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David H. Sanford [75]David Hawley Sanford [1]
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Profile: David Sanford (Duke University)
  1.  6
    David H. Sanford (2004). If P, Then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning. Routledge.
    This new edition includes three new chapters, updating the book to take into account developments in the field over the past fifteen years.
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  2. David H. Sanford (1993). The Problem of the Many, Many Composition Questions, and Naive Mereology. Noûs 27 (2):219-228.
    Naive mereology studies ordinary, common-sense beliefs about part and whole. Some of the speculations in this article on naive mereology do not bear directly on Peter van Inwagen's "Material Beings". The other topics, (1) and (2), both do. (1) Here is an example of Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many". How can a table be a collection of atoms when many collections of atoms have equally strong claims to be that table? Van Inwagen invokes fuzzy sets to solve this problem. (...)
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  3.  72
    David H. Sanford (2003). Fusion Confusion. Analysis 63 (277):1–4.
    Two fusions can be in the same place at the same time. So long as a house made of Tinkertoys is intact, the fusion of all its Tinkertoys parts coincides with the fusion of it walls and its roof. If none of the Tinkertoys is destroyed, their fusion persists through the complete disassembly of the house. (So the house is not a fusion of its Tinkertoy parts.) The fusion of the walls and roof does not persist through the complete disassembly (...)
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  4. David H. Sanford (1975). Causal Necessity and Logical Necessity. Philosophical Studies 28 (2):185 - 194.
    Myles Brand and Marshall Swain advocate the principle that if A is the set of conditions individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the occurrence of B, then if C is a set of conditions individually necessary for the occurrence of B, every member of C is a member of A. I agree with John Barker and Risto Hilpinen who each argue that this principle is not true for causal necessity and sufficiency, but I disagree with their claim that it is (...)
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  5.  32
    David H. Sanford, Determinates Vs. Determinables. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Everything red is colored, and all squares are polygons. A square is distinguished from other polygons by being four-sided, equilateral, and equiangular. What distinguishes red things from other colored things? This has been understood as a conceptual rather than scientific question. Theories of wavelengths and reflectance and sensory processing are not considered. Given just our ordinary understanding of color, it seems that what differentiates red from other colors is only redness itself. The Cambridge logician W. E. Johnson introduced the terms (...)
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  6.  72
    David H. Sanford (1972). Begging the Question. Analysis 32 (6):197-199.
    A primary purpose of argument is to increase the degree of reasonable confidence that one has in the truth of the conclusion. A question begging argument fails this purpose because it violates what W. E. Johnson called an epistemic condition of inference. Although an argument of the sort characterized by Robert Hoffman in his response (Analysis 32.2, Dec 71) to Richard Robinson (Analysis 31.4, March 71) begs the question in all circumstances, we usually understand the charge that an argument is (...)
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  7. David H. Sanford (1978). Causal Necessity and Logical Necessity. Philosophical Studies 33 (2):185 - 194.
    Hume's arguments for the contention that causal necessity precludes logical necessity depend on the questionable principle that a cause must precede its effect. Hobbes' definition of entire cause, although it fails to account for causal priority, is not refuted by Hume. The objections of Myles Brand and Marshall Swain (Philosophical Studies, 1976) to my counterexample against Hume (Philosophical Studies, 1975) are ineffective. Their other objections to my criticisms of their argument against defining causation in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (...)
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  8.  59
    David H. Sanford (1976). The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Conditionship. Journal of Philosophy 73 (8):193-207.
    I criticize and emend J L Mackie's account of causal priority by replacing ‘fixity’ in its central clause by 'x is a causal condition of y, but y is not a causal condition of x'. This replacement works only if 'is a causal condition of' is not a symmetric relation. Even apart from our desire to account for causal priority, it is desirable to have an account of nonsymmetric conditionship. Truth, for example, is a condition of knowledge, but knowledge is (...)
