks (reading, repetition, object naming and color naming) than silent one-back-matching on the same stimuli. Third, we compared putamen activation for words versus pseudowords during overt reading and auditory repetition. This revealed that the anterior putamen was most activated by reading pseudowords, whereas the posterior putamen was most activated by words irrespective of whether the task was reading words or auditory word repetition. The pseudoword effect in the anterior putamen is consistent with prior studies that associated this region with the initiation of novel sequences of movements. In contrast, the heightened word response in the posterior putamen is consistent with other studies that associated this region with “memory guided movement”. Our results illustrate how the functional dissociation between the anterior and posterior putamen supports sublexical and lexical processing during reading. (shrink)
Two experiments using a realistic version of the selection task examined the relationship between participants probability estimates of finding a counter example and their selections. Experiment 1 used everyday categories in the context of a scenario to determine whether or not the number of instances in a category affected the estimated probability of a counter-example. Experiment 2 modified the scenario in order to alter participants estimates of finding a specific counter-example. Unlike Kirby 1994a , but consistent with his proposals, (...) both studies showed that probability estimates significantly predicted selection. Overall results point to the value of understanding selections in terms of their subjective expected utility. (shrink)
We examine how opinion on a controversial real-world issue shifts as a function of reading relevant arguments and engaging in a specific mental simulation about a future, fictional state of affairs involving the target issue. Individuals thought either counterfactually about a future event (“if only X had not happened …”) or semifactually about it (“even if X had not happened …”). In Experiment 1, as expected, individuals became more in favour of a course of action (the electronic tagging of children) (...) after reading relevant supporting arguments. They also became more in favour after they thought counterfactually how a negative future event could have been avoided if only electronic tagging had not been banned some years earlier. The effects of argument relevance and type of mental simulation were additive. Using a similar procedure but a different target issue (whether the UK should join the Economic Monetary Union), Experiment 2 confirmed that the type of mental simulation exerts a substantial effect on the impact of relevant arguments. Much weaker effects arose when the mental simulation was not relevant to the target issue. We set and discuss our results in terms of dual-processing theory. (shrink)
This paper develops the view that in arguing informally individuals construct a dual representation in which there is a coupling of arguments and the structure of the qualitative (mental) causal model to which these refer. Invited to consider a future possibility, individuals generate a causal model and mentally simulate the consequences of certain actions. Their arguments refer to the causal paths in the model. Correspondingly, faced with specific arguments about a policy option they generate a model with particular causal paths (...) and mentally simulate the outcomes. The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with this notion. Decisions on the percentage of funds to be allocated to genetically modified (GM) crop research depended on the structure of the arguments elicited in response to imagining a future state of affairs. Specifically, the presence of a dissuasive argument eliminated the impact of any persuasive argument. The non-monotonic properties of everyday informal argument can then be seen as a corollary of change to causal structure in the model. The dual representation view predicts that the impact of a dissuasive argument will depend on the structure of the causal model. Experiment 2 tested and confirmed this prediction by requiring individuals to judge the relative persuasiveness of two cases referring either to a model with two independent causal paths or to a model in which one causal path depended on the other. In contrast to Experiment 1, prior opinion on GM crop research did not affect allocation decisions. An advisory role in contrast to a participant role may encourage a more decontextualised mode of thinking. According to the dual representation view, ease of mental simulation should exert wide-ranging effects on judgements and the rhetoric of arguments should also be important. The paper concludes with a discussion of some of these expectations. (shrink)
We suggest that anecdotes have evidentiary value in interpreting nonhuman primate behavior. We also believe that any outcome from the experiments proposed by Heyes can be interpreted as a product of previous experience with trainers or as associative learning using the experimental cues. No potential outcome is clearcut evidence for or against the theory of mind proposition.