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  9.  17
    David H. Sanford (1976). Competing Semantics of Vagueness: Many Values Versus Super-Truth. Synthese 33 (2-4):195--210.
    A semantics of vagueness should reject the principle that every statement has a truth-value yet retain the classical tautologies. A many-value, non-truth-functional semantics and a semantics of super-valuations each have this result. According to the super-valuation approach, 'if a man with n hairs on his head is bald, then a man with n plus one hairs on his head is also bald' is false because it comes out false no matter how the vague predicate 'is bald' is appropriately made precise. (...)
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  10.  8
    David H. Sanford (1988). Begging the Question as Involving Actual Belief and Inconceivable Without It. Metaphilosophy 19 (1):32–37.
    This article answers John Biro's "Knowability, Believability, and Begging the Question: a Reply to Sanford" in "Metaphilosophy" 15 (1984). Biro and I agree that of two argument instances with the same form and content, one but not the other can beg the question, depending on other factors. These factors include actual beliefs, or so I maintain (against Biro) with the help of some analysed examples. Brief selections from Archbishop Whatley and J S Mill suggest that they also regard reference to (...)
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  11.  11
    David H. Sanford (1975). Borderline Logic. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):29-39.
    To accommodate vague statements and predicates, I propose an infinite-valued, non-truth-functional interpretation of logic on which the tautologies are exactly the tautologies of classical two-valued logic. iI introduce a determinacy operator, analogous to the necessity operator in alethic modal logic, to allow the definition of first-order and higher-order borderline cases. On the interpretation proposed for determinacy, every statement corresponding to a theorem of modal system T is a logical truth, and I conjecture that every logical truth on the interpretation corresponds (...)
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  12.  66
    David H. Sanford (1968). Contraries and Subcontraries. Noûs 2 (1):95-96.
    If two statements are contraries if and only if they cannot both be true, but can both be false, then some corresponding A and E categorical statements are not contraries, even on the presupposition that something exists which satisfies the subject term. For some such statements are necessarily true and thus cannot be false. There is a similar problem with subcontraries.
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  13.  87
    David H. Sanford (1976). The Primary Objects of Perception. Mind 85 (April):189-208.
    The primary objects of hearing are sounds: everything we hear we hear by hearing a sound. (This claim differs from Berkeley’s that we hear only sounds and from Aristotle’s that we only hear sounds.) Colored regions are primary objects of sight, and pressure resistant regions are primary objects of perception by touch. By definition, the primary objects of perception are physical. The properties of the primary objects of perception are exactly the properties sense-datum theories attribute to sense-data. Indirect Realism holds (...)
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  14.  22
    David H. Sanford (1975). Infinity and Vagueness. Philosophical Review 84 (4):520-535.
    Many philosophic arguments concerned with infinite series depend on the mutual inconsistency of statements of the following five forms: (1) something exists which has R to something; (2) R is asymmetric; (3) R is transitive; (4) for any x which has R to something, there is something which has R to x; (5) only finitely many things are related by R. Such arguments are suspect if the two-place relation R in question involves any conceptual vagueness or inexactness. Traditional sorites arguments (...)
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  15.  73
    David H. Sanford (2005). Distinctness and Non-Identity. Analysis 65 (288):269–274.
    The following statement (A) is usually abbreviated with symbols: (A) There are items X and Y, each is F, X is not identical to Y, and everything F is identical to X or is identical to Y. (A) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of exactly two distinct things that are F. Some things are neither identical nor distinct. The difference between distinctness and nonidentity makes a difference in asking questions about counting, constitution, and persistence.
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  16.  46
    David H. Sanford (1974). Classical Logic and Inexact Predicates. Mind 83 (329):112-113.
  17.  39
    David H. Sanford (1970). Locke, Leibniz, and Wiggins on Being in the Same Place at the Same Time. Philosophical Review 79 (1):75-82.
    Locke thought it was a necessary truth that no two material bodies could be in the same place at the same time. Leibniz wasn't so sure. This paper sides with Leibniz. I examine the arguments of David Wiggins in defense of Locke on this point (Philosophical Review, January 1968). Wiggins’ arguments are ineffective.
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  18.  6
    David H. Sanford (1992). The Anastylosis of Reason: Fitting Together Stich's Fragments. Inquiry 35 (1):113 – 137.
    Anastylosis is the reconstruction of a monument using the original fragments and filling in the missing parts with an easily distinguishable modern material. This long review of "The Fragmentation of Reason; Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation" (MIT, 1990) by Stephen P Stich reconstructs, while preserving their original shapes, the conceptions of reason, truth, and rationality that Stich attempts to shatter. The review agrees with Stich's Chapter 3 which is itself highly critical of some philosophical views about evolution (...)
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  19.  7
    David H. Sanford (1985). Causal Dependence and Multiplicity. Philosophy 60 (232):215-230.
    In "Causes and "If P, Even If X, still Q," Philosophy 57 (July 1982), Ted Honderich cites my "The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Conditionship," journal of Philosophy 73 (April 22, 1976) as an example of an account of causal priority that lacks the proper character. After emending Honderich's description of the proper character, I argue that my attempt to account for one-way causation in terms of one-way causal conditionship does not totally lack it. Rather than emphasize the (...)
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  20.  22
    David H. Sanford (1979). Nostalgia for the Ordinary: Comments on Papers by Unger and Wheeler. Synthese 41 (2):175 - 184.
    Unger claims that we can block sorites arguments for the conclusion that there are no ordinary things only by invoking some kind of miracle, but no such miracle is needed if we reject the principle that every statement has a truth value. Wheeler's argument for the nonexistence of ordinary things depends on the assumptions that if ordinary things exist, they comprise real kinds, and that if ordinary predicates really apply to things, the predicates refer to real properties. If we accept (...)
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  21.  32
    David H. Sanford (1981). Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives: Comments on Dretske. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):379 - 388.
    Fred Dretske holds that if one knows something, one need not eliminate every alternative to it but only the relevant alternatives. Besides defending this view in "The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge" ("Phil. Stud.", 40, 363-378, n 81), he makes some tentative suggestions about determining when an alternative is relevant. I discuss these suggestions and conclude that there are problems yet to be solved. I do not conclude that there are insoluble problems or that Dretske's approach is on the wrong track. (...)
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  22.  40
    David H. Sanford (1981). Illusions and Sense-Data. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):371-385.
    Examples of sensory illusion show the failure of the attempt of traditional sense-datum theory to account for something's phenomenally appearing to be F by postulating the existence of a sense-datum that is actually F. the Muller-Lyer Illusion cannot be explained by postulating two sensibly presented lines that actually have the lengths the physical lines appear to have. Illusions due to color contrast cannot be explained by postulating sense-data that actually have the colors the physical samples appear to have.
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  23.  21
    David H. Sanford (1984). The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Time. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):53-75.
    I revise J L Mackie's first account of casual direction by replacing his notion of "fixity" by a newly defined notion of "sufficing" that is designed to accommodate indeterminism. Keeping Mackie's distinction between casual order and casual direction, I then consider another revision that replaces "fixity" with "one-way conditionship". In response to the charge that all such accounts of casual priority beg the question by making an unjustified appeal to temporal priority, i maintain that one-way conditionship explains rather that assumes (...)
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  24.  29
    David H. Sanford (1969). Time May Have a Stop. Analysis 29 (6):206.
    In "Time to Stop" (Analysis, 29,2, December 1968) Vernon Pratt argues that on a relativistic view of time the universe could not become static. He does not distinguish "it might be true at some time later than t that such-and-such is not the case" from "it might not be true that such-and-such is the case at some time later than t," and this distinction undermines his argument.
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  25.  31
    David H. Sanford (2003). Reply to Mr. Aranyosi. Analysis 63 (280):305–309.