Abstract In order to be a general theory of human cognition, the theory of mental models needs to accommodate a variety of forms of reasoning in addition to deduction. The mental model theory of induction is a crucial step in establishing generality. After suggesting that the theory of mental models can also account for abduction and analogy, the paper points out that inductive performance is likely to be constrained both by the nature of the representation used and by strategic factors. (...) Since human cognition involves the communication of arguments, a final section explores the relationship between the theory of mental models and the notion of an argument. It proposes that models can contain tokens of inductive arguments which can be referred to in the course of other arguments. (shrink)
Two experiments, using a mock legal case, confirmed the causal role of arguments in verdict decisions and explored the process involved. Experiment 1 showed that verdicts varied with the strength of counter-arguments and Experiment 2 showed that the use of background information that undermined such arguments determined the verdict reached. Such results confirm the causal role of arguments but do not speak to the representations constructed. In both experiments we analysed the reasons proposed for verdicts. Participants generally represented the state (...) of affairs, and conjectured state of affairs, to which the arguments referred. Experiment 2 also asked participants about the number of causal possibilities they envisaged. Confidence in the verdict was moderated by the strength of counter-arguments but in different ways for those who envisaged a single causal account as opposed to two causal accounts. In the former case, confidence decreased with the rated strength of counter-arguments. In the latter case, confidence increased. We suggest that verdicts are abductive explanations of the events generated through a process of mental simulation. (shrink)
This paper proposes that different experimental contexts (single or dual language contexts) permit different neural loci at which words in the target language can be selected. However, in order to develop a fuller understanding of the neural circuit mediating language control we need to consider the community context in which bilingual speakers typically use their two languages (the behavioural ecology of bilingual speakers). The contrast between speakers from code-switching and non-code switching communities offers a way to increase our understanding of (...) the cortical, subcortical and, in particular, cerebellar structures involved in language control. It will also help us identify the non-verbal behavioural correlates associated with these control processes. (shrink)
The estimates that humans make of statistical dependencies in the environment and therefore their representation of uncertainty crucially depend on the integration of data over time. As such, the extent to which past events are used to represent uncertainty has been postulated to vary over the cortex. For example, primary visual cortex responds to rapid perturbations in the environment, while frontal cortices involved in executive control encode the longer term contexts within which these perturbations occur. Here we tested whether primary (...) and executive regions can be distinguished by the number of past observations they represent. This was based on a decay-dependent model that weights past observations from a Markov process and Bayesian Model Selection (BMS) to test the prediction that neuronal responses are characterised by different decay half-lives depending on location in the brain. We show distributions of brain responses for short and long term decay functions in primary and secondary visual and frontal cortices, respectively. We found that visual and parietal responses are released from the burden of the past, enabling an agile response to fluctuations in events as they unfold. In contrast, frontal regions are more concerned with average trends over longer time scales within which local variations are embedded. Specifically, we provide evidence for a temporal gradient for representing context within the prefrontal cortex and possibly beyond to include primary sensory and association areas. (shrink)
Extreme weather continues to preoccupy society as a formidable public safety concern bearing huge economic costs. While attention has focused on global climate change and how it could intensify key elements of the water cycle such as precipitation and river discharge, it is the conjunction of geophysical and socioeconomic forces that shapes human sensitivity and risks to weather extremes. We demonstrate here the use of high-resolution geophysical and population datasets together with documentary reports of rainfall-induced damage across South America over (...) a multi-decadal, retrospective time domain (1960–2000). We define and map extreme precipitation hazard, exposure, affectedpopulations, vulnerability and risk, and use these variables to analyse the impact of floods as a water security issue. Geospatial experiments uncover major sources of risk from natural climate variability and population growth, with change in climate extremes bearing a minor role. While rural populations display greatest relative sensitivity to extreme rainfall, urban settings show the highest rates of increasing risk. In the coming decades, rapid urbanization will make South American cities the focal point of future climate threats but also an opportunity for reducing vulnerability, protecting lives and sustaining economic development through both traditional and ecosystem-based disaster risk management systems. (shrink)