    Although Aranyosi's claim that McTaggart's "set of parts" is a set rather than a fusion is correct, his attempt to restate McTaggart's conception needs revision. Aranyosi argues that "the fusion of cats is identical with the fusion of all cat-parts, 'regardless of whether all cat-parts are parts of cats or not.'" Fusions have unique decompositions into what David Lewis calls "nice parts." Cats are nice parts of cat fusions, as are maximal spatio-temporally connected parts. Part of Aranyosi's argument fails when (...)
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  26.  7
    David H. Sanford (1977). The Fallacy of Begging the Question: A Reply to Barker. Dialogue 16 (03):485-498.
    According to John A Barker, whether an argument begs the question is purely a matter of logical form (Dialogue, 1976). According to me, it is also a matter of epistemic conditions; some arguments which beg the question in some contexts need not beg the question in every context (Analysis, 1972). I point out difficulties in Barker's treatment and defend my own views against some of his criticisms. In the concluding section, "Alleged difficulties with disjunctive syllogism," I defend the validity of (...)
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  27.  25
    David H. Sanford (1993). Disjunctive Predicates. American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):167-1722.
    Philosophers have had difficulty in explaining the difference between disjunctive and non-disjunctive predicates. Purely syntactical criteria are ineffective, and mention of resemblance begs the question. I draw the distinction by reference to relations between borderline cases. The crucial point about the disjoint predicate 'red or green', for example, is that no borderline case of 'red' is a borderline case of 'green'. Other varieties of disjunctive predicates are: inclusively disjunctive (such as 'red or hard'), disconnected (such as 'grue' on the usual (...)
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  28.  1
    David H. Sanford (1994). Causation and Intelligibility: David H. Sanford. Philosophy 69 (267):55-67.
    I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori, but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other.
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  29.  11
    David H. Sanford (1983). Impartial Perception. Philosophy 58 (225):392 - 395.
    Wittgenstein remarks in the "Tractatus" that the eye is not in the visual field. I question the claim of Michael Dummett and P T Geach that reflection on this remark helps one conceive of an observer perceiving objects in space without having any location in that space. The literal meaning of "point of view" is illustrated by the visual field. Reflection on the fact that the point of view is not itself normally an object of sight is no help in (...)
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  30.  1
    David H. Sanford (1993). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 102 (406):357-360.
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  31.  7
    David H. Sanford (1981). Independent Predicates. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (2):171 - 174.
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  32.  11
    David H. Sanford (1990). The Inductive Support of Inductive Rules: Themes From Max Black. Dialectica 44 (1‐2):23-41.
    Overall, Max Black's defense of the inductive support of inductive rules succeeds. Circularity is best explained in terms of epistemic conditions of inference. When an inference is circular, another inference token of the same type may, because of a difference of surrounding circumstances, not be circular. Black's inductive arguments in support of inductive rules fit this pattern: a token circular in some circumstances may be noncircular in other circumstances.
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  33.  2
    David H. Sanford (1988). Epistemology Meets Cognitive Psychology. Inquiry 31 (4):519 – 533.
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  34.  19
    David H. Sanford (1968). McTaggart on Time. Philosophy 43 (166):371 - 378.
    McTaggart argues that the A series, which orders events with reference to past, present, and future, involves an inescapable contradiction. The significant difference between the earlier version of his argument (Mind, 1908) and the version in The Nature of Existence, Volume II, Chapter 33 (1927), has often gone unnoticed. His arguments are all invalid; the conclusion can be rejected without rejecting any premiss. It is therefore unnecessary to adopt any philosophical thesis about time (e.g., that some token-reflexive analysis of tensed (...)
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  35.  5
    David H. Sanford (1980). Armstrong's Theory of Universals. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (1):69-79.
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  36.  17
    David H. Sanford (1994). Causation and Intelligibility. Philosophy 69 (267):55 - 67.
    Hume, in "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", holds (1) that all causal reasoning is based on experience and (2) that causal reasoning is based on nothing but experience. (1) does not imply (2), and Hume's good reasons for (1) are not good reasons for (2). This essay accepts (1) and argues against (2). A priori reasoning plays a role in causal inference. Familiar examples from Hume and from classroom examples of sudden disappearances and radical changes do not show otherwise. A (...)
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  37.  4
    David H. Sanford (2001). Causal Asymmetries. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):243-246.
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  38.  21
    David H. Sanford (1991). Coulds, Mights, Ifs and Cans, Revisited. Noûs 25 (2):208-211.
  39.  22
    David H. Sanford (1986). The Possibility of Transparent White. Analysis 46 (4):212-215.
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  40.  0
    David H. Sanford (1986). "From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief" by Stephen P. Stich. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):149.
  41. David H. Sanford (1983). The Perception of Shape. In Carl Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge And Mind: Phil Essays. Oxford University Press
    The central text of this article is Thomas Reid’s response to Berkeley’s argument for distinguishing tangible from visual shape. Reid is right to hold that shape words do not have different visual and tangible meanings. We might also perceive shape, moreover, with senses other than touch and sight. As Reid also suggests, the visual perception of shape does not require perception of hue or brightness. Contrary to treatments of the Molyneux problem by H. P. Grice and Judith Jarvis Thomson, I (...)
     
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  42.  17
    David H. Sanford (2002). Vague Numbers. Acta Analytica 17 (1):63-73.
    If there are vague numbers, it would be easier to use numbers as semantic values in a treatment of vagueness while avoiding precise cut-off points. When we assign a particular statement a range of values (less than 1 and greater than 0) there is no precise sharp cut-off point that locates the greatest lower bound or the least upper bound of the interval, I should like to say. Is this possible? “Vague Numbers” stands for awareness of the problem. I do (...)
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  43.  12
    David H. Sanford (1986). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting By Daniel C. Dennett Clarendon Press, 1985, X + 200 Pp., £17.50, £7.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Philosophy 61 (238):547-.
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  44.  3
    David H. Sanford (1991). Symposium Contribution on Events and Their Names by Jonathan Bennett. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):633 - 636.
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  45.  10
    David H. Sanford (1984). The Asymmetry of the by-Relation. Mind 93 (371):410-411.
    Sam signaled a turn by extending his arm out the window. Difficulties in explaining the asymmetry of the by-relation in such examples by reference to acceptable and unacceptable counterfactual conditionals are explored by Hugh McCann in "The Trouble with Level-Generation" ("Mind", October 1982). I refine and defend the following alternative account of one-way dependence of y on x: not only is x necessary for y, but something else, independent from x, is also necessary for y; but there is nothing independent (...)
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  46.  15
    David H. Sanford (1976). What Could Have Happened. Noûs 10 (September):313-326.
    Morton White proposes two patterns of expansion for sentences of the form "Possible (x is Q)" in "On What Could Have Happened" (Philosophical Review, 1968). His attempts in "Ands and Cans" (Mind, 1974) and in "Positive Freedom, Negative Freedom, and Possibility" (Journal of Philosophy, 1973) to simplify these two patterns and his argument for abandoning the first pattern are mistaken. Although I question a number of White's claims, my purpose is to improve his treatment of possibility rather than to refute (...)
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  47.  13
    David H. Sanford (1966). Red, Green and Absolute Determinacy: A Reply to C. Radford's Incompatibilities of Colours. Philosophical Quarterly 16 (October):356-358.
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  48.  6
    David H. Sanford (1995). Causes and Coincidences. Teaching Philosophy 18 (1):86-88.
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  49.  2
    David H. Sanford (1996). Review: Demolishing the Standard View. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):181 - 186.
  50.  2
    David H. Sanford (1978). Book Review:Perception, Common Sense, and Science James W. Cornman. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 45 (1):163-.
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