G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a better (...) explanation of the absurdity both in assertion and in belief that avoids our four objections. (shrink)
Various argumentation analysis tools permit the analyst to represent functional components of an argument (e.g., data, claim, warrant, backing), how arguments are composed of subarguments and defenses against potential counterarguments, and argumentation schemes. In order to facilitate a study of argument presentation in a biomedical corpus, we have developed a hybrid scheme that enables an analyst to encode argumentation analysis within the framework of Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST), which can be used to represent the discourse structure of a text. This (...) paper describes the hybrid representation scheme and illustrates its use for investigation of contexts that license omission of elements of an argument. The analyses given in the paper involve reconstruction of enthymemes. Defeasible argumentation schemes serve as a constraint on reconstruction. In addition, the examples illustrate several other types of contextual constraints on reconstruction of enthymemes. (shrink)
The journal Mind is now a wholly philosophical journal. At the time of its founding, in 1876, however, its mission was rather different in character. Its aim was to discover whether scientific psychology was a truly viable enterprise and, if so, what its boundaries with philosophy, with other scientific disciplines, and with the earlier generation of discredited attempts at `scientific' studies of the mind (e.g. phrenology, mesmerism) might be. Although at first Mind published mostly philosophical pieces and literature reviews, by (...) the mid-1880s it was publishing primary experimental research, mostly by American psychologists who as yet had few outlets of their own. For a time it was the leading journal of experimental psychology in the English-speaking world. As the international competition among scientific and scholarly journals intensified in the 1890s, however, Mind started to lose its share of experimental contributions, and with the editorial takeover of the journal of George Stout in 1892, the journal soon became one dedicated purely to philosophy. (shrink)
In this article we respond to arguments from William Hasker and David Kyle Johnson that free will is incompatible with both divine foreknowledge and eternalism (what we refer to as isotemporalism). In particular, we sketch an Anselmian account of time and freedom, briefly defend the view against Hasker's critique, and then respond in more depth to Johnson's claim that Anselmian freedom is incompatible with free will because it entails that our actions are 'ontologically necessary'. In defending Anselmian freedom we (...) argue that our ordinary intuitions do not support Johnson's case and that Anselmian freedom is compatible with deliberation. (shrink)
Beginning from a basis in the theoretical analysis of comparative religious ethics provided by David Little and Sumner Twiss, this essay extends that analysis by sketching certain "benchmark" theoretical options in comparative religious ethics and by identifying certain fundamental questions which ethicists ought to address to the data supplied by descriptive studies of comparative religions. To illustrate the application of the theoretical model thus defined, the essay concludes with an analysis of selected themes in the essays by Campany, Guberman, (...) and Read in this Focus. (shrink)
Discussions of the source of the Stroop interference effect continue to pervade the literature. Semantic competition posits that interference results from competing semantic activation of word and color dimensions of the stimulus prior to response selection. Response competition posits that interference results from competing responses for articulating the word dimension versus the color dimension at the time of response selection. We embedded Stroop stimuli into a delayed match-to-sample task in an attempt to test semantic and response competition accounts of the (...) interference effect. Participants viewed a sample color word in black or colored fonts that were congruent or incongruent with respect to the color word itself. After a 5s delay, participants were presented with two targets (i.e., a match and a foil) and were instructed to select the correct match. We probed each dimension independently during target presentations via color targets (i.e., two colors) or word targets (i.e., two words) and manipulated whether the semantic content of the foil was related to the semantic content of the irrelevant sample dimension (e.g., word sample “red” in blue font with the word “red” as the match and the word “blue” as the foil). We provide evidence for Stroop interference such that response times increased for incongruent trials even in the presence of a response option with semantic content unrelated to the semantic content of the irrelevant sample dimension. Accuracy also deteriorated during the related foil trials. A follow-up experiment with a 10s delay between sample and targets replicated the results. Results appear to provide converging evidence for Stroop interference in a delayed match-to-sample task in a manner that is consistent with an explanation based upon semantic competition and inconsistent with an explanation based upon response competition. (shrink